ARLON ELSER V STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INS CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ARLON ELSER and SHIRLEY ANN ELSER,
UNPUBLISHED
May 24, 2005
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V
No. 260351
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 04-001668-NF
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and White and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant.
We reverse. This case is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
On May 26, 2001, plaintiffs were injured in a collision with an uninsured motorist.
Defendant paid $50,000 on Arlon Elser’s claim for uninsured motorist benefits and $6,000 on
Shirley Elser’s claim. Plaintiffs, however, sought additional uninsured motorist benefits, and on
May 12, 2004, they filed suit solely against defendant.1
Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10),
arguing that plaintiffs failed to follow the procedures set forth in the insurance policy in that they
failed to join the uninsured driver as a defendant. In the meantime, plaintiffs filed a separate
action against the errant driver and obtained a default judgment in the amount of $160,000.
Defendant first learned of this action only after the default judgment was entered.
The trial court held that plaintiffs were contractually obligated to join the driver in the
instant case and to act within the applicable limitations period. The trial court also held that even
if the late-filed separate action were proper, it could not cure the initial failure to join the driver
because plaintiffs failed in their contractual obligation to provide notice of this action to
defendant.
1
Plaintiffs also included a count for declaratory relief with respect to PIP benefits. The parties
stipulated to the dismissal of that count.
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We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Auto
Club Group Ins Co v Burchell, 249 Mich App 468, 479; 642 NW2d 406 (2002).
The parties’ policy included the following provisions for uninsured-motorist benefits:
Two questions must be decided by agreement between the insured and us:
1. Is the insured legally entitled to collect damages from the owner or
driver of the uninsured motor vehicle; and
2. If so, in what amount?
If there is no agreement, then:
***
2. If either party does not consent to arbitrate these questions . . . , the
insured shall:
a. file a lawsuit in the proper court against the owner or driver of the
uninsured motor vehicle and us, or if such owner or driver is
unknown, against us; and
b. upon filing, immediately give us copies of the summons and
complaint filed by the insured in that action, and
c. secure a judgment in that action. The judgment must be the final
result of an actual trial and an appeal, if an appeal is taken.
3. If the insured files suit against the owner or driver of the uninsured
motor vehicle, we have the right to defend on the issues of the legal
liability of and the damages owed by such owner or driver.
We are not bound by any judgment against any person or organization
obtained without our written consent.
“Uninsured motorist benefit clauses are construed without reference to the no-fault act
because such insurance is not required under the act.” Twichel v MIC Gen Ins Corp, 469 Mich
524, 533; 676 NW2d 616 (2004)(citation omitted). Therefore, the insurance contract is enforced
according to its terms. Id. at 534. The contract of insurance determines the circumstances under
which benefits will be awarded. Rohlman v Hawkeye-Security Ins Co, 442 Mich 520, 525; 502
NW2d 310 (1993).
It is certainly arguable, as maintained by plaintiffs, that the terms of the insurance policy
do not clearly indicate that plaintiffs were required to sue the uninsured driver and defendant at
the same time and in a single lawsuit. On the other hand, plaintiffs undoubtedly violated the
policy’s requirement that they immediately provide copies of the summons and complaint with
respect to the action against the uninsured motorist, where there is no dispute that defendant was
not made aware of the action against the motorist. One of the issues that presents itself in this
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case is that the action against the uninsured driver was filed outside the three-year statute of
limitations and that defendant, if given notice of the suit, could have defended on behalf of the
driver, raising the defense that the action was time-barred.
Plaintiffs argue that the policy does not reference a three-year limitations period;
defendant argues that such a period is implicit in the policy’s language. We conclude that the
three-year statutory limitations period for personal-injury actions applied for purposes of
plaintiffs’ suit against the driver. MCL 600.5805(10). Regardless of the fact that a default
judgment was actually entered against the uninsured motorist, defendant could have stepped in,
with proper notice, and successfully sought dismissal.
The question then becomes whether the time-barred action against the driver, or the
failure to timely sue the driver, resulted in the proper dismissal of plaintiffs’ action in the case at
bar. This issue must be analyzed in light of plaintiffs’ argument that defendant suffered no
prejudice, assuming policy violations on plaintiffs’ part. In Koski v Allstate Ins Co, 456 Mich
439, 444; 572 NW2d 636 (1998), our Supreme Court stated that “it is a well-established
principle that an insurer who seeks to cut off responsibility on the ground that its insured did not
comply with a contract provision requiring notice immediately or within a reasonable time must
establish actual prejudice to its position.” Citing Wendel v Swanberg, 384 Mich 468; 185 NW2d
348 (1971); Weller v Cummins, 330 Mich 286; 47 NW2d 612 (1951); 1 Windt, Insurance Claims
& Disputes (3d ed), § 3.05, p 123. The Koski Court’s discussion of the application of
“prejudice” principles was in reference to both notice-of-claim and notice-of-suit provisions, and
the case itself addressed a failure to provide notice to the insurer of a suit against the insured
tortfeasor. Koski, supra at 444-445. Accordingly, it is proper to determine here whether
defendant was prejudiced by plaintiffs’ violations of the policy. Thus, we return to the statute of
limitations issue to decide whether defendant was prejudiced by plaintiffs’ untimely suit against
the uninsured motorist, having already determined that the suit against the motorist was timebarred,2 and now placing our focus on the statute of limitations relative to defendant.
There is case law which provides that a contractual claim for uninsured motorist benefits
is subject to the six-year limitations period applicable to contracts in general that is found in
MCL 600.5807(8). Jacobs v DAIIE, 107 Mich App 424, 430; 309 NW2d 627 (1981); DAIIE v
Hafendorfer, 38 Mich App 709, 718-719; 197 NW2d 155 (1972). Plaintiffs’ suit against
defendant was filed within three years; therefore, the action was timely regardless of whether the
limitations period is three or six years. However, it is argued that, had defendant interceded in
the action against the uninsured motorist and obtained a dismissal on the basis of the statute of
limitations, any liability by defendant for uninsured motorist benefits would have evaporated.
Defendant points out that the policy provides coverage where “the insured [is] legally entitled to
collect damages from the owner or driver of the uninsured motor vehicle,” and that, because
plaintiffs were not legally entitled to collect damages from the uninsured driver in light of the
2
This being said, the default judgment against the uninsured motorist is legally valid and
enforceable as between plaintiffs and the driver.
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limitations period, the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations as to the driver
necessarily required a dismissal with respect to defendant.
We find Hafendorfer, supra, informative on this issue. There, the defendant insured was
severely injured by an uninsured driver, and the insured had uninsured motorist coverage through
DAIIE. The insured failed to commence an action within three years against anyone. The
insurance contract provided that the insurer would pay “[a]ll sums which the insured shall be
legally entitled to recover as damages[.]” Id. at 712. The Court had to determine whether the
three-year limitations period for injuries to persons was applicable, or rather the six-year
limitations period for contract actions. After extensive analysis and review of the case law, the
Hafendorfer panel concluded:
We agree with the decisions of these courts that the “legally entitled to
recover” clause denotes only the establishment of fault on the part of the
uninsured motorist and proof of the damages caused thereby. The “legally
entitled” phrase does not subject insured’s claim to the three-year statute of
limitations.
We hold that the six-year statute of limitations applies to defendant
insured’s claim against plaintiff insurer on the uninsured motorist clause of his
insurance contract. [Id. at 718-719.]3
This Court’s opinion in Hafendorfer implicitly and necessarily encompassed the
argument presented to us. Because the insured in Hafendorfer failed to file suit within three
years, it would make no sense for the Court to entertain the issue whether the six-year limitations
period on the claim for benefits applied if indeed the policy language, comparable to the
language here, precluded any action by the insured for benefits where there was no maintainable
suit against the underlying tortfeasor because the limitations period had run as to that tortfeasor.
Because the Hafendorfer panel construed the phrase “legally entitled to recover” as merely
meaning the “establishment of fault,” the question whether the uninsured motorist here was at
fault, along with the extent of any damages, can be answered in this action, despite the fact that
the action against the driver was technically time-barred.
Additionally, we see no bar to a claim by defendant against the uninsured motorist
premised on equitable subrogation arising out of any uninsured motorist benefits that may be
paid to plaintiffs. Citizens Ins Co of America v Buck, 216 Mich App 217, 224-228; 548 NW2d
3
Defendant’s reliance on Rory v Continental Ins Co, 262 Mich App 679; 687 NW2d 304 (2004),
appeal gtd 471 Mich 904; 688 NW2d 93 (2004), is misplaced because the brief discussion of
whether a three- or six-year period applied was dicta. The plaintiffs in Rory, like the plaintiffs
here, filed a claim against the insurer within three years. More important, the language in Rory
was directed to the question of what limitations period should be supplied as a matter of contract
interpretation where the contractual limitation period set forth in the contract is unreasonably
short, rather than the question of which statutory limitations period applies in the absence of a
contractual limitations period.
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680 (1996).4 Aside from the doctrine of equitable subrogation, defendant has subrogation rights
by way of contractual assignment language in the insurance policy. See id. at 226 (subrogation
denotes two different kinds of rights – those transferred by way of contractual assignment and
those that arise by operation of law). As noted earlier, the default judgment against the driver is
valid and collectible as between plaintiffs and the driver, and therefore subject to subrogation
rights held by defendant. To the extent that it can be argued that, had the suit against the driver
been dismissed on the basis of defendant’s presumed involvement in the action on notice given,
there would have been no judgment for plaintiffs to assign to defendant, equitable subrogation,
along with its six-year limitations period, would be implicated.
Moreover, there is no prejudice or injury to defendant predicated on the $160,000 default
judgment entered against the uninsured driver. Defendant asserts that it is not bound by the
default judgment, and plaintiffs make no claim that defendant is bound by that judgment. In fact,
plaintiffs specifically and expressly agree that defendant is not bound by the judgment. More
importantly, the insurance policy provides, as quoted earlier, that defendant is “not bound by any
judgment against any person or organization obtained without [its] written consent.” Therefore,
plaintiffs are precluded from contending that the default judgment entitles them to collect certain
sums from defendant in uninsured motorist benefits. Accordingly, there is a lack of prejudice.
Finally, we note the following passage from Koski in which the Court discussed prejudice
to the insurer:
The evidence in the instant case established that Allstate received no
notification of the suit brought against plaintiff until three months after the entry
of the default judgment. Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that Allstate
would have refused to defend the suit, if asked, under a reservation of rights.
Consequently, Allstate was deprived of any opportunity to engage in discovery,
cross-examine witnesses at trial, or present its own evidence relative to liability
and damages. [Koski, supra at 445.]
In Koski, the plaintiff purchased homeowners insurance from the defendant Allstate. The
policy required the plaintiff to provide Allstate with any legal papers he received concerning any
accident or claim. The plaintiff’s minor daughter suffered serious injuries when her foot was
caught under the wheels of a garden tractor owned and operated by the plaintiff. Subsequently,
the daughter, through her mother – the plaintiff’s wife, sued the plaintiff for money damages.
The plaintiff did not notify Allstate, nor did he defend against the action, and a default judgment
4
The doctrine of equitable subrogation is based on the principle that a person or entity who, in
order to protect a security that is held, is compelled to pay a debt for which another is primarily
liable, is entitled to be substituted in the place of and to be vested with the rights of the person to
whom such payment is made, without agreement to that effect. Buck, supra at 226 (citation
omitted). The Buck panel addressed and applied the doctrine of equitable subrogation in the
context of a case involving a motor vehicle insurer seeking compensation from an uninsured
tortfeasor for uninsured motorist benefits paid by the insurer to its insured. The Court noted that
the applicable statute of limitations for subrogation is six years. Id. at 227.
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was entered against the plaintiff. The plaintiff then initiated a declaratory judgment action
against Allstate for indemnification of the judgment. Id. at 441-442. Thus, contrary to the
circumstances here, the situation involved an insured tortfeasor, who was defaulted without
providing notice to his insurer, seeking indemnification on the judgment from his insurer. The
plaintiff sought to hold Allstate liable on a judgment that it was not given an opportunity to
defend against, nor was there an opportunity to do so at a later time. Such is not the case in the
action before us today.
Here, we first note that, if defendant had interjected itself into the action against the
uninsured motorist, there most likely would not have been a trial in light of the statute of
limitations. Furthermore, because the default judgment is not binding on defendant, and because
defendant will have the full opportunity to defend its position that plaintiffs are not entitled to
additional uninsured motorist benefits, defendant has not been harmed or prejudiced, as opposed
to the circumstances in Koski.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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