PEOPLE OF MI V ALPHONZO LEON WRIGHT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 29, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 256475
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 03-012650-FH
ALPHONZO LEON WRIGHT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Saad and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Alphonzo Leon Wright appeals as of right his jury trial convictions for
possession with the intent to deliver between 50 and 450 grams of cocaine,1 and maintaining a
drug vehicle.2 The trial court sentenced Wright, as a third habitual offender,3 to 217 months to
40 years’ imprisonment for his possession with the intent to deliver between 50 and 450 grams of
cocaine conviction, and 415 days’ imprisonment for his maintaining a drug vehicle conviction.
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
On May 22, 2003, Officer Rogelio Villarreal testified that he surveilled 130 Odette St. in
order to execute a warrant.4 Officer Villarreal was looking for a gray Cadillac. After
approximately 40 minutes, Officer Villarreal saw a gray Cadillac drive up to 130 Odette St.
1
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii).
2
MCL 333.7405(1)(d).
3
MCL 769.11.
4
During argument on defendant’s motion in limine, both the defense and prosecution referenced
the fact that the defendant was originally wanted for a homicide investigation, and the warrant
police were executing was an arrest warrant issued for defendant because of his suspected
involvement with a homicide. However, Villarreal did not specify what type of warrant the
police were executing while testifying.
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Wright exited the car and walked up to the house. Wright then returned to the car and drove
away from the house. Officer Villarreal notified the other officers about the Cadillac’s
departure. Officer Randy Tolbert followed Officer Villarreal’s directions and met up with the
Cadillac approximately three blocks away. Officer Tolbert followed the Cadillac in his
unmarked car while it made numerous turns throughout Flint. At one point, the Cadillac began
to drive at an accelerated rate. The Cadillac continued driving at an accelerated rate through a
housing complex and down a few more streets until it reached an intersection that Officer Lee
Kahan was blocking. The Cadillac swerved around Officer Kahan’s marked police car and
continued speeding down several more streets, nearly hitting another vehicle. When the Cadillac
finally stopped, Wright exited the vehicle and started running.
Officer Tolbert chased Wright on foot. He chased Wright onto a front porch, where
Wright reached into the front of his pants, grabbed a clear bag containing 125 grams of cocaine,
and threw the bag onto the porch. When Officer Tolbert realized that Wright was not reaching
for a weapon, he took Wright into custody. Officer Tolbert collected the bag of cocaine from the
porch. He also found and collected a digital scale on the ground in front of the Cadillac and a
cellular phone plugged into the cigarette lighter outlet.
In his statement taken by agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
(ATF), Wright explained that he ran from the police because he “was dirty.” According to ATF
Special Agent Todd Bowden, the term “dirty” is a common street term for an individual who is
in possession of or caught with an item that they are not supposed to have, such as cocaine.
Wright admitted that the cocaine was his.
Sergeant Mark Blough was qualified as an expert in the area of sale and distribution of
cocaine in the vicinity of Flint. He testified that, based on the quantity of cocaine Wright
possessed, the scale, the fact that Wright had over $100 in cash on him, and the lack of personal
use paraphernalia, Wright possessed the cocaine with the intent to deliver it.
Wright filed a motion in limine with the trial court to exclude a three-hour video recorded
interview, primarily regarding Wright’s participation in a homicide. The interview took place
after Wright was arrested for the instant charge but focused primarily on his involvement in a
homicide. The trial court precluded the use of the videotape with respect to any matters other
than this case. Defense counsel and the trial court endorsed the prosecution’s offer to have
Special Agent Bowden testify to Wright’s admission to possession of cocaine in lieu of playing
the video tape.
To explain how he became involved in the incident, Officer Kahan stated, “I heard one of
the 800 cars puttin’ [sic] out a chase or they were following a vehicle that had a potential
homicide suspect in it.” Out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel argued that Officer
Kahan’s reference to Wright as a homicide suspect was unduly prejudicial and violated the
court’s ruling on his motion in limine. Defense counsel then asked the trial court to declare a
mistrial. The trial court ruled:
[C]learly, any reference to an alleged homicide or the [Wright] being a
suspect is not relevant. However, the context of all the other testimony in this
case, one reference to a homicide suspect with . . . nothing more, no further
evidence, no further mentioning by either a witness or the prosecutor, seems to
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be—to weigh against granting a motion for a mistrial. I don’t find it to be unduly
prejudicial, but I am offering to give a curative instruction.
Defense counsel then renewed her motion for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. The trial
court gave the following curative instruction to the jury: “[Y]ou are instructed to disregard any
reference to an alleged homicide that you may have heard. It is totally irrelevant to any issues in
this trial.”
The jury convicted Wright for possession with the intent to deliver between 50 and 450
grams of cocaine and maintaining a drug vehicle.
II. Motion For Mistrial
A. Standard Of Review
Wright first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for
a mistrial. We disagree. “‘A mistrial should be granted only for an irregularity that is prejudicial
to the rights of the defendant and impairs his ability to get a fair trial.’”5 “[N]ot every instance of
mention before a jury of some inappropriate subject matter warrants a mistrial.”6 An
unresponsive, volunteered answer to a proper question that injects improper evidence into a trial
is not generally grounds for a mistrial, “unless the prosecutor knew in advance that the witness
would give the unresponsive testimony or the prosecutor conspired with or encouraged the
witness to give that testimony.”7
B. Reference To Wright As Homicide Suspect
In response to a properly phrased question, Officer Kahan briefly indicated that Wright
was a homicide suspect. Nothing suggests that the prosecutor knew in advance that Officer
Kahan would give the unresponsive testimony or that he encouraged the statement. Its
admission did not impair Wright’s ability to receive a fair trial. The trial court gave the jury an
appropriate curative instruction and sufficient evidence was presented through the police
officers’ testimony to support Wright’s conviction of possession with intent to deliver cocaine.
Thus, the court properly denied Wright’s motion for a mistrial.
III. Sufficiency Of The Evidence; Drug Vehicle
A. Standard Of Review
Wright next argues that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to support his
conviction for maintaining a drug vehicle because there was no evidence that he used the vehicle
5
People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 36; 597 NW2d 176 (1999), quoting People v Haywood,
209 Mich App 217, 228; 530 NW2d 497 (1995) (alterations by Griffin).
6
Id.
7
Id.; People v Hackney, 183 Mich App 516, 531; 455 NW2d 358 (1990).
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for the purpose of selling or keeping drugs. On de novo review of a claim of insufficient
evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine
whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.8
B. Maintaining A Drug Vehicle
To satisfy the elements of maintaining a drug vehicle the prosecution must show that
(1) the defendant exercised authority or control over the vehicle, (2) for the purpose of making it
available for keeping or selling proscribed drugs, and (3) he did so continuously for an
appreciable period of time.9
While evidence presented at trial was sufficient to show that Wright controlled the
vehicle in which he was observed, it did not show that he controlled the car for the purpose of
keeping or selling drugs and it did not show he did so continuously for an appreciable period of
time. “Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from it may be sufficient to
establish the elements of a crime.”10 But “the fact that a piece of evidence has some tendency to
make the existence of a fact more probable, or less probable, does not necessarily mean that the
evidence would justify a reasonable juror in reasonably concluding the existence of that fact
beyond a reasonable doubt.”11 Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, only two inferences could be drawn from the evidence presented: (1) because
Wright was observed throwing down the bag of cocaine after he exited the vehicle, it can be
inferred that on that one occasion he possessed cocaine while he was in that vehicle; and
(2) because the scale was found on the ground in front of the vehicle, it can be inferred that on
that one occasion he possessed a scale in the car. It would require piling inference upon
inference to conclude that Wright had used that vehicle for an appreciable period of time for the
purpose of keeping or selling proscribed drugs. Police neither observed Wright selling drugs out
of his car nor found any drugs in the car after he was arrested.12 Thus, we cannot conclude that
the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support Wright’s maintaining a drug vehicle
conviction.
8
People v Fennell, 260 Mich App 261, 270; 677 NW2d 66 (2004); People v Hawkins, 245 Mich
App 439, 457; 628 NW2d 105 (2001).
9
MCL 333.7405(1)(d); Griffin, supra at 32-33.
10
Fennell, supra at 270.
11
People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 368; 285 NW2d 284 (1979).
12
Our review of relevant case law reveals that where a defendant has been convicted for
maintaining a drug vehicle, or the related charge of maintaining a drug house, there has been a
drug sales transaction or the police discovered clear evidence that drugs were being stored in the
subject location. See e.g., People v Custer, 465 Mich 319; 630 NW2d 870 (2001); People v
Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich 431; 606 NW2d 645 (2000); People v McKinney, 258 Mich App 157;
670 NW2d 254 (2003); People v Gonzalez, 256 Mich App 212; 663 NW2d 499 (2003); Griffin,
supra at 29; People v Bartlett, 231 Mich App 139; 585 NW2d 341 (1998).
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We affirm Wright’s possession with the intent to deliver conviction but reverse Wright’s
maintaining a drug vehicle conviction.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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