PEOPLE OF MI V JOHNIE BERNARD WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 17, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 256442
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 03-193461-FH
JOHNIE BERNARD WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Cavanagh and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions for assault with intent to do great
bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84, and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced to thirty-three months to ten years in
prison for the assault with intent to do great bodily harm conviction and two years in prison for
the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
Defendant’s first issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s
hearsay statements under the excited utterance hearsay exception. We disagree.
This Court reviews for a clear abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision to admit or
exclude evidence. An abuse of discretion exists only if an unprejudiced person considering the
facts on which the trial court acted would say that there is no justification or excuse for the trial
court's decision. A trial court's decision on a close evidentiary question ordinarily cannot be an
abuse of discretion. People v Houston, 261 Mich App 463, 465-466; 683 NW2d 192 (2004).
Testimony regarding a statement made by another and offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted is hearsay, but an excited utterance is an admissible hearsay statement. MRE
803(2); People v Kowalak (On Remand), 215 Mich App 554; 546 NW2d 681 (1996). An excited
utterance is a statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. MRE 803(2); People v Smith,
456 Mich 543, 550; 581 NW2d 654 (1998). The rule allows hearsay testimony that would
otherwise be excluded because it is perceived that a person who is still under the sway of
excitement precipitated by an external startling event will not have the reflective capacity
essential for fabrication so that any utterance will be spontaneous and trustworthy. Smith, supra
at 550. There are two primary requirements for an excited utterance: (1) a startling event, and
(2) the resulting statement must have been made while the declarant was under the excitement
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caused by that event. Id. There is no express time limit for excited utterance statements. Id. at
551. The rule focuses on the lack of capacity to fabricate, not the lack of time to fabricate. Id.
Although the amount of time that passes between the event and the statement is an important
factor in determining whether the declarant was still under the stress of the event when the
statement was made, it is not dispositive. Id. The question is not strictly one of time, but of the
possibility of conscious reflection. Id. Physical factors, such as shock, unconsciousness, or pain,
may prolong the period in which the risk of fabrication is reduced to an acceptable minimum. Id.
at 551-552. The trial court's decision regarding whether the declarant was still under the stress of
the event is given wide discretion. Id. at 552.
Defendant contends that the hearsay statements admitted were not made while the victim,
Rubshona, was under the stress of excitement caused by the shooting. Specifically, defendant
contends that three hours passed after the shooting before the victim made the statements to the
police. However, as noted, there is no express time limit for excited utterance statements. Smith,
supra at 551. Here, the circumstances presented a continuing level of stress arising from the
shooting, which reduced the possibility of fabrication. Id. at 553. As the victim and defendant
traveled home, defendant pointed a handgun at her stomach and hit her in the head with the
handgun. Defendant then threatened to kill her and shot her in the right leg. The victim was
afraid that defendant would kill her and tried to remain as calm as possible. When they arrived
at the victim’s home, defendant noticed that she was shot and offered to take her to the hospital.
Because the victim feared defendant, she asked her brother to ride to the hospital with her and
defendant. Defendant took the victim to the hospital. The victim indicated that she was in pain
at the time the police arrived at the hospital, approximately three hours after the shooting. She
also indicated that she was dazed, confused, and in shock because of the shooting.
Officer Mullins also indicated that the victim appeared upset, scared, and reluctant to
speak. The victim told Mullins she was scared and cried when Mullins asked her about the
shooting. It is well settled that several physical factors, including shock or pain, may prolong the
period in which the risk of fabrication is reduced to an acceptable minimum. Smith, supra at
551-552. The statements to Mullins were also made while Rubshona was at the hospital because
of the incident. Therefore, the record indicates that the statement was made while Rubshona was
under excitement caused by the shooting. Id. at 550. Therefore, defendant’s contention that the
passage of time between the shooting and the victim’s statements to the police gave her time to
fabricate is without merit.
Defendant further contends, in his supplemental brief, that the prosecution withheld
statements obtained from medical personnel who spoke with the victim. Defendant contends that
these witnesses could testify that the victim did not realize that she was injured. MCR
6.201(B)(1) requires the prosecution to provide the defendant, upon the defendant's request, “any
exculpatory information or evidence known to the prosecuting attorney.” A trial court should
grant a motion for discovery of information that is “necessary to a fair trial and a proper
preparation of a defense.” People v Laws, 218 Mich App 447, 452; 554 NW2d 586 (1996).
Provided the information will aid the defendant in the preparation of trial, inadmissible evidence
is subject to discovery. Id. If the evidence is favorable to the defendant and material to guilt or
innocence, the defendant has a due process right to obtain such evidence in the possession of the
prosecution. Id. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that any statements obtained from
members of the hospital staff regarding the victim’s recognition that she was shot was material to
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his guilt or innocence. In fact, the victim testified that she informed hospital staff that she did
not know who shot her. She also testified that she did not realize she was injured until she
reached her home. Therefore, the victim’s statement to medical personnel was already placed on
the record. Additional testimony from members of the hospital staff regarding the victim’s
knowledge of the shooter would not have been material to defendant’s guilt or innocence.
In addition, defendant contends in his supplemental brief that the police coerced the
victim into making a statement implicating defendant. However, defendant has merely
announced his position on appeal and gave the issue cursory treatment. A party may not
announce a position on appeal and leave it to this Court to unravel or elaborate his claims.
People v Johnigan, 265 Mich App 463, 467; 696 NW2d 724 (2005). Therefore, this issue has
been abandoned on appeal.
Defendant’s second issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in admitting improperly
obtained physical evidence. We disagree.
The determination whether a violation of the federal constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures requires exclusion of the evidence is a question of law which
is reviewed de novo on appeal. People v Lombardo, 216 Mich App 500, 505; 549 NW2d 596
(1996).
Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions protect a person against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and no warrants may issue except based on probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized. US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11; People v McGhee, 255 Mich App 623,
625; 662 NW2d 777 (2003). The right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures
absent a warrant based upon probable cause is subject to specifically established and welldelineated exceptions. People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411, 417-418; 605 NW2d 667 (2000).
An automobile may be searched without a warrant if it is readily mobile and probable cause
exists which would support the issuance of a warrant. Id. at 419. The automobile exception does
not rise or fall depending on the peculiarities of the automobile to be searched. Instead, the
exception was established because of the mobility of automobiles in general. People v Carter,
250 Mich App 510, 515; 655 NW2d 236 (2002).
Several months after the shooting, Mullins went to the victim’s home to deliver
subpoenas to the victim and her mother. He noticed defendant’s blue Chevy Tahoe backed in the
driveway of the victim’s home. Mullins confirmed defendant’s ownership through a VIN
number search. Mullins looked through the driver’s side window and noticed the passenger’s
side door panel missing. He walked around the vehicle and looked through the passenger’s side
window. He noticed a speaker cover on the floorboard with what appeared to be a bullet hole in
it. Mullins impounded defendant’s vehicle and later obtained a search warrant to search the
inside of the vehicle. Defendant contends that the seizure of his vehicle without a search warrant
violated his constitutional rights.
An automobile may be searched without a warrant if it is readily mobile and probable
cause exists which would support the issuance of a warrant. Id. at 419. The seizure of
defendant’s vehicle did not violate his constitutional rights. Although defendant’s vehicle was
parked and locked, it appeared readily movable. Mullins verified defendant’s ownership of the
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vehicle by conducting a VIN number search. While walking around the outside of the vehicle,
Mullins noticed a speaker cover on the floorboard with what appeared to be a bullet hole in it.
He spoke with the victim several months before this date and she informed him that defendant
shot her as she sat in the passenger’s side of the vehicle. Therefore, there was probable cause
which would support the issuance of a search warrant. In fact, Mullins secured a search warrant
after impounding the vehicle (i.e., before he conducted a search of the vehicle). Therefore,
defendant’s contention is without merit. Defendant further contends that the information upon
which the warrant was based was stale. However, defendant cites no authority for his position
and it is thereby abandoned on appeal. Johnigan, supra at 467.
Defendant’s final issue on appeal is that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.
We disagree.
Because defendant did not move for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing, this Court's
review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Westman, 262 Mich App 184,
192; 685 NW2d 423 (2004). Whether a defendant has been denied the effective assistance of
counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. A judge must first find the facts and then must
decide whether those facts constitute a violation of the defendant's constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel. People v Riley, 468 Mich 135, 139; 659 NW2d 611 (2003).
Question of constitutional law are reviewed by this Court de novo. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich
575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: (1) that his trial
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; (2) that defendant was
so prejudiced thereby that he was denied a fair trial, i.e., that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different; and 3) that
the resultant proceedings were fundamentally unfair or unreliable. People v Rodgers, 248 Mich
App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001). Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the
defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76;
601 NW2d 887 (1999). When considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, counsel’s
performance must be considered without the benefit of hindsight. Moreover, a defendant must
overcome the presumption that the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.
People v LaVearn, 448 Mich 207, 216; 528 NW2d 721 (1995).
Defendant first contends that defense counsel’s failure to call medical personnel as
witnesses deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. However, decisions regarding what
evidence to present and whether to call or question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial
strategy. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). Even so, the information
defendant purported medical personnel would provide was provided by the victim at trial.
Therefore, the statement the victim made to medical personnel was already admitted at trial.
Defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that defense counsel’s failure to call medical
personnel as witnesses was sound trial strategy.
Defendant also contends that defense counsel’s failure to file a motion for a 180-day
ruling constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. However, defendant has failed to cite
supporting authority and has given this issue cursory treatment. It is therefore abandoned on
appeal. Johnigan, supra at 467. Defendant has also cited little or no supporting authority
regarding his contention that defense counsel’s failure to file a motion for a new trial, failure to
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file a motion for a directed verdict based on insufficient evidence, and failure to secure
defendant’s presence at a circuit court hearing constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
These issues are likewise abandoned on appeal. Id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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