IN RE CHAPMAN MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of NIKKIANN MARIE CHAPMAN,
ASHLEY MARIA CHAPMAN, CARIETHA
AUTUMN CHAPMAN, KLYN DANIEL
CHAPMAN, JR., and RYAN LEE CHAPMAN,
Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, f/k/a
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 1, 2005
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 262623
Mecosta Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 03-004549-NA
KLYN DANIEL CHAPMAN,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Schuette and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating his parental rights to
the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g). We affirm.
I. FACTS
On the morning of September 24th, 2003, police were dispatched to the home of
respondent and his partner, Lisa Flewelling, where they found thirteen-year-old Nikkiann alone
in filthy, cluttered conditions. Flewelling had taken the four other children on a trip a few days
prior and left Nikkiann home alone with only the loose supervision of a neighbor. There was
inadequate food in the refrigerator and cupboards, rotten food in the kitchen, trash covering the
floors, no sheets on the beds, a broken front window and broken chairs. The trial court issued a
pickup order for the children and they were placed with a paternal aunt on September 24th, 2003.
The family had a history of chronic neglect, and respondent was an admitted alcoholic,
who had been incarcerated periodically during most of his adult life. Respondent had drunk
driving convictions, as well as convictions for driving on a suspended and/or revoked license,
and was on parole for those offenses at the time this proceeding commenced. Flewelling, was
referred to protective services eleven times, and substantiated one for neglect of the children in
February 2002.
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On September 24th 2003, when the children were taken into temporary custody,
respondent had absconded from parole and his whereabouts were unknown. He was aware of the
September 25, 2003 preliminary hearing because a protective services worker spoke to him on
the telephone the day before, but respondent did not attend the hearing. Flewelling pleaded no
contest to the trial courts temporary jurisdiction on October 21st, 2003, but requested a trial at the
continued hearing on November 13, 2003. Respondent did not attend either the October 21st
hearing or the November 13th hearing. The children were removed from the paternal aunt’s
custody on November 13th, 2003 because respondent and Flewelling showed up in the early
hours of the morning demanding the children, and a police report was filed. The children were
then placed with a maternal aunt. On November 15th, 2003 respondent was arrested for
Operating While Impaired and second Driving With License Suspended offense, as well as a
Parole Absconder offence and Driving Without Insurance. His presentencing report indicated
that he had two prior felonies and eleven misdemeanors. He was convicted and imprisoned with
an earliest release date of January 1st, 2004.
Petitioner filed for termination of respondent’s and Flewelling’s parental rights on
September 10th, 2004, and the termination hearing was scheduled for November 4th, 2004.
However, the termination hearing was postponed in anticipation of respondent’s release.
Respondent was released from prison but absconded from parole on January 27th, 2005. He was
apprehended while driving under the influence of alcohol and jailed again on February 12th,
2005. Flewelling voluntarily released her parental rights to the children on February 24, 2005.
The termination hearing with regard to respondent took place on April 7th, 2005.
Respondent was present. Caseworker Robert Rae testified that the children were removed in
September 2003, and that respondent made no attempt to contact Rae, plan for the children, or
arrange to see the children before his incarceration in November 2003. Based on statements
made by the children, Rae testified that respondent had spent only brief periods of time with his
children during their lives, was incarcerated very often, and did not provide consistent or
substantial support. Respondent’s parole officer, who had access to respondent’s entire criminal
history, testified that since 1988 respondent had never gone twenty-four months without a
conviction.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination set forth in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing
evidence. In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 632-633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). If a statutory ground for
termination is established, the trial court must terminate parental rights unless there exists clear
evidence, on the whole record, that termination is not in the child’s best interests. MCL
712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 353; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). On appeal from
termination of parental rights proceedings, this Court reviews the trial court’s findings under the
clearly erroneous standard. MCR 3.977(J); Sours, supra at 633. A finding is clearly erroneous
if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003); In re
Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 455 NW2d 161 (1989). To be clearly erroneous, a decision must be
more than maybe or probably wrong. Sours, supra at 633. Further, regard is to be given to the
special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared
before it. MCR 2.613 (C); Miller, supra at 337.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Termination of Parental Rights
The trial court did not clearly err in determining that the statutory grounds for termination
of parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re
Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Only one statutory ground was necessary for
termination of respondent’s parental rights, and the record showed that the trial court relied on
subsections 19b(3)(c)(i) and (g) for termination, and referenced but did not rely upon subsections
19b(3)(h) and (j). In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). The evidence
showed that respondent had been an alcoholic for the duration of the children’s lives, and that his
alcoholism had rendered him unable to provide proper care or custody since his first child’s birth
in 1990. He was periodically incarcerated during the past fifteen years and never free to provide
care or custody for the children for any substantial length of time. He was arrested and facing
impending incarceration again at the time of the termination hearing. Despite attending
substance abuse education classes and AA meetings in prison, respondent had not been able to
conquer his alcohol addiction. Placement with paternal relatives as a plan for custody of the
children during his incarceration was not in the children’s best interests.
B. Best Interests of Child
The evidence did not show that termination of respondent-appellant’s parental rights was
not in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); Trejo, supra at 356-357. There is nothing
in the record to suggest that the trial court erred in terminating the rights of the respondentappellant.
IV. DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENTS
Respondent argues that there is a lack of clear evidence to suggest that he would be
incarcerated for more than two years, thus failing to satisfy the statutory requirements of
712A.19(b)(3)(h). Additionally, respondent argues that his rights should not be terminated based
on a criminal record that does not contain crimes against the children. Finally, respondent argues
that his due process rights were violated because the trial court noted possible grounds for
termination that were not included in the termination petition.
A. 712A.19(b)(3)(h)
Respondent argues on appeal that the trial court erred in relying upon subsection
19b(3)(h) as a ground for termination because there was no evidence that respondent’s
incarceration would deprive the children of a normal home life for at least two years. The trial
court merely referred to subsection 19b(3)(h), and therefore this argument is without merit.
B. 712A.19(b)(3)(g)
Respondent next argues that the trial court erred in relying upon respondent’s habitual
criminality in finding that subsection 19b(3)(g) was established because the crimes for which
respondent was convicted were alcohol-related, and not offenses against the children or offenses
specified by statute as required under subsection 19b(3)(n). The trial court did not rely upon or
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even reference subsection 19b(3)(n). Respondent’s recent offenses were primarily alcoholrelated. The trial court based termination upon respondent’s long-term alcoholism, which led to
frequent incarcerations as well as an inability to care for the children while not incarcerated.
Respondent’s criminality was merely one consequence of his alcoholism and not the only fact
upon which the trial court based termination. The trial court correctly found that respondent had
failed to rectify his alcoholism, had failed to provide proper care or custody for the children, and
that there was no reasonable expectation that he would be able to do so within a reasonable time.
C. Due Process Rights
Finally, respondent argues that his procedural right to due process was violated when the
trial court terminated his parental rights on grounds that were not specified in the petition,
specifically subsections 19b(3)(h) and (j). Procedural due process considerations require that a
respondent must be afforded notice of the nature of the proceedings and an opportunity to be
heard. In re Nunn, 168 Mich App 203, 208-209; 423 NW2d 619 (1988), citing In re Slis, 144
Mich App 678, 683; 375 NW2d 788 (1985). The petition must contain the essential facts
constituting an offense against the child under the Juvenile Code. MCR 3.961(B)(3). As stated
above, the trial court did not rely upon subsection 19b(3)(h) or (j) in terminating respondent’s
parental rights, and therefore there is no basis for this argument. Additionally, the petition did
allege respondent’s frequent incarcerations in past years, and respondent argued against
termination under subsection 19b(3)(h) in his closing argument. Respondent was apprised of the
allegations against him, and his right to due process was not violated.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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