PEOPLE OF MI V PARNELL MORRIS DICUS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 27, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 256477
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 03-000150-FH
PARNELL MORRIS DICUS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Talbot and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury conviction for aggravated stalking of his
estranged wife, Verna Dicus, in violation of MCL 750.411i. We affirm.
Defendant raises a myriad of issues on appeal claiming that he was denied a fair trial
because he did not receive a speedy trial and further, that he was denied a fair trial because his
trial counsel was ineffective. Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred by allowing “other
acts” into evidence.
We first address whether defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial. Defendant
failed to preserve this issue for review, thus we review this issue for plain error affecting
substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750 (1999). Defendant’s failure to promptly
assert his right to a speedy trial also weighs against his subsequent claim that he was denied the
right. People v Rosengren, 159 Mich App 492, 508; 407 NW2d 391 (1987).
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed to criminal defendants by the federal and
Michigan constitutions as well as by statute. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, sec 20, MCL
768.1; People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 111; 605 NW2d 28 (1999). In determining whether a
defendant has been denied a speedy trial, four factors must be balanced: (1) the length of the
delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial;
and (4) prejudice to the defendant from the delay. People v Hill, 402 Mich 272, 283; 262 NW2d
641 (1978).
An examination of these four factors reveals that defendant was not denied his right to a
speedy trial because most of the delay is attributable to defendant. Defendant was arrested on
January 22, 2003. A pretrial hearing was held on April 10, 2003, during which the trial court
ordered a competency examination. Following the examination, defendant was found competent
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to stand trial, and his competency was stipulated to on June 19, 2003. On that same date, defense
counsel moved to withdraw because defendant refused to listen to his advice. Counsel’s motion
was granted. On June 26, 2003, another pretrial hearing was held and trial was scheduled for
September 22, 2003 – only eight months after defendant’s arrest. On September 22, 2003, trial
was adjourned because defendant requested another competency hearing. On November 6,
2003, defendant’s second attorney moved to withdraw because defendant had filed a request for
an investigation of his attorney. On December 4, 2003, defense counsel’s motion to withdraw
was granted, new counsel was appointed, and the competency hearing was adjourned until
December 18, 2003. On December 18, 2003, defendant was again found competent to stand
trial. Defendant’s trial began on April 19, 2004.
Because his delay was less than eighteen months, defendant has the burden of proving
that he was prejudiced by the delay. People v Collins, 388 Mich 680, 695; 202 NW2d 769
(1972). A defendant can experience two types of prejudice while awaiting trial: prejudice to the
person and prejudice to the defense. Prejudice to the person results when pretrial incarceration
deprives an accused of many civil liberties, and prejudice to the defense occurs when the defense
might be prejudiced by the delay. People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App 442, 461-462; 564 NW2d
158 (1997). Defendant asserts that the delay caused him needless anxiety and concern and that
the delay resulted in problems with his memory. However, anxiety alone is insufficient to
establish a violation of the right to a speedy trial. Id. at 462. Moreover, a general allegation of
prejudice caused by delay, such as the unspecified loss of evidence or memory, is insufficient to
establish that a defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial. Id. Furthermore, defendant
testified at trial that “my memory may be slow, but it’s still there” and he attributed his slow
memory to the fact that he was heavily medicated. Defendant further testified that, because he
was so heavily medicated, he kept a handwritten log of events from November 2002 until his
arrest in January 2003, which he used to refresh his memory during trial. Thus, defendant has
failed to sustain his burden of demonstrating prejudice resulting from the fifteen month delay
between his arrest and trial.
Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly admitted “other acts” evidence.
Defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal. We review unpreserved issues for plain error
affecting substantial rights, i.e., errors that were outcome determinative. Carines, supra at 764,
774.
Defendant specifically objects to the admission of the following evidence: (1) evidence
that defendant told Verna that he would get her fired if she hung up on him at work; (2) evidence
that defendant left dead flowers on her desk at work; (3) evidence that Verna called the police
during a confrontation between her and defendant; that the phone went dead when she tried to
use it, that defendant rammed through a locked door and assaulted Verna in the presence of their
children, and that Verna fled the home on foot to seek help from the fire department; (4)
evidence that defendant forcibly had sex with Verna while she had Migraine headaches telling
her that there is no such thing as rape when the parties are married; (5) evidence that defendant
had previously been employed as a bounty hunter; (6) evidence that defendant sent Verna’s
parents a letter from jail stating that Verna is mentally ill; and (7) evidence that defendant used to
be Verna’s stepfather; that Verna became pregnant by defendant while he was still married to her
mother who was also pregnant by defendant; that defendant bought Verna drinks while she was
underage; and that he took her to a hotel to begin their sexual relationship.
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Pursuant to MRE 402, “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Michigan,
these rules, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.” “Relevant evidence” is defined by MRE 401 as “evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
The elements of aggravated stalking require the prosecution to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the victim’s feelings of fear were reasonable. MCL 750.411i (1)(e).
Therefore, the first five pieces of testimony were relevant and admissible to prove that Verna’s
fear was reasonable.
The other two pieces of evidence were irrelevant to Verna’s state of mind and violated
MRE 404(b)(1)’s general rule that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith” because the
only conceivable purpose of such evidence was to demonstrate that defendant has a bad
character. However, the admission of this evidence did not affect defendant’s substantial rights.
Even excluding the irrelevant evidence, the prosecution presented more than sufficient evidence
with which to convict defendant of aggravated stalking. Verna Dicus obtained a PPO against
defendant in September 2002. In January 2003, defendant parked in a lot next door to SAFE
House, a home for abused women, that Verna and her children moved into after Verna was
assaulted by defendant. Defendant followed her from SAFE House to the police station parking
lot. Shortly thereafter, defendant went to Verna’s work. The next day defendant waited outside
of their child’s school because he knew that Verna would pick the child up after school.
Although Verna picked him up early to avoid running into defendant, defendant was there. He
followed her as she drove down random streets and blocked her into a driveway until she
threatened to run him over if he did not move his car. While Verna was trapped in the driveway
defendant banged on her car windows. This evidence, taken as a whole, is more than sufficient
to sustain defendant’s conviction.
Defendant next argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Before this
Court will find that “a defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel was so undermined
that it justifies reversal of an otherwise valid conviction, a defendant must show that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the representation so
prejudiced the defendant as to deprive him of a fair trial.” People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). “To find prejudice, a court must conclude that there is ‘a
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt
respecting guilt.’” Id. at 312, quoting Strickland v Washington, 446 US 668, 695; 104 S Ct 2052;
80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984).
Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the other acts evidence. As
discussed above, the majority of the evidence defendant now objects to as inadmissible was
relevant to the victim’s state of mind and, thus, admissible. An attorney is not ineffective for
failing to object to admissible evidence. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d
502 (2000). The evidence that was irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible, did not affect
defendant’s substantial rights because the prosecution presented more than sufficient evidence
with which to convict defendant of aggravated stalking, even excluding the irrelevant evidence.
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Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to subpoena defendant’s son and the
Dicuses’ “spiritual advisors,” Floyd Johnson and Kevin Newman. Decisions as to what evidence
to present and whether to call or question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy,
People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398; 688 NW2d 308 (2004). This Court does not substitute
its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy. People v Matuszak, 263 Mich
App 42, 58; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). The failure to call witnesses can constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel only when it deprives the defendant of a substantial defense, Dixon, supra
at 398. A substantial defense is one which might have made a difference in the outcome of the
trial. People v Hyland, 212 Mich App 701, 710; 538 NW2d 465 (1995). Defense counsel’s
decision not to subpoena defendant’s son and the “spiritual advisors” did not deprive defendant
of a substantial defense. Defendant’s defense that his wife initiated the contact was presented by
defense counsel through cross-examination of his wife. The jury chose not to accept that
defense. That a strategy that does not work does not render ineffective assistance of counsel.
People v Kevorkian, 248 Mich App 373, 414-415; 639 NW2d 291 (2001).
Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to use a copy of defendant’s cellular
phone bill to impeach Verna’s credibility. At trial, Verna testified that she did not go to work on
January 15, 2003; defendant claims that she was at work that day and argues that his cellular
phone bill can prove his claim. Defendant’s phone bill shows that he placed a call to a particular
telephone number on January 15, 2003, and talked for 32 minutes, but defendant has produced
no evidence that the particular telephone number is Verna’s work number or that the person he
talked to at that number was Verna. Moreover, defendant has presented no evidence that he was
prejudiced by counsel’s failure to impeach Verna with the phone bill.
Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion for speedy trial. As
discussed above, the majority of the delays between defendant’s arrest and trial were attributable
to the defendant. An attorney is not ineffective for failing to bring a futile motion. People v
Riley, 468 Mich 135, 142; 659 NW2d 611 (2003).
Finally, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to file an interlocutory appeal with
regard to defendant’s bond and his failure to move for defendant’s release pursuant to MCR
6.004(C). Defense counsel’s decision not to file an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s
decision not to reduce defendant’s bond was a matter of trial strategy and, as noted above, this
Court does not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy. An
interlocutory appeal would have delayed trial and prolonged defendant’s incarceration.
Therefore, defense counsel’s failure to file an interlocutory appeal was not unreasonable.
Furthermore, defendant was not entitled to release pursuant to MCR 6.004(C) because most of
the delays between arrest and trial were attributable to defendant. Therefore, his attorney was
not ineffective for failing to move for his release. Again, counsel is not required to make a
frivolous or meritless motion.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to reduce his bond. We will
not entertain this issue because it is moot. “An issue becomes moot when an event which makes
it impossible for this court to fashion a remedy.” Crawford Co v Secretary of State, 160 Mich
App 88, 93; 408 NW2d 112 (1987). “The principal duty of this Court is to decide actual cases
and controversies. To that end, this Court does not reach moot questions or declare principles or
rules of law that have no practical legal effect in the case before [this Court]. . . unless the issue
is one of public significance that is likely to recur, yet evade judicial review.” Federated
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Publications v Lansing, 47 Mich 98, 112; 649 NW2d 383 (2002). Because defendant is no
longer subject to bond, we could not fashion a remedy to cure the trial court’s abuse of
discretion, even if we found that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to reduce
defendant’s bond. Moreover, this issue is not one of public significance; it is a matter of
significance only to defendant.
Defendant’s final argument is that he is entitled to a new judge for his new trial. Because
defendant is not entitled to a new trial we need not address this issue, except to note that
defendant’s arguments on this issue are completely frivolous.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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