MARLO BEAUTY SUPPLY INC V FARMERS INS GROUP OF COMPANIES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARLO BEAUTY SUPPLY, INC a Michigan
corporation and ALLIED BARBER AND
BEAUTY SUPPLY, INC, a Michigan corporation
UNPUBLISHED
May 26, 2005
Plaintiffs-Appellees/CrossAppellants,
v
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP OF
COMPANIES and TRUCK INSURANCE
EXCHANGE, a foreign corporation authorized to
engage in general insurance business in the State of
Michigan,
No. 247224
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 93-308567-CK
Defendants-Appellants/CrossAppellees.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Wilder and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this insurance case, defendants, Farmer’s Insurance Group and Truck Insurance
Exchange appeal as of right the trial court’s findings of fact and resulting judgment for plaintiffs
Marlo Beauty Supply, Inc. and Allied Barber and Beauty Supply, Inc. Plaintiffs cross-appeal on
the issue of damage calculations. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTS
In 1989, defendant William D. Abraham, an agent for defendant Farmers Insurance
Group, sold plaintiffs a liability insurance policy. In 1991 and 1992, two women (formerly
underlying plaintiffs) brought actions against plaintiffs, alleging that they were injured when
acetone that they had purchased from plaintiffs ignited when they used it to clean their floors.
Defendants refused to defend or indemnify plaintiffs in these suits because of two policy
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endorsements which restricted products liability coverage, ET-1141 (products liability exclusion)
and ET-3432 (products and completed operations exclusion). In addition, defendants claimed
that coverage was precluded by the exclusion in § IV(4)(b) of the insurance policy.3 Plaintiffs
1
This exclusion read:
It is agreed that such insurance as is afforded by the Bodily Injury Liability
Coverage and the Property Damage Liability Coverage for the operations
described in this endorsement does not apply to bodily injury or property damage
arising out of
(1)
(2)
thereto;
the named insured’s products, or
reliance upon a representation or warranty made with respect
if the bodily injury or property damage occurs after physical possession of such
products has been relinquished to others whether bodily injury or property
damage occurs on premises owned by or rented to the named insured or
elsewhere.
2
This restriction read:
In consideration of the reduced premium, it is agreed that this policy affords no
coverage for Bodily Injury or Property Damage arising out of any matter
encompassed within the definitions of “Products Hazards” or “Completed
Operations Hazards” including but not limited to causes of action based upon:
1.
Breach of any express or implied warranty;
2.
Defects
manufacture;
or
negligence
in
design,
inspection,
3.
or
Failure to warn;
4.
testing,
Failure to properly instruct in the use of a product; or
5.
Any other alleged defects, negligence, or failure of whatsoever
kind or nature in relation to a product or completed operation.
3
The exclusion stated in (IV)(b)(4) of the policy was applicable only to “bodily injury or
(continued…)
-2-
brought an action for a declaratory judgment that defendants were obligated to defend plaintiffs.
In addition, plaintiffs brought a claim for negligence against Abraham, alleging that Abraham
had negligently failed to provide plaintiffs with adequate insurance coverage.
Plaintiffs moved for summary disposition claiming that there was no genuine issue of
material fact that the signatures of plaintiffs’ president, Michael Asher, on the two policy
restriction endorsements were forgeries. In addition, they claimed that the exclusion in §
IV(4)(b) of the insurance policy was not applicable. Finally, they argued that defendants should
be estopped from denying coverage because plaintiffs reasonably believed that they had
purchased products liability coverage. Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary disposition.
The first trial court held that defendants had failed to create a question of fact concerning
the authenticity of the signatures on the two policy restriction endorsements and granted
plaintiffs partial summary disposition on that issue. The first trial court also found that the
exclusion in § IV(4)(b) was not applicable because the acetone which allegedly injured the
underlying plaintiffs was not manufactured by plaintiffs. Instead of granting plaintiffs’ motion
for summary disposition in full or defendants’ cross-motion for summary disposition, the first
trial court ordered a trial to determine whether plaintiffs reasonably expected coverage under the
policy. Following a bench trial, the first trial court found that plaintiffs could not have
reasonably expected coverage, and denied declaratory relief. In addition, because the first trial
court found no special relationship between plaintiffs and Abraham, it denied plaintiffs’
negligence claim.
Plaintiffs appealed. In a published per curiam opinion, Marlo Beauty Supply, Inc v
Farmers Ins Group, 227 Mich App 309, 320; 575 NW2d 324 (1998) (Marlo I), this Court
determined that: 1) the first trial court did not err in concluding that Abraham was not negligent
because no special relationship existed between Abraham and Asher, and Abraham owed no duty
to plaintiffs; 2) the first trial court did err in finding that plaintiffs did not have a reasonable
expectation of coverage because, without considering the exclusions, the policy language would
have led plaintiffs to reasonably expect defendants would defend them in the underlying suit; 3)
the first trial court reached the right result, albeit for the wrong reason, in determining that the
exclusion in § IV(4)(b) did not apply because it did not explicitly disallow coverage for damages
resulting from a failure to warn; 4) the first trial court erred in granting plaintiffs’ motion for
summary disposition on the issue of applicability of the two policy restriction endorsements
because a genuine issue of material fact remained regarding the authenticity of the signatures of
Asher; and 5) the first trial court did not err in finding that the element of a promise in estoppel
was not satisfied and even if the terms of the insurance policy excluded products liability
coverage, plaintiffs were not led to believe that defendants would provide them the same
coverage as plaintiffs carried with their prior insurance company. This Court remanded for a
determination of whether Asher did sign the two policy restriction endorsements and instructed
(…continued)
property damage resulting from a failure of the named insured’s products . . . to perform the
function or serve the purpose intended by the named insured, if such failure is due to a mistake
or deficiency in any design, formula, plan, specifications, advertising material or printed
instructions prepared or developed by the insured.”
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that a finding that Asher did sign the restrictions would mean plaintiffs could not have
reasonably expected coverage.
On remand, the trial court found that neither policy restriction endorsement (ET-114 ET343, referred to by the trial court as exhibits 35 and 36) were signed by Asher or at Asher’s
direction. It also found, by a preponderance of evidence that whoever signed the policy
restrictions, also filled out exhibits 34 and 56. Defendants appeal these findings of fact arguing
that the trial court applied the preponderance of the evidence standard when it should have
applied the clear and convincing evidentiary standard.
Based on these findings, the trial court determined plaintiffs were entitled to coverage in
the underlying lawsuit. The parties stipulated that plaintiffs were entitled to damage payments
toward the settlement of the underlying case and fees and costs paid to plaintiffs’ attorneys in the
amount of $100,000 plus expert witness fees. While the appeal was pending, the parties settled
the underlying cases. The parties could not agree, however, on how to calculate pre-judgment
interest on costs and attorney fees. Plaintiffs asserted that judgment interest should run on the
total damages from the date of the filing of the complaint. Defendants argued that interest
should be calculated on each of the individual or periodic payments of attorney fees and interest
from the date on which the payment was made. The trial court awarded damages based on
defendants’ method of computation.
II. LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE
Defendants argue that this panel should reinstate the first trial court’s decision in light of
two intervening cases dealing with extrinsic evidence. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
Whether law of the case doctrine applies is a question of law subject to review de novo.
Kalamazoo v Dep’t of Corrections (After Remand), 229 Mich App 132, 135; 580 NW2d 475
(1998).
B. Analysis
The law of the case doctrine holds that a ruling by an appellate court on a particular issue
binds the appellate court and all lower tribunals with respect to that issue. Driver v Hanley (After
Remand), 226 Mich App 558, 565; 575 NW2d 31 (1997). Thus, a question of law decided by an
appellate court will not be decided differently on remand or in a subsequent appeal in the same
case. Id. The primary purpose of the doctrine is to maintain consistency and avoid
reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single continuing lawsuit.
Bennett v Bennett, 197 Mich App 497, 499-500; 496 NW2d 353 (1992). However, the doctrine
does not preclude reconsideration of a question if there has been an intervening change of law.
Freeman v DEC Int’l, Inc, 212 Mich App 34, 38; 536 NW2d 815 (1995). For this exception to
apply, the change of law must occur after the initial decision of the appellate court. Id.
For purposes of analysis of this issue we set aside the issue of the two restrictive
endorsements ET-114 and ET-343 and their alleged forgery. However, the first trial court’s
findings regarding the inapplicability of the exclusion in § IV(4)(b) are relevant and will be
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addressed within this issue. The first trial court determined that plaintiffs had no reasonable
expectation of coverage because a premium was never paid for such coverage, and plaintiffs’
representative admitted he had never read any of the policies. The Marlo I panel rejected this
conclusion. Marlo I, supra at 315-317. The Marlo I panel determined that the trial court should
never have reached the issue of reasonable expectation given its determination that the plain
language of the general contract would have granted plaintiffs coverage in this situation and
given its determination, as discussed below, that the exclusion found in § IV(4)(b) did not apply
to this situation. The Marlo I panel determined the first trial court reached the right result in its §
IV(4)(b) analysis, but for the wrong reason.
The exclusion found in § IV(4)(b) does not explicitly disallow coverage for
damages resulting from a failure to warn. The wording of this exclusion has
caused confusion and ambiguity. W T Grant Co v USF & G Ins Co, 279 Pa Super
591; 421 A2d 357, 360 (1980). This is not a case where the underlying plaintiff
alleged that a product actively malfunctioned. See id. Similarly, this is not a case
where a product failed to perform its function. Compare Pittway Corp v
American Motorists Ins Co, 56 Ill App 3d 338; 370 NE2d 1271, 1276 (1977);
Kyllo, supra, pp 632-633. To the contrary, the evidence showed that it was
known that acetone was extremely flammable, and that its vapors could ignite.
Strictly construing the exclusion’s ambiguity against defendants, we hold that the
exclusion in § IV(4)(b) does not unambiguously encompass an allegedly negligent
failure to warn. Scarborough v Northern Assurance Co, 718 F2d 130, 136 (CA 5,
1983). Accordingly, the trial court reached the correct conclusion when it
determined that the exclusion listed in § IV(4)(b) of the insurance policy did not
apply.
The Marlo I panel found that the general contract language provided coverage to plaintiffs in this
situation and found that the § IV(4)(b) exclusion did not apply to this case. We will now address
whether this determination is inconsistent with the two intervening cases as advocated by
defendants.
In Klapp, supra, an insurance agent brought an action against an insurance company,
alleging that the company failed to pay renewal commissions to which the agent was entitled
pursuant to his contract. The circuit court denied the insurance company’s motion for summary
disposition, and entered judgment in favor of the agent. This Court reversed. Our Supreme
Court held that: (1) irreconcilable conflict between the vesting schedule in the agent’s agreement
and the definition of retirement in the agent’s manual rendered the agreement ambiguous; (2)
extrinsic evidence was admissible in interpreting agreement’s ambiguous language; and (3)
failing to inform jury that it could only apply rule of contra proferentem4 if it was unable to
discern parties’ intent from extrinsic evidence was harmless error. Id.
4
In interpreting a contract whose language is ambiguous, the jury should also consider that
ambiguities are to be construed against the drafter of the contract. Herweyer v Clark Hwy
Services, Inc, 455 Mich 14, 22; 564 NW2d 857 (1997).
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In Wilkie, supra, the case involved a dispute between Auto-Owners Insurance Company
and its insured, Frank and the decedent, Wilkie, regarding underinsured-motorist coverage. The
defendant Auto-Owners argued that the plaintiffs Frank and Wilkie’s recoveries from AutoOwners were limited under the terms of the policy to $50,000 each. Frank and Wilkie argued
that they were each owed $75,000. The trial court and this Court agreed with Frank and Wilkie.
Our Supreme Court reversed. Our Supreme Court rejected this Court’s reliance on the argument
that to allow the construction advocated by the defendant would defy the insured’s reasonable
expectations, stating:
This approach, where judges divine the parties’ reasonable expectations and then
rewrite the contract accordingly, is contrary to the bedrock principle of American
contract law that parties are free to contract as they see fit, and the courts are to
enforce the agreement as written absent some highly unusual circumstance, such
as a contract in violation of law or public policy. This Court has recently
discussed, and reinforced, its fidelity to this understanding of contract law in
Terrien v Zwit, 467 Mich 56, 71; 648 NW2d 602 (2002). Wilkie, supra at 51-52
Our Supreme Court then concisely stated the current status of the rule of reasonable expectations
in Michigan:
The rule of reasonable expectations clearly has no application to unambiguous
contracts. That is, one’s alleged “reasonable expectations” cannot supersede the
clear language of a contract. Therefore, if this rule has any meaning, it can only
be that, if there is more than one way to reasonably interpret a contract, i.e., the
contract is ambiguous, and one of these interpretations is in accord with the
reasonable expectations of the insured, this interpretation should prevail.
However, this is saying no more than that, if a contract is ambiguous and the
parties’ intent cannot be discerned from extrinsic evidence, the contract should be
interpreted against the insurer. In other words, when its application is limited to
ambiguous contracts, the rule of reasonable expectations is just a surrogate for the
rule of construing against the drafter. Wilkie, supra at 60.
We find that the first trial court’s decision should not be reinstated. With regard to the
general policy language, the Marlo I Court found the language to be clear. Although the Court
discussed this matter within the framework of plaintiffs’ “reasonable expectations,” the Marlo I
panel’s ultimate analysis was that the reason plaintiffs could reasonably have expected coverage
was because the general policy language was so clear. This is in contrast to Klapp, where the
contract language was ambiguous and required analysis of extrinsic evidence to determine the
parties’ intent, and in contrast to Wilkie where determination of the parties’ reasonable
expectations was improper because the language of the contract was unambiguous.
With regard to the § IV(4)(b) exclusion, the Marlo I panel determined that this exclusion
did not specifically disallow coverage for failure to warn. The panel cited a Pennsylvania case
involving an insurance contract with language identical to the § IV(4)(b) exclusion and
acknowledged that this language caused “confusion and ambiguity.” However, the Marlo I
panel then distinguished this case from the Pennsylvania case and went on to construe the
language of the contract against defendants. “It is already well established that ambiguous
language should be construed against the drafter, i.e., the insurer.” Wilkie, supra at 62.
-6-
However, that rule is applicable only where all conventional means of contract interpretation fail
to resolve the ambiguity. Klapp, supra at 471. This aspect of the contract interpretation is more
similar to Klapp because there is ambiguity in the contract language. However, Klapp instructs
us that:
‘Where a contract is to be construed by its terms alone, it is the duty of the court
to interpret it; but where its meaning is obscure and its construction depends upon
other and extrinsic facts in connection with what is written, the question of
interpretation should be submitted to the jury, under proper instructions.’ Id. at
469, citing, O’Connor v March Automatic Irrigation Co, 242 Mich 204, 210; 242
NW 784 (1928)
Here, the interpretation of the § IV(4)(b) exclusion can easily be construed by its terms alone.
The exclusion was applicable only to “bodily injury or property damage resulting from a failure
of the named insured’s products . . . to perform the function or serve the purpose intended by the
named insured, if such failure is due to a mistake or deficiency in any design, formula, plan,
specifications, advertising material or printed instructions prepared or developed by the insured”
(emphasis added). It was not, as defendants seem to argue, a blanket exclusion for all injury and
damage resulting from use of the insured’s products. Rather, it excluded coverage only where
the party suing the insured sought compensation for damages arising from the failure of the
product to serve the purpose intended.
In this case, the personal injury plaintiffs sought compensation for was an injury
sustained from the failure of plaintiffs to warn them that the product should not be used for a
certain purpose under certain conditions. There has been no allegation that the acetone was
intended for use as a cleaning product, or that the personal injury plaintiffs suffered damages
from was the result of the acetone’s failure to serve its intended purpose. The exclusion was
therefore not applicable and this interpretation is readily discernable from a close reading of the
language. This interpretation would not be aided by extrinsic evidence of the intent of the
parties. There is no indication from the opinion that the Marlo I panel performed an analysis that
would be contrary to Klapp.
In fact, defendants’ request that this Court reinstate the first trial court’s decision could
actually be considered contrary to Wilkie. The first trial court determined that the general policy
language was unambiguous and that the § IV(4)(b) exclusion did not apply. Thus, for the first
trial court to proceed to trial to determine the reasonable expectations of plaintiffs when it had
already concluded that the contract language supported plaintiffs would have been an approach
where the judge divined the parties’ reasonable expectations and then rewrote the contract
accordingly, “contrary to the bedrock principle of American contract law that parties are free to
contract as they see fit, and the courts are to enforce the agreement as written absent some highly
unusual circumstance, such as a contract in violation of law or public policy.” Wilkie, supra at
51.
III. CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
Defendants argue that the trial court erred by using the wrong standard when it found by
a preponderance of evidence that the signatures on the two restrictive endorsements were
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forgeries committed by defendants where the proper standard was clear and convincing
evidence. We agree.
A. Standard of Review
The determination of the proper standard of proof is an issue of law. This Court reviews
questions of law de novo. Burba v Burba, 461 Mich 637, 647; 610 NW2d 873 (2000).
B. Analysis
The trial court was required to determine whether Asher’s signatures had been forged.
Forgery may be defined as the making of a false document, with the intent to deceive in a
manner which exposes another to loss. People v Susalla, 392 Mich 387, 392-393; 220 NW2d
405 (1974); Matter of Loyd, 424 Mich 514, 526; 384 NW2d 9 (1986). Intent to defraud is the
gist of the offense of forgery. People v Gil, 8 Mich App 89, 92-93; 153 NW2d 678 (1967).
Generally, fraud must be proved by “clear and convincing” evidence rather than by the
preponderance of the evidence. Foodland Distributors v Al-Naimi, 220 Mich App 453, 459; 559
NW2d 379 (1996). This Court has rejected claims that our Courts have established “no
definitive standard for the burden of proof” in fraud cases. Both Campbell v Great Lakes
Insurance Co, 228 Mich 636; 200 NW 457 (1924) and Mina v General Star Indemnity Co, 218
Mich App 678; 555 NW2d 1 (1996), rev’d in part on other grounds 455 Mich 866 (1997),
involved insurers that used fraud and false swearing as an affirmative defense to preclude
recovery under insurance policies. Our Supreme Court and this Court have clearly stated that a
plaintiff must prove a tort claim of fraud by clear and convincing evidence. Flynn v Korneffel,
451 Mich 186, 199, 201-202; 547 NW2d 249 (1996).
Therefore, the proper standard in analyzing the signatures in this case is clear and
convincing evidence. In Wayne Co Prosecutor v Parole Bd, 210 Mich App 148; 532 NW2d 899
(1995), the trial court, in vacating the parole board’s decision, applied a higher standard of
review than was warranted. Despite the development of a complete record, this Court remanded,
requiring the trial court to apply the appropriate standard of review in light of the record and
statutory requirements. Id. at 152-153. Similarly, where a trial court applied the preponderanceof-the-evidence standard to a juvenile proceeding, this Court remanded the matter for application
of the proper and stricter beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof. In re Weiss, 224 Mich
App 37, 42; 568 NW2d 336 (1997). In both cases, remand was appropriate because the
reviewing court could not guess whether the outcome would have been different had the trial
court applied the proper standard in the first instance.
Thus, on remand the trial court should examine the elements of a claim of forgery and
scrutinize them in light of the clear and convincing standard of proof and issue findings of fact
consistent with this review. Given that an element of fraudulent intent must be shown by clear
and convincing evidence and the trial court did not require proof of this element during its fact
finding, on remand, the trial court should allow additional testimony to establish this element if
so desired by the parties.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT
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Defendants also argue that the trial court clearly erred in ruling that the signatures on the
restrictive endorsements were not signed by or at the direction of Asher. We decline to find clear
factual error, but given our determination that the trial court did not apply the proper standard of
proof, will leave to the trial court on remand the issue whether the evidence of forgery is
sufficient under the correct standard of clear and convincing evidence.
V. LOSS OF EXHIBITS
Defendants argue that the loss of trial exhibits bearing the signatures in question
following the hearing renders the trial court’s findings of fact void. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
Defense counsel requested a hearing on the record when he discovered the original
exhibits missing. However, defense counsel never specifically inquired as to whether the trial
court had been able to review the documents before issuing its findings of fact. Thus, we will
treat this issue as an unpreserved evidentiary issue. This Court reviews unpreserved evidentiary
issues to determine whether there was plain error affecting a party's substantial rights.
Hilgendorf v St John Hosp & Medical Center Corp, 245 Mich App 670, 700; 630 NW2d 356
(2001).
B. Analysis
On October 2, 2000, the trial court held a hearing regarding the original trial exhibits in
this case. The testimony of both plaintiff’s counsel and defendant’s counsel indicates that
following the July 2000 hearing, each party divided up their respective exhibits and took them in
order to organize them for the trial court. Defense counsel stated that he mailed the exhibits back
to the trial court along with a cover letter. Defense counsel called and confirmed that the
exhibits had been received by the trial court. Later, when defense counsel visited the courthouse
in an attempt to retrieve the exhibits, they were nowhere to be found. At the October 2 hearing,
the trial court stated that it would make a “herculean effort” to search for the original documents.
However, it appears the trail court was unsuccessful. The record does not contain the originals
of the trial exhibits, only copies.
Defendants argue that the missing documents should render the trial court’s findings of
fact void because MRE 1003 provides:
A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine
question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances
it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.
Defendants assert that the authenticity of the signatures on the original documents was the sole
subject of the trial and as a result, the trial court should have had the opportunity to examine
those documents to reach its conclusion. Defendants cite People v Drake, 64 Mich App 671,
679-680; 236 NW2d 537 (1975) for the proposition that where prejudice results from the
unavailability of lost exhibits, and said exhibits are necessary to prepare or determine an appeal,
an error may have occurred. However, Drake was a criminal case wherein this Court determined
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that the defendant did not demonstrate prejudice from the loss of trial exhibits between the end of
trial and the appeal.
The Drake Court extrapolated its rule from cases wherein a transcript of the lower court
proceedings was unavailable. It noted that this Court has held that the failure to file a transcript
or settled record will not automatically require a new trial. People v Carson, 19 Mich App 1,
172; NW2d 211 (1969). The failure of the State to provide a transcript when, after good faith
effort, it cannot physically do so, does not automatically entitle a defendant to a new trial. Id. at
7, citing Norvell v Illinois, 373 US 420, 83 S Ct 1366, 10 L Ed 2d 456 (1963); United States ex
rel Smart v Pate, 318 F2d 559, 562 (CA 7, 1963); contrast United States v Randolph, 259 F2d
215 (CA 7, 1958).’
The Drake Court then asked, “[h]as plaintiff’s failure to file all the required exhibits so
prejudiced defendant that the enjoyment of his constitutional right of appeal has been impeded?”
Drake, supra at 680. The Court concluded that it had not because the defendant had cited no
prejudice from the unavailability of the exhibits. Id. The Court concluded that the testimony
was so complete and concise on the record that the exhibits were not necessary to the preparation
of defendant’s appeal or this Court’s resolution of that appeal. Id.
Defendants have not demonstrated prejudice here either. The trial court issued its
findings of fact and conclusions of law on September 1, 2000. Defense counsel did not discover
the exhibits were missing until October 2, 2000. At the October 2 hearing, the trial court gave no
indication that it did not review the originals in making its decision. Testimony of defense
counsel indicates that the court confirmed receipt of the originals at some point. Additionally,
the originals were submitted at trial, giving the trial court the opportunity to review them at that
time. Also, the expert testified that his opinions were based upon his examination of the original
documents. Thus, defense counsel has not demonstrated that the trial court was without the
originals when it made its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The loss of these documents,
while plainly an error, did not affect defendant’s substantial rights.
VI. PUBLIC POLICY
Defendants argue that the trial court’s decision was contrary to public policy. We
disagree.
A. Standard of Review
Whether the trial court’s failure to enforce the restrictive endorsements in this matter is
contrary to public policy is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Vicencio v
Ramirez, 211 Mich App 501; 536 NW2d 280 (1995).
B. Analysis
Michigan law undoubtedly supports the enforcement of restrictive endorsements. In
Marlo I, this Court stated:
An insurer is free to define or limit the scope of coverage as long as the policy
language fairly leads to only one reasonable interpretation and is not in
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contravention of public policy. Zurich-American [Co v Amerisure Ins Co, 215
Mich App 526; 547 NW2d 52 (1996)] supra, at 531. Appellate courts strictly
construe against an insurer exemptions that preclude coverage for the general risk.
However, courts cannot create ambiguity where none exists. Pacific Employers[
v Michigan Mut Ins Co, 452 Mich 218, 224, 549 NW2d 872 (1996)] supra, at
224; Diehl [Fire Ins Exchange v Diehl, 450 Mich 678; 545 NW2d 602 (1996)],
supra, at 687. Clear and specific exclusions must be given effect. Pacific
Employers, supra, at 224. [Marlo I, supra at 317-318.]
Here, the trial court predicated its decision to not enforce the restrictive endorsements on
its determination that Asher never signed the restrictive endorsements. A decision supporting the
enforcement of forged restrictive endorsements would unmistakably be in contravention of
public policy. Defendants’ assertion that the forged endorsements should be enforced because
plaintiffs never paid premiums for products liability coverage is unpersuasive. Testimony and
depositions indicate plaintiffs believed their premiums did cover products liability. Further, the
Marlo I panel concluded that without these two restrictive endorsements, the contract would
have covered plaintiffs in the underlying suit.
In short, public policy does favor the enforcement of restrictive endorsements, but not
where they have been forged. Defendants’ argument that the trial court’s decision was contrary
to public policy is without merit
VII. PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST
Plaintiffs argue on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in its method of pre-judgment
interest calculations on costs and attorney fees. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews de novo an award of interest pursuant to MCL 600.6013.” Everett v
Nickola, 234 Mich App 632, 638; 599 NW2d 732 (1999). “Entitlement to interest on a judgment
is purely statutory and must be specifically authorized by statute.” Dep't of Transportation v
Schultz, 201 Mich App 605, 610; 506 NW2d 904 (1993).
B. Analysis
In Ayar v Foodland Distributors, 263 Mich App 105; 687 NW2d 365 (2004), this Court
determined that statutory interest on costs and mediation sanctions accrued from the date costs
and mediation sanctions were awarded rather than the date that the original complaint was filed.
Id. at 114. This Court was not persuaded that the Legislature would have intended a situation
where the trial court could award interest for a period during which there was no fund in
existence upon which to calculate interest. Id. at 113-114. Therefore, in the present case, the
trial court correctly awarded damages based on each of the individual or periodic payments of
attorney fees and properly calculated interest from the dates on which the payments were made.
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Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Bill Schuette
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