PEOPLE OF MI V LARRY CHATMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 1, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 256615
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 03-013529-01
LARRY CHATMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Saad and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The jury convicted defendant of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and the trial court
sentenced him to fifteen to thirty years in prison. We affirm.
I.
Defendant says that his conviction was contrary to the great weight of the evidence. We
disagree.
Because defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal, People v Winters, 225 Mich
App 718, 729; 571 NW2d 764 (1997), we review to determine if there is plain error that affected
defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999);
People v Musser, 259 Mich App 215, 218; 673 NW2d 800 (2003). Under Carines, this Court
should reverse only if the defendant is actually innocent or the error seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Carines, supra, p 763; People v
Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 24; 650 NW2d 96 (2002).
“The test to determine whether a verdict is against the great weight of the evidence is
whether the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage
of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” Musser, supra, pp 218-219. “Conflicting testimony,
even when impeached to some extent, is an insufficient ground for granting a new trial.” People
v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 647; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). “[U]nless it can be said that directly
contradictory testimony was so far impeached that it ‘was deprived of all probative value or that
the jury could not believe it,’ or contradicted indisputable physical facts or defied physical
realities, the trial court must defer to the jury's determination.” Id. at 645-646, quoting Sloan v
Kramer-Orloff Co, 371 Mich 403, 410; 124 NW2d 255 (1963).
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The elements of armed robbery are: (1) an assault, and (2) a felonious taking of property
from the victim's presence or person, (3) while the defendant is armed with a specified weapon
or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the person assaulted to reasonably believe it
to be a dangerous weapon. People v Ford, 262 Mich App 443, 458; 687 NW2d 119 (2004);
MCL 750.529.
Here, the description the victim gave on the night of the incident differed slightly from
the description she gave two days later in a written statement. The victim testified that defendant
pushed her up against the outside door of a neighborhood store, pulled out a gun, put the gun
against her chest, demanded her purse, and left the scene with her purse. Further, the victim saw
defendant again as she was driving away from the store, and testified that she saw defendant’s
face and recognized him because she had seen him at the neighborhood store on numerous prior
occasions.
It is neither material nor relevant that, at the time of his arrest, defendant was not wearing
the same clothes the victim described immediately after the robbery because defendant was
arrested the day after the crime. Furthermore, defendant could have shaved his full beard into a
goatee and the victim’s discrepancy in her description of defendant’s height and weight could be
explained by the stress of the situation. The victim also viewed a photo line-up a few days after
the incident and pointed directly to defendant as the perpetrator. Moreover, at trial, the victim
gave unrebutted identification testimony that defendant was the man who robbed her. Therefore,
we conclude that the victim’s testimony had sufficient probative value so that the jury could
believe her identification of defendant as the man who robbed her. Lemmon, supra, pp 645-646.
Thus, we conclude that defendant’s verdict should stand. Musser, supra, pp 218-219.
II.
Defendant also claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it scored ten points
for offense variable twelve (OV12). We agree, but conclude that the error was harmless because
the correct score would have resulted in the same recommended sentencing range.
Defendant correctly asserts that MCL 777.42(2)(b) provides that possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony should not be considered in scoring OV12. MCL
777.42(2)(b). Thus, the trial judge erred when he scored ten points for OV12 because he should
have scored OV12 at under MCL 777.42(1)(e). If the trial judge had scored five points for
OV12, defendant’s OV score would have been twenty-five points instead of thirty points.
However, defendant’s OV level would have remained “II,” and thus, defendant’s minimum
sentence range would have remained the same. MCL 777.62. Accordingly, the trial judge’s
scoring error was harmless, and we need not remand for resentencing. If the guidelines were
incorrectly scored but the correct score would not change the guidelines recommended range,
remand for resentencing is not required. People v Houston, 261 Mich App 463, 473; 683 NW2d
192 (2004).
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
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