PEOPLE OF MI V MARK MALASKI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 30, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 252635
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 03-000641-FH
MARK MALASKI,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Schuette and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant pleaded guilty of felonious assault, MCL 750.82, and possession of firearm
during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to one to four years’
imprisonment for the assault conviction and a consecutive two-year term of imprisonment for the
felony-firearm conviction. He appeals by delayed leave granted. We affirm. This case is being
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
I. FACTS
As a factual basis for his plea, defendant admitted pointing a rifle at his neighbor to scare
him. The prosecutor recommended that defendant serve his sentence in Caro Hospital and that if
defendant is released from the hospital before serving his full sentence, he then be placed with
the Department of Corrections. Defense counsel agreed. Counsel stated that defendant was on
medication but that the effectiveness of the medication varied greatly. The trial court accepted
defendant’s plea.
The trial court sentenced defendant to one to four years imprisonment for the assault
conviction and two years imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. The trial court
specified that defendant was to serve his sentences at Caro Hospital, and, once discharged, was
to serve the remainder of his sentences at the Department of Corrections. However, at a
resentencing hearing, the trial court stated that the Department of Corrections had indicated that
defendant’s sentence could not be carried out as ordered; specifically, the placement of defendant
at Caro Hospital. The court recognized that it did not have authority regarding a specific
placement for defendant within the Department of Corrections, but recommended that defendant
undergo a mental health examination as soon as possible and be placed in an appropriate setting.
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Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, contending that it was not an
understanding and voluntary plea because he was on medication at the time it was tendered. The
trial court determined that, looking at defendant’s plea as a whole, defendant was competent to
enter the plea despite the fact he was on medication at the time he tendered the plea. Therefore,
the court denied the motion.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant argues that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because his
medication rendered him incompetent to tender the plea. This Court reviews for an abuse of
discretion a trial court’s decision on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. People v Patmore, 264
Mich App 139, 148-149; 693 NW2d 385 (2004); People v Wilhite, 240 Mich App 587, 594; 618
NW2d 386 (2000). An abuse of discretion occurs when an unprejudiced person, considering the
facts upon which the trial court relied, would conclude that there exists no justification or excuse
for the ruling. Patmore, supra at 149; People v Clement, 254 Mich App 387, 389; 657 NW2d
172 (2002).
III. ANALYSIS
A. KNOWING & VOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEA
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea once the plea is
tendered and the trial court accepts the plea. Patmore, supra at 149; People v Effinger, 212 Mich
App 67, 69; 536 NW2d 809 (1995). MCR 6.302 provides that a trial court may not accept a plea
“unless it is convinced that the plea is understanding, voluntary, and accurate.” Defendant
argues that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was on prescription medication
when it was made. A review of the plea proceeding as a whole, however, reveals that
defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary and that he was competent to tender the plea. The
trial court followed the requirements articulated in MCR 6.302(B), (C), and (D) before accepting
the plea. The court questioned defendant as follows:
Q. And does the taking of these medications impair your ability to understand me
or does it assist you in understanding me or doesn’t it matter one way or the
other?
A. I’m not sure.
Q. Okay. Do you understand what is going on here today?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you heard me and your counsel and the prosecutor?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you understand each of us?
A. Yes.
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Q. If I were to ask you is there a plea bargain or plea agreement in this matter, is
there?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you understand that under the terms of the plea bargain – has the entire
plea bargain been stated on the record by the prosecuting attorney and your
attorney?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Well, did you hear them? Did you hear -A. Yes, I guess so.
In addition, defendant responded affirmatively to the court’s question inquiring whether
he understood that by pleading guilty he was giving up his right to a jury trial, his right to call
witnesses on his behalf, and his right to testify at trial. Further, defense counsel admitted that
defendant was competent to tender the plea at that time. In light of this record, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis
that his medication rendered him incompetent to enter a knowing and voluntary plea.
B. RESENTENCING
Defendant also contends that his plea was induced by a promise that he would serve at
least a portion of his sentence at Caro Hospital. Defendant’s failure to move to withdraw his
plea on this basis in the trial court and his acquiescence to the court’s resentencing constituted
waiver of this issue. Waiver is “the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right.’” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 762 n 7; 597 NW2d 130 (1999), quoting United States
v Olano, 507 US 725, 733; 113 S Ct 1770; 123 L Ed 2d 508 (1993). A party who waives his
rights may not thereafter seek appellate review regarding the deprivation of those rights because
the waiver extinguishes any error. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
See also MCR 6.311(C).
The purpose of resentencing defendant was to correct the trial court’s previous sentence
requiring defendant’s placement at Caro Hospital. At the hearing, defense counsel acquiesced to
the sentence, stating:
Your Honor, I think the Court’s well aware of the discussions we’ve had
off record and in chambers and we are here for resentencing. I think the
commentary on the disposition speaks for itself. I think the appropriate
authorities have been notified of [defendant’s] condition and will do the best to
place him appropriately. I would – the only difference that I would ask the Court
to note is that apparently if the sentence is going to be re-imposed technically,
he’s entitled to another 23 days jail credit.
Thereafter, the trial court imposed the same sentences, but without the requirement that
defendant be placed in Caro Hospital. Because defendant was aware of the sentences being
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imposed and acquiesced to the removal of the condition that he be placed at Caro Hospital rather
than the Department of Corrections, he waived any argument that he should be permitted to
withdraw his plea on this basis. Thus, by expressly approving of the resentencing, defendant
waived this issue on appeal. Carter, supra at 215; People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 688; 660
NW2d 322 (2002).
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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