IN RE BRECK COLE MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of BRECK COLE, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
July 7, 2005
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 259840
Clinton Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 04-016881
ALAN RICKY COLE,
Respondent-Appellant.
In the Matter of BRECK COLE, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 259841
Clinton Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 04-016881
THERESA SLATER,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Fort Hood and R. S. Gribbs*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents Alan Ricky Cole and Theresa Slater appeal as
of right from the trial court order terminating their parental rights to their child under MCL
712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm. These appeals are being decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The minor child was taken into care due to domestic violence in respondents’ home. The
child stated that he was afraid of his father, but that he would like to remain with his mother if
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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she left him. Although police officers had responded to several domestic violence calls at the
home and Mr. Cole had been convicted of three domestic violence offenses, both respondents
denied that Mr. Cole abused Ms. Slater. During the period the child was in the court’s custody,
respondents were also arrested for resisting and obstructing officers. Respondents were released
on bond, which was subsequently revoked when officers found them intoxicated and threatening
neighbors.
On appeal, Mr. Cole correctly argues that the trial court failed to state its conclusions of
law and specify the statutory grounds for termination. However, the court did reference the four
statutory grounds upon which petitioner was seeking termination and, as discussed below, the
evidence supported termination. Therefore, the court’s error does not warrant vacating the
termination order.1
The trial court properly terminated Mr. Cole’s parental rights, as the statutory grounds
were established by clear and convincing evidence. We review a trial court’s decision to
terminate parental rights for clear error.2 If the trial court determines that the petitioner has
proven by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one or more statutory grounds for
termination, the court must terminate the respondent’s parental rights unless it finds from the
record evidence that termination is clearly not in the child’s best interests.3 We review the trial
court’s determination regarding the child’s best interests for clear error.4 Mr. Cole was actually
convicted three times for domestic violence and the child indicated that he was afraid of his
father. Even so, Mr. Cole denied that he abused Ms. Slater and refused to participate in
counseling. Accordingly, the trial court properly found that the grounds for termination had been
established and that termination of Mr. Cole’s parental rights was not contrary to the child’s best
interests.
Ms. Slater contends that the termination of her parental rights was contrary to the child’s
best interests as the child, who was almost fourteen years old, wanted to maintain his relationship
with her. However, Ms. Slater continued to deny that Mr. Cole abused her even though he was
convicted of those offenses. She also failed to recognize the effect of this relationship on her
child and failed to comply in any way with the parent-agency agreement. Furthermore, the court
1
See In re TC, 251 Mich App 368, 371; 650 NW2d 698 (2002); MCR 2.613(A); MCR 3.902(A).
2
MCR 3.997(J); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
3
MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 353-354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
4
Id. at 356-357.
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was not required to adopt the child’s preferences or to place the child with a relative rather than
terminate Ms. Slater’s parental rights.5 Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating either
respondent’s parental rights to the child.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Karen Fort Hood
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
5
In re IEM, 233 Mich App 438, 453; 592 NW2d 751 (1999); In re JS & SM, 231 Mich App 92;
585 NW2d 326 (1998), overruled on other grounds in In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341; 612 NW2d 407
(2000).
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