FATEN YOUSIF V WALLED MONA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
FATEN YOUSIF,
UNPUBLISHED
August 16, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 246680
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 02-001903-NO
WALLED MONA,
Defendant-Appellee.
ON REMAND
Before: Markey, P.J., and Wilder and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff originally appealed as of right from a circuit court order granting defendant’s
motion for summary disposition in this premises liability action. We reversed and remanded the
case, concluding that “a genuine, material, factual dispute existed regarding whether . . . a loose
carpet loop located on a landing above a flight of stairs created an unreasonable risk of harm of
which defendant was aware or should have been aware and of which plaintiff was not aware.”
Yousif v Mona, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued June 8, 2004
(Docket No. 246680), p 2. Defendant filed an application for leave to appeal in the Supreme
Court, which has now remanded the case to us and instructed us “to articulate the material facts
in issue on the question of whether the carpet pulls represented an unreasonable hazard, of which
defendant had a duty to warn plaintiff.” The Supreme Court has retained jurisdiction in the case.
We stated the following in our previous opinion:
The duty owed by a landowner to a visitor depends on whether the visitor
is an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser. Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship,
462 Mich 591, 596; 614 NW2d 88 (2000). “[I]nvitee status must be founded on a
commercial purpose for visiting the owner’s premises.” Id. at 607. Plaintiff was
visiting defendant’s home for a family function when she fell down a stairway
after allegedly catching her heel on a loose carpet thread loop on a landing at the
top of the stairway. Defendant’s home was not held open for a commercial
purpose and thus plaintiff, as a social guest, was a licensee. Taylor v Laban, 241
Mich App 449, 453; 616 NW2d 229 (2000).
“Ordinarily, a possessor owes at least a marginal duty of care to his
licensees.” Altairi v Alhaj, 235 Mich App 626, 634; 599 NW2d 537 (1999). A
landowner does not have a duty of inspection or affirmative care to make the
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premises safe for the licensee’s visit. Stitt, supra at 596; Burnett v Bruner, 247
Mich App 365, 373, 376; 636 NW2d 773 (2001). He “owes a licensee a duty to
warn the licensee of any hidden dangers the owner knows or has reason to know
of, if the hidden danger involves an unreasonable risk of harm and the licensee
does not know or have reason to know of the hidden danger [and] the risk
involved.” Kosmalski v St John’s Lutheran Church, [261 Mich App 56, 65; 680
NW2d 50 (2004)]. The landowner “has no obligation to take any steps to
safeguard licensees from conditions that are open and obvious.” Pippin v Atallah,
245 Mich App 136, 143; 626 NW2d 911 (2001).
Plaintiff’s claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in granting
defendant’s motion because there existed genuine issues of fact regarding the
open and obvious nature of the defect, regarding whether the defect presented an
unreasonable risk of harm about which defendant knew or should have known,
and regarding whether plaintiff herself did not know or have reason to know of
the defect or the risk of harm it presented.
The evidence suggested that defendant was aware of the particular loose
thread loop at issue and that a visitor to his home may not have been aware of
such a thread upon casual inspection. We conclude that a genuine, material,
factual dispute existed regarding whether such a loose carpet loop located on a
landing above a flight of stairs created an unreasonable risk of harm of which
defendant was aware or should have been aware and of which plaintiff was not
aware. Consequently, defendant’s motion for summary disposition should have
been denied. Kosmalski, supra at [65]. [Yousif, supra at 1-2 (footnote omitted).]
As noted, defendant owed a duty to warn plaintiff “of any hidden dangers [he knew] or
ha[d] reason to know of, if the hidden danger involve[d] an unreasonable risk of harm and
[plaintiff did] not know or have reason to know of the hidden danger and the risk involved.”
Kosmalski, supra at 65.
The evidence presented in the circuit court clearly created a question of fact regarding
whether defendant was aware, or should have been aware, of the carpet loop at issue before
plaintiff’s fall. Indeed, in his own appellate brief, defendant refers to a document in which he
stated the following:
I saw thread outside of bathroom door[1] [sic] and did not think it was a
problem. The thread was there for quite some time – I think the pull (thread pull)
developed as a result of in-home weekly steam cleaning. I did not inform my
sister or anyone else outside my house of the pull because I did not think it was a
problem.
Defendant later stated, during his deposition, that he had not been aware of the particular carpet
thread at issue but that he had been aware of other loose threads in the carpet. He testified that
the carpet “would snag” and that “it’s very eas[y] . . . to pull the thread off that carpet.” This
1
We note that the bathroom door referred to by defendant is located near the top of the set of
stairs down which plaintiff fell.
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evidence, viewed as a whole, created a question of fact concerning whether the particular carpet
loop at issue was something about which defendant knew or should have known.
Moreover, given the clear evidence that the loop was located at the top of a set of stairs,
there existed a question of fact concerning whether the loop posed a considerable danger to
visitors. Indeed, the location of the carpet loop is a key factor with regard to the question of
“unreasonable risk.” Id. While the loop arguably would not have posed an unreasonable risk of
harm if it had been in a different location, this loop was located in a spot where tripping on it
could cause serious injuries.
Finally, the evidence created a question of fact regarding whether the risk posed by the
carpet loop was a hidden risk about which a guest in the home would not have reason to know
and about which plaintiff did not know. Id. Defendant stated the following when asked “If you
just looked down at the carpet [could you] see where the thread was pulled?”:
You would have to look at it, yeah. Because you have to understand, it’s a
– it’s a gray carpet and to me I would see them because I knew they were there, I
mean for somebody like, you know, you to walk in my house, I don’t think you
would look at my carpet and see if there were any thread pulls, so I mean – I
don’t know, to me I see them, so I don’t know. [Emphasis added.]
Also, plaintiff testified that she noticed nothing wrong with the carpet before her fall. This
evidence clearly created a question of fact regarding whether the risk of harm posed by the carpet
loop was a hidden risk about which plaintiff had no reason to know and about which she in fact
did not know.
In sum, the available evidence in this case indicated the existence of questions of fact
regarding whether the carpet loop at issue represented an unreasonable risk of harm about which
defendant had a duty to warn plaintiff. Id.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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