CITIZENS INS CO V AMERISURE INS CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY, as
subrogee of ELOPAK, INC., and ELOPAK
SCOTT, L.L.C.,
UNPUBLISHED
November 29, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 254034
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2002-043846-CZ
AMERISURE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Cavanagh and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). We affirm.
Defendant’s insured, Scott Equipment Company (Scott), is a subsidiary of Elopak-Scott,
L.L.C. (Elopak-Scott), which is a subsidiary of plaintiff’s insured, Elopak, Inc. (Elopak).
Elopak-Scott hired a controller who embezzled funds from Scott. Both Scott and Elopak filed
claims of loss with their respective insurers. Defendant denied coverage on the ground that the
controller was not Scott’s employee within the meaning of its policy. Although plaintiff
maintained that it was obligated to cover only a pro-rata share of the entire loss, it fully
compensated Elopak for the loss, and then brought this action against defendant, as subrogee of
Elopak, to recover defendant’s alleged pro-rata share. Defendant moved for summary
disposition, arguing that plaintiff’s suit was filed after the expiration of the two-year contractual
limitations period in defendant’s policy. The trial court agreed and granted the motion.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 159; 645 NW2d 643 (2002). Although the
trial court granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), that subrule applies only to
statutory limitation periods, not contractual limitation periods. Where a trial court grants
summary disposition under the wrong subrule, this Court may review the issue under the correct
subrule, in this case MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). Computer Network,
Inc v AM General Corp, 265 Mich App 309, 313; 696 NW2d 49 (2005). A motion under MCR
2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint. Kraft v Detroit Entertainment, LLC,
261 Mich App 534, 539; 683 NW2d 200 (2004). Summary disposition should be granted if there
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is no genuine issue of any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial
judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 540; MCR 2.116(C)(10) and (G)(4).
Plaintiff generally argues that its action states an independent claim against defendant for
contribution or subrogation and, therefore, is governed by the six-year limitations period in MCL
600.5807(8), not the two-year contractual limitation period. Michigan law recognizes that
contribution actions between insurers are predicated on the theory of equitable subrogation.
Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co, Inc v Continental Ins Co, 450 Mich 429, 440 (Cavanagh, J.,
concurring), 446 (Levin, J., dissenting); 537 NW2d 879 (1995); Commercial Union Ins Co v
Medical Protective Co, 426 Mich 109, 119; 393 NW2d 479 (1986). The common-law doctrine
of contribution enables an insurer who has paid an insured’s entire loss to obtain another
insurer’s pro-rata share of the loss. Arco Industries Corp v American Motorists Ins Co, 232
Mich App 146, 160-161; 594 NW2d 61 (1998); Keene Corp v Ins Co of North America, 215 US
App DC 156; 667 F2d 1034 (1981). In doing so, the paying insurer becomes subrogated to the
insured’s right to coverage from the non-paying insurer. Our Supreme Court has explained that
[e]quitable subrogation is a legal fiction through which a person who pays a debt
for which another is primarily responsible is substituted or subrogated to all the
rights and remedies of the other. It is well-established that the subrogee acquires
no greater rights than those possessed by the subrogor, and that the subrogee may
not be a “mere volunteer.” [Auto-Owners Ins Co v Amoco Production Co, 468
Mich 53, 59; 658 NW2d 460 (2003), quoting Commercial Union Ins Co, supra at
117 (opinion by Williams, C.J.) (citations omitted).]
Although the parties disagree over the proper characterization of plaintiff’s action, it is clear that
plaintiff’s sole basis for relief from defendant is rooted in contribution and subrogation theories.
Plaintiff claims that it paid an amount that defendant should have paid to its insured, and that
defendant must therefore now pay that amount to plaintiff.
Plaintiff emphasizes that it has no privity of contract with defendant and, therefore, its
contribution action cannot be considered an action “on the policy,” subject to the policy’s
limitation period. This argument runs counter to the basic and well-established principle that a
subrogee steps into the shoes of the subrogor, and is entitled to no greater rights than its
subrogor. Therefore, plaintiff is subject to the same time constraints as Scott, and the trial court
correctly determined that the action was untimely.
The trial court appropriately relied on Fremont Mutual Ins Co v Michigan Basic Property
Ins Ass’n, 171 Mich App 500; 430 NW2d 764 (1988). In Fremont, the plaintiff and defendant
both issued fire insurance policies on the same property. When the property was damaged by
fire, the plaintiff covered its insureds’ loss and filed suit for proration against the defendant. Id.
at 501. The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s action was barred by the one-year limitations
period set forth in MCL 500.2832 (now repealed), Michigan’s standard fire insurance policy. Id.
at 502. The plaintiff argued that its claim for contribution was not subject to the same limitation
period for an insured’s action against the insurer. Id. This Court disagreed, stating:
Plaintiff’s claim against defendant, filed some 3-1/2 years after the fire
and after defendant’s refusal to pay, is derivative of plaintiff’s payment to
Kingslien, whom defendant had insured. Because there is no privity of contract
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between the plaintiff and defendant insurers, plaintiff’s action is clearly “one on
the policy,” governed by the one-year limitation period contained therein. [Id.]
Although this Court did not explicitly discuss the subrogation doctrine, its discussion of the
derivative nature of the contribution action clearly invokes the underlying subrogation principles.
Because the plaintiff was, in essence, stepping into its insureds’ shoes and asserting the insureds’
rights under the defendant’s policy, it was subject to the same one-year limitations period.
Likewise, plaintiff in the instant case is substituting itself for the insured, and claiming the same
rights enjoyed by the insured, subject to the same restrictions. Plaintiff argues that the absence
of privity of contract renders those restrictions inapplicable, but this argument disregards the fact
that, without the contractual relationship between defendant and the insured, plaintiff would have
no basis for asserting a contribution action.
The cases on which plaintiff relies, Auto Club Ins Ass’n v New York Life Ins Co, 440
Mich 126; 485 NW2d 695 (1992), Titan Ins Co v Farmers Ins Exchange, 241 Mich App 258;
615 NW2d 774 (2000), and Citizens Ins Co of America v Buck, 216 Mich App 217; 548 NW2d
680 (1996), are distinguishable, because none of those cases involved a subrogee claiming relief
from a contractual limitations period in a subrogor’s insurance contract. Plaintiff suggests that
Buck generally holds that insurance subrogation actions are governed by the six-year statute of
limitations in MCL 600.5807, but this suggestion misinterprets the analysis in Buck. The Court
in Buck determined that the plaintiff insurer, as subrogee, stepped into its insured’s shoes;
therefore, it was in the position of an insured suing for uninsured motorist benefits, and subject to
the six-year limitations period, rather than the three-year period for wrongful death actions under
MCL 600.2922. Id. at 225-226. The reasoning in Buck actually supports the trial court’s
decision in the instant case, because it underscores the principle that the subrogee acquires the
rights of the subrogor, whatever they might be in the particular situation.
Plaintiff argues that it cannot be bound by the contractual limitations period, because it
was a stranger to the insurance policy, and thus unaware that it imposed a two-year limitations
period. This argument is contrary to the basic principle that a subrogee stands in the shoes of the
subrogor. The law is well-settled that an insured must be held to knowledge of the terms and
conditions contained in the insured’s policy of insurance, even if the insured may not have read
it. Russell v State Farm Mutual Auto Ins Co, 47 Mich App 677, 679; 209 NW2d 815 (1973);
Universal Underwriters Co v VanKirk, 26 Mich App 254, 259; 182 NW2d 354 (1970); Scanlon v
Western Fire Ins Co, 4 Mich App 234, 238; 144 NW2d 677 (1966). Consequently, plaintiff must
also be held to the same knowledge. Plaintiff has not cited any authority stating that this
principle does not apply when the plaintiff is not the insured, but its subrogee. A party who fails
to cite authority in support of its position on appeal waives the argument. Caldwell v Chapman,
240 Mich App 124, 132; 610 NW2d 264 (2000). Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in
making a factual finding that it knew, or should have known, that defendant’s policy contained a
two-year limitations period. However, the insured is held to that knowledge as a matter of law,
irrespective of actual knowledge.
Plaintiff also argues that even if it is subject to the two-year limitations period, that period
was tolled when Scott filed its claim of loss, and did not begin to run again, because defendant
never formally denied coverage. Plaintiff’s argument is based on the judicial tolling doctrine,
first recognized in Tom Thomas Organization, Inc v Reliance Ins Co, 396 Mich 588, 597; 242
NW2d 396 (1976), but recently abrogated in Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562; 702
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NW2d 539 (2005). We acknowledge that the Devillers decision involved tolling of the statutory
limitations period for no-fault actions in MCL 500.3145(1). However, the decision in Devillers
was based on the well-established principle that unambiguous statutory language must be
enforced as written. Devillers, supra at 581. See, e.g., McClements v Ford Motor Co, 473 Mich
373, 385; 702 NW2d 166 (2005). This principle is fully analogous to the equally wellestablished principle that unambiguous contractual language must be enforced as written.
Upjohn Co v New Hampshire Ins Co, 438 Mich 197, 207; 476 NW2d 392 (1991); Wausau
Underwriters Ins Co v Ajax Paving Industries, Inc, 256 Mich App 646, 650; 671 NW2d 539
(2003). Indeed, the Court in Devillers acknowledged the common basis of these principles by
broadly stating that Tom Thomas and Lewis were wrongly decided because “[s]tatutory—or
contractual—language must be enforced according to its plain meaning, and cannot be judicially
revised or amended to harmonize with the prevailing policy whims of members of this Court.”
Devillers, supra at 582 (emphasis added). But even if judicial tolling were still recognized, it
does not aid plaintiff here. Defendant unequivocally stated in its August 28, 2000, letter to Scott
that it was denying coverage. Therefore, plaintiff’s action, brought in September 2002, was
untimely.
Plaintiff argues that “equitable considerations” preclude application of the contractual
limitations period, because it is unfair to require an insurer to comply with all provisions of a
competing insurer’s policy in order to pursue a contribution action. We are not persuaded that
applying the limitations period in the instant case leads to an inequitable result, where plaintiff
had access to the policy through its insured’s subsidiary and plaintiff itself is a sophisticated
entity in the insurance industry.
Finally, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by not giving it an opportunity to
amend its complaint. This issue is waived on appeal because it was not raised in the statement of
questions presented. Wallad v Access BIDCO, Inc, 236 Mich App 303, 309; 600 NW2d 664
(1999); MCR 7.212(C)(5). Furthermore, plaintiff filed its claim of appeal before the trial court
decided plaintiff’s motion to amend. Once a claim of appeal is filed, the trial court may not set
aside or amend the judgment or order appealed from except by order of this Court, or other
circumstances not applicable here. MCR 7.208(A). The trial court recognized that it did not
have authority to decide plaintiff’s motion to amend because plaintiff filed an appeal while the
motion was still pending. Accordingly, it issued an order indicating that plaintiff’s request to file
an amended complaint would be taken under advisement pending a decision by this Court.1
Under the circumstances, it would be premature for this Court to address plaintiff’s request to
amend its complaint. Plaintiff will have the opportunity to pursue this issue after this appeal is
decided.
1
Plaintiff originally filed an appeal as of right. After the briefs were filed, it became apparent
that the order appealed from was not a final order because plaintiff had filed a postjudgment
motion to amend its complaint, which was still pending in the trial court. On August 10, 2005,
this Court entered an order treating plaintiff’s appeal as a delayed application for leave to appeal
and granting it. Citizens Ins Co v Amerisure Ins Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals,
entered August 10, 2005 (Docket No. 254034).
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Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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