SUSAN SHIELDS V CURTIS BLESSING
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SUSAN SHIELDS,
UNPUBLISHED
August 30, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 261685
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 03-053202-NZ
v
CURTIS BLESSING and AMANDA VAN
DUSEN,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Markey and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
Plaintiff was employed by Cranbrook Schools as a fifth grade teacher at its elementary
school during the 2001-2002 school year. Defendants are the parents of a student who was in
plaintiff’s class. In October 2001, defendants contacted the school headmaster regarding
concerns they had with plaintiff’s teaching methods. A series of contentious meetings and
communications between defendants and plaintiff and other school administrators occurred over
the next three months. In January 2002, defendants’ daughter was assigned to another teacher.
Evidence was submitted indicating that during the remainder of the 2001-2002 school year,
school administrators confronted plaintiff about a number of other matters of concern, unrelated
to defendants’ daughter. In a letter dated June 19, 2002, the school informed plaintiff that she
was being terminated from her teaching position for insubordination, specifically, for failing to
attend two scheduled meetings to resolve an issue related to her use of a school-issued
purchasing card. Plaintiff subsequently brought this lawsuit alleging that defendants tortiously
interfered with her employment contract. However, finding that there was no genuine issue of
material fact whether defendants engaged in an unjustified instigation of any alleged breach, the
trial court granted summary disposition in favor of defendants.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for summary
disposition. Trost v Buckstop Lure Co, 249 Mich App 580, 583; 644 NW2d 54 (2002). A
motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. Lewis v LeGrow, 258
Mich App 175, 192; 670 NW2d 675 (2003). In reviewing the motion, a court “must consider the
available pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other documentary evidence in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether the moving party was entitled to
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judgment as a matter of law.” Unisys Corp v Comm’r of Ins, 236 Mich App 686, 689; 601
NW2d 155 (1999).
In order to establish a claim for tortious interference with a contract, a plaintiff must
demonstrate each of the following: “(1) a contract; (2) a breach, and (3) an unjustified
instigation of the breach by the defendant.” Mahrle v Danke, 216 Mich App 343, 350; 549
NW2d 56 (1996). At issue here is whether plaintiff has put forth evidence sufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact regarding the latter of these elements, i.e., an unjustified instigation
by defendants of the alleged breach of her employment contract with Cranbrook. In order to
meet this requirement it was incumbent upon plaintiff to show “‘the intentional doing of a per se
wrongful act or the doing of a lawful act with malice and unjustified in law for the purpose of
invading the contractual rights or business relationship of another.’” CMI Int’l, Inc v Intermet
Int’l Corp, 251 Mich App 125, 131; 649 NW2d 808 (2002), quoting Feldman v Green, 138 Mich
App 360, 378; 360 NW2d 881 (1984). In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants
interfered with her employment contract by challenging her personal and professional
competency, and demanding that she be dismissed from her position as a teacher on those
grounds. However, this Court has held that a person is not liable for tortious interference with a
contract if the conduct alleged to have instigated the breach was motivated by legitimate personal
or business interests. See Wood v Herndon & Herndon Investigations, Inc, 186 Mich App 495,
500; 465 NW2d 5 (1990). As explained below, we agree with the trial court that the evidence
presented below failed to show the requisite per se wrongful or improperly motivated conduct.
A wrongful act per se is an act that is inherently wrongful or that can never be justified
under any circumstances. Prysak v R L Polk Co, 193 Mich App 1, 12-13; 483 NW2d 629
(1992). Here, the evidence presented below showed that defendants held legitimate concerns
regarding plaintiff’s teaching methods and acted upon those concerns by seeking plaintiff’s
dismissal from Cranbrook. Although defendants conduct in seeking to resolve their concerns
could be considered unprofessional or unbefitting at times, defendants nonetheless had both an
interest and a right to see that their child was being competently taught. See, e.g., SwensonDavis v Martel, 135 Mich App 632, 636; 354 NW2d 288 (1984). Therefore, there is no basis for
concluding that defendants’ actions were inherently wrongful. Prysak, supra.
The evidence similarly does not permit a conclusion that defendants engaged in a lawful
act with malice and unjustified in law for the purpose of invading plaintiff’s contractual rights.
As noted above, the evidence shows that the conduct on which plaintiff relies to support her
claim of tortious interference arose from and was motivated by defendants’ sincere concern
regarding the efficacy of their child’s education under plaintiff’s tutelage. That defendants’
conduct in seeking a solution to those concerns was not otherwise improperly motivated is
evidenced by a letter written shortly after their daughter’s reassignment, wherein defendants
expressed their appreciation of the school’s “efforts in implementing the solution upon which
[the parties had] agreed,” as well as their intent to concentrate on “looking forward” to the
upcoming semester at Cranbrook, “not back.” Given this evidence, as well as that indicating that
plaintiff’s employment with Cranbrook was not terminated until approximately six months after
defendants expressed their satisfaction with resolution of their concerns, we find no error in the
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trial court’s decision to grant defendants’ motion for summary disposition on the ground that
there was no genuine issue of material fact whether defendants engaged in an “unjustified”
instigation of any alleged breach.1 Wood, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
1
In light of our conclusion in this regard, we need not address the question of proximate cause.
Moreover, because there was no fair chance that further discovery would result in factual support
for plaintiff’s action, the fact that discovery was not complete when defendants first moved for
summary disposition does not compel a contrary conclusion. Ireland v Edwards, 230 Mich App
607, 623; 584 NW2d 632 (1998).
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