PEOPLE OF MI V JOHN ANTONIO POOLE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 5, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 244023
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-000893-02
JOHN ANTONIO POOLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions for first-degree murder, MCL
750.316, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison for the first
degree murder conviction, 24 to 90 months in prison for the felon in possession of a firearm
conviction, and two years in prison for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
I. FACTS
Defendant’s convictions arise out of the shooting death of Henry Covington on December
12, 2001, around 6:45 a.m., outside a home where Covington resided with his fiancé, Delora
Lester. A few months before the shooting, Lester had purchased a house from Harold Varner,
defendant’s uncle and a codefendant in this case.1 Lester indicated that she did not have enough
money to close on the home and had to borrow money from Varner. Lester testified that she had
problems with Varner when she attempted to take possession of the home she purchased, and
ultimately she and Covington had to leave the home after someone threw a firebomb through the
kitchen window.
On December 12, 2001, Varner called Amanda Coddington, who managed properties for
Varner and had a child with him, at 5:00 a.m. to ask her to meet him at a gas station.2
1
Varner’s appeal is pending in Docket No. 244024.
2
Testimony from Coddington about defendant and Varner was presented at trial by way of
cross-examining Coddington using her testimony given at the preliminary examination. At trial,
Coddington recanted much of her preliminary examination testimony that implicated defendant
(continued…)
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Coddington met Varner and then went to pick up defendant. Defendant got into a white Explorer
with Varner first and then he got into the car with Coddington. Varner told Coddington to follow
him and Coddington drove to an area near where Lester and Covington were living. Defendant
exited the car and went to an alley heading toward Lester’s house. Coddington indicated that
defendant was gone approximately 15 minutes.
Lester was inside the home when she heard four shots fired. After hearing the shots, she
ran to the door. Lester could hear Covington yelling and when she opened the door, Covington
fell into the hallway. Coddington, who was still at her car, also heard four shots and after the
shots, defendant returned to the car holding a .357 gun. Defendant put the gun in a shopping bag
on the floor. Coddington asked defendant what happened. Defendant initially said, “don’t worry
about it, just go.” Defendant later informed Coddington that he shot someone, but did not
specify whom he shot. Defendant left the gun in Coddington’s car and she later threw the gun
into a dumpster.
Coddington indicated that Varner told her later that day that Covington had been shot. A
day or two after the shooting, Varner said to Coddington that he paid defendant $300 to kill
someone and that he was annoyed that defendant kept calling him about more money. Varner
said he did not know why defendant kept phoning him, and that he was going to pay defendant
more when everything died down. Coddington testified that Varner told her that having
Covington shot made it easier to deal with Lester and the problems she had with the home she
had purchased from him.
On December 18, 2001, Varner was arrested based on information the police obtained
from Coddington. Varner asked to speak to Sergeant Kenneth Gardner, one of the investigating
officers. Gardner interviewed Varner on December 20, 2001. Gardner testified that Varner
offered to give information about a separate murder, in exchange for receiving a deal in this case.
Gardner testified that Varner told him that a few days after the shooting, defendant told Varner
that he shot Covington.
Vaudi Higginbotham, a cell mate of Varner’s, testified that Varner told him that he was
going to have a female named Amanda stage a fake compliant against the police and that he gave
his nephew $300 and a gun to kill a guy. Higginbotham testified that Varner told him that he
had Coddington take defendant to kill the guy and that “he couldn’t sleep at night until he killed
this guy . . . or had this guy killed.”
Originally both Varner and defendant were charged with first-degree murder. Later, the
charge against Varner was amended to second-degree murder. Varner and defendant were tried
jointly and neither testified. Defendant and Varner were found guilty as charged.
II. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
(…continued)
in the shooting. Coddington testified at trial, that she did not go any where with defendant on
December 12, 2001 and that she was threatened by the police to give a statement implicating
defendant and Varner.
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Defendant first argues that his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against
him was violated by the admission of out-of-court statements of Varner, by way of the testimony
of Higginbotham and Gardner. We conclude that defendant has not shown error requiring a new
trial.
A. Standard of Review
Admissibility issues involving questions of law are reviewed de novo. People v Lukity,
460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). This Court also reviews claims of constitutional
error de novo. People v McPherson, 263 Mich App 124, 133; 687 NW2d 370 (2004). However,
defendant failed to preserve this issue at the trial court and we therefore review for plain error
affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
B. Analysis
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with
the witnesses against him . . . .” US Const, Am VI. In Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 42,
58; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004), the Court held that the Confrontation Clause
prohibits the admission of testimonial hearsay against a criminal defendant unless the declarant
is unavailable and there was a prior opportunity for cross-examination of the declarant. See
also People v Shepherd, 472 Mich 343, 347; 697 NW2d 144 (2005). The Court determined that
when nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, “an approach that exempted such statements from
Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether” was permissible. Crawford, supra at 68. However,
when testimonial evidence is at issue, “the Sixth Amendment demands . . . unavailability and a
prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Id. The Court left “for another day any effort to spell
out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’ Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a
minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial;
and to police interrogations.” Id.
The out-of-court statements by Varner to Higginbotham were not testimonial and
therefore, do not implicate the Confrontation Clause. In People v Shepherd, 263 Mich App 665,
673; 689 NW2d 721 (2004), rev’d on other grounds 472 Mich 343; 697 NW2d 144 (2005), this
Court considered whether the admission of statements a defendant made to relatives that were
overheard by jail guards implicated Crawford. The Court stated that because the defendant “was
speaking to relatives, not to the guards, and made spontaneous, unprompted comments,” the
statements were not testimonial in nature. Id. at 675. The Court further noted that “[e]ven under
the broadest definition of testimonial, it is unlikely that [the defendant] would have reasonably
believed that the statements would be available for use at a later trial.” Id. at 675-676.
Varner’s statements to Higginbotham also do not fit under the definition of testimonial
evidence. The statements were made to a cell mate and not a government employee. The
statements also were not “statement[s] in the nature of ‘ex parte in-court testimony or its
functional equivalent.’” People v Geno, 261 Mich App 624, 631; 683 NW2d 687 (2004)(citation
omitted). It is also unlikely that Varner believed that his statements would later be used at a trial.
Therefore, Varner’s statements to Higginbotham were not testimonial and, even though
defendant did not have the opportunity to cross-examine Varner at trial, the statements were
admissible.
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However, Varner’s out-of-court statements to Sergeant Gardner were testimonial in
nature. Crawford noted that “‘statements that were made under circumstances which would lead
an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later
trial’” were testimonial in nature. Crawford, supra at 52. The Court also determined that
“[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are . . . testimonial under
even a narrow standard.” Id. The Court noted that it was using the term “‘interrogation’ in its
colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense” and noted that one could imagine various
definitions for the term interrogation. Id. at 53 n 4.
Varner was under arrest and incarcerated when he gave his statement to police. Although
Varner requested to speak with Gardner, Gardner approached the situation as an interview,
reading Varner his constitutional rights and obtaining a waiver of those rights from Varner.
Varner then proceeded to give Gardner information about another case in hope of getting some
type of deal in the current case. Varner also gave Gardner information about the current case.
Varner informed Gardner that he would not write down the information he gave the police about
either case until he was assured of getting a deal in the current case. After the interview, Gardner
immediately typed out his recollection of the interview.
Based on the above facts, we conclude that Varner’s statements to Gardner were
testimonial in nature. The fact that Varner was read his rights and that Gardner immediately
typed his recollection of the conversation suggest that one would believe that the statements
“would be available for use at a later trial.” Crawford, supra at 52. Additionally, Varner was
under arrest and incarcerated at the time of the statements. Although he may not have been
subject to a technical interrogation by the police, the circumstances surrounding Varner’s
statements suggest that they were testimonial in nature. Therefore, the trial court erred in
admitting these statements.
However, “when the trial court commits an error that denies a defendant his
constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause . . . we need not reverse if the error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” McPherson, supra at 131-132. In this case, there was
other evidence besides Gardner’s testimony concerning Varner’s statements to support
defendant’s conviction. As discussed previously, Higginbotham’s testimony about Varner’s
statements was not testimonial in nature and was properly admitted. These statements
specifically implicated defendant in the crime. Additionally, Coddington was impeached by her
preliminary examination testimony, which also implicated defendant in the murder. As such, the
error in admitting Gardner’s testimony about Varner’s statement was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant next argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his
trial counsel failed to object to the admission of the hearsay statements of Varner, by way of the
testimony of Higginbotham and Sergeant Gardner. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel must be raised in a motion for a new trial or
an evidentiary hearing under People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 456; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). Defendant failed to move in
the trial court for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing with regard to the ineffective assistance
claim. Therefore, our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Rodriguez,
251 Mich App 10, 38; 650 NW2d 96 (2002). The questions presented by a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel are mixed questions of law and fact; findings of fact by the lower court are
reviewed for clear error, and questions of law are reviewed de novo. People v LeBlanc, 465
Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002).
B. Analysis
A constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed under the standard
established in Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984),
which requires the defendant to show that, under an objective standard of reasonableness,
counsel made an error so serious that counsel was not functioning as an attorney guaranteed
under the Sixth Amendment. People v Harris, 201 Mich App 147, 154; 505 NW2d 889 (1993).
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed and defendant bears a heavy burden of proving
otherwise. People v Rocky, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). To succeed on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that, but for an error by
counsel, the result of the proceedings would have been different and that the proceedings were
fundamentally unfair or unreliable. People v Garza, 246 Mich App 251, 255; 631 NW2d 764
(2001).
Here, trial counsel could not have validly objected to the admission of the out-of-court
statements of Varner on the basis of Crawford and the Sixth Amendment right to confront
witnesses. The trial occurred in 2002, and Crawford was not decided until 2004. Crawford,
supra. In addition, no valid Crawford objection could have been made to Higginbotham’s
testimony because, as shown above, Crawford only precludes testimonial hearsay, and Varner’s
out-of-court statements to Higginbotham were nontestimonial.
Additionally, we have
determined that the admission of Gardner’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, defendant cannot show that the result of the proceedings would have been different if
objections had been made. Garza, supra at 255.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Bill Schuette
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