PAMALA BROWNLEE V GENERAL MOTORS CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PAMALA BROWNLEE and PAUL
BROWNLEE,
UNPUBLISHED
August 30, 2005
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 252867
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 03-047476-NO
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Gage and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm. This case is being decided without
oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiffs commenced this action after plaintiff Pamela Brownlee slipped on a puddle of
water while clearing dishes in a kitchen at a General Motors Proving Grounds facility in Milford,
Michigan.1 The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of defendant, concluding that
the puddle did not create an unreasonable risk of harm because it was open and obvious, and that
there were no special aspects to the condition because plaintiff could have avoided it.
A trial court’s decision granting summary disposition is reviewed de novo to determine
whether the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden v Rozwood,
461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). When reviewing a motion under MCR
2.116(C)(10), the court must examine the documentary evidence presented below and, drawing
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, determine whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 361-362; 547 NW2d 314
(1996). A question of fact exists when reasonable minds could differ on the conclusions to be
drawn from the evidence. Glittenberg v Doughboy Recreational Industries (On Rehearing), 441
Mich 379, 398-399; 491 NW2d 208 (1992).
1
Plaintiff Paul Brownlee brought a claim for loss of consortium. As used in this opinion, the
term “plaintiff” refers only to Pamela Brownlee.
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Plaintiff, an employee of Aramark Food Services, was on defendant’s premises for
business purposes that benefited defendant. Therefore, plaintiff was defendant’s invitee. See
White v Badalamenti, 200 Mich App 434, 436; 505 NW2d 8 (1993). Plaintiff’s responsibilities
included serving food, bussing tables, mopping floors and general cleaning. On the date of the
incident, plaintiff was assigned to clean the food service line. A co-worker was assigned to the
dishwasher. Plaintiff was injured when she slipped on the water while taking a dirty cup and
dish to the dishwasher.
A “landowner has a duty of care, not only to warn [an] invitee of any known dangers, but
also to make the premises safe, which requires the landowner to inspect the premises and,
depending upon the circumstances, make any necessary repairs or warn of any discovered
hazards.” Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 597; 614 NW2d 88 (2000).
A premises possessor is not required to protect an invitee from open and obvious dangers, but “if
special aspects of a condition make even an open and obvious risk unreasonably dangerous, the
premises possessor has a duty to undertake reasonable precautions to protect invitees from that
risk.” Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512, 517; 629 NW2d 384 (2001).
In this case, plaintiff admits that she was aware of the large puddle of water in front of
and around the dishwasher, because the pipes under the dishwasher had been leaking for months.
Thus, the only question is whether there were “special aspects” to the puddle that made it
unreasonably dangerous, notwithstanding that it was open and obvious. In Lugo, supra at 518519, our Supreme Court cautioned that in considering whether special aspects exist, the risks
posed by the condition ought not be considered after the fact. A risk ought not be deemed to
have special aspects because, in hindsight, the risk of serious injury is apparent. Rather, special
aspects exist only where the open and obvious condition is effectively unavoidable or where the
conditions “give rise to a uniquely high likelihood of harm or severity of harm if the risk is not
avoided . . . .” Id.
In this case, the trial court determined that the risk of harm was avoidable, observing that
plaintiff could have set the dishes in another area without adverse employment repercussions.
Plaintiff admitted she would not have suffered any adverse employment action had she simply
set the plates in another area of the kitchen. Thus, plaintiff was not required to traverse the wet
floor in order to comply with the demands of her employment. Because the condition was
avoidable, we agree with the trial court that the hazardous condition in the kitchen did not have
any special aspects that precluded application of the open and obvious danger defense to
plaintiff’s premises liability claim.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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