PETER RICHARD V RL&D MCDONALD'S OF SASHABAW
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DONETTE RICHARD, Personal Representative of
the Estate of PETER RICHARD,
UNPUBLISHED
December 1, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 255464
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2003-048787-NO
RL&D MCDONALD’S OF SASHABAW,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
CLIFFORD WAYNE TRIMBLE, LANCE ALLAN
SCHMITT and JOSEPH WELLS STAPLETON,
Defendants.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Sawyer and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a circuit court order granting summary disposition to
defendant McDonald’s (defendant). We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff’s decedent1 was injured during an assault committed by Lance Schmitt and
Joseph Stapleton on defendant’s premises. The trial court ruled that the decedent’s injury was
not clearly foreseeable by defendant, which had nonetheless fulfilled any duty owed to the
decedent.
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling with respect to a motion for summary
disposition. Kefgen v Davidson, 241 Mich App 611, 616; 617 NW2d 351 (2000).
1
We note that the decedent died during the pendency of this case in the trial court.
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“Owners and occupiers of land have a special relationship to their invitees.” Mason v
Royal Dequindre, Inc, 455 Mich 391, 398; 566 NW2d 199 (1997), overruled in part on other
grounds by MacDonald v PKT, Inc, 464 Mich 322, 334 n 10; 628 NW2d 33 (2001).
Nevertheless, the general rule is that a business invitor does not have a duty to protect its invitees
from the criminal acts of third persons. See, generally, Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores,
Inc, 429 Mich 495, 498-499, 501-502; 418 NW2d 381 (1988). However, in Mason, supra at
393, the Court held “that merchants can be liable in tort for failing to take reasonable measures to
protect their invitees from harm caused by the criminal acts of third parties. The harm must be
foreseeable to an identifiable invitee and preventable by the exercise of reasonable care.” In
MacDonald v PKT, Inc, 464 Mich 322, 338; 628 NW2d 33 (2001), the Court limited the holding
in Mason and stated the following:
To summarize, under Mason, generally merchants “have a duty to use
reasonable care to protect their invitees from the foreseeable criminal acts of third
parties.” The duty is triggered by specific acts occurring on the premises that
pose a risk of imminent and foreseeable harm to an identifiable invitee. Whether
an invitee is readily identifiable as being foreseeably endangered is a question for
the factfinder if reasonable minds could differ on this point. While a merchant is
required to take reasonable measures in response to an ongoing situation that is
taking place on the premises, there is no obligation to otherwise anticipate the
criminal acts of third parties. Consistent with Williams, a merchant is not
obligated to do anything more than reasonably expedite the involvement of the
police. [Citations omitted.]
Whether an invitee is foreseeably endangered is to be gauged not from past incidents of
criminal activity on the merchant’s premises, i.e., whether a criminal act in general was
foreseeable. See id. at 339. The proper inquiry is “once a disturbance occurs on the premises,
whether a reasonable person would recognize a risk of imminent harm to an identifiable invitee.”
Id. An identifiable invitee is a particular invitee who is personally endangered by the criminal
episode. See Mason, supra at 402-405.
Evidence showed that Schmitt and Stapleton were on defendant’s premises for several
minutes before the altercation with the decedent. During that time, they allegedly planned to
commit a robbery and became involved in a verbal altercation with a customer. However, the
decedent did not become personally endangered by their actions until he arrived on the premises.
A disturbance was not created until the decedent confronted Schmitt and Stapleton after they
swore at him. Assuming that that disturbance created a risk of imminent harm, defendant had an
obligation to call the police. Someone did so, and the police arrived on the scene within three
and one-half minutes.
If one of defendant’s employees called the police, defendant fulfilled its duty under
MacDonald. See Smith v Hamilton’s Henry VIII Lounge, Inc, 468 Mich 885, 885; 661 NW2d
234 (2003). If defendant’s employees did not call the police, defendant may have breached its
duty. However, no evidence showed that had an employee placed such a call, the police would
have arrived any sooner. Moreover, even if the police had arrived sooner, they could not
reasonably have prevented the decedent’s injuries because the fight ended less than a minute
after it began. Therefore, plaintiff has not shown that defendant’s possible breach of its duty was
a proximate cause of any damages to the decedent. We will not reverse if the trial court reached
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the right result for the wrong reason. Taylor v Laban, 241 Mich App 449, 458; 616 NW2d 229
(2000).
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
I concur in result only.
/s/ William B. Murphy
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