IN RE JAYDEN SEARLES MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of JAYDEN SEARLES, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, f/k/a
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 1, 2005
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 263333
Kalkaska Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 04-003682-NA
CRYSTAL HOPPE,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Schuette and Borrello, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (j), and (l). We affirm.
I. FACTS
The child in this case was born while proceedings were pending to terminate
respondent’s parental rights to another child, Kaitlin Searles. Based on the circumstance of the
case involving Kaitlin, Jayden was removed from respondent’s care on September 8th, 2004,
when he was one and a half months old, and placed in foster care. On October 14th, 2004, the
trial court terminated the rights of respondent to Kaitlin.
The hearing to terminate parental rights to Jayden was held on April 7th, 2005. Paula
Lipinski, a child protective services worker, testified that Jayden was removed after determining
that the conditions that caused the removal of Kaitlin continued to exist. Lipinski further
testified that although respondent had participated in services to alleviate the risk caused by
domestic violence, respondent had not benefited from those services. Respondent had also
participated in a psychological evaluation wherein it was determined that the likelihood of
successfully reuniting respondent with Kaitlin was poor. Throughout the case involving Kaitlin,
respondent had failed to maintain stable or appropriate housing for the children.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing evidence.
In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 632-633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). If a statutory ground for
termination is established, the trial court must terminate parental rights unless there exists clear
evidence, on the whole record, that termination is not in the child’s best interests. MCL
712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 353; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). On appeal from
termination of parental rights proceedings, this Court reviews the trial court’s findings under the
clearly erroneous standard. MCR 3.977(J); Sours, supra at 633. A finding is clearly erroneous
if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003); In re
Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 455 NW2d 161 (1989). To be clearly erroneous, a decision must be
more than maybe or probably wrong. Sours, supra at 633. Further, regard is to be given to the
special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared
before it. MCR 2.613 (C); Miller, supra at 337.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Termination of Parental Rights
Contrary to respondent’s contentions, ample evidence existed to support the trial court’s
decision. At the time Jayden was born, proceedings were ongoing regarding respondent’s
neglect of another child, Kaitlin. It is undisputed that respondent’s parental rights to Kaitlin
were terminated in October 2004. Although respondent had participated in some services in her
efforts to regain custody of Kaitlin, she failed to demonstrate that she was capable of properly
caring for a child. At the time respondent’s parental rights to Jayden were terminated,
respondent had made no real progress toward maintaining a stable home or in acquiring the
necessary emotional stability to parent a child. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that
§§ 19b(3)(g) and (j) were each established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In
re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Furthermore, the trial court also
terminated respondent’s parental rights under § 19b(3)(l), and respondent does not challenge the
trial court’s decision in this regard.1
B. Best Interests of Child
Finally, the evidence did not clearly show that termination of respondent’s parental rights
was against the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); Trejo, supra at 356-357. Therefore,
the trial court did not err in terminating respondent’s parental rights to the child.
1
Termination was proper under § 19b(3)(1), because it is undisputed that respondent’s parental
rights to Kaitlin were previously terminated as a result of proceedings under MCL 712A.2(b).
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Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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