WILLIE WRIGHT V MICRO ELECTRONICS INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WILLIE WRIGHT,
UNPUBLISHED
June 30, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 252790
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2003-050906-NO
MICRO ELECTRONICS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
TONY NUNEZ and FRANK ANGELUCCI,
Defendants.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Schuette and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff failed to serve defendant, Micro Electronics, Inc., in accordance with the court
rules, but sent a copy of the summons and complaint to the attorney representing defendant in a
related federal action brought by plaintiff. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(3) (service of process was insufficient). Plaintiff
appeals as of right, asserting that dismissal was improper pursuant to MCR 2.105(J)(3).
Defendant contends that this case involved a complete failure of service and, therefore, MCR
2.105(J)(3) is inapplicable. We disagree and reverse. This case is being decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
We review the grant or denial of summary disposition de novo to determine if the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597
NW2d 817 (1999).
MCR 2.105(J)(3) provides that “[a]n action shall not be dismissed for improper service of
process unless the service failed to inform the defendant of the action within the time provided in
these rules for service.” The principal dispute between the parties is whether this case involved
“improper service of process” or a complete failure of service of process. The importance of the
distinction is discussed in Holliday v Townley, 189 Mich App 424; 473 NW2d 733 (1991).
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In Holliday, the plaintiff filed a complaint and sent a copy to the defendant with a cover
letter threatening to “formally serve the papers” if the defendant did not provide the plaintiff with
dental records that she requested. The defendant was never served with or received a summons.
The summons expired, and the limitation period expired. The trial court dismissed the action for
failure to serve the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff relied on MCR 2.105(J)(3) and argued
that the defendant had actual notice of the lawsuit. This Court concluded that MCR 2.105(J)(3)
was inapplicable “where the question is not one of defects in the manner of service, but rather a
complete failure of service of process.” Id. at 425. The Court stated that the rule “forgives
errors in the manner or content of service of process. It does not forgive a failure to serve
process.” Id. at 426. The summons is a necessary part of service of process. “MCR 2.105(J)(3),
as well as every other court rule governing service of process, assumes that the summons will be
served with the complaint, even if in a technically defective fashion.” Id. The Court in Holliday
concluded that there was a complete failure of service of process and, therefore, affirmed the
dismissal of the action.
In contrast to Holliday, both Hill v Frawley, 155 Mich App 611; 400 NW2d 328 (1986),
and Bunner v Blow-Rite Insulation Co, 162 Mich App 669, 674; 413 NW2d 474 (1987), are
examples of errors in the manner of service to which MCR 2.105(J)(3) applies.
In Hill, the plaintiff filed a complaint and attempted to serve it by certified mail, but did
not enclose a copy of the complaint. He made a second attempt to serve the defendant, but
someone other than the defendant signed the return receipt. The defendant filed a motion for
summary disposition on the basis that process and service were insufficient. The motion was
filed before the summons expired. Although the service did not comply with MCR 2.105(A)(2),
this Court relied on MCR 2.105(J)(3) to conclude that the defendant was not entitled to summary
disposition. “[I]f a defendant actually receives a copy of the summons and complaint within the
permitted time, he cannot have the action dismissed on the ground that the manner of service
contravenes the rules.” Id. at 613. In Hill, the defendant acknowledged receiving the summons
and complaint within the pertinent time period by retaining counsel and filing a motion for
summary disposition. Id. at 613-614.
In Bunner, the plaintiffs filed an action against a defendant (“Rapco”) that was involved
in bankruptcy proceedings and had ceased to do business. The plaintiffs served Rapco’s
bankruptcy trustee, who forwarded the summons and complaint to an insurance company, and
counsel was hired to represent Rapco. The trial court granted Rapco’s motion to quash and
dismissed the case. This Court explained that it was not clear whether the plaintiffs had
complied with all requirements for proper service on Rapco. However, dismissal was improper
pursuant to MCR 2.105(J)(3). The Court stated:
While the exact nature of Rapco’s current existence is somewhat unclear,
it is clear in this case that Rapco is aware of the pending action. Service on the
trustee is undisputed. At the hearing on the motion to quash, Robert Roth stated
that he was appearing on behalf of Rapco, not an insurance company.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in quashing service and dismissing Rapco when
Rapco was fully aware of the pending action despite any errors in the manner of
service. [Id. at 674.]
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We conclude that the present case involves an error in the manner of service rather than a
complete failure of service, as in Holliday. The summons and complaint were sent to
defendant’s attorney rather than served on defendant as specified in the court rule. We disagree
with defendant’s position that failure to serve an entity in compliance with MCR 2.105 means
that there is a “complete failure of service” to which MCR 2.105(J)(3) does not apply. This
interpretation is not suggested by the holding in Holliday, where the crucial defect was the
failure to send a summons in the first instance. Nor is it consistent with the holdings in Hill and
Bunner, supra.
The evidence submitted to the trial court indicates that counsel for plaintiff and defendant
discussed the state court action and defense counsel received a copy of the summons and
complaint before the summons expired. This is adequate to show that the service informed
defendant of the action. Indeed, defendant does not argue to the contrary. Accordingly,
dismissal of plaintiff’s action was improper pursuant to MCR 2.105(J)(3).
Reversed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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