METRO CHARTER ACADEMY V GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIV
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
METRO CHARTER ACADEMY, METRO
CHARTER ACADEMY VICE PRESIDENT,
METRO CHARTER ACADEMY TREASURER,
UNPUBLISHED
August 23, 2005
Plaintiffs-Appellants/CrossAppellees,
v
No. 255197
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 04-404186-CK
GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY,
Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant,
and
METRO CHARTER ACADEMY,
Intervening-Defendant/Appellee.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Hoekstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial
court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant Grand Valley State University
(GVSU).1 GVSU cross-appeals from this same order, challenging the trial court’s denial of its
motion for sanctions. We affirm.
1
Although the trial court orally granted Metro Charter Academy’s motion to dismiss it as a party
plaintiff in this matter and rejoin the suit as an intervening defendant, it appears that no written
order of that dismissal was ever entered by the court. Metro Charter Academy therefore remains
both a plaintiff and a defendant. For purposes of this opinion, however, all references to
“plaintiffs” are to plaintiffs Justin Mordarski and Leonard Mungo, as the respective vice
president and treasurer of Metro Charter Academy at the time this suit was filed.
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At issue in this case is the authority of GVSU, as the authorizing body of Metro Charter
Academy, to remove a member of the academy’s board of directors by modification of the length
of the term to be served by that member. Plaintiffs argued below that GVSU exceeded its
powers under the contract by which the academy was chartered when, after it had ratified their
appointments, it modified the length of the terms to be served by academy board members Justin
Mordarski and Leonard Mungo. Finding that GVSU acted within its statutory and contractual
power of oversight, the trial court disagreed and granted summary disposition in favor of GVSU.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
Adair v State, 470 Mich 105, 119; 680 NW2d 386 (2004). The trial court did not articulate
which subrule it relied on in deciding GVSU’s motion. But because the court considered matters
outside the pleadings, we review the court’s decision under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Driver v Hanley
(After Remand), 226 Mich App 558, 562; 575 NW2d 31 (1997). Summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454-455; 597
NW2d 28 (1999). Issues requiring statutory interpretation or contractual construction are
questions of law also reviewed de novo by this Court. Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 141;
693 NW2d 825 (2005); Thompson v Thompson, 261 Mich App 353, 358; 683 NW2d 250 (2004).
Pursuant to the revised school code, MCL 380.1 et seq., the authorizing body of a public
school academy is required to oversee operation of the academy to ensure compliance with the
terms of the authorizing contract and all applicable laws, MCL 380.502(4), and may revoke a
contract for an academy’s noncompliance with the terms of the contract or any applicable law.
MCL 380.507. See also Council of Organizations & Others for Education About Parochiaid v
Governor, 455 Mich 557, 565-567; 566 NW2d 208 (1997). The contract by which Metro
Charter Academy was established specifically incorporated the authorizing resolution adopted by
GVSU, which, as required by MCL 380.503(4), sets forth the method of selection, length of
term, and number of members of the Metro Charter Academy board of directors. It is not
disputed that this resolution expressly authorizes the academy board of directors to remove a
board member by two-thirds vote of the academy board, and to itself fill board vacancies through
nomination and appointment of new board members for a term of up to three years. However,
with respect to such nominations and appointments, the resolution also provides:
Method of Selection
***
All Academy Board of Director appointments must be submitted to the University
Board of Control for ratification at its next regularly scheduled meeting. The
University Board of Control retains the authority to review, rescind, modify, or
ratify any Academy Board appointment made by the Academy’s Board of
Directors. [Emphasis added.]
Plaintiffs argued below that GVSU did not, in its resolution, reserve for itself the power
to remove an academy board member and could not do so by modifying the terms of a board
member’s office after it had ratified the member’s appointment. The trial court disagreed,
finding that GVSU expressly retained the power to modify board appointments by the operative
language emphasized above and, therefore, did not exceed its authority when it modified
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Mordarski’s and Mungo’s terms of office. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court reasoned
that although plaintiffs’ argument was plausible given that the heading of the paragraph appears
to address only GVSU’s authority before ratification, the operative language itself was not
ambiguous and must be interpreted consistent with the public policy conveying plenary authority
over a public school academy to its authorizing body. We agree with the trial court and conclude
that GVSU acted within its statutory and contractual authority in modifying the terms of office at
issue here.
Contracts must be construed in their entirety and in accordance with their terms. Perry v
Sied, 461 Mich 680, 689; 611 NW2d 516 (2000). The parties are presumed to have understood
the import of the contract’s terms and to have had the intention manifested by those terms.
Burkhardt v Bailey, 260 Mich App 636, 656; 680 NW2d 453 (2004). “In interpreting contracts
capable of two different constructions, [courts] prefer a reasonable and fair construction over a
less just and less reasonable construction.” Schroeder v Terra Energy, Ltd, 223 Mich App 176,
188; 565 NW2d 887 (1997). Moreover, when reasonably possible, a court should interpret
contractual provisions that potentially conflict with statutes to harmonize with the statutes. See
Cruz v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 466 Mich 588, 599; 648 NW2d 591 (2002).
Plaintiffs would have this Court hold that once GVSU ratifies a board member’s
appointment, it has no power to remedy acts of that member that are unlawful or otherwise
outside the charter’s mandate, short of revoking the academy’s contract. However, although the
contract at issue here specifically states that the academy board has the power to remove its
members by a two-thirds vote of that board, there is nothing in the language of the contract to
indicate that all such removal power is reserved to the academy board alone. To the contrary,
GVSU specifically reserved for itself “the authority to review, rescind, modify, or ratify any
Academy Board appointment made by the Academy’s Board of Directors.” The fact that this
language is contained under the heading “Method of Selection” does not clearly limit GVSU’s
ability to exercise this power to the period prior to its ratification of a board appointment, and no
contract language provides to the contrary. A contract for a public school academy is “an
executive act” taken by the authorizing body, the language of which should be interpreted by this
Court in a manner consistent with the public policy underlying the grant of such authority. See
MCL 380.501(2)(d); see also Cruz, supra. It was the intent of the revised school code that the
public govern the operation of a public school academy through its authorizing body. See
Parochiaid, supra at 566-567, 572-575. The Legislature bestowed upon the authorizing body the
duty and obligation to ensure a public school academy’s compliance with the authorizing
contract and all applicable law, specifically affording authorizing bodies the sole and nonreviewable discretion to revoke an academy’s charter. See MCL 380.502(4) and MCL 380.507.
That defendant reserved for itself the ability to remedy an outlaw board member or board action
other than by revoking the academy’s charter contract is consistent with its legislative mandate
and a reasonable construction of the terms of the contract. Consequently, the trial court did not
err in concluding that GVSU acted within its statutory and contractual authority when it modified
Mordarski’s and Mungo’s terms of office.2
2
Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred when it granted the motion to strike Metro Charter
(continued…)
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On cross-appeal, GVSU argues that because counsel for plaintiffs was involved in a suit
wherein a claim similar to that at issue here was rejected, the trial court erred in denying its
motion for sanctions. Again, we disagree.
Upon motion of a party, if the court finds that an action of a party was frivolous it must
impose costs and attorney fees as sanctions against the non-prevailing party and their attorney.
MCL 600.2591; MCR 2.625; Lakeside Oakland Development, LC v H & J Beef Co, 249 Mich
App 517, 531-532; 644 NW2d 765 (2002). A claim or defense is frivolous when (1) the party’s
primary purpose was to harass, embarrass, or injure the prevailing party; (2) the party had no
reasonable basis to believe that the underlying facts were true; or (3) the party’s position was
devoid of arguable legal merit. MCL 600.2591(3)(a); Jerico Constr, Inc v Quadrants, Inc, 257
Mich App 22, 35-36; 666 NW2d 310 (2003). Sanctions may also be imposed pursuant to MCR
2.114(E) for violation of MCR 2.114(C). A trial court’s decision regarding a motion for
sanctions will not be reversed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Lakeside, supra at 532. A
decision is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court
is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Kitchen v Kitchen, 465 Mich
654, 661-662; 641 NW2d 245 (2002).
Initially, we note that the prior action cited by GVSU as support for the claimed
frivolousness of the instant suit involved different parties and is factually distinguishable from
the present action. Plaintiffs’ claims here stem from unique contractual language regarding
GVSU’s power as an authorizing body to modify board member terms subsequent to ratification.
Moreover, plaintiffs claims were not devoid of legal merit and the facts do not indicate that this
suit was filed with the intent to harass GVSU. Plaintiffs sought relief based on their reading of
the charter contract, which, as noted above, the trial court found to be plausible. The contract
language, as plaintiffs interpreted it, provided them a reasonable basis to contest GVSU’s
actions. The fact that plaintiffs were ultimately unsuccessful does not render their claims
groundless or completely devoid of legal merit. See Jerico, supra at 36; see also Lakeside, supra
at 532 (holding that the party’s claim was not devoid of legal merit where the facts as conveyed
by the party would support their claim and the law, in certain circumstances, may provide a
remedy). Consequently, we find no clear error in the trial court’s decision to deny GVSU’s
motion for sanctions.
For these same reasons, we deny GVSU’s request that plaintiffs be sanctioned for filing a
frivolous appeal. “This Court has imposed sanctions where the appeal is brought ‘without any
reasonable basis for belief that there was a meritorious issue to be determined on appeal.’”
Cvengros v Farm Bureau Ins, 216 Mich App 261, 268; 548 NW2d 698 (1996), quoting MCR
7.216(C)(1)(a). Although plaintiffs’ appellate arguments are ultimately unpersuasive, we
(…continued)
Academy as party plaintiff and allow it to intervene as a defendant. Specifically, plaintiffs
contend that the presence of three board members at the January 29, 2004 meeting whereat this
suit was authorized constituted a quorum of the board and, therefore, the Metro Charter
Academy board’s action was valid. However, in light of our decision to affirm the trial court’s
grant of summary disposition, this claim of error is moot. See Ryan v Ryan, 260 Mich App 315,
330; 677 NW2d 899 (2004).
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conclude that, for the reasons cited above, there was a reasonable basis for belief that there was a
meritorious issue to be determined on appeal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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