IN RE BENNETT/CHAPMON MINORS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of TERICK JOHN CHAPMON,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, f/k/a
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
November 15, 2005
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 261451
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-412139-NA
ERIC CHAPMON,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
TIFFANY A. BENNETT, RUFUS WILSON, and
DAVID PARKER,
Respondents.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Sawyer and Meter, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the order terminating his parental rights to
the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(c)(i), (g), and (h). We affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that statutory grounds for termination were
established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 355;
612 NW2d 407 (2000); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999).
Respondent-appellant, who is incarcerated, argues that the trial court erred in terminating
his parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) because he could provide a safe and suitable
home for his child if his criminal appeal were to be granted. Because respondent-appellant has
failed to develop this argument sufficiently and failed to provide any authority to support his
contention, he has abandoned this claim. People v Kevorkian, 248 Mich App 373, 389; 639
NW2d 291 (2001); Consumers Power Co v Public Service Com’n, 181 Mich App 261, 268; 448
NW2d 806 (1989).
-1-
Moreover, the trial court did not err in finding that the conditions of MCL
712A.19b(3)(g) and (h) were established. Although the child was being cared for by his
maternal grandparents, the fact remained that respondent-appellant was serving a twenty-year
prison sentence and could not care for the child while incarcerated. In addition, there was no
reasonable expectation that respondent-appellant would be able to provide proper care and
custody within a reasonable time considering that respondent-appellant’s release date is May 11,
2025. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).
Although the parties do not address subsection (3)(h) on appeal, the trial court relied on
this subsection, and the evidence established that (1) the child would be deprived of a normal
home for a period exceeding two years because of respondent-appellant’s incarceration, (2)
respondent-appellant had not provided for the child’s care, and (3) there was no reasonable
expectation that he would be able to provide such care within a reasonable time. Therefore, the
trial court did not clearly err in terminating respondent-appellant’s parental rights under this
subsection.1
Finally, respondent-appellant argues that termination of his parental rights was not in the
child’s best interests. Although respondent-appellant maintained some contact with his son
while incarcerated, the child had been in the grandmother’s care the majority of the child’s life.
This child, aged four at the time of trial, needed permanency, which respondent-appellant could
not provide at the time of the termination hearing or in the near future.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
1
We note that only one statutory ground for termination need be established to justify the
termination of parental rights. Trejo, supra at 356. Therefore, we need not address the
additional arguments respondent-appellant raises on appeal.
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
