PEOPLE OF MI V KARL JON DAHLSTROM II
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 1, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 255875
Tuscola Circuit Court
LC No. 03-008859-FC
KARL JON DAHLSTROM, II,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Saad and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals his jury trial convictions of one count of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1)(f) (causing personal injury to the victim and using force or
coercion to accomplish sexual penetration), two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct
(CSC II), MCL 750.520c(1)(f) (causing personal injury to the victim and using force or coercion
to accomplish sexual contact), and one count of telephone line cutting, MCL 750.540.
Defendant was sentenced as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to concurrent terms of
twenty to sixty years in prison for the CSC I conviction, 15 to 22½ years in prison for each CSC
II conviction, and two to three years in prison for the telephone line cutting conviction. We
affirm.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant argues that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence at trial to sustain his
CSC I and CSC II convictions. We disagree. Appellate courts review challenges to the
sufficiency of the evidence de novo. People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 680; 660 NW2d 322
(2002).1
1
The reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999).
Questions of credibility and intent should be left to the trier of fact to resolve. People v Avant,
235 Mich App 499, 506; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). Circumstantial evidence and the reasonable
inferences that arise therefrom can constitute sufficient proof of the elements of a crime beyond a
(continued…)
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A person has committed CSC I under MCL 750.520b(1)(f) if the person “(1) causes
personal injury to the victim, (2) engages in sexual penetration with the victim, and (3) uses force
or coercion to accomplish the sexual penetration.” People v Nickens, 470 Mich 622, 629; 685
NW2d 657 (2004). MCL 750.520a(l) defines “personal injury” as “bodily injury, disfigurement,
mental anguish, chronic pain, pregnancy, disease, or loss or impairment of a sexual or
reproductive organ.” Here, the victim testified that defendant punched her in the head, choked
her, held her down, ripped at her breasts, threatened to kill her, forced her legs apart, and
digitally penetrated her. Both the neighbor from whom plaintiff asked for help after the attack
and the Caro police officer who responded to the scene testified that following the attack the
victim had red marks on her body. Further, the doctor who examined the victim testified that she
had facial swelling, along with tenderness, bruising, and redness on other parts of her body. The
victim also testified that, after the attack, she felt humiliated and ashamed and that she required
counseling and psychiatric medications to help her stay calm and focused. Clearly, a rational
trier of fact could find that the prosecutor proved the essential elements of CSC I beyond a
reasonable doubt.
With regard to defendant’s CSC II convictions, the statute, MCL 750.520c(1), states in
relevant part:
A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree if the
person engages in sexual contact with another person and if any of the following
circumstances exists:
***
(f) The actor causes personal injury to the victim and force or coercion is
used to accomplish the sexual contact. Force or coercion includes, but is not
limited to, any of the circumstances listed in section 520b(1)(f)(i) to (v). [MCL
750.520(1).]
MCL 750.520a(n) defines “sexual contact” as:
the intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts or the intentional
touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s or actor’s
intimate parts, if that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being
for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, done for a sexual purpose, or in
a sexual manner for:
(i) Revenge.
(ii) To inflict humiliation.
(iii) Out of anger. [MCL 750.520a(n).]
(…continued)
reasonable doubt. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
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Defendant contends that the prosecutor failed to establish that he touched the victim’s
breasts for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, a sexual purpose, or in a sexual manner
for revenge, to inflict humiliation, or out of anger. The victim testified that defendant ripped,
grabbed, pinched, and pulled at her breasts while referring to her as a “whore” and a “slut.” The
evidence shows that defendant expressed that he assaulted the victim because he believed that
she was sexually involved with another man. This supports an inference that defendant was
touching her breasts for revenge, to inflict humiliation, or out of anger.2
Defendant also maintains that this Court must overturn his CSC II convictions on double
jeopardy grounds because his CSC I and CSC II convictions arose out of the same incident. As
the prosecutor correctly states, defendant failed to properly present this issue for review by
setting it forth in his statement of questions presented. People v Brown, 239 Mich App 735, 748;
610 NW2d 234 (2000). However, we also reject this double jeopardy argument on its merits.
Here, separate and distinct conduct supported each of defendant’s convictions. Specifically,
defendant used force to digitally penetrate the victim and to make sexual contact with both her
right and left breasts. Although the force used to accomplish all three sexual contacts and the
resulting personal injury were intermingled, this fact does not prevent defendant’s convictions of
the separate charges. See People v Martinez, 190 Mich App 442, 444-445; 476 NW2d 641
(1991). Accordingly, we conclude that defendant’s convictions for CSC I and CSC II were each
based on distinct conduct and that the Legislature intended that each crime be punished
separately.
II. Sentencing
Defendant also asserts that he is entitled to resentencing based on certain alleged scoring
errors and because the trial court relied on certain information in the Presentence Information
Report (PSIR). However, defense counsel affirmatively stated at sentencing that both she and
defendant reviewed the PSIR and found it “to be factually accurate.” Thus, this issue has been
waived. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
Defendant also argues, for the first time on appeal, that he is entitled to resentencing
under Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). In People v
Claypool, 470 Mich 715; 684 NW2d 278 (2004), a majority of the Justices of our Supreme Court
opined that Blakely is inapplicable to guidelines scoring in Michigan’s sentencing scheme. Id. at
730-731 n 14 (Taylor, J., joined by Markman, J.), 741 (Cavanagh, J.), 744 (Weaver, J.).
Defendant argues that the decision in Claypool should be revisited because it was only stated in
dicta, but this Court has specifically rejected that contention. People v Drohan, 264 Mich App
2
For the same reasons, we reject defendant’s argument that his CSC I and CSC II convictions
are against the great weight of the evidence. A verdict is against the great weight of the evidence
if “the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict so that it would be a miscarriage of
justice to allow the verdict to stand.” People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 627; 576 NW2d 129
(1998). In this case, the evidence clearly does not preponderate against the jury’s verdict.
-3-
77, 89 n 4; 689 NW2d 750 (2004), lv gtd 472 Mich 881 (2005).3 Accordingly, defendant’s
Blakely argument fails.
III. Prosecutor’s Conduct
Defendant argues that misconduct by the prosecutor deprived him of a fair trial. Because
defendant did not timely object to any of the actions he now claims constitute prosecutorial
misconduct, appellate review is precluded unless an objection could not have cured the error or a
failure to review the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice. People v Callon, 256 Mich
App 312, 329; 662 NW2d 501 (2003). Further, appellate review of this unpreserved issue is only
for plain error affecting substantial rights. Id.
Many of the claims of error defendant asserts within this issue actually relate to alleged
evidentiary errors and not prosecutorial misconduct. “[P]rosecutorial misconduct cannot be
predicated on good-faith efforts to admit evidence.” People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660;
608 NW2d 123 (1999). There is nothing in the record to indicate that the prosecution acted in
bad faith when it introduced the evidence in question. Accordingly, we review the following
asserted instances of prosecutorial misconduct as unpreserved evidentiary errors.
The trial court did not err when it admitted the nurse’s testimony about the victim’s
statement to her because the statement was admissible as an excited utterance. MRE 803(2).
The nurse testified that the victim made the statement approximately one hour after the attack
while she was visibly upset and crying. We also conclude that the trial court correctly admitted
the victim’s medical records under MRE 803(6) because both the nurse and the treating
physician testified that the records were prepared and kept as part of the hospital’s ordinary
course of business.
The trial court also properly admitted defendant’s testimony about a letter he wrote in
prison in which he attempted to persuade the recipient to convince the victim not to testify. “If a
witness is offering relevant testimony, whether that witness is truthfully and accurately testifying
is itself relevant because it affects the probability of the existence of a consequential fact.”
People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 72; 537 NW2d 909, mod and remanded 450 Mich 1212 (1995).
Here, defendant testified that he was not the attacker, which placed his credibility in issue. In the
letter, defendant stated that the victim “knows that she never really ever got hurt so bad that any
of this would warrant what she is trying to do.” This statement clearly casts doubt on
defendant’s testimony. Further, considering the weight of the other evidence against defendant,
there is little danger that the jury gave it undue or preemptive weight. Elezovic v Ford Motor Co,
259 Mich App 187, 207; 673 NW2d 776, rev’d in part on other grounds 472 Mich 408 (2005).
Nor does introduction of the letter violate MRE 404(b), because it is directly relevant to the
determination of a fact in issue without an intermediate inference of character. People v
VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 64; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), modified 445 Mich 1205 (1994).
3
Our Supreme Court granted leave in Drohan limited to the issue of whether Blakely and United
States v Booker, 543 US ___; 125 S Ct 738; 160 L Ed 2d 621 (2005) apply to Michigan’s
sentencing scheme.
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We also reject defendant’s assertion that the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony that
defendant slashed the victim’s tires after he left her apartment. The damage defendant did to the
victim’s car forms part of the admissible res gestae of the charged offenses. People v Savage,
225 Mich 84, 86; 195 NW 669 (1923) (“It is elementary that the acts, conduct and demeanor of a
person charged with a crime at the time of, or shortly before or after the offense is claimed to
have been committed, may be shown as a part of the res gestae.”).
We also conclude that the trial court did not err when it admitted testimony about the
vulgar language defendant used in reference to the victim after the attack. The evidence was
relevant to the issue of the credibility of both the victim and the person who drove defendant to
her apartment on the night of the assault. Further, the evidence was relevant to show the purpose
of the assault, i.e., that was it done in a sexual manner for the purpose of revenge, inflicting
humiliation, or out of anger. MCL 750.520a(n).
Nor do we find error in the admission of testimony that the victim remained fearful after
the attack. One of the elements of CSC I is the infliction of physical injury, which includes
mental anguish. MCL 750.520a(l); MCL 750.520b(1)(f). Thus, the victim’s continuing
fearfulness is relevant to a fact in issue.
Defendant also claims that it was error for the prosecutor to reference “past acquitted
charges,” but fails to cite to the record where the prosecutor mentioned prior charges in front of
the jury. “Defendant may not leave it to this Court to search for a factual basis to sustain or
reject his position.” People v Traylor, 245 Mich App 460, 464; 628 NW2d 120 (2001).
Defendant asserts that the police committed misconduct when they lied to the person who
drove defendant to the victim’s apartment by telling him that they knew he was there on the
night in question. However, defendant has failed to support his assertion of error with a citation
to proper authority. People v Hermiz, 235 Mich App 248, 258; 597 NW2d 218 (1999).
Moreover, as the prosecutor points out, this Court has previously held that similar police conduct
did not render a defendant’s confession involuntary. People v Hicks, 185 Mich App 107, 113;
460 NW2d 569 (1990). Accordingly, we reject defendant’s argument on this issue.
The remainder of plaintiff’s allegations of prosecutorial misconduct involve statements
made by the prosecutor during trial. In reviewing this issue, this Court must examine the record
and evaluate the prosecutor’s remarks in context, including any pertinent defense arguments.
Callon, supra at 330.
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor mischaracterized the law and infringed on the jury’s
responsibility to determine the facts of the case when, during voir dire, he asked jurors whether
they agreed that the victim was entitled to a fair trial just as defendant was entitled to a fair trial.
Defendant does not characterize this as a civic duty argument, but he claims that the alleged error
invited the jury to convict defendant based on a duty outside the facts of the case. At the
conclusion of proofs, the trial court properly instructed the jurors that the arguments of the
attorneys were not evidence and that it was the jury’s job to decide the facts of the case. Further,
to the extent defendant claims that the comments misstated the law, the trial judge instructed the
jury that the court has the duty to instruct the jury on the law. Specifically, the trial court advised
the jury that, “You must take the law as I give it to you. If a lawyer says something different
about the law, follow what I say.” Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions. People v
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Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). It is also clear that a timely cautionary
instruction could have cured any alleged error. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to any
relief on this issue. See People v Peery, 119 Mich App 207, 213; 326 NW2d 451 (1982).
Defendant further claims that the prosecutor made improper statements during closing
argument. In People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 455; 678 NW2d 631 (2004), this Court
stated:
[A] prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of his witnesses by implying that
he has some special knowledge of their truthfulness. But a prosecutor may
comment on his own witnesses’ credibility during closing argument, especially
when there is conflicting evidence and the defendant’s guilt depends on which
witnesses the jury believes. [Citation omitted.]
Here, the victim and defendant gave conflicting testimony about whether an assault occurred and
the jury’s verdict depended, in part, on whether it believed the victim or defendant. The
prosecutor argued from the evidence that the victim was worthy of belief because her version of
events remained consistent from her initial disclosure to her trial testimony. The prosecutor did
not imply that he had knowledge beyond the evidence introduced at trial that led him to believe
the victim. Accordingly, defendant has failed to show that the prosecutor’s remarks constituted
error. Callon, supra at 329-330.
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor improperly attempted to appeal to the jurors’
sympathy for the victim. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 591; 629 NW2d 411 (2001).
The prosecutor’s comment that the attack was a “life altering event” for the victim countered
defense counsel’s argument that the victim’s testimony about the timing of the assault conflicted
with other testimony. The prosecutor argued that the victim’s testimony concerning the time of
the assault was more credible because she had a greater reason to remember when it occurred.
The prosecutor’s statements concerning how the victim had to repeat her version of what
happened to multiple persons was also part of his argument about the credibility of the witnesses.
We hold that, read in context, there was no error in these remarks. See People v Matuszak, 263
Mich App 42, 55; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).
Defendant further claims that the prosecutor improperly told the jury that it should not
ignore evil, including defendant. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
Defendant also complains that the prosecutor improperly commented about how the victim was
treated and argued to the jury that evil should not be ignored. We conclude that these comments
are “not so inflammatory as to prejudice defendant.” Watson, supra at 591. Were we to
conclude that the prosecutor attempted to appeal to the jury’s sympathies when he commented
that no person deserves to be treated as the victim was treated, any error was minor, and clearly
could have been cured by a timely, cautionary instruction. Callon, supra at 329. Moreover, the
trial court specifically instructed the jurors not to allow sympathy or prejudice to influence their
decision. See Graves, supra at 486.
Furthermore, in referring to defendant as “evil” and the prosecutor’s exhortation to the
jury to hold defendant accountable for the evil he had done, the prosecutor was simply arguing
that the evidence established that defendant committed the crimes charged. Accordingly, “these
remarks do not constitute an assertion of personal belief by the prosecutor in defendant’s guilt or
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an argument that the jury should convict the defendant regardless of the evidence.” Matuszak,
supra at 56; see also People v Williams, 265 Mich App 68, 71; 692 NW2d 722 (2005)
(concluding that “[w]hile the prosecutor vividly described defendant as ‘cold blooded’ and the
crime as ‘evil,’ she did not unfairly depict the evidence of the crime or defendant’s state of
mind”). Moreover, as noted, the trial court properly instructed the jury that it should base its
verdict only on the evidence and that the arguments of the attorneys were not evidence. For
these reasons, we deny defendant’s request for reversal.
We also reject defendant’s contention that the prosecutor improperly denigrated him and
his defense strategy. The record reflects that the prosecutor did not challenge counsel’s veracity.
People v Dalessandro, 165 Mich App 569, 579; 419 NW2d 609 (1988). Rather, the prosecutor’s
comments countered defendant’s position that he was not at the apartment the night of the assault
and that the prosecutor failed to prove his case. It is well settled that, “[w]hile the prosecution’s
assertion that the defense argument was ridiculous may have been characterized differently, a
prosecutor need not state arguments in the blandest possible terms.” Matuszak, supra at 55-56.
Defendant also complains that the prosecutor improperly stated his personal belief that
the touching of the victim’s breasts was done in a sexual manner. However, the record reflects
that the prosecutor was not, as defendant suggests, placing the prestige of his office behind the
contention that defendant was guilty. Rather, he correctly argued from the evidence that
defendant touched the victim’s breasts in a sexual manner for revenge, to inflict humiliation, or
out of anger. Callon, supra at 330.
Defendant says that the prosecutor improperly argued that the victim could not call for
help because the handset for the phone had been taken when the evidence did not support a
finding that she could not use the base of the phone to call for help. Defendant’s argument on
this point is without merit. In fact, the victim testified that she looked for her phone to call the
police, but could only find the base, so she left the apartment. The obvious and reasonable
inference is that she could not make a phone call from the base of the phone.
Defendant further asserts that the prosecutor erred by mischaracterizing the definition of
an assault. While we agree that the prosecutor’s statement of the law was inaccurate, People v
Nickens, 470 Mich 622, 628; 685 NW2d 657 (2004), a proper instruction on assault and battery
was given by the court, as well as the instruction that the jury “must take the law” as given by the
court. Accordingly, any error was harmless. People v Grayer, 252 Mich App 349, 357-359;
651 NW2d 818 (2002).
Also, defendant alleges that even if the alleged errors described above do not merit
reversal individually, the cumulative effect of the errors denied him a fair trial. People v
Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 454; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). We found no error in most of
defendant’s allegations of misconduct and, of those that may have constituted error, the effect
was not prejudicial. Accordingly, defendant was not denied a fair trial and is not entitled to
reversal on this basis. Id.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant maintains that his trial counsel denied him a fair trial in several respects. The
determination of whether a defendant has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed
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question of fact and law. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). This
Court reviews the trial court’s factual findings for clear error, while its constitutional
determinations are reviewed de novo. Id.4
Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to object to the
asserted evidentiary errors, instances of prosecutorial misconduct, and sentencing errors
referenced above. However, for those allegations that we rejected on the merits, counsel cannot
be faulted for her actions with respect to each. See People v Darden, 230 Mich App 597, 605;
585 NW2d 27 (1998). As for the arguably improper comments made by the prosecutor on the
law of assault, we cannot conclude that, had an objection been raised, there is a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different or that the proceedings
were fundamentally unfair or unreliable. People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d
294 (2001).
Defendant also complains that his attorney should have made a proportionality argument
at sentencing. However, arguably, defendant’s trial counsel purposely avoided making such an
argument because of the circumstances of this crime and this defendant. In any event, defendant
has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the sentencing proceedings
would have been different had the argument been raised. Accordingly, defendant has failed to
show that he was denied effective assistance of counsel on this basis. Rodgers, supra at 714.
Defendant further asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately
investigate the case. Specifically, defendant complains that, before trial, his attorney should
have had an investigator interview the man who drove defendant to the victim’s apartment for
impeachment purposes. However, it is not clear how such an investigation would have benefited
defendant. Indeed, at trial, defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined the man, which revealed
his disagreement with defendant regarding a work injury and the fact that the man initially told
the police that he had not driven defendant to the victim’s apartment. Defendant also asserts that
he asked his trial attorney to contact a potential witness who was told by the man who drove
defendant that he was planning on “getting even” with defendant. However, defense counsel
denied that defendant provided her with this information. Moreover, it is not clear how
testimony from such a witness would have affected the outcome, given counsel’s cross
examination of the driver at trial.
4
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and a defendant bears a heavy burden in
establishing otherwise. LeBlanc, supra at 578. To establish ineffective assistance, a defendant
must show: (1) counsel’s performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms; (2) a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the result of the
proceedings would have been different; and (3) the concomitant proceedings were fundamentally
unfair or unreliable. People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001). The
defendant must overcome the presumption that the challenged action was sound trial strategy.
People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 385-386; 624 NW2d 227 (2001). Decisions regarding
whether to call or question a witness are presumed to be matters of trial strategy. People v
Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999).
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Defendant also claims that his attorney should have obtained the victim’s phone records.
Defense counsel admitted that defendant asked her to obtain the phone records, but said that she
explained to him that the phone records were not necessary because it was not disputed that he
had a relationship with the victim. Defendant has failed to show that his counsel’s decision in
this regard was not sound trial strategy.
Defendant also takes issue with defense counsel’s failure to have the rape kit analyzed.
Defendant argues that an analysis of the rape kit might have revealed that the victim had
intercourse with someone else which would cast doubt on her credibility. However, it is not
clear that such evidence would have been admissible pursuant to Michigan’s rape shield law,
MCL 750.520j. Moreover, even if the victim had intercourse with someone else that night, that
fact would not rebut the evidence that defendant attacked her. Further, because the rape kit was
not analyzed, defense counsel was able to argue that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of
proof. Again, defendant has failed to show that his counsel’s decision in this regard was not
sound trial strategy.
Defendant also argues that his counsel denied him a fair trial because she failed to
identify a potential witness who went to the bar with defendant on the night of the crime and
signed up with defendant and others to enter a fishing tournament. However, defense counsel
testified that she did not recall defendant asking her to identify the person. Moreover, because
the unidentified witness did not arrive to go fishing in the morning, this witness could not have
added to defendant’s alibi defense. Accordingly, there is no reasonable probability that his
testimony could have affected the outcome of the proceedings.
Defendant also asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to strike one of the
jurors. However, an attorney’s decision whether to strike a juror is a matter of trial strategy and
does not support claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Robinson, 154 Mich App
92, 95; 397 NW2d 229 (1986).
Defendant further claims that defense counsel failed to adequately cross-examine the
victim. Defendant makes specific reference to a matter, not discussed in the record, that he
claims would have affected her credibility, and also suggests that counsel should have further
questioned the victim about when the attack occurred. However, decisions regarding what
evidence to present and whether to question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial
strategy that this Court “will not second-guess with the benefit of hindsight.” People v Dixon,
263 Mich App 393, 398; 688 NW2d 308 (2004). Moreover, defendant has not established that
had his trial counsel raised these issues that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceedings would have been different.
Defendant also states that defense counsel failed to question the hospital physician
regarding whether bruising and tenderness can result from “energetic sex.” In this case, defense
counsel’s questions to the physician indicate that she was trying to dispute the fact that the victim
actually suffered any significant bruising at all. Again, decisions regarding what evidence to
present and whether to question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy that this
Court “will not second-guess with the benefit of hindsight.” Dixon, supra at 398.
Defendant argues that his trial attorney should have asked the man who drove him to the
victim’s apartment additional questions about where defendant told him he had thrown the
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victim’s phone because of alleged inconsistencies in the man’s trial testimony and what he told
the police. The statements are not necessarily inconsistent but, regardless, because the driver
testified before the police officer, counsel may not have learned of any discrepancy until after the
driver finished testifying. Counsel could have reasonably decided not to recall the driver
because she wanted to leave the discrepancy unexplained in order to use it to discredit the
witness. See Dixon, supra at 398.
Defendant also complains that his attorney should have withdrawn because she admitted
that she did not like him.5 “Appointment of a substitute counsel is warranted only upon a
showing of good cause and where substitution will not unreasonably disrupt the judicial
process.” People v Jones, 168 Mich App 191, 194; 423 NW2d 614 (1988). Defendant has not
shown that he disagreed with his counsel’s overall trial strategy, that they had a legitimate
difference of opinion regarding trial tactics, or any other basis that might be considered good
cause for a second substitution of counsel in this case. Id. Nor has defendant shown that his trial
attorney’s dislike for him impacted her representation. In fact, there is nothing in the record to
indicate that he was dissatisfied with her performance prior to entry of the verdict.
For these reasons, we conclude that defendant failed to establish that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel. Rodgers, supra at 714.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
5
Defendant’s initial counsel withdrew shortly before this case was tried.
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