PAMELA L WILLIAMS V MICHAEL A WHITFIELD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PAMELA L. WILLIAMS,
UNPUBLISHED
November 17, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 254906
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 03-315615-NI
MICHAEL A. WHITFIELD,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Sawyer and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a circuit court order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition. We reverse and remand. This appeal is being decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff, a passenger on defendant’s motorcycle, was injured after defendant collided
with another vehicle. At issue is whether plaintiff must meet the no-fault “serious impairment”
threshold to recover noneconomic damages from defendant. The trial court ruled that she did
and that, because plaintiff’s injuries did not meet that threshold, defendant was entitled to
summary disposition.
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling with respect to a motion for summary
disposition. Kefgen v Davidson, 241 Mich App 611, 616; 617 NW2d 351 (2000). Statutory
interpretation is a question of law that is also reviewed de novo. Roberts v Mecosta Co General
Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 62; 642 NW2d 663 (2002).
The rules of statutory construction require the courts to give effect to the Legislature’s
intent. Institute in Basic Life Principles, Inc v Watersmeet Twp (After Remand), 217 Mich App
7, 12; 551 NW2d 199 (1996). We should first look to the specific statutory language to
determine the intent of the Legislature, which is presumed to intend the meaning that the statute
plainly expresses. Id. If the language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute
reflects the legislative intent, and judicial construction is not permitted. Tryc v Michigan
Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135; 545 NW2d 642 (1996). If the statute defines a given
term, that definition is controlling. Id. at 136.
“[T]ort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use . . . of a motor vehicle
with respect to which the security required by section 3101 was in effect is abolished except”
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with regard to damages for noneconomic loss for personal injury as provided by § 3135(1) and
with regard to other circumstances not relevant here. See MCL 500.3135(3)(b). Section 3135(1)
provides, in part, that a “person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by
his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has
suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” MCL
500.3135(1).
Section 3101 requires the owner or registrant “of a motor vehicle required to be
registered” to “maintain security for payment of benefits under personal protection insurance,
property protection insurance, and residual liability insurance.” MCL 500.3101(1). As used in
Chapter 31, of which §§ 3101 and 3135 are a part, a “motor vehicle” is defined to include “a
vehicle, including a trailer, operated or designated for operation upon a public highway by power
other than muscular power which has more than 2 wheels. Motor vehicle does not include a
motorcycle or moped . . . .” MCL 500.3101(2)(e). Thus, a motorcycle owner is not required to
maintain the insurance otherwise required under § 3101(1). See Piersante v American Fidelity
Ins Co, 88 Mich App 607, 609-610; 278 NW2d 691 (1979).
Here, plaintiff seeks recovery in tort from the driver of a motorcycle. Because § 3135(3)
only abolishes tort liability arising from the use of a motor vehicle for which insurance is
required, and because a motorcycle is not a “motor vehicle” and is not required to be insured
under § 3101, tort liability arising from the use of a motorcycle is not abolished. One exception
to the general abolition of tort liability under § 3135(3) is the situation in which the plaintiff
suffered a threshold injury. However, because tort liability arising from the use of a motorcycle
is not abolished, any exception to the abolition of tort liability arising from the use of motor
vehicles is irrelevant here. Viewed another way, the limitation on tort liability for threshold
injuries under § 3135(1) applies only to losses caused by a person’s “ownership, maintenance, or
use of a motor vehicle.” A motorcycle is not a “motor vehicle” as that term is used in § 3135(1),
and, therefore, losses caused by a person’s ownership, maintenance or use of a motorcycle are
not subject to the limitations of § 3135.
We acknowledge that in Braden v Spencer, 100 Mich App 523, 529; 299 NW2d 65
(1980), this Court concluded that “[i]n drafting the no-fault act, we do not believe the Legislature
intended that motorcyclists be excluded from § 3135.” However, the Braden Court did not
consider § 3135(1) in the context of liability sought to be imposed against a motorcycle driver.
While the plaintiff in Braden was a motorcyclist, he sought recovery in tort from the driver of a
“motor vehicle.” Braden, supra at 525. Because the plaintiff sought to impose tort liability
against the driver of a “motor vehicle” who was required to maintain insurance under § 3101,
and because none of the exceptions to the abolition of tort liability under § 3135(3) applied, the
defendant driver was not liable in tort. See Braden, supra at 529. In this case, by contrast,
plaintiff seeks recovery in tort from the driver of a vehicle other than a “motor vehicle.”
Accordingly, the limitations of § 3135 are inapplicable, and the trial court erred in granting
summary disposition to defendant.
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Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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