PEOPLE OF MI V TEJUAN LAWRENCE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 6, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 255574
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 03-014112
TEJUAN LAWRENCE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Schuette and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his sentences for carjacking, MCL 750.529a, third-degree
fleeing and eluding, MCL 257.602a(3), possession of a firearm by a felon, MCL 750.224f,
carrying a concealed weapon (CCW), MCL 750.227, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced as a fourth-habitual
offender, MCL 769.12, to 30 to 45 years in prison for carjacking, and to concurrent terms of
three years, four months to five years in prison for fleeing and eluding, felon in possession, and
CCW. He received a consecutive five-year sentence for felony-firearm. We affirm defendant’s
sentences.
I. FACTS
Prior to trial, the prosecutor provided defendant with a notice of intent to charge him as a
fourth-felony offender. The information listed two 1989 convictions and a 1990 conviction.
These offenses were also listed in presentence information report (PSIR). During sentencing,
defense counsel stated that defendant challenged the inclusion of the 1989 offenses in the PSIR
on the ground that he had not committed the listed offenses and that someone else, probably his
brother, had committed the crimes and then used his name. The trial court stated that it would
continue to use the offenses in scoring because the probation department had provided that
information and defendant had not provided any other information to the contrary. Defendant
now challenges his scoring as a habitual offender and raises a related claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
II. PRE SENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
A. Standard of Review
-1-
A defendant is entitled to the use of accurate information during his sentencing, and a
trial court must respond to a defendant’s allegations that a presentence investigation report
contains inaccuracies. People v McAllister, 241 Mich App 466, 473; 616 N.W.2d 203 (2000),
remanded in part on other grounds 465 Mich 884 (2001). We review the sentencing court’s
response to a defendant’s claim of inaccuracies in his PSIR for an abuse of discretion, People v
Spanke, 254 Mich App 642, 648; 658 NW2d 504 (2003), and review the trial court’s factual
findings at sentencing for clear error. MCR 2.613(C); People v Houston, 261 Mich App 463,
471; 683 NW2d 192 (2004). Any necessary statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo.
Houston, supra at 471.
B. Analysis
The existence of a defendant’s prior convictions for purposes of sentencing under the
habitual offender statutes1 must be determined by the trial court at sentencing or a scheduled
hearing. MCL 769.13(5). Any relevant evidence, including information contained in the PSIR,
may establish the existence of a prior conviction. MCL 769.13(5)(c). A PSIR is presumed to be
accurate, and a trial court is entitled to rely upon factual information therein unless the defendant
effectively challenges it. People v Grant, 455 Mich 221, 233-234; 565 NW2d 389 (1997). It is
defendant’s initial burden to show that the prior conviction information is inaccurate:
The defendant shall bear the burden of establishing a prima facie showing that an
alleged prior conviction is inaccurate or constitutionally invalid. If the defendant
establishes a prima facie showing that information or evidence is inaccurate, the
prosecuting attorney shall bear the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the information or evidence is accurate. [MCL 769.13(6).]
Here, defendant challenges the trial court’s decision not to delay sentencing and schedule
a separate hearing to decide the validity of the prior convictions. However, according to the
plain language of the statute, a defendant can present evidence or challenge prior convictions
either “at sentencing or at a separate hearing scheduled for that purpose before sentencing.”
MCL 769.13(5) (emphasis added). Defendant did not raise his challenge before sentencing;
therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by deciding the challenges at
sentencing.
We find that defendant failed to meet his burden under MCL 769.13(6). He has
presented nothing to support his allegations that the 1989 convictions were actually those of his
brother or another individual. He has not explained why he could not have committed the
previous offenses, and has provided no explanation as to why he could not obtain such
information. This Court has previously held that, depending on the nature of the disputed matter,
a flat denial may be sufficient to mount an effective challenge to items in the PSIR. See People v
Callon, 256 Mich App 312, 334; 662 NW2d 501 (2003), citing People v Walker, 428 Mich 261,
267-268; 407 NW2d 367 (1987). However, given the statutory obligation of MCL 769.13(6)
that a defendant make a “prima facie showing” of the inaccuracy of prior conviction information,
1
MCL 769.10, MCL 769.11, and MCL 769.12.
-2-
we find that some “affirmative factual showing” is required to meet this burden. Walker, supra.2
Defendant has failed to establish a prima facia showing of the inaccuracy of the PSIR, and we
find that the trial court did not clearly err in relying on the information in the PSIR to sentence
him as a habitual offender. Grant, supra at 233-234.
III. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A. Standard of Review
The determination whether a defendant has been deprived of the effective assistance of
counsel presents a mixed question of fact and constitutional law. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich
575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). The trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error,
while its constitutional determinations are reviewed de novo. Id. Because there was no Ginther3
hearing held in the trial court, this Court’s review is limited to mistakes that are apparent from
the lower court record. People v Riley (After Remand), 468 Mich 135, 139; 659 NW2d 611
(2003).
B. Analysis
In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate
that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable, and that the outcome would probably
have been different but for the attorney’s error. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600; 623
NW2d 884 (2001); People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 338; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). Defendant has
presented no evidence that he did not commit the crimes listed in the habitual offender notice and
the PSIR. Thus, there is no basis for his claim that counsel either committed an objectively
unreasonable error by failing to challenge the sentence enhancement, or that the alleged error
deprived him of a shorter sentence. Carbin, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
2
MCL 769.13(6) was substantially rewritten in 1994.
3
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.