PEOPLE OF MI V JOHN ANTHONY SPRATT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 3, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 254767
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2003-193007-FC
JOHN ANTHONY SPRATT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Cooper and Kelly, J.J.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of first-degree felony murder,
MCL 750.316(b), armed robbery, MCL 750.529, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL
750.224f, and three counts of felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced as a fourth
habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to concurrent prison terms of life without parole for the felony
murder conviction, forty to sixty years for the armed robbery conviction, and six to twenty years
for the felon in possession conviction. His concurrent prison terms of two years for each of the
felony-firearm convictions are consecutive to the other sentences. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it permitted the prosecution to
introduce other acts, MRE 404(b) testimony regarding a home invasion committed before the
charged crimes occurred. We disagree. Because defendant failed to preserve this evidentiary
issue for appellate review, we review it for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 508; 674 NW2d 366 (2004).
The prosecution sought to introduce this testimony under the res gestae exception to
MRE 404(b). Under the res gestae exception, “‘[e]vidence of other criminal acts is admissible
when so blended or connected with the crime of which defendant is accused the proof of one
incidentally involves the other or explains the circumstances of the crime.’” People v Scholl,
453 Mich 730, 742; 556 NW2d 851 (1996), quoting People v Delgado, 404 Mich 76, 83; 273
NW2d 395 (1978).
The prosecution presented evidence that two nine-millimeter weapons were fired during
the commission of the robbery and murder. The prosecution also presented evidence that a .40
caliber gun was carried during the charged crimes, though there was no evidence that the gun
was fired. The challenged testimony, that of co-defendant Haywood, explained that defendant
stole a third weapon from a home in the hour preceding the charged crimes. Haywood testified
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that this gun was neither the nine-millimeter nor the .40 caliber weapon recovered by the police.
Thus, this testimony provided crucial evidence that, during the commission of the charged
crimes, the co-defendants possessed a third weapon, never recovered by police. Therefore,
Hayward’s testimony provided the complete story and explained the circumstances of the
charged crimes.
Defendant contends that this third weapon was used only to shoot the second victim and
that, because defendant was not charged with any crime related to that victim’s shooting, this
evidence was irrelevant. However, the prosecution presented testimony that multiple shots were
fired by the unrecovered gun during the events giving rise to the charged crimes, including the
shot that injured the second victim. The prosecution further presented testimony from the second
victim that only one shot was fired at her. Taken together, this testimony indicates that the
unrecovered gun must also have been fired during the robbery and shooting of the first victim, in
connection with whose death defendant is charged. Accordingly, this argument is without merit.
Further, one of the prosecution’s theories of the case was that the four co-defendants
committed the robbery and murder because they did not succeed in getting any money during the
home robbery described by Haywood. On this basis, too, the evidence gave the jury the
complete story and explained the circumstances of the charged crimes.
For these reasons, we conclude that Hayward’s testimony was admissible under the res
gestae exception. Because the trial court correctly admitted this testimony, defendant’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is also without merit. “Ineffective assistance of counsel
cannot be predicated on the failure to make a frivolous or meritless motion.” People v Riley
(After Remand), 468 Mich 135, 142; 659 NW2d 611 (2003).
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred when it permitted defendant’s jury to hear
Rachel Joost’s testimony regarding events that took place after the crimes giving rise to the
charges against him. We disagree. Because defendant failed to preserve this issue for appellate
review, we review it for plain error affecting his substantial rights. Knox, supra at 508.
This evidence was also admissible under the res gestae exception. The events described
by Joost were incident to and intimately related to the events giving rise to the charges against
defendant. After shooting the hotel clerk and robbing the hotel, defendant and the co-defendants
departed the crime scene. However, upon returning to the hotel, they encountered Joost, a hotel
guest. Joost would not have been shot had the events giving rise to the charges against defendant
not occurred. Further, Joost’s testimony provided an explanation for some of the physical
evidence the police found in the hotel. This physical evidence included bloodstains that had no
obvious source without testimony about Joost’s injury. Because Joost’s testimony was
admissible under the res gestae exception, the trial court did not err in its admission.
Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the malice
element necessary to find defendant guilty under an aiding and abetting theory of first-degree
felony murder and second-degree murder. We review de novo claims of instructional error.
People v Hall, 249 Mich App 262, 269; 643 NW2d 253 (2002).
To convict a defendant of first-degree felony murder under an aiding and abetting theory
the prosecution must prove: (1) the crime charged was committed by defendant or some other
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person, (2) defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the
crime, and (3) defendant intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the
principal intended its commission at the time that he gave aid and encouragement. People v
Atkins, 259 Mich App 545, 554-555; 675 NW2d 863 (2003). Moreover, “[i]f an aider and
abettor participates in a crime with knowledge of the principal’s intent to kill or to cause great
bodily harm, the aider and abettor is acting with wanton and willful disregard sufficient to
support a finding of malice.’” Riley, supra at 141.
Because the court’s instruction virtually mirrored the elements set forth in Akins, we
conclude that the trial court’s jury instruction fairly presented the issues to be tried and
sufficiently protected defendant’s rights. People v Gonzalez, 256 Mich App 212, 225; 663
NW2d 449 (2003). Therefore, reversal is not warranted on the basis of the trial court’s
instruction on first-degree felony murder. Id.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in its jury instruction on second-degree
murder under an aiding and abetting theory. However, the trial court instructed the jury that it
must first consider the first-degree felony murder charge and, only after finding defendant not
guilty of that charge or failing to reach an agreement on that charge, could it proceed to consider
the lesser offense of second-degree murder. “It is well established that jurors are presumed to
follow their instructions.” People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998).
Because the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree felony murder, we must presume that it
never considered the second-degree murder charge. Therefore, even if the trial court’s
instruction on second-degree murder was erroneous, it was harmless and does not warrant
reversal. People v Bartlett, 231 Mich App 139, 144; 585 NW2d 341 (1998).
Finally, defendant argues that the prosecution engaged in misconduct in its closing and
rebuttal arguments by appealing to the jury’s sympathy and its sense of civic duty, and by
denigrating the defense. We disagree. Because defendant failed to preserve this issue for
appellate review, we review it for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v
Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 32; 650 NW2d 96 (2002).
The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). A prosecutor
is free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it as they relate to his
theory of the case. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). However, a
prosecutor may not appeal to the jury to sympathize with the victim. Watson, supra at 591. Nor
may a prosecutor urge the jurors to convict the defendant as part of their civic duty. Bahoda,
supra at 282.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor made three statements that improperly appealed the
jurors’ sympathy. In two of the challenged statements, the prosecutor merely argued the facts in
evidence and inferences drawn therefrom. While the prosecutor’s remarks were somewhat
emotional in nature, “a prosecutor may use emotional language during closing argument.”
People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 454; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). These arguments were not
improper.
The third statement, referring to defendant as the victim’s judge, jury and executioner,
initially appears more problematic. However, in People v Hall, 396 Mich 650, 656; 242 NW2d
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377 (1976), our Supreme Court, faced with a similar prosecutorial argument, concluded that such
did not entitle the defendant to the reversal of his convictions because any error was cured by the
court’s cautionary instruction that the attorneys’ arguments did not constitute evidence. In this
case, the trial court similarly instructed the jury that the attorneys’ statements and arguments
were not evidence. Therefore, this statement does not provide a basis for reversal of defendant’s
convictions.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor made an improper plea to the jurors’ sense of
civic duty. Bahoda, supra at 282. However, viewed in context, it appears that the prosecutor
was simply asking the jurors to use their common sense. He argued that armed robberies always
have the potential for violence and, therefore, defendant, by participating in an armed robbery,
acted with willful and wanton disregard of the likelihood of the natural tendency of his behavior
to cause death or great bodily harm. Accordingly, this statement did not constitute an improper
appeal to the jurors’ sense of civic duty.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor improperly denigrated the defense. Watson,
supra at 592. Defendant argued in his closing argument that Haywood, who testified about the
existence of a third weapon at the crime scene, was lying to protect herself. The prosecution
responded to this argument by suggesting that defense counsel was attempting to divert the jury’s
attention from the truth. This was a proper rebuttal to defendant’s closing argument.
Because each of the challenged statements was proper, reversal is not warranted on the
basis of the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s comments. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575,
591-592; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is also
without merit because each of the challenged prosecutor’s statements was proper. Riley, supra at
142.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
I concur in result only.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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