GRACE D TURNEY V CLARENCE E WILSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GRACE D. TURNEY, Personal Representative of
the Estate of LEROY TURNEY, deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
November 29, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 253332
Monroe Probate Court
LC No. 03-00093-CZ
CLARENCE E. WILSON, and LYNDIA L.
WILSON
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Zahra, P.J., Cavanagh and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the order dismissing her complaint. We affirm. This
appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
I. Basic Fact and Proceedings
Sometime in the mid 1980’s, plaintiff, then Grace D. Bartholow, traveled from her home
in Ohio to Carleton, Michigan to live and work on the decedent’s (Leroy Turney) twenty-five
acre farm. At this time, the decedent was married to Goldie H. Turney. In 1994, defendants
Clarence and Lyndia Wilson moved from Detroit to Carlton, about 1 to 1½ miles from the
decedent’s home. Shortly after moving to Carleton, Clarence met the decedent and began
helping the decedent with work on his farm. Eventually, the decedent and defendants became
good friends.
The decedent approached Clarence, and later Lyndia, about giving them his property.
Defendants told the decedent that he should give the property to plaintiff. Lyndia testified that
the decedent replied he wanted defendants to have the property because “if you give [the farm] to
Grace [plaintiff], Grace’s daughter would take it and sell it, and use it for drugs.” Defendants
asked the decedent to think it over. After about a month had passed, the decedent told
defendants that he still wanted to give them his property. Lyndia contacted an attorney she knew
from Detroit, Ronald Sopo, and set up an appointment at Sopo’s Detroit office.
Defendants testified that they attended a meeting at Sopo’s office on April 14, 1997, at
which the decedent, Sopo, plaintiff and plaintiff’s granddaughter, Samantha, were present.
Plaintiff denied that she or Samantha attended this meeting. Sopo could not recall who attended
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the meeting. Clarence testified that the decedent “told [Sopo] that he wanted to give
[defendants] this land at Carleton West.” Further, that Sopo replied, “”do you know what you’re
doing?” Sopo also asked the decedent, “are you sure you want to do this?” Sopo then
“explain[ed] to [the decedent] what he was doing[,]” specifically that the decedent is “giving
[defendants] this piece of land at [the decedent’s] death.” Sopo read the deed aloud, and the
decedent signed it.
The deed provides that on April 14, 1997, “Leroy Turney, as survivor of himself and his
deceased wife, Goldie H. Turney, “quit claims the property in question to himself, Clarence and
Lyndia, “as joint owners with full rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common subject to
life estate in Grace D. Bartholow for her natural life.” The deed also states that, “[p]rovided on
death of Leroy Turney, the surviving joint tenants will pay taxes on property.” The deed also
indicates the amount paid as “for the sum of 00/100 Dollars, gift, . . . .”
On the way home from Sopo’s office, the decedent handed Clarence the deed and said,
“I’m giving it to you because I don’t want it to get lost.” Clarence testified that Sopo told the
decedent, in Clarence’s presence, that “nothing changed about his ownership [in the property],”
that “he owned everything” and that “he could do anything with the property he wanted to.”
However, Clarence admitted no one ever explained the deed to him [Clarence]. Defendants later
recorded the deed.
Plaintiff testified that, about a month after April 14, 1997, she asked the decedent where
he had been on April 14, 1997, and he indicated, “he went to Detroit and got the will.” Dave
Kemeny, a friend of the decedent, testified that, in 2000, he overheard the decedent tell Clarence
“that him and Grace were going to get married, and asked from [(sic)] papers back, some
documents.” Kemeny testified that the decedent told him “he wanted a roof over Grace’s head
and said he’d like a trust fund set-up for Samantha, the grandchild, for when she gets older, for
college.” Clarence, however, testified that the decedent was standing next to him, when
“[Kemeny] came up and ask[ed him], . . . we want the papers back, Leroy does.” Clarence
testified that he told the decedent “if he wants the papers back to come down to the house and we
would talk about it.” The decedent never showed up. Kenemy also testified that he later asked
Lyndia for “the papers back out of concern” for “Leroy’s well being,” but Lyndia replied, “they
would have to talk with their lawyer.”
The decedent died on December 6, 2002, and plaintiff was named personal representative
of his estate. She filed a complaint in probate court to set aside the conveyance, alleging that the
decedent lacked the mental capacity to execute the quit claim deed, that no consideration was
given by defendants, and that the decedent was led to believe that he was receiving value above
and beyond that of the purported survivorship rights set forth in the deed.
The probate court conducted a bench trial and the parties agreed to narrow the issues to
whether there was confidential relationship between the decedent and defendants giving rise to a
presumption of undue influence, and whether there had been a valid gift of the property. The
probate court concluded that no confidential relationship existed between defendants and the
decedent, and that a valid gift had been executed.
II. Undue Influence.
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A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews the findings of fact by a trial court sitting without a jury under the
clearly erroneous standard. Walters v Snyder, 239 Mich App 453, 456; 608 NW2d 97 (2000). A
finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed. Id.
B. Analysis
The probate court did not clearly err in finding no undue influence.
“The presumption of undue influence is brought to life upon the introduction of evidence
which would establish (1) the existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the
grantor and a fiduciary, (2) the fiduciary or an interest which he represents benefits from a
transaction, and (3) the fiduciary had an opportunity to influence the grantors decision in that
transaction.” In re Estate of Karmey, 468 Mich 68, 73; 658 NW2d 796 (2003). “Although a
broad term, confidential or fiduciary relationship has a focused view toward relationships of
inequality.” Id. at 75. The Karmey Court also stated that one should not lose sight of the basic
principles of the concept of undue influence: To establish undue influence, it must be shown that
the grantor was subjected to threats, misrepresentation, undue flattery, fraud, or physical or
moral coercion sufficient to destroy free agency and impel the grantor to act against his
inclination and free will. Id. A confidential relationship is one in which dominion may be
exercised by one person over another. Id.
Although the probate court concluded that no confidential relationship existed, the
probate court’s conclusion was based on its finding that defendants had not influenced the
decedent’s decision to give them the property. We agree with the probate court that no there was
no undue influence. The record reflects that defendants were initially reluctant to take the
property, and asked the decedent to think it over. Defendants even told the decedent that he
should give the property to plaintiff. After three weeks, the decedent told defendants that he still
wanted to give defendants his property and asked Lyndia to contact an attorney to set up an
appointment. Lyndia complied with the decedent’s request, and defendants even later drove the
decedent to meet the attorney.
To establish undue influence, it must be shown that the grantor was subjected to threats,
misrepresentation, undue flattery, fraud, or physical or moral coercion sufficient to destroy free
agency and impel the grantor to act against his inclination and free will. Karmey, supra. Here,
the record reflects only that defendants facilitated the decedent’s inclination and free will. In
addition, attorney Sopo testified that he considered the decedent, and not defendants, to be his
client. Although Sopo could not specifically remember what was discussed at the meeting, he
testified that normally, or habitually, would have discussed with his client what the client wanted
to do with property. Sopo drafted the deed in accordance with the decedent’s wishes, which
further dispels any suggestion of undue influence. In addition, Clarence testified that Sopo read
the deed to everyone at the meeting, and then the decedent signed it. Plaintiff conceded that she
was not aware of any threats or use of force by defendants. The probate court’s finding that
defendants did not influence the decedent’s decision to give them the property is not clearly
erroneous, and therefore, the probate court properly determined that there was no undue
influence.
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III. Inter-Vivos Gift
Plaintiff argues that the conveyance must be set aside for want of delivery because the
decedent did not intend to pass a present interest in the land when he handed the deed, which
plaintiff claims the decedent believed was a will, to Clarence for “safekeeping.” We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews the findings of fact by a trial court sitting without a jury under the
clearly erroneous standard. Walters, supra. A finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing
court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id.
B. Analysis
A plaintiff who attacks the validity of a gift has the burden of proving that no gift was
made. Vander Honing v Taylor, 344 Mich 24, 29-30; 73 NW2d 458 (1955).
In order for a gift to be valid, three elements must be satisfied: (1) the donor must
possess the intent to transfer title gratuitously to the donee, (2) there must be
actual or constructive delivery of the subject matter to the donee, unless it is
already in the donee’s possession, and (3) the donee must accept the gift.
Acceptance is presumed if the gift is beneficial to the donee. [In re Handelsman,
266 Mich App 433,437-438; 702 NW2d 641 (2005), quoting Davidson v Bugbee,
227 Mich App 264, 268; 575 NW2d 574 (1997).]
Plaintiff specifically argues that there was no effective delivery of the deed:
As to delivery, it must be unconditional and it may be either actual or
constructive; the property may be given to the donee or to someone for him. Such
delivery must place the property within the dominion and control of the donee.
This means that a gift inter vivos must be fully consummated during the lifetime
of the donor and must invest ownership in the donee beyond the power of recall
by the donor. [Osius v Dingell, 375 Mich 605, 611; 134 NW2d 657 (1965)
(citations omitted).]
Similarly:
Delivery of a deed is essential to pass title. The whole object is to indicate the
grantor’s intent to give effect to the instrument. The test is whether it can be said
that delivery of the deeds was such as to convey a present interest in the land.
Physical delivery to the grantee raises a presumption of intent to pass title. This
presumption, however, is not conclusive and may be rebutted by the evidence.
[Resh v Fox, 365 Mich 288, 112 NW2d 486 (1961) (citations omitted).]
Along these lines, plaintiff claims that the decedent believed the document was a will, not
a deed. This claim buttresses plaintiff’s argument that there was no effective delivery because
whether a given document is legally a deed or a will turns on whether it conveys a present
interest or whether it conveys an interest on the death of the person who executed it. Benton
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Harbor Federation of Women’s Clubs v Nelson, 301 Mich 465, 470; 3 NW2d 844 (1942). That
determination turns on the intent of the person who executed it, which may be gleaned from the
instrument itself, from the circumstances surrounding its creation, and from the manner in which
the parties subsequently dealt with it. Id. at 471.
Plaintiff’s claim is based on statements from plaintiff and Kemeny indicating that the
decedent believed he signed a will. Plaintiff also cites to defendants’ testimony that they
believed the decedent owned the property until his death, and that until that time, the decedent
“had the same rights that he had when he came to Mr. Sopo’s office.”
Initially, the record does not indicate that the parties are legally sophisticated, and thus
we discount their statements made with respect to their understanding of property law concepts.
See Wright v Wright, 134 Mich App 800, 804-805; 351 NW2d 868 (1984). While the deed does
appear to have some testamentary features, i.e. right of survivorship, we agree with the probate
court’s determination that the decedent did not intend to create a will. The decedent brought his
old deed to Sopo’s office, and a new deed was drafted in accordance with the decedent’s wishes.
The deed was read aloud to the decedent, and does not contain any language that would indicate
it was a will, such as “I,” “will,” “give” or “death.” Given this evidence, the probate court
reasonably found that the decedent did not intend to create a will, but a deed that operates as a
will substitute. Therefore, the probate court did not clearly err in finding valid delivery of the
deed.
Further, the deed carries out the decedent’s intent. The deed created a joint life estate in
the decedent and defendants with a contingent remainder in fee to the survivor, subject to
plaintiff’s life estate. See Butler v Butler, 122 Mich App 361, 364; 332 NW2d 488 (1983).
There is no dispute that the decedent intended to convey to plaintiff a life estate in the property
with remainder to defendants. Given the likely circumstance that the decedent would predecease
plaintiff and defendants, the instrument he executed allowed him to presently execute this intent.
Further, the deed also provided that the decedent retain an interest in the property while he
continued to live there until his death.
Thus, because the decedent intended to create a deed, and thus pass a present interest in
the property, we agree with the probate court that the decedent effectively delivered the deed to
Clarence. “Physical delivery to the grantee raises a presumption of intent to pass title.” Resh,
supra. Further, we agree that the probate court did not clearly err in finding valid delivery where
the decedent, in his capacity as a grantee, presumptively delivered the deed to defendants.1
”Delivery to one of several joint grantees, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is delivery to
all of the grantees.” Schmidt v Jennings, 359 Mich 376, 382; 102 NW2d 589 (1960), quoting
Mayhew v Wilhelm, 249 Mich 640, 646; 229 NW 459 (1930). Here, the probate court found that
the decedent intended to form a “sort of partnership” with defendants when he signed the
document. The record supports this finding, and under these circumstances, we agree with the
probate court there was valid delivery.
1
The probate court relied on Gambino v Gambino, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court
of Appeals, issued May 30, 1997 (Docket No. 190953).
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Plaintiff heavily relies on testimony that the decedent stated to Clarence when handing
him the deed, “I’m giving it to you because I don’t want it to get lost.” As mentioned, we
discount the legal significance of this statement; such may not indicate the decedent’s intent to
presently pass title of the property. Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, the decedent’s statement
may not be inconsistent with the decedent’s intent to deliver the deed. Rather, the statement may
affirm his belief that both he and Clarence had a present interest in the property. Thus, contrary
to plaintiff’s claim, this statement does not necessarily show an intent not to deliver.
Finally, we note that plaintiff’s argument presumes that the decedent believed the
document would take effect upon his death. However, just as in Crane v Smith, 243 Mich 447,
450; 220 NW 750 (1928), “the deed was drafted by [the grantors] attorney, upon full knowledge
of the facts and claims. There was no showing that he made a mistake in stating its agreed terms.
The mistake, if any, was purely one of law, an erroneous conclusion as to the legal effect of
known facts.” Crane, supra at 450. “Mistake as to the legal effect of a written instrument,
deliberately executed and adopted, constitutes no ground for relief in equity.” Schmalzriedt v
Titsworth, 305 Mich 109, 119; 9 NW2d 24 (1943), quoting Crane, supra. Therefore, plaintiff is
not entitled to relief.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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