ANDREA CHAMPAGNE V WILLIAM V LICARI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ANDREA CHAMPAGNE,
UNPUBLISHED
October 4, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
WILLIAM V. LICARI, Trustee of WILLIAM V.
LICARI TRUST,
No. 254372
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 02-044752-NO
Defendant-Appellee,
and
GREEN VALLEY, INC., and DUNKIN
DONUTS, INC.,
Defendants.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Neff and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court orders that granted summary disposition
to defendants and dismissed this premises liability action. We affirm. This appeal is being
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff parked her car in defendants’ parking lot, exited the vehicle, picked up her
young daughter, and walked toward the Dunkin Donuts, in the process stepping into a pothole
and injuring her foot. Plaintiff testified that the parking lot was wet and generally in disrepair
making the pothole over which she tripped hard to see. Plaintiff also admitted that she was not
looking at the ground while she was walking because she was focusing on the busy and chaotic
traffic traversing the parking lot at the time. The trial court dismissed the case on the ground that
the pothole over which she tripped was an open and obvious hazard, and that no special
condition caused it to pose an unusual danger despite its openness and obviousness. On appeal,
plaintiff challenges these conclusions. We agree with the trial court.
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency
of a claim. Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed, 470 Mich 274, 278; 681 NW2d 342 (2004). In evaluating
a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a court must consider the affidavits, pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in a light most favorable to
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the party opposing the motion. Id. “Where the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine
issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Plaintiff was a business invitee because the “premises were held open for a commercial
purpose.” Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 604; 614 NW2d 88 (2000)
(emphasis deleted). Generally, a premises owner “owes a duty to an invitee to exercise
reasonable care to protect the invitee from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous
condition on the land.” Lugo v Ameritech Corp, 464 Mich 512, 516; 629 NW2d 384 (2001).
However, “a premises possessor is not required to protect an invitee from open and obvious
dangers [unless] special aspects of a condition make an open and obvious risk unreasonably
dangerous.” Id. at 517.
A condition is open and obvious if “it is reasonable to expect an average user of ordinary
intelligence to discover the danger upon casual inspection.” Weakley v Dearborn Hgts, 240 Mich
App 382, 385; 612 NW2d 428 (2000). A court considering this question must “focus on the
objective nature of the condition of the premises at issue, not on the subjective degree of care
used by the plaintiff.” Lugo, supra at 523-524.
Plaintiff argues that the pothole was not open and obvious because the parking lot was in
“bad shape,” making it hard to see the particular pothole over which she tripped. Plaintiff argues
that the parking lot was in disrepair and the photographs plaintiff submitted as evidence well
illustrate the point. Under the circumstances an average user of ordinary intelligence would
discover any danger on casual inspection and therefore the condition was open and obvious.
Plaintiff also argues that the parking lot was busy and chaotic at the time, which required
her to look for traffic instead of concentrating on where she was walking. However, “there is
certainly nothing ‘unusual’ about vehicles being driven in a parking lot, and accordingly, this is
not a fact that removes this case from the open and obvious doctrine.” Lugo, supra at 522.
Plaintiff alternatively argues that the pothole was unavoidable and unreasonably
dangerous, even if open and obvious. Again, a premises owner has a duty to protect invitees
from open and obvious conditions if special aspects of the conditions make them unreasonably
dangerous, despite their openness and obviousness. Lugo, supra at 517. Such situations involve
conditions that are effectively unavoidable or impose an unreasonably high risk of severe harm.
Id. at 518. Plaintiff admitted that she could have avoided the pothole by parking in another area
of the parking lot. In addition, ordinary potholes in a parking lot do not give rise to special
aspects because they do not “involve an especially high likelihood of injury.” Lugo, supra at
520. Plaintiff presented no evidence suggesting that the pothole at issue was other than common
and ordinary.
For these reasons, the trial court did not err in determining that the pothole over which
plaintiff tripped was not a special condition making it unreasonably dangerous.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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