PEOPLE OF MI V KEITH ELROY SMITH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 1, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 257026
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 04-003429-01
KEITH ELROY SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Saad and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals his jury trial convictions for first-degree premeditated murder, MCL
750.316, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b.1 The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent
prison terms of mandatory life for the first-degree premeditated murder conviction and three to
five years for the felon in possession of a firearm conviction, and a consecutive two-year prison
term for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
I.
Defendant contends that the admission of witness Richard Gentry’s preliminary
examination testimony at trial under MRE 804(b)(1) violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation. We disagree.2
1
The prosecutor initially charged defendant with first-degree premeditated murder, felony
murder, MCL 750.316, felon in possession of a firearm, and felony-firearm. The trial court
granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the alternate felony-murder count and the
jury convicted defendant of the remaining charges.
2
We review a trial court’s finding regarding the issue of due diligence for an abuse of discretion,
People v Eccles, 260 Mich App 379, 389; 677 NW2d 76 (2004). We review a trial court’s
decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion and underlying questions of law de novo.
People v Washington, 468 Mich 667, 670-671; 664 NW2d 203 (2003). To the extent that a trial
(continued…)
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The Sixth Amendment bars testimonial statements by a witness who does not appear at
trial unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
the witness. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 54;
124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004). Here, it is undisputed that Gentry’s preliminary
examination testimony was testimonial.3 Thus, his prior testimony could only be properly
admitted against defendant if Gentry was unavailable and defendant had the prior opportunity to
cross-examine him.
A witness is “unavailable” if he is “absent from the hearing and the proponent of a
statement has been unable to procure the declarant’s attendance . . . by process or other
reasonable means, and in a criminal case, due diligence is shown.” MRE 804(a)(5). The due
diligence factor requires that the prosecutor “made a diligent good-faith effort in its attempt to
locate a witness for trial.” People v Bean, 457 Mich 677, 684; 580 NW2d 390 (1998).4 The test
is “one of reasonableness and depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, i.e., whether
diligent good-faith efforts were made to procure the testimony, not whether more stringent
efforts would have produced it.” Id. at 684.
Defendant specifically asserts that the prosecutor failed to meet its due diligence
obligation because its attempts to locate Gentry were “tardy and incomplete.” To support his
argument, defendant relies on People v Dye, 431 Mich 58; 427 NW2d 501 (1988), and People v
James (After Remand), 192 Mich App 568; 481 NW2d 715 (1992), but the cases are clearly
distinguishable.
In Dye, though the prosecutor knew that the witnesses (1) were difficult to locate for the
first trial, (2) left the state after the first trial and, (3) had incentives to go into hiding, the
prosecutor made no effort to locate them, other than single visits to their homes. In light of those
facts, our Supreme Court found a lack of due diligence in securing the witnesses at retrial. Dye,
supra at 67-73, 76-78.
Here, the prosecutor knew of no potential difficulty in producing Gentry at trial or that
Gentry had an incentive to go into hiding. Rather, the record shows that Gentry intended to
appear in court until the day before trial. When, on the second day of trial, the prosecutor and
the police realized that Gentry might not arrive, they immediately conducted exhaustive searches
to locate him. Investigator Dale Collins testified that he visited Gentry’s residence on Garland.
Also, after receiving information that Gentry might reside at the YMCA on Shoemaker and
Harper, Investigator Collins sent Officer Mark Amos and his crew, at approximately 10:00 a.m.
that day, to look for Gentry in the YMCA area, as well as the area of Bewick, Garland, and
Hurlbut Streets. Investigator Collins also spoke with Gentry’s sister, who indicated that she did
not know his whereabouts.
(…continued)
court’s rulings implicate a defendant’s right to confrontation, our review is de novo. People v
Beasley, 239 Mich App 548, 557; 609 NW2d 581 (2000).
3
See Crawford, supra at 52 (ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing is testimonial).
4
The good-faith effort standard is identical to the due diligence standard. See Bean, supra at
682-683 n 11.
-2-
The next day, Investigator Collins testified that Officer Amos and his crew made several
more attempts to locate Gentry in the area of YMCA, Shoemaker, Hurlbut and Bewick, but were
unable to find him. The officers were told that no one had seen Gentry for a few days.
According to Investigator Collins, Sheila Sellers contacted him that morning and told him that
she received a phone call from Gentry who said that he did not know if he was coming to court.
Sellers told Investigator Collins that, at approximately 3:30 a.m. that morning, she went to a drug
house at which Gentry was present, but that Gentry jumped out of a window and fled.
Investigator Collins also testified that he contacted various local agencies, including the Wayne
County Jail and Morgue, and the Detroit Police Headquarters, but none of these facilities had a
record of Gentry. Thus, unlike Dye, officers made substantial efforts to locate Gentry and there
is no indication in the record that the prosecutor and the police failed to trace the leads or that
any other measures could have led to the production of Gentry.
This case is also distinguishable from James, supra, in which this Court found that the
prosecutor’s efforts were tardy because it had no contacts with the witness over three and onehalf years between the time of the preliminary examination and the time of trial. Here, less than
three months elapsed between the preliminary examination and the trial. Accordingly,
defendant’s reliance on Dye and James is misplaced. Also, contrary to defendant’s contention, it
is not necessary that the authorities exhaust all possible avenues to locate a witness. Rather, the
prosecutor must only exercise a reasonable, good faith effort to obtain the presence of a witness.
People v Briseno, 211 Mich App 11, 16; 535 NW2d 559 (1995). Because the record clearly
supports the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor exercised due diligence in attempting to
obtain Gentry, we find no abuse of discretion and hold that Gentry was properly considered
“unavailable” under MRE 804(a)(5).
We also hold that defendant had the prior opportunity to cross-examine Gentry.
Crawford, supra at 54. The preliminary examination testimony of a witness is admissible at trial
if the witness is unavailable and the party against whom the testimony is offered had an
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony through cross-examination. People v
Meredith, 459 Mich 62, 66-67; 586 NW2d 538 (1998), citing MRE 804(b)(1). Whether a
defendant had a similar motive to develop the testimony through cross-examination depends on
the similarity of the issues for which the testimony was presented at each proceeding. People v
Vera, 153 Mich App 411, 415; 395 NW2d 339 (1986).
Here, the prosecutor elicited Gentry’s preliminary examination testimony to establish
defendant’s guilt and the prosecutor introduced the testimony at trial for the same purpose.
Similarly, defendant’s trial counsel cross-examined Gentry at the preliminary examination in an
effort to show inconsistencies between his testimony and other evidence and to prove that
defendant did not commit the crimes for which he was charged. Therefore, we hold that
defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine Gentry at the preliminary examination under a
similar motive. Meredith, supra at 66-67. Because Gentry was unavailable, as required by the
Confrontation Clause, and defendant had the prior opportunity to develop his testimony through
cross-examination, we conclude that Gentry’s preliminary examination testimony was properly
admitted MRE 804(b)(1) and that defendant’s right to confrontation was not violated. Crawford,
supra at 54.
II.
-3-
Defendant also maintains that the trial court erred by refusing to give the cautionary
accomplice instructions, CJI2d 5.5 and CJI2d 5.6, with regard to the testimony of Gentry whom
defendant claims is a disputed accomplice. We disagree.
“The decision whether to give a cautionary accomplice instructions falls within the trial
court’s sound discretion.” People v Young, 472 Mich 130, 135; 693 NW2d 801 (2005). Here,
defendant requested the disputed accomplice instruction, CJI2d 5.5, and thus, properly preserved
the issue regarding CJI2d 5.5. MCL 768.29; MCR 2.516(C); People v Sabin (On Second
Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 657; 620 NW2d 19 (2000). Accordingly, we review the trial
court’s decision to refuse defendant’s request for the disputed accomplice instruction, CJI2d 5.5,
for an abuse of discretion. Young, supra at 135. However, defendant neither requested the
cautionary instruction on accomplice testimony, CJI2d 5.6, nor objected to the court’s failure to
give one. Thus, our review of the unpreserved issue regarding the accomplice testimony
instruction, CJI2d 5.6, is limited for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Id.;
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 761, 764-767; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Generally, if a defendant requests a cautionary instruction regarding an accomplice’s
testimony, a trial court is required to give the instruction. People v Ho, 231 Mich App 178, 188189; 585 NW2d 357 (1998). However, a trial court is not required to give requested instructions
that are not supported by the evidence or the facts of the case. Id. Here, the trial court properly
refused to read the instruction because no evidence showed that Gentry was an accomplice “who
knowingly and willingly helped or cooperated with someone else in committing a crime.”
People v Allen, 201 Mich App 98, 105; 505 NW2d 869 (1993), quoting CJI2d 5.5. Though
Gentry was with the victim in his van at the time of the shooting, nothing in the record indicates
that Gentry knew that defendant planned to shoot the victim. Gentry did not encourage
defendant, but instead fled for his life when he saw defendant fire the first shot into the van.
Gentry heard the second shot as he ran to his house, and he immediately told his neighbor to call
for help. The record simply does not reveal that Gentry participated in the victim’s murder. In
the absence of evidence that Gentry acted as defendant’s accomplice, we hold that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to read the disputed accomplice instruction regarding
Gentry. Ho, supra at 189.
We also hold that there was no plain error in the trial court’s failure to give the
accomplice testimony instruction, CJI2d 5.6.5 Defendant, relies on People v McCoy, 392 Mich
231; 220 NW2d 456 (1974), and argues that the court’s failure to give the accomplice testimony
instruction is error requiring reversal. However, our Supreme Court, in Young, supra, recently
overruled McCoy, supra, explaining:
In People v McCoy, 392 Mich 231; 220 NW2d 456 (1974), this Court
invented a new rule regarding cautionary instructions on accomplice testimony.
That rule provided that the trial court’s failure to give a cautionary instruction
5
The standard jury instruction regarding accomplice testimony, CJI2d 5.6, advises the jury to
exercise caution when considering the testimony of an accomplice, and provides more detail with
respect to the considerations for evaluating accomplice testimony.
-4-
upon a defense request requires reversal of a conviction. Moreover, reversal may
be required even in the absence of a defense request if the issue of guilt is “closely
drawn.” We reject the McCoy rule because it has no basis in Michigan law.
Indeed, it contravenes long-standing authorities according discretion to trial courts
in deciding whether to provide a cautionary instruction on accomplice testimony.
Moreover, the McCoy rule is inconsistent with MCL 768.29, which provides that
the failure to instruct on a point of law is not a ground for setting aside a verdict
unless the instruction is requested by the accused, and MCR 2.516(C), which
states that a party may assign as error the failure to give an instruction only if the
party objects on the record before the jury retires to consider the verdict. [Young,
supra at 132.]
In Young, our Supreme Court held that a cautionary accomplice instruction was not clearly or
obviously required upon its findings that:
[I]t is not clear that Martin and Lawrence were accomplices in any event.
Moreover, the prosecution presented evidence of guilt beyond the testimony of
the alleged accomplices, including testimony from other witnesses and physical
evidence that defendant was at the murder scene. Further, counsel thoroughly
cross-examined Martin and Lawrence and challenged their testimony during
closing argument, thereby exposing their potential credibility problems to the
jury. The court also instructed the jury to consider any bias, prejudice, or
personal interest that a witness might have. For these reasons, defendant has not
demonstrated a plain error that affected his substantial rights.
Similarly, we hold that defendant was not entitled to the cautionary accomplice
instruction. As discussed, supra, no evidence indicates that Gentry was defendant’s accomplice.
See Young, supra at 143. Also, apart from Gentry’s preliminary examination testimony, ample
evidence implicated defendant in the murder. Id. All other eyewitnesses consistently testified
that the victim was sitting in the driver’s seat in his van when defendant removed a silver
handgun from his pocket and fired two shots into the van. The undisputed evidence also shows
that after the shootings, defendant entered the van and drove away.
Moreover, Gentry’s potential credibility problems were plainly presented to the jury and
his motivation to lie was thoroughly explored by defense counsel. Id. at 143-144; See also
People v Reed, 453 Mich 685, 693; 556 NW2d 858 (1996). The record shows that, during
closing argument, defense counsel highlighted Gentry’s initial status as a suspect, his absence
from trial and his motivation for falsely testifying and implicating defendant at the preliminary
examination. Defense counsel also discussed the inconsistencies between Gentry’s prior
testimony and the testimony of other witnesses. Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury to
consider whether a witness has “any bias, prejudice, or personal interest in how the case is
decided” when assessing credibility. See Young, supra at 144. Moreover, defendant’s defense
was that the prosecutor failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the
charged crimes: Defendant cannot have accomplices to crimes that he purportedly did not
commit, and thus, neither CJI2d 5.5 nor CJI2d 5.6 was applicable. Accordingly, we hold that
defendant failed to demonstrate that any error occurred and he is not entitled to relief. Carines,
supra at 761, 764-767.
-5-
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
-6-
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