PEOPLE OF MI V JULIAN DALE KEY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 31, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 247718
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-005202-02
CEDRIC PIPES,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 247719
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-005202-01
JULIAN DALE KEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Bandstra and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this consolidated case, defendants Cedric Pipes and Julian Key appeal as of right their
jury trial convictions of first-degree premeditated murder, in violation of MCL 750.316(1)(a).
We reverse and remand for new trials.
This case arises out of the tragic drive-by shooting death of three-year old Destiney
Thomas on March 23, 2002. The prosecution’s theory of the case was that Destiney was the
innocent victim of a dispute over drug territory between defendants and Jackie Close and Eddie
Smith. Close and Smith were friends with Terrell Brown, the boyfriend of Deneen Thomas,
Destiney’s mother. After Smith and Brown got into an argument with defendants, the green Jeep
Cherokee that defendant Key was known to drive was fired upon and damaged while it was
parked in front of the home of defendant Key’s mother. Defendants saw a car that resembled
Close’s vehicle drive away shortly after the shots were fired. The prosecution maintained that
defendants retaliated against Close and Smith: defendants and some friends drove in two
separate vehicles, one of which was the green Jeep Cherokee, to Brown’s house, where they
-1-
believed they would find Close and Smith. Gunshots were fired from one or both vehicles, and
some of the bullets penetrated the house, striking and killing Destiney.
Deneen Thomas, Destiney’s mother, testified that she lived at Brown’s house. Close and
Smith were both at Brown’s house the day before the shooting. Smith and Sean Taylor were
both at the house at the time of the shooting. Thomas hit the floor when the gunfire started, and
although many shots were fired, she was unable to discern from which direction they came.
After the gunfire stopped, Thomas found Destiney in a pool of blood in the room where she had
been playing. The medical examiner testified that Destiney died as a result of a gunshot wound
to the head.
Terrell Brown was friends with defendant Key. Brown testified that there was some
animosity between himself and defendant Pipes. At the time of the shooting, Brown was on the
front porch; Smith was present, and Taylor was approaching the house. Just before the shooting
started, Brown saw a car drive past the house. A green Jeep Cherokee then pulled up and
stopped. Brown heard gunshots and dove into the house. Brown testified that the Jeep looked
like the vehicle defendant Key was known to drive. According to Brown, the gunshots were
fired from the passenger side of the Jeep. Brown heard Thomas scream and ran upstairs, where
he saw Destiney on the floor. From a window, Brown saw the Jeep speed off after the shooting;
however, he was unable see who was in the Jeep.
Brown testified that approximately four days after the shooting, he gave the police
defendant Key’s name as the person in the Jeep, because he knew Key was known to drive the
Jeep, and therefore blamed the shooting on him. Brown only identified defendant Key as the
shooter because of the Jeep, did not actually see who was in the Jeep, and admitted lying to the
police about seeing the driver of the Jeep. Brown did not give the police defendant Key’s name
as a suspect until several days following the shooting because he planned on “getting even” and
“dealing with” the situation himself. Brown later told the police that he could not identify the
shooter, and did not know if defendant Key was in the Jeep at the time of the shooting. After the
shooting, Brown learned about a dispute between defendant Key and Close and Smith, which he
relayed to the police. Brown thought he probably gave the name of defendant Pipes to the
police. Brown believed the gun used in the shooting was an AK-47 by the way the shots were
fired.
Terrence Mitchell, Close’s brother, testified that he knew that defendants were friends
and that defendant Key was known to drive a green Jeep Cherokee. At the time of the shooting,
Mitchell was about one block away from Brown’s house, when he heard gunfire. After it
stopped, he saw a green Jeep Cherokee coming toward him at a “kind of fast” pace. Mitchell
testified that when he was approximately ten to twelve feet from the Jeep, he saw defendant
Pipes driving the vehicle, and defendant Key in the passenger seat; he did not see another car in
the area besides the Jeep. Mitchell testified that he gave a statement to the police shortly after
the incident, but believed that certain information was added by the police, including information
about a small white car that was in the area. Mitchell claimed that he was forced to sign the
inaccurate statement.
Before trial, Mitchell was required to testify pursuant to an investigative subpoena. He
denied testifying at that proceeding that he saw a white car that appeared to be traveling with the
Jeep, despite what the transcript stated. Mitchell also denied that he previously testified that two
-2-
people were in the white car, including the passenger, who he knew by the name of Pierre;
Mitchell claimed that the prosecutor or the court reporter fabricated such information.
Djuana Smith, defendant Key’s girlfriend at the time of the shooting, owned a green Jeep
Cherokee, and often allowed defendant Key to drive her vehicle. While Djuana was out of town,
defendant Key borrowed the Jeep. She asked him to return it several times, but despite his
assurances, defendant Key failed to do so. Defendant Key ultimately admitted that the Jeep was
damaged by gunshots while it had been parked in front of his mother’s home. Defendant Key
told her that he did not know who fired the shots, but that it might have been someone with
whom he had been in an argument. When Djuana eventually received the Jeep back, the rear
window on the driver’s side was shot out, and there were two or three bullet holes in it.
Casings collected from the street outside Brown’s house were .30 caliber, and were all
fired from the same weapon. Bullet fragments collected at the scene were also the same caliber
as the casings, but it could not be determined if the bullets came from the same weapon as the
casings. Ammunition of the type found at the scene is typically used in an AK-47 or SKS-type
weapon. A bullet recovered from inside the wall of the Jeep was .45 caliber and possibly fired
from another gun. The police found gun shot residue in at least one area of the Jeep, but the
quantity of residue particles was insufficient to meet reporting standards to confirm the presence
of gunshot residue. As a result, the forensic chemist was unable to determine if a gun was
discharged or fired from inside the Jeep.
A fingerprint found on the top of the glass on the front passenger door outside the Jeep
was a match to defendant Pipes’ fingerprint. The position of the fingerprint on the glass was as
if someone inside the vehicle extended his fingers over the top of the glass onto the outside of the
vehicle.
Sean Taylor was unavailable as a witness, so his prior testimony was read to the jury.
Taylor was friends with Brown, and was at Brown’s house at the time of the shooting. Taylor
did not know defendants. Before the shooting started, Taylor saw a small blue car drive by with
a green Jeep Cherokee behind it. When the shooting began, Taylor ran into the back alley.
Although he did not see any shots fired, he testified that the shots came from the blue car. Just
before he ran away, Taylor saw a gun hanging out of the passenger side window of the blue car.
He did not see anything hanging out of the windows of the Jeep. Taylor was unable to see the
shooter in the blue car, but gave a partial description to the police.
Multiple statements from each defendant were admitted into evidence at trial. The trial
court instructed the jury that each statement should only be considered against the defendant who
made the statement, and not against the codefendant.
Defendant Key was arrested on March 26, 2002. After being advised of his constitutional
rights, defendant Key signed a form acknowledging his rights and agreed to give a statement.
Defendant Key was asked a series of questions, and a police officer wrote down his answers.
After reviewing the statement and making some changes, defendant Key signed each page of the
statement. Defendant Key admitted driving Djuana’s Jeep on March 22, 2002, with defendant
Pipes and Damon Clark. According to defendant Key, defendant Pipes got into an argument
with Close and Smith about their drug territory. Later that day, defendant Key saw the Jeep get
hit with five or six rounds of gunfire, and saw a car that resembled Close’s vehicle leaving the
-3-
scene—Close and Smith had been driving the same car earlier that day. Defendants Key and
Pipes discussed seeking revenge against Close and Smith for shooting at the Jeep. According to
defendant Key, defendant Pipes rented a car and drove it past Brown’s house—defendant Pipes
shot at the house with a nine-millimeter gun, and Clark used an “AK.” Another man, Pierre,
followed them in the Jeep.
On March 27, 2002, defendant Key agreed to give another statement after being advised
of his rights. Defendant Key initially denied that he fired any shots at the house or that he knew
who fired the shots. He also denied being in the Jeep or having any participation in the shooting.
Defendant Key then admitted that he was involved in the shooting. Defendant Key explained
that he and defendant Pipes had gotten into an argument with Close and Smith over their
respective drug territories. After someone fired shots at his girlfriend’s Jeep, defendant Key and
some friends borrowed a car for a few hours. Defendant Key admitted that he and defendant
Pipes were in the rental car, and fired several shots at Brown’s house in retaliation, in an attempt
to harm Smith. Their other friends followed in the Jeep to act as backup. Defendant Key
appeared to admit that he used an AK-47.
On March 26, 2002, defendant Pipes was advised of and acknowledged his constitutional
rights and agreed to talk about the shooting, although he was not under arrest at that time.
Defendant Pipes admitted spending the day before the shooting with defendant Key. He
recounted an incident with Smith and stated that the Jeep belonging to defendant Key’s girlfriend
had been damaged by gunfire. According to defendant Pipes, defendant Key told him that Close
and Smith were the perpetrators. Defendant Key then made threats to “get” Smith, and stated
that he was going to kill Smith. Following the shooting, defendant Key told defendant Pipes that
he was trying to shoot Smith, and that he did not intend to shoot the little girl. According to
defendant Pipes, a man named “Pierre” was with defendant Key—Pierre drove the Jeep, and
either defendant Key or Pierre shot at the house from the vehicle.
On March 27, 2002, defendant Pipes again acknowledged his rights and agreed to give a
statement. Defendant Pipes gave an oral statement, which was recorded by the police.
Defendant Pipes refused to sign the written statement, but, over objection, the trial court
admitted the statement. Defendant Pipes recounted that after defendant Key discovered that
Smith was responsible for shooting the Jeep, defendant Key was “ready to go get” Smith.
Defendant Pipes obtained a rental car, which defendant Key drove with Marcus to Brown’s
house. Defendant Pipes followed in the Jeep with Damon. Defendant Pipes abruptly ended the
interview at that point.
On March 28, 2002, defendant Pipes gave yet another statement after being advised of his
constitutional rights. Defendant Pipes recalled that on the day of the shooting, defendant Key
told him that Smith shot up the Jeep, and that he knew where Smith could be found. Defendant
Key asked defendant Pipes if he could borrow a car from someone so that defendant Key could
kill Smith. Defendant Pipes provided defendant Key with a rental car, and defendant Pipes
drove the Jeep. According to defendant Pipes, defendant Key and “Marcus” shot at the house.
Defendant Key used a nine-millimeter gun, and Marcus used a rifle. Defendant Pipes denied
firing any shots, but admitted to providing the car for defendant Key.
At the close of the prosecution’s case, both defendants were unsure if they would testify,
despite the fact that the trial court made its earlier rulings to admit the statements and have a
-4-
consolidated trial on an offer of proof that both defendants would testify. The trial court had
previously stated that it decided not to grant separate trials based on the offer of proof that both
defendants would testify, but acknowledged that trial strategies often change during the course of
trial. Both defendants ultimately refrained from testifying.
Defendants now argue on appeal that they were denied a fair trial because the trial court
denied their motions for separate trials or separate juries, and then allowed the same jury to hear
each of their custodial statements. We agree. The decision whether to grant separate trials is
within the discretion of the trial court and we will not reverse absent an abuse of that discretion.
People v Cadle (On Remand), 209 Mich App 467, 469; 531 NW2d 761 (1995); MCL 768.5.
Additionally, this issue presents a constitutional question concerning the Confrontation Clause,
which we review de novo. People v Beasley, 239 Mich App 548, 557; 609 NW2d 581 (2000);
US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20.1
MCR 6.121(C) mandates the severance of trials in certain situations. The rule provides
that “[o]n a defendant’s motion, the court must sever the trial of defendants on related offenses
on a showing that severance is necessary to avoid prejudice to substantial rights of the
defendant.” A trial court is only required to grant separate trials under MCR 6.121(C) “when a
defendant provides the court with a supporting affidavit, or makes an offer of proof, that clearly,
affirmatively, and fully demonstrates that his substantial rights will be prejudiced by a joint trial
and that severance is necessary to remedy the prejudice.” People v Hana, 447 Mich 325, 346;
524 NW2d 682, amended 447 Mich 1203; 524 NW2d 710 (1994). This standard can be satisfied
where defendants argue conflicting defenses that are not merely inconsistent, but also mutually
exclusive or irreconcilable. Id. at 349.
1
Although the trial court made its ruling denying severance based upon an offer of proof that
both defendants intended to testify, ultimately, neither defendant elected to testify. Accordingly,
both defendants were denied the opportunity to cross-examine each other regarding their various
statements to the police. The dissenting opinion would affirm on what amounts to a waiver
analysis. However, the prosecution does not argue that this issue was waived by defendants both
stating in advance of trial that they intended to testify, i.e., both would have been available for
confrontation upon cross-examination.
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
Any such waiver argument would rest on the premise that a defendant’s constitutional right to
confront witnesses may be susceptible to a codefendant’s decision to go back on a stated
intention to testify, and we are not aware of any precedents suggesting that approach. Further,
we are not aware of any precedents suggesting that a codefendant who expresses an intent to
testify can be forced to do so if a trial court relies on that stated intention to allow otherwise
inadmissible codefendant testimony, in derogation of that defendant’s right to remain silent and
right against self-incrimination. Admittedly, the trial court was apparently led astray by the
defendants’ stated intent not to testify. However, the better approach, to assure that their
constitutional rights would not be compromised, would have been to proceed with separate trials
or separate juries.
-5-
In this case, by its own admission, the trial court focused only on the proposed defenses
of each defendant in determining that severance was not required. The trial court erred by failing
to give sufficient consideration to the prosecutor’s intention to offer the custodial statements of
each defendant into evidence before the same jury. In Hana, supra at 346 n 7, our Supreme
Court observed that potentially reversible prejudice requiring separate trials can occur where
“evidence that the jury should not consider against a defendant and that would not be admissible
if a defendant were tried alone is admitted against a codefendant,” quoting Zafiro v United
States, 506 US 534, 539; 113 S Ct 933; 122 L Ed 2d 317 (1993). Our Supreme Court also noted
that “[e]vidence that is probative of a defendant’s guilt but technically admissible only against a
codefendant also might present a risk of prejudice.” Hana, supra at 346 n 7, quoting Zafiro,
supra at 539.
In Bruton v United States, 391 US 123, 135-136; 88 S Ct 1620; 20 L Ed 2d 476 (1968),
the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant is deprived of his right to confrontation
when his codefendant’s incriminating confession is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury
is instructed to consider that confession only against the codefendant. Cruz v New York, 481 US
186, 187-188; 107 S Ct 1714; 95 L Ed 2d 162 (1987). See also People v Frazier (After Remand),
446 Mich 539, 544-545; 521 NW2d 291 (1994) (Brickley, J.). The Court observed:
In joint trials . . . when the admissible confession of one defendant inculpates
another defendant, the confession is never deleted from the case and the jury is
expected to perform the overwhelming task of considering it in determining the
guilt or innocence of the declarant and then of ignoring it in determining the guilt
or innocence of any codefendants of the declarant. A jury cannot ‘segregate
evidence into separate intellectual boxes.’ [Bruton, supra at 131.]
The Court further stated that “[a] defendant may be prejudiced by the admission in evidence
against a co-defendant of a statement or confession made by that co-defendant,” and that “[t]his
prejudice cannot be dispelled by cross-examination if the co-defendant does not take the stand.”
Id. at 132.
[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot,
follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the
defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be
ignored. Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully incriminating
extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with
the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial. Not only are
the incriminations devastating to the defendant but their credibility is inevitably
suspect, a fact recognized when accomplices do take the stand and the jury is
instructed to weigh their testimony carefully given the recognized motivation to
shift blame onto others. The unreliability of such evidence is intolerably
compounded when the alleged accomplice, as here, does not testify and cannot be
tested by cross-examination. [Id. at 135-136 (citations omitted).]
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that the rule from Bruton applies
even in the situation where the defendant has also confessed and his unredacted statement is
“interlocking” with the codefendant’s statement. Cruz, supra at 191-194. Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia noted the “devastating” practical effect of codefendant testimony without
-6-
cross-examination referenced in Bruton. Id. at 191. The Court found it “impossible to imagine
why there should be excluded from that category [codefendant confessions], as generally not
‘devastating,’ codefendant confessions that ‘interlock’ with the defendant’s own confession.”
Cruz, supra at 191-192. “[T]he infinite variability of inculpatory statements (whether made by
defendants or codefendants), and of their likely effect on juries, makes [the assumption that an
interlocking confession will preclude devastation] untenable.” Id. at 192, quoting Parker, supra
at 84 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia reasoned that usually a defendant tries to negate or
avoid the consequences of a confession and the admission of a codefendant’s custodial account
that corroborates that confession presents a serious obstacle to that strategy. Id. at 192. Thus,
the Court held that “where a nontestifying codefendant’s confession incriminating the defendant
is not directly admissible against the defendant, the Confrontation Clause bars its admission at
their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed not to consider it against the defendant, and even if
the defendant’s own confession is admitted against him.” Id. at 193 (internal citation omitted).2
Regarding defendant Pipes, the prosecutor concedes that the trial court erred in admitting
defendant Key’s statements in the joint trial. Further, with respect to defendant Key, the
prosecutor agrees that even though the issue on appeal is framed in terms of the trial court’s error
in denying defendant’s motion to sever the joint trial, the “real argument” is that the trial court
committed a Bruton error by admitting defendant Pipes’ statements in the joint trial. Under
Cruz, supra at 191, the fact that defendant Key confessed in his second statement to the police
does not erase the Bruton error.
However, these Bruton violations do not automatically require reversal of defendants’
convictions. People v Banks, 438 Mich 408, 427; 475 NW2d 769 (1991). Even where the
Bruton rule is violated, the error may be considered harmless in certain circumstances. Banks,
supra at 427. Thus, a defendant’s confession “may be considered on appeal in assessing whether
any Confrontation Clause violation was harmless.” Cruz, supra at 193-194, citing Harrington v
California, 395 US 250; 89 S Ct 1726; 23 L Ed 2d 284 (1969). If the evidence properly admitted
against the defendant is so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the codefendant’s
statement so insignificant by comparison, the improper admission of the statement is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Banks, supra at 427. See also People v Harris, 201 Mich App 147,
150; 505 NW2d 889 (1993).
In this case, both codefendants were prejudiced by the admission of each other’s
unredacted statements. Witnesses did not get a clear look at who was actually responsible for the
shooting. There were varying accounts of which vehicles were involved, who was in the
vehicles, and which vehicle was the source of the gunfire. In an attempt to exonerate himself,
2
The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36; 124
S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004), further supports barring the use of a nontestifying
codefendant’s statement in a joint trial. In Crawford, the Court held that out-of-court statements
that are testimonial in nature are barred under the Confrontation Clause where the declarant is
unavailable, unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. People v
Bell (On Second Remand), 264 Mich App 58, 61-63; 689 NW2d 732 (2004).
-7-
defendant Pipes implicated defendant Key in all three of his statements to the police. Defendant
Key similarly implicated defendant Pipes in his two statements to the police, while additionally
admitting his own involvement in the shooting in his second statement. Because defendants
gave conflicting statements, the jury had to decide which statements were accurate. Indeed, it
appears that the jury was unable to determine the identity of the actual shooter, because neither
defendant was convicted of felony-firearm.
Under the circumstances, we conclude that both defendants were, at a minimum, entitled
to trials before separate juries, given that the prosecution intended to offer into evidence the
statements of each defendant, and that each defendant implicated the other in their own
statements. The admission of these unredacted statements at trial violated each defendant’s right
of confrontation, because neither defendant testified at trial and thus was not subject to crossexamination. Because the properly admitted evidence of guilt was not overwhelming, and
because the prejudicial effect of the codefendants’ statements against each other was significant
by comparison, Banks, supra at 427, we are compelled to reverse the convictions of both
defendants on this basis and remand for new trials.
To aid the trial court on remand, we address defendants’ remaining issues on appeal.
Defendant Pipes argues that the trial court erred in admitting investigative subpoena hearing
testimony of Miles Scott. We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of
discretion. People v McDaniel, 469 Mich 409, 412; 670 NW2d 659 (2003). But where the
decision involves a preliminary question of law, such as whether a rule of evidence precludes
admissibility, we review the question de novo. Id.
MRE 801(d)(1)(A) provides that a statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is
inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of
perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition. Here, Scott testified at trial and
was available for cross-examination concerning his statement within the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause, despite the fact that he claimed to remember nothing. See People v
Chavies, 234 Mich App 274, 283; 593 NW2d 655 (1999). Additionally, Scott’s trial
testimony—where he claimed to remember nothing about the incident or his prior statement—
was inconsistent with his investigative subpoena hearing testimony, where he recalled the events
in question and implicated defendant Pipes. Id. at 281-282. Therefore, we find that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Scott’s investigative subpoena hearing testimony
as substantive evidence under MRE 801(d)(1)(A).
We note defendant Pipes’ argument that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony
under MRE 613(b), which allows a witness to be impeached by extrinsic evidence of a prior
inconsistent statement. However, defendant did not object to the admission of the testimony on
this basis at trial, and “objections to admissibility not properly raised at trial cannot be later
asserted on appeal.” People v Kilbourn, 454 Mich 677, 685; 563 NW2d 669 (1997). We also
note defendant Pipes’ argument that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony by
concluding that Scott’s prior testimony was trustworthy.
However, the element of
trustworthiness is applicable when hearsay is admitted under MRE 803(24), the residual hearsay
exception, and the trial court was not required to find that the prior testimony was trustworthy in
order to admit it under MRE 801(d)(1)(A). Because, as noted above, the trial court properly
admitted the testimony as substantive evidence under MRE 801(d)(1)(A), we need not decide if
-8-
the evidence was alternatively admissible under MRE 803(24). Accordingly, defendant Pipes
would not be entitled to relief on this issue.
Defendant Key argues that the prohibition against double jeopardy barred his retrial
where, at the first trial, he was provoked into moving for a mistrial after a police officer
disclosed that he had failed a polygraph examination. US Const, Ams V, XIV; Const 1963, art 1,
§ 15. A constitutional double jeopardy challenge presents a question of law that we review de
novo. People v Lett, 466 Mich 206, 212; 644 NW2d 743 (2002). When a mistrial is declared,
retrial is permissible under double jeopardy principles where the defendant requested the mistrial
and the mistrial was caused by innocent conduct on the part of the prosecutor or by factors
beyond his control. Id. at 215; People v Echavarria, 233 Mich App 356, 363; 592 NW2d 737
(1999). Stated another way, where a defendant requests a mistrial, retrial is not barred unless the
prosecutor has engaged in conduct that was intended to provoke or goad the request for a
mistrial. Lett, supra at 215.
We agree with the trial court that the police officer’s comments at defendant Key’s first
trial were made inadvertently. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the prosecutor
sought to elicit testimony from the police officer regarding the results of defendant Key’s
polygraph examination, thereby provoking defendant Key into requesting a mistrial. Indeed,
defendant Key never made such a claim when moving for a mistrial. Defendant Key’s retrial did
not violate double jeopardy principles because the mistrial was granted at his request, and the
mistrial was caused by factors beyond the prosecutor’s control, namely, the police officer’s
unsolicited reference to defendant Key’s polygraph results. Echavarria, supra at 363.
Defendant Key next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction
of first-degree murder. We disagree. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the
evidence de novo in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational
trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. People v Fennell, 260 Mich App 261, 270; 677 NW2d 66 (2004).
In order to convict a defendant of first-degree murder, the prosecution must prove that the
defendant intentionally killed the victim and that the act of killing was premeditated and
deliberate. People v Anderson, 209 Mich App 527, 537; 531 NW2d 780 (1995). The elements
of premeditation and deliberation require sufficient time to allow the defendant to take a second
look, and may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the killing. Id. Premeditation
may be established through evidence of the following factors: (1) the prior relationship of the
parties; (2) the defendant’s actions before the killing; (3) the circumstances of the killing itself;
and (4) the defendant’s conduct after the homicide. Id.
We apply these principles here by examining the evidence against defendant Key apart
from the improperly admitted custodial statements made by defendant Pipes. The prosecution
presented evidence that defendant Key was involved in an argument with Close and Smith
regarding their respective drug territories, and believed that they were involved in an earlier
incident in which gunshots were fired at a vehicle that defendant Key was known to drive. In his
own statement, defendant Key admitted his involvement in the shooting as revenge for the earlier
shooting incident. During the shooting, several gunshots were fired in the direction of a house
where two people were outside on the front porch, one person was in the yard, and several others
were inside. One person on the front porch dove into the house to avoid being shot. Viewing
-9-
this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence from
which a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of first-degree murder were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant Key next argues that the trial court erred in admitting a tape recording of a
series of 911 calls made following the shooting. We note, initially, that the contents of the 911
tape were not transcribed into the record, and despite requests from this Court, the prosecution
has failed to produce the tape recording of the 911 calls. MCR 7.210(C) provides that once a
claim of appeal is filed, the party possessing any exhibits offered into evidence, here the
prosecution, must file them with the trial court absent a stipulation or order to the contrary.
People v Wilson (On Rehearing), 96 Mich App 792, 796; 293 NW2d 710 (1980). While an
incomplete lower court record can jeopardize a criminal defendant’s right to appeal, “not every
gap in the record on appeal requires reversal of a conviction.” Id. at 797. “When the surviving
record is sufficient to allow evaluation of the appeal, the defendant’s right is satisfied,” and
“[w]hether a record is sufficient in a particular case will of course depend upon the questions that
must be asked of it.” Id.
Here, defendant Key claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the 911
tape into evidence because it was introduced solely to inflame the passions of the jurors, was
cumulative of other evidence presented at trial, and any probative value was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under MRE 403. We review de novo preliminary
questions of law, such as whether a rule of evidence precludes admissibility, and we review the
trial court’s ultimate decision to admit the evidence for an abuse of discretion. McDaniel, supra
at 412.
Although the record does not contain the 911 tape or a transcription of it, our review of
the record reveals that the trial court determined that although its contents were generally
cumulative to the in-court testimony of witnesses to the shooting, the potential prejudice or
cumulative nature did not outweigh its probative value. We conclude that the record presents
justification for the trial court’s decision, and thus find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the 911 tape. See People v Schmitz, 231 Mich App 521, 534-535; 586
NW2d 766 (1998).
We reverse and remand. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
-10-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.