JAMES LINTON V DOROTHY D LINTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JAMES LINTON,
UNPUBLISHED
November 17, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 256651
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 03-004652-DO
DOROTHY D. LINTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, PJ, and Neff and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right from the divorce judgment. We affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand.
Defendant contends that the trial court assigned incorrect values to certain contested
assets and inequitably divided the marital estate. In granting a divorce, the trial court must make
findings of fact and dispositional rulings. Sands v Sands, 442 Mich 30, 34; 497 NW2d 493
(1993). A trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App
131, 150; 693 NW2d 825 (2005). A finding is clearly erroneous only when we are left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Draggoo v Draggoo, 223 Mich App 415,
429; 566 NW2d 642 (1997). In divorce cases, the trial court has the best opportunity to view the
demeanor of the witnesses and weigh their credibility. Stoudemire v Stoudemire, 248 Mich App
325, 339; 639 NW2d 274 (2003). Therefore, this Court gives special deference to a court’s
findings when they are based on the credibility of the witnesses. Draggoo, supra at 429.
If the court’s findings of fact are upheld, this Court must decide whether the dispositional
ruling was fair and equitable in light of those facts. Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 151-152;
485 NW2d 893 (1992). The dispositional ruling is discretionary and should be affirmed unless
we are left with the firm conviction that the division was inequitable. Id. at 152.
Defendant first asserts that the trial court erred by not specifically commenting on the
record regarding plaintiff’s credibility. We disagree. Defendant offers no authority for this
argument, and we could therefore consider the issue abandoned on appeal. Korth v Korth, 256
Mich App 286, 294; 662 NW2d 111 (2003). Nonetheless, we will briefly address the argument’s
merits.
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Findings of fact are governed by MCR 2.517, which states in relevant part that “[b]rief,
definite, and pertinent findings and conclusions on contested matters are sufficient, without
overelaboration of detail or particularization of facts.” MCR 2.517(A)(2). Our Supreme Court
has observed in the context of child custody cases that this rule does not require the trial court to
recite all the evidence considered, and that the trial court’s failure to mention a particular fact
does not suggest that the fact was overlooked. Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 883-884; 526
NW2d 889 (1994). We believe that this rule applies equally in the context of divorce cases. The
fact that the trial court did not specifically mention plaintiff’s credibility does not mean that it
was overlooked. The trial court expressly said that it considered the credibility of the witnesses,
of which there were only two – plaintiff and defendant. Defendant’s contention in this regard is
without merit.
Defendant next argues that the court erred in determining that plaintiff had made greater
contributions to the marital estate than had she. We disagree. Defendant admits that plaintiff’s
financial contributions to the marriage were more substantial than her own. However, she asserts
that the trial court failed to properly consider the non-financial contributions that she had made,
and suggests that the two parties contributed equally. Defendant cites Hanaway v Hanaway, 208
Mich App 278; 527 NW2d 792 (1995), for the proposition that one spouse’s non-financial
contributions to the marital estate are equally as important as the other spouse’s financial
contributions. Although defendant is not strictly incorrect, her reliance on Hanaway is
misplaced because she did not make non-financial contributions of the type mentioned in that
case.
The evidence in the case at bar indicated not only that plaintiff had paid most of the
major expenses, including taxes, insurance, and mortgage payments, but also indicated that
defendant was rarely present to care for the household or contribute to the marital relationship.
Specifically, plaintiff’s testimony that defendant was frequently away from the marital home and
was “not around to maintain the house or do anything,” was completely uncontested. On these
facts, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that plaintiff had contributed
more to the marital estate than had defendant.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in determining that she was at fault for
the breakdown of the marriage. Again, we disagree. The trial court is in the best position to
determine the extent to which each party contributed to the breakdown of the marriage.
Hanaway, supra at 297. The testimony in this case revealed that defendant had neglected the
marital relationship for some time, carrying on an extramarital relationship during the final two
and one-half years of marriage. The testimony also indicated that defendant and her paramour
taunted and ridiculed plaintiff through several notes and telephone calls. Based on this
uncontested evidence, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant was at fault for
the breakdown of the marriage.
Defendant’s next argument is that the trial court improperly considered fault in its
decision to disproportionately divide the balance of plaintiff’s individual retirement account
(IRA). We disagree. Although the fault of the parties is relevant to the distribution of marital
property, it is only one factor to be considered. Sparks, supra at 159. The other factors include
the duration of the marriage, the contributions of the parties to the marital estate, the age of the
parties, the health of the parties, the life status of the parties, the necessities and circumstances of
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the parties, the earning abilities of the parties, and general principles of equity. Id. at 159-160.
No one factor should be given such disproportionate weight as to be dispositive. Id. at 163.
In the present case, the trial court considered all the Sparks factors, making specific
findings of fact with regard to each one. The court determined that plaintiff had contributed
more to the marriage than had defendant, that defendant had been at fault for the breakdown of
the marital relationship, that plaintiff had suffered from high blood pressure and depression since
defendant’s affair began, and that plaintiff had developed concerns regarding sexually
transmitted diseases, requiring periodic testing. Additionally, the trial court found that the
marriage had lasted nearly fifteen years, that plaintiff and defendant were of approximately equal
age, and that both parties were gainfully employed. The court concluded that the majority of the
marital estate should be divided equally, but that the Sparks factors weighed in favor of dividing
plaintiff’s IRA disproportionately, granting fifty-five percent to plaintiff and forty-five percent to
defendant.
Although each of the Sparks factors did not individually weigh in favor of plaintiff, the
factors viewed as a whole supported awarding plaintiff more of his IRA. Because the trial court
based its decision on more than one of the factors and adopted the 55%-to-45% division with
respect to only one of the assets, we are not left with the firm conviction that the division was
inequitable. Sparks, supra at 152.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff credit for his $24,000
down payment on the marital home. Again, we disagree. Plaintiff testified that he had
contributed $24,000, earned before the marriage, toward the down payment on the marital home.
Defendant testified that she had contributed $14,400 in premarital assets of her own toward the
down payment. Neither party’s testimony on this matter was contested. Thus, the trial court did
not err in its findings regarding those contributions or in its finding that these contributions
constituted premarital assets. When a marital estate is divided, each party generally takes away
any premarital assets as separate property. Reeves v Reeves, 226 Mich App 490, 494; 575 NW2d
1 (1997). Premarital assets invested as a down payment on the purchase of real estate constitute
separate property. Id. at 495-496. Therefore, the trial court did not err in excluding the amount
of the parties’ down payment from the marital estate.
Defendant’s next argument concerns the value and distribution of the parties’ jewelry and
three motorcycles. The trial court found that the value of plaintiff’s two motorcycles was
roughly equivalent to the combined value of defendant’s motorcycle and jewelry, so it allowed
plaintiff to keep his motorcycles and defendant her motorcycle and jewelry. Defendant contends
that this was inequitable because the court undervalued her jewelry and improperly included it in
the marital estate. We disagree.
The testimony revealed that all but one piece of defendant’s jewelry had been
accumulated during the marriage. Although plaintiff initially testified that he believed the
jewelry was worth $33,000, he later testified that he did not know its value. Defendant testified
that she believed the jewelry was worth less than $33,000, but did not offer an estimated value of
her own. Defendant later testified that plaintiff would be able to purchase half of the jewelry for
$15,000. The court adopted $13,700 as the value of the jewelry.
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In light of the paucity of evidence regarding the value of the jewelry, the court drew a
reasonable inference, basing its determination of value on the possible range suggested by the
parties. Where a trial court’s valuation of a marital asset is within a range established by the
proofs, no clear error is present. Jansen v Jansen, 205 Mich App 169, 171; 517 NW2d 275
(1994). Moreover, because both parties testified that the jewelry was accumulated during the
marriage, the court did not clearly err in determining that it was part of the marital estate. We
note that defendant could have assisted the trial court on the issue of valuation by providing
evidence of the jewelry’s worth. Although both parties had ample time to conduct discovery on
the value of this asset, neither did so. As we observed in Perrin v Perrin, 169 Mich App 18, 23;
425 NW2d 494 (1988), this Court will not reverse a trial court’s valuation of an asset simply
because the parties failed to present proper evidence of the asset’s value.
The trial court then considered the value of the three motorcycles, finding that plaintiff’s
two motorcycles had a combined value of about $21,300, and that defendant’s motorcycle was
worth about $6,200. Although the apportionment of a marital estate should be equitable, the
spouses need not receive mathematically equal shares. Byington v Byington, 224 Mich App 103,
114; 568 NW2d 141 (1997). The trial court granted defendant her motorcycle and jewelry with a
combined value of about $19,900, and granted plaintiff both of his motorcycles, with a combined
value of $21,300. Although not mathematically equal, we are not left with the firm conviction
that this division was inequitable. Sparks, supra at 152.
Defendant next argues that the trial court inequitably divided 834.44 shares of Sysco
Corporation stock by awarding it entirely to plaintiff. We agree and remand for redistribution.
The trial court included the 834.44 shares plaintiff acquired during the marriage in the marital
estate, but neither party testified regarding the value of the Sysco stock. Apparently because it
was unable to determine the value, the trial court granted all of the stock to plaintiff. While we
agree that the stock was a marital asset, Byington, supra, at 110, we do not believe that the stock
was fairly divided.
Certain assets, like stock, may be divided without regard to their value. Both parties
agreed that the number of shares owned at the time of trial was 834.44. Therefore, the court
could have equally divided the stock into two sets of 417.22 shares, or it could have divided the
stock 55%-to-45%, as it did the IRA. Because the trial court inequitably awarded the entire asset
to plaintiff, we remand for a redistribution of the stock.
Defendant’s final contention concerns the severance package that she anticipated
receiving from her employer. Defendant testified that her employer would be closing the facility
where she worked within the year, but that she did not know the exact date on which her
employer planned to cease operations. In exchange for a retention bonus, defendant agreed to
continue working until her employer’s final day of business. Defendant testified that upon losing
her job, she would receive a severance package consisting of two parts: severance pay based on
the number of years she had worked, and the retention bonus for remaining with her employer
until it terminated its operations.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in its valuation of her severance package. We
disagree. Defendant testified that she did not know the exact value of her severance package, but
she believed that the severance pay portion would be based on the number of years she had
worked and a percentage of her annual salary. Based on this formula, plaintiff testified that he
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believed the severance pay portion would be about $32,000. Plaintiff also testified that he
believed the retention bonus would be about $8,000. On the basis of this testimony, the trial
court found that the two portions of the severance package had a combined total of $40,000.
Deferring to the trial court’s superior ability to observe the witnesses and weigh the testimony,
Dragoo, supra, at 429, the trial court did not clearly err in assessing this value.
Defendant next argues that even if the trial court properly assessed the value, it erred in
including the entire severance package in the marital estate. We agree. The testimony indicated
that the severance pay portion had been earned entirely during the marriage, based entirely on
defendant’s past service to her employer; however, the retention bonus would not accrue until
defendant completed her final period of employment. The trial court included both portions in
the marital estate. The court granted the full $40,000 severance package to defendant, but offset
that amount by awarding plaintiff $40,000 in cash from the balance of his IRA.
This Court has held that severance compensation earned entirely during the marriage is a
marital asset subject to equitable division on divorce. McNamara v Horner, 249 Mich App 177,
187-188; 642 NW2d 385 (2002). Because defendant’s $32,000 severance pay had already been
earned during the marriage, the trial court did not err by including it in the marital estate. But,
unlike the severance pay, defendant had not yet earned the retention bonus, so it was not
accumulated during the marriage. Id. By including defendant’s $8,000 retention bonus in the
marital estate, the trial court erred so we remand for exclusion of defendant’s $8,000 retention
bonus from the marital estate. On remand, the trial court shall reduce the value of plaintiff’s
$40,000 cash setoff to $32,000 and equitably divide the $8,000 difference.1
1
Defendant allegedly learned after the judgment was entered in this case that she would not be
losing her job and would not receive any severance or retention pay. Defendant filed a postjudgment motion to reopen the divorce and amend the judgment, but provided no documentary
evidence in support of the motion. The trial court denied defendant’s motion. The denial of
such a motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Mixon v Mixon, 237 Mich App 159, 163;
602 NW2d 406 (1999).
Defendant’s motion asserted that her circumstances with respect to the once-anticipated
severance package had changed; however, defendant presented no evidence to substantiate this
claim. Post-judgment motions to amend, when based on a change in circumstances or newly
discovered evidence, must be accompanied by supporting affidavits. MCR 2.611(D)(1). In
addition, it is not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to deny a post-judgment motion to
amend when there is no indication that the motion is meritorious. Cowan v Anderson, 184 Mich
649, 656; 151 NW 608 (1915). Because defendant presented no affidavit or other documentary
evidence to corroborate her assertion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant’s motion.
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We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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