PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL RAY VILLICANA JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 20, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 254046
Allegan Circuit Court
LC No. 02-12831-FC
MICHAEL RAY VILLICANA, JR.
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Murphy and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury conviction and sentence for three counts of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(i), and one count of second-degree
criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(b)(i). We affirm.
Before trial, the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of an
alleged incident that occurred eighteen months before complainant made the allegations against
defendant, in which complainant purportedly told classmates she was pregnant and that her
boyfriend was twenty years old. The trial court noted that the school counselor and the Family
Independence Agency had determined this to be a “rumor” and that complainant had denied
making the statement. The trial court concluded the evidence that complainant had made such a
statement was unreliable, was not probative, and was “probably irrelevant.” Defendant argues
that this ruling was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion, and violated his right to confront the
witnesses against him. We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court's evidentiary rulings and limitation of cross-examination
for an abuse of discretion. People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 60; 614 NW2d 888
(2000). An abuse of discretion will only be found if an unprejudiced person would say there was
no justification or excuse for the ruling based on the facts presented. People v Ullah, 216 Mich
App 669, 673; 550 NW2d 568 (1996). To the extent that such rulings implicate a defendant's
right to confrontation, this Court’s review is de novo. People v Beasley, 239 Mich App 548,
557; 609 NW2d 581 (2000).
The determination of the proper scope of cross-examination is within the discretion of the
trial court. People v Williams, 191 Mich App 269, 273; 477 NW2d 877 (1991). While the right
of cross-examination is a primary interest secured by the Confrontation Clause, neither the
Confrontation Clause nor due process confers on a defendant an unlimited right to cross-examine
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witnesses on any subject. People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 347; 365 NW2d 120 (1984); People
v Adamski, 198 Mich App 133, 138; 497 NW2d 546 (1993). Rather, the Confrontation Clause
“guarantees to defendant a reasonable opportunity to test the truth of a witness’ testimony.”
Hackett, supra at 347, citing Alford v United States, 282 US 687; 51 S Ct 218; 75 L Ed 624
(1931). “‘[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to
impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other
things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is
repetitive or only marginally relevant.’” Adamski, supra at 138, quoting Delaware v Van
Arsdall, 475 US 673, 679; 106 S Ct 1431; 89 L Ed 2d 674 (1986). A trial court may limit crossexamination as to collateral matters bearing only on general credibility. Hackett, supra at 348.
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact, which is of
consequence to the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
MRE 401; People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 388-389; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). Thus, “evidence
is admissible if it is helpful in throwing light on any material point.” People v Aldrich, 246 Mich
App 101, 114; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). Testimony that complainant previously lied to classmates
about being pregnant was relevant only to the extent that it undermined the credibility of her
statements against defendant.
However, the statements against defendant were made
approximately eighteen months after the purported pregnancy statement and approximately
twenty-two months before she testified against defendant at trial. Hence, the only manner in
which such a statement could be considered relevant would be to show that, because complainant
previously lied to classmates about being pregnant, she was more likely to be lying about the
present allegations; a statement about being pregnant is not substantively material to the
allegations against defendant. Therefore, the excluded testimony was of a collateral matter that
might bear on complainant’s general credibility, but did not bear directly on the veracity of her
specific allegations in this case; consequently, it was within the trial court’s discretion to
disallow it. Hackett, supra at 348.
Defendant was permitted to explore complainant’s credibility as to the specific
allegations against him. He presented two witnesses who testified that complainant told them
she was lying about her claims that defendant sexually assaulted her. Defendant also presented
the testimony of his parents, who each stated complainant told them that she had done something
she should not have done, implying she had lied about the sexual abuse. Therefore, defendant
was provided with a reasonable opportunity to test the truth of complainant’s testimony and the
trial court’s order denying him the opportunity to inquire into her purported statement to
classmates about being pregnant did not deprive him of his right to confront the witnesses
against him.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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