PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL DOUGLAS STURGIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 15, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 254348
Emmet Circuit Court
LC No. 03-002147-FH
MICHAEL DOUGLAS STURGIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Neff and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of engaging in child sexually abusive
activity, MCL 750.145c(2); possession of child sexually abusive material, MCL 750.145c(4);
accosting a child for immoral purposes, MCL 750.145a; and fourth-degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520e. He was sentenced as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to ten
to thirty years’ in prison for child sexually abusive activity, and to lesser, concurrent sentences
for the other crimes. Defendant appeals his convictions as of right. We affirm. This appeal is
being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant’s first two convictions stem from the making and possessing of a videotape
portraying him engaged in sexual acts with a sixteen-year-old female. Defendant’s other two
convictions stem from his conduct with a second complainant, a fourteen-year-old friend of the
first. Defendant grabbed the second complainant’s clothed breasts and buttocks, and requested
that the second complainant engage in intercourse with him and the first complainant.
Defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to sever the
charges relating to the different complainants into separate trials. Because defendant did not
request a hearing pursuant to People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973), he
has failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal. People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 38;
650 NW2d 96 (2002). Therefore, this Court’s review is limited to mistakes apparent on the
record. People v Riley (After Remand), 468 Mich 135, 139; 659 NW2d 611 (2003).
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness that
denied him a fair trial. People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 661-662; 608 NW2d 123 (1999).
Defendant has not borne this burden, because he has not established that he was entitled to
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severance of the charges against him. See People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 271-272; 662
NW2d 836 (2003); People v Duranseau, 221 Mich App 204, 208; 561 NW2d 111 (1997). Here,
defendant used his relationship with the sixteen-year-old female to perpetrate the child sexually
abusive acts, and to have contact with the fourteen-year-old female. The relationship and access
to the fourteen-year-old female could be characterized as a continuous series of events, like that
leading to the properly joined charges in Abraham. Id. Further, much of the same testimony
would have been necessary to establish the elements of the charges relating to either
complainant, and would have been admissible at separate trials. See Duranseau, supra at 208.
One may question retrospectively that a discretionary motion to sever would have been
successful, but such a question does not require a finding and we do not find that defense
counsel’s failure to bring such a motion was a clear mistake. Therefore, defendant has not
established that his trial counsel’s failure to move to sever the charges was objectively
unreasonable.
Next, defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge for
cause a juror who was ultimately impaneled. Counsel’s performance during jury selection is
generally presumed to be a matter of trial strategy, and cannot constitute ineffective assistance
unless it results in an obviously unfair trial. Miller v Webb, 385 F3d 666, 672-673 (CA 6, 2004).
Here, defense counsel successfully challenged two prospective jurors for cause and exercised
peremptory challenges to exclude another four jurors. With respect to the impaneled juror,
defendant cites as his basis for the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, counsel’s failure to
challenge for cause the juror who during voir dire agreed with another prospective juror’s
statement that, “a child would be truthful” when giving testimony.
A defendant has a right to an impartial jury, and this right is denied when a juror that is
removable for cause is allowed to serve on the jury. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art I, §20;
People v Daoust, 228 Mich App 1, 8-9; 577 NW2d 179 (1998). Prospective jurors may be
challenged for cause if they are biased against a party, demonstrate a state of mind or opinion
that would prevent them from rendering a just verdict on the facts presented, or have opinions
that would improperly influence a trial verdict. MCR 2.115(D)(3)-(5); People v Lee, 212 Mich
App 228, 249-251; 537 NW2d 233 (1995). The thought that a child would testify truthfully is
nothing more than a belief in a vacuum. Alone, it does not demonstrate bias against a party, state
of mind or opinion that would prevent a fair and just verdict on presented facts, or an improper
influence on the deliberative process. Answers to other questions were balanced, for example,
that people are responsible for their actions, regardless of age. With answers like those received
from the impaneled juror as compared to those utilized by counsel in invoking both for cause and
peremptory challenges, defense counsel may have included her on the jury as a matter of trial
strategy. Defendant has not demonstrated that the juror could have been properly challenged for
cause, or that he was not denied a fair trial on the basis of the person’s inclusion on the jury.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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