KRISTIN BELOTE V KEITH STRANGE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KRISTIN BELOTE,
UNPUBLISHED
October 25, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 262591
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2004-057964-NI
KEITH STRANGE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Smolenski and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this automobile negligence action, plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s grant of
summary disposition in favor of defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On April 26, 2003, plaintiff and defendant were involved in an automobile accident. On
April 29, 2004, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant alleging that defendant proximately
caused the accident of April 26, 2003 and that during the accident plaintiff suffered head, neck,
back and muscle-skeletal system injuries, which injuries constitute a serious impairment of body
function. On February 14, 2005, defendant filed a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) claiming
that he was entitled to summary disposition because plaintiff’s injuries were not caused by the
accident, were not aggravated by the accident and did not rise to the level of a serious
impairment of body function as required by MCL 500.3135.1
In support of its motion, defendant presented evidence that plaintiff had been seeing a
chiropractor, David T. Mitchell, D.C., since 1998 for back problems and that a CT scan taken
just eight days before the accident revealed identical abnormalities to one taken after the
accident. In addition, defendant claimed that plaintiff had misled the physicians who treated her
by stating that her symptoms arose after the automobile accident. In support of this assertion,
defendant attached the affidavits of the surgeon who performed plaintiff’s back surgery, Steven
1
We note that plaintiff erroneously states that defendant’s motion was brought pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10).
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M. Rapp, M.D., and Clifford M. Buchman, D.O.,2 who performed an independent medical
examination of plaintiff after the accident. In his affidavit, Rapp retracted his earlier opinion that
the accident caused plaintiff’s “clinical presentation.” Instead, he averred,
I have most recently thoroughly examined Ms. Belote’s reported symptomatology
which existed prior to her involvement in a motor vehicle accident occurring on
April 26, 2003. In doing so, it is apparent that Ms. Belote was experiencing and
complaining of low back pain which radiated to her right hip and down her right
leg prior to her involvement in a car accident. In particular, Ms. Belote informed
me at the time of her first office visit that she had been experiencing pain in her
right hip and leg for a period of approximately two months prior to her initial
office visit of May 1, 2003. In addition, I have personally reviewed the CT of the
lumbosacral spine taken on April 18, 2003 wherein the particular herniation at
L4-L5 was identified. I have also examined the CT of May 6, 2003, which I now
know was taken approximately one week after Ms. Belote’s involvement in an
automobile accident. In comparison, there was absolutely no change noted
between the CT scan taken before the accident and the CT scan taken after the
accident.
Based on this, Rapp stated that he did not believe the automobile accident caused plaintiff to
sustain “any form of anatomical injury” and did not cause the herniation at the L4-L5 level.
Indeed, Rapp stated that there was no evidence that the automobile accident even aggravated the
pre-existing condition. Therefore, he concluded, his treatment of plaintiff, including her surgery,
was not caused by the accident. Like Rapp, Buchman had originally stated that plaintiff’s
complaints were likely caused by the automobile accident. However, in his affidavit, Buchman
also stated that on further review of plaintiff’s complete medical records, he was of the opinion
that plaintiff’s herniated disc was a condition that pre-existed the accident. He also noted that
the CT scans taken before and after plaintiff’s accident reveal no change in her condition.
On March 16, 2005, the trial court heard arguments on defendant’s motion for summary
disposition. Before either party had begun its arguments, the trial court stated,
I know what the briefs said, I know what you said in the briefs, I know
what she says on the history that was taken prior to the accident, after the
accident. This case would go directly to the purpose of [MCR] 2.114. It bothers
me somewhat that we have an individual here who apparently lied to the medical
people who are trying to treat her. That, to me, flies in the face of what we’re
supposed to do in the litigative process.
Our jurisprudence is put in contempt by such activities and I’m very
concerned about that.
2
Defendant also supplied a letter from Phillip Friedman, M.D., who was retained by defendant
to make an independent assessment of plaintiff’s case. Friedman opined that there did not appear
to be any significant anatomical alteration as a result of the April 2003 automobile accident.
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Plaintiff responded that his client was in fact truthful with her physicians. Plaintiff’s counsel
also argued that a fact question regarding causation was created by the opinion of plaintiff’s
chiropractor and the earlier opinions of Rapp and Buchman, whose subsequent affidavits merely
established a credibility issue. Plaintiff’s counsel further contended that defendant’s counsel
violated the law by having an ex parte meeting with Rapp. Because defendant’s ex parte contact
with Rapp violated the law, plaintiff’s counsel asked the court to disregard the affidavit illegally
obtained from Rapp and levy sanctions against defendant.
After hearing the arguments, the trial court stated that it was “satisfied that Plaintiff has
failed to establish that the accident proximately caused her to sustain some form of additional
injury, which required the surgery.” The court then described the contents of the affidavits by
Rapp and Buchman as well as the letter by Friedman. The Court concluded,
The only testimony that Plaintiff has to refute all these experts is a letter
from her chiropractor and the Court finds that is not admissible evidence . . . .
Thus, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has failed to provide this Court
with any proper evidence to meet her burden of proof that the motor vehicle
accident at issue proximately caused her to sustain a threshold injury. Therefore,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Disposition is granted. . . .
An order granting defendant’s motion was entered on March 16, 2005.
On March 29, 2005, plaintiff filed a for reconsideration of the trial court’s grant of
defendant’s motion for summary disposition. With her motion for reconsideration, plaintiff
attached an affidavit by her chiropractor. In the affidavit, Mitchell averred that it was his
professional opinion that plaintiff’s herniated disc was aggravated by the automobile accident of
April 26, 2003, and that this accident caused plaintiff to sustain a serious impairment of body
function. In her motion, plaintiff argued that Rapp’s affidavit should have been struck because it
was illegally obtained and, even considering the affidavit, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence
to create a fact question on the issue of causation. Specifically, plaintiff contended that
plaintiff’s deposition testimony, wherein she states that her herniated disc became symptomatic
after the accident, coupled with the affidavit of Mitchell, created a fact question. For these
reasons, plaintiff argued, the trial court committed palpable error by granting defendant’s
motion.
On April 22, 2005, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration because
there were no new material facts and plaintiff merely presented the same issues already ruled on
by the court. Plaintiff then appealed as of right.
II. Summary Disposition
Plaintiff first argues that she presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact for
the jury concerning whether her injuries were caused by the accident. For this reason, she
contends, the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the
grounds that she had not presented a fact question on the causation issue. We disagree.
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A. Standards of Review
This Court reviews de novo the grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition.
Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). In addition, this Court
reviews de novo the proper interpretation of a statute. Macomb Co Prosecutor v Murphy, 464
Mich 149, 157; 627 NW2d 247 (2001).
B. HIPAA Violation
While plaintiff argues that she presented sufficient evidence to create a fact question on
the issue of causation even if the Rapp’s affidavit is considered, she initially argues that the trial
court erred when it considered Rapp’s affidavit, which was obtained in violation of the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA). See 42 USC 1320d et seq. Therefore,
we shall address that argument first.
Under HIPAA, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) is charged with
promulgating rules and regulations for the safeguarding of health information. Bayne v Provost,
359 F Supp 2d 234, 236 (ND NY, 2005); 42 USC 1320d-2. Health information is defined as
“any information, whether oral or recorded in any form or medium, that – (A) is created or
received by a health care provider, health plan, public health authority, employer, life insurer,
school or university, or health care clearinghouse; and (B) relates to the past, present, or future
physical or mental health or condition of an individual, the provision of health care to an
individual, or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an
individual.” 42 USC 1320d(4). An ex parte meeting between a plaintiff’s physician and
defendant’s counsel to discuss the plaintiff’s medical history or condition clearly falls within the
definition of health information that is subject to the standards promulgated by the Secretary.
Pursuant to the rules governing the transmission of health information, plaintiff’s
physician could not “use or disclose protected health information, except as permitted or required
by this subpart . . . .” 45 CFR 164.502(a). Under subpart 502(a), plaintiff’s physician could
disclose protected health information to defendant’s counsel pursuant to and in compliance with
a valid authorization under 45 CFR 164.508, or pursuant to an agreement under, or as otherwise
permitted by 45 CFR 164.510, or as permitted by and in compliance with 45 CFR 164.512, or 45
CFR 164.514(e), (f), or (g). 45 CFR 164.502(a)(1)(iv)-(vi). It is undisputed that defendant’s ex
parte communication with plaintiff’s physician was not done in compliance with any of these
provisions. That notwithstanding, defendant contends that the meeting between plaintiff’s
physician and his trial counsel was expressly permitted under our Supreme Court’s decision in
Domako v Rowe, 438 Mich 347; 475 NW2d 30 (1991). Therefore, defendant concludes, there
“can be no question that the meeting was entirely appropriate . . . .” We disagree.
This Court is bound to respect the supremacy of federal law. US Const, art VI, § 2.
HIPAA expressly provides that “[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2), a provision or
requirement under this part, or a standard or implementation specification adopted or established
under sections 1320d-1 through 1320d-3 of this title, shall supersede any contrary provision of
State law . . . .” 42 USC 1320d-7(a)(1). Under paragraph (2), a provision, requirement or
standard adopted pursuant to HIPAA shall not supersede a contrary provision of state law if,
subject to section 264(c)(2), the state law relates to the privacy of individually identifiable health
information. 42 USC 1320d-7(a)(2)(B). Under Section 264(c)(2) of PL 104-191; 110 Stat 1936,
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Congress provided that, “[a] regulation promulgated under paragraph (1) shall not supercede a
contrary provision of State law, if the provision of State law imposes requirements, standards, or
implementation specifications that are more stringent than the requirements, standards, or
implementation specifications imposed under the regulation.” See Notes to 42 USC 1320d-2; 45
CFR 160.203(b) (implementing section 264(c)(2) of PL 104-191; 110 Stat 1936). Consequently,
unless Michigan law imposes stricter requirements on the disclosure of health information,
HIPAA will control.
In Michigan, a party may “obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . .” MCR 2.302. Likewise,
when, as is the case here, a party places his or her mental or physical condition in controversy,
“medical information about the condition is subject to discovery under these rules to the extent
that . . . (b) the party does not assert that the information is subject to a valid privilege.” MCR
2.314(A)(1). In Michigan, the relevant privilege is provided by MCL 600.2157, which states
that,
Except as otherwise provided by law, a person duly authorized to practice
medicine or surgery shall not disclose any information that the person has
acquired in attending a patient in a professional character, if the information was
necessary to enable the person to prescribe for the patient as a physician, or to do
any act for the patient as a surgeon.
However, this privilege may be informally waived by the patient by either failing to timely assert
the privilege after certain discovery requests, MCR 2.314(B)(1), or by bringing an action against
any defendant to recover for any personal injuries where the patient produces a treating physician
as a witness, MCL 600.2157. Once the physician-patient privilege has been waived, a
defendant’s counsel may properly conduct an ex parte interview with a plaintiff’s treating
physician. Davis v Dow Corning Corp, 209 Mich App 287, 292; 530 NW2d 178 (1995), citing
Domako, supra.
In stark contrast to Michigan law, under HIPAA the plaintiff’s physician may only
disclose protected health information without the written consent of the patient pursuant to 45
CFR 164.508 or an agreement entered into pursuant to 45 CFR 164.510, if the disclosure is in
response to a court order, subpoena, discovery request, or other lawful process. 45 CFR
164.512(e)(1)(i) and (ii). Furthermore, if the physician’s response is to a discovery request, the
physician may still only respond if he or she “receives satisfactory assurance . . . from the party
seeking the information that reasonable efforts have been made by such party to ensure that the
individual who is the subject of the protected health information that has been requested has been
given notice of the request;”3 or “receives satisfactory assurance . . . from the party seeking the
3
Under 45 CFR 164.512(e)(iii), a physician receives adequate assurances for purposes of 45
CFR 164.512(e)(ii)(A) if the party seeking protected health information provides the physician
with a written statement and accompanying documentation, which demonstrates that the party
requesting the information has made a good faith attempt to provide written notice of the request
to the individual and that notice provided sufficient information to permit the party to raise an
(continued…)
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information that reasonable efforts have been made by such party to secure a qualified protective
order that meets the requirements of paragraph (e)(1)(v) of this section.” 45 CFR
164.512(e)(ii)(A) & (B).
From these provisions, it is clear that a patient may not informally waive the protections
afforded by HIPAA. Indeed, the detailed requirements imposed by HIPAA on health
information disclosures give the patient extensive control over the dissemination of his or her
health information. Even in the discovery context, HIPAA prevents a physician from disclosing
health information absent a court order, written permission from the patient, or assurances that
the patient has been informed of the request and given an opportunity to object. “If state law can
force disclosure without a court order, or the patient’s consent, it is not ‘more stringent’ than the
HIPAA regulations.” Law v Zuckerman, 307 F Supp 2d 705, 711 (D MD, 2004). Because the
requirements and standards imposed by HIPAA are stricter and afford more protection for a
patient’s health information than MCL 600.2157 and the Michigan Court Rules, HIPAA
controls. 42 USC 1320d-7(a)(1). Therefore, defendant was required to obtain plaintiff’s written
consent pursuant to 45 CFR 164.508 or to comply with the discovery procedures detailed under
45 CFR 164.512(e), before conducting an ex parte interview with plaintiff’s treating physician.
Because defendant’s trial counsel did not comply with those requirements, Rapp’s disclosures,
including his affidavit, were obtained in violation of HIPAA.
Having determined that HIPAA applies, we must now determine the applicable remedy.
The remedies for failure to comply with the requirements and standards of HIPAA are found
under 42 USC 1320d-5. However, these remedies do not address how court’s should treat health
information obtained in violation of its provisions. Although there is no remedy specified under
HIPAA for violations made in the discovery context, this Court “has repeatedly recognized that a
trial court has inherent authority to impose sanctions on the basis of the misconduct of a party or
an attorney.” Persichini v Beaumont Hosp, 238 Mich App 626, 639; 607 NW2d 100 (1999).
Consistent with this inherent authority, we hold that trial courts may treat discovery obtained in
violation of HIPAA as a discovery violation under MCR 2.313(B).4 As with every discovery
violation, whether and in what manner the violation should be sanctioned is a matter committed
to the sound discretion of the court. McDonald v Grand Traverse Co Election Comm, 255 Mich
App 674, 697; 662 NW2d 804 (2003); MCR 2.313(B)(2).
At the March 16, 2005 summary disposition hearing, plaintiff argued that Rapp’s
affidavit was illegally obtained and asked the trial court to “not only completely disregard the
Affidavit of Dr. Steven Rapp, but [assess] sanctions against [defendant’s counsel] to prevent this
. . . type of conduct in the future.” After hearing defendant’s response, the trial court proceeded
to consider Rapp’s affidavit and concluded that plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence
to establish that her injuries were caused by the accident. While the trial court did not explicitly
(…continued)
objection before the court.
4
This holding is consistent with the decision in Law, supra at 712, where the court held that
“[s]ince HIPAA does not include any reference to how a court should treat such a violation
during discovery or at trial, the type of remedy to be applied is within the discretion of the Court
under [FRE 37].”
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state the basis for refusing defendant’s request to disregard the affidavit and impose sanctions, at
the start of the hearing, the trial court indicated that it was concerned about plaintiff’s conduct.
Indeed, the trial court stated that “we have an individual here who apparently lied to the medical
people . . .” and indicated that it thought that MCR 2.114, which in part deals with sanctions for
frivolous claims, might apply. Given this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s refusal
to disregard the affidavit, which directly addressed and arose out of the conduct noted by the trial
court, was without justification or excuse. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by refusing to disregard Rapp’s affidavit and levy sanctions against defendant’s trial counsel.
B. Causation
Plaintiff next argues that, even if the trial court properly considered Rapp’s affidavit, the
attempts by Rapp and Buchman to retract their earlier opinions do not negate the earlier
opinions, but rather go to the credibility of the witnesses. Plaintiff further contends that her
deposition testimony and the affidavit of her chiropractor are sufficient to create a fact question
regarding causation. Therefore, plaintiff argues, the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s
motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We disagree.
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency
of a claim. Dressel, supra at 561. Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR
2.116(C)(10), if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.” “A genuine issue of material fact
exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open
an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177,
183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003), citing Shallal v Catholic Social Services of Wayne Co, 455 Mich
604, 609; 566 NW2d 571 (1997); Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 369; 547 NW2d
314 (1996). When determining whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, the trial
court must consider the evidence presented by the parties in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion. Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454-455; 597 NW2d 28 (1999),
quoting Quinto, supra at 362-363.
In order to establish a prima facie case of negligence, “a plaintiff must prove four
elements: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, (3)
causation, and (4) damages.” Case v Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6; 615 NW2d 17
(2000). In his motion for summary disposition, defendant attacked the causation element of
plaintiff’s claim. In presenting its motion, defendant had the initial burden of supporting its
position by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence. Quinto, supra at
362. To support his claim that plaintiff’s injuries were not caused by the accident in question,
defendant submitted some of plaintiff’s medical records, as well as the affidavits of Rapp and
Buchman and the statement of Friedman. This evidence tended to establish that plaintiff’s
injuries were not proximately caused or aggravated by the accident, but rather were preexisting.
Because defendant properly supported his motion for summary disposition, the burden to present
evidence shifted to plaintiff, who had to establish that a genuine issue of disputed fact existed in
order to avoid summary disposition. Id.
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It is undisputed that, other than attempting to discredit the affidavits of Rapp and
Buchman,5 plaintiff only presented the February 3, 2005 letter of her Chiropractor to rebut the
evidence defendant proffered in support of his motion for summary disposition.6 However, in
order to be considered for purposes of a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10), the proffered evidence must be substantively admissible. Maiden v Rozwood, 461
Mich 109, 121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Plaintiff does not dispute on appeal that the letter was
not properly sworn as required by MCR 2.119(B) and was otherwise inadmissible hearsay. See
MRE 801; MRE 802. Therefore, the trial court properly refused to consider it.
Plaintiff further contends that the trial court erred, because her deposition testimony alone
establishes the existence of a fact question regarding causation. At her deposition, plaintiff
testified that, while she had a herniated disc before the accident, “it didn’t prohibit me in any
way whatsoever.” Plaintiff’s argument is essentially that, although she had a preexisting
herniated disc, because she did not begin to suffer from the herniated disc until after the car
accident, the car accident must have been the cause of all her subsequent suffering, including her
need for surgery. We disagree that this testimony is sufficient to establish causation. While it is
true that a plaintiff may present circumstantial evidence to establish a fact question regarding
causation, “at a minimum, a causation theory must have some basis in established fact.” Skinner
v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 164; 516 NW2d 475 (1994).
However, a basis in only slight evidence is not enough. Nor is it sufficient to
submit a causation theory that, while factually supported, is, at best, just as
possible as another theory. Rather, the plaintiff must present substantial evidence
from which a jury may conclude that more likely than not, but for the defendant’s
conduct, the plaintiff’s injuries would not have occurred. [Id. at 164-165.]
Given the evidence that plaintiff had a preexisting herniated disc and that the subsequent surgery
was performed to correct that same herniated disc, we do not believe plaintiff’s assertion that her
preexisting condition did not prohibit her “in any way whatsoever” before the accident is
sufficient to establish that, but for the accident, plaintiff would not have undergone the surgery or
otherwise suffered from the same ailments. It is equally plausible that plaintiff’s herniated disc
would have required surgery even without the accident. Therefore, plaintiff’s proffered
testimony is legally insufficient to afford a reliable basis from which reasonable minds could
infer that more probably not, but for the accident, plaintiff would not have suffered the same
impairments. Id. at 171.
5
We note that merely attacking the credibility of the moving party’s affidavits is insufficient to
establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Once the burden shifted, plaintiff had
an affirmative duty to set forth facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. MCR
2.116(G)(4); Quinto, supra at 362.
6
In the letter, Mitchell states, “I was treating her before the auto accident for the herniated disc
and she was responding very well to treatment[;] she had minimal pain and discomfort. After the
accident she had severe pain in the low back as well as severe pain radiating into her right leg. I
have no doubt that her condition is a direct result of the automobile accident on 04/26/2003.”
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Finally, plaintiff argues that Mitchell’s affidavit, which plaintiff attached to her motion to
reconsider, is sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact on the issue of causation. We disagree.
Plaintiff first submitted this affidavit with her motion for reconsideration. Hence, it was not
considered by the trial court in making its determination and, therefore, is not now properly
before this Court. Maiden, supra at 126 n 9.7
Plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient to establish the existence of a fact question
on the issue of causation. Therefore, the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
III. Conclusion
Because we have determined that the trial court properly granted summary disposition to
defendant on the causation element of plaintiff’s negligence claim, we need not address
plaintiff’s argument that her injuries constitute a serious impairment of body function under
MCL 500.3135(1) & (7) or her argument that her economic loss damages are not subject to the
serious impairment of body function threshold.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
I concur in result only.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
7
Plaintiff did not appeal the trial court’s decision to deny her motion for reconsideration.
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