JOYCE DIFALCO V ROBERT L DOCK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOYCE DIFALCO, JAMES DIFALCO and K. JIN
LIM, Trustee in Bankruptcy for the ESTATE OF
JOYCE DIFALCO AND JAMES DIFALCO,
UNPUBLISHED
December 16, 2004
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
ROBERT L. DOCK, M.D., F.A.C.O.O.G.; SINAI
HOSPITAL, d/b/a SINAI PROFESSIONAL
OB/GYN; and SINAI GRACE HOSPITAL, d/b/a
SINAI PROFESSIONAL OB/GYN,
No. 250675
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2000-028388-N
Defendants-Appellants.
JOYCE DIFALCO, JAMES DIFALCO, and K.
JIN LIM, Trustee in Bankruptcy for the ESTATE
OF JOYCE DIFALCO AND JAMES DIFALCO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
ROBERT L. DOCK., M.D., F.A.C.O.O.G.; SINAI
HOSPITAL, d/b/a SINAI PROFESSIONAL
OB/GYN; and SINAI GRACE HOSPITAL, d/b/a
SINAI PROFESSIONAL OB/GYN,
No. 250999
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2000-028388-NM
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Jansen and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 250675, defendants appeal as of right from a jury verdict finding
defendant Dr. Robert Dock liable for medical malpractice in his treatment of plaintiff Joyce
DiFalco’s ovarian cancer and awarding plaintiffs $250,000 in damages. Defendants challenge
the trial court’s denial of their motion to strike plaintiffs’ affidavit of merit and also raise several
issues related to the trial and to the recovery of costs. In Docket No. 25099, plaintiff Joyce
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DiFalco appeals as of right from the trial court’s granting of remittitur, reducing the jury’s award
to $125,000. We affirm.
I. Background
Plaintiff filed the instant action alleging that Dock committed malpractice in failing to
timely diagnose her ovarian cancer and that as a result she was required to undergo aggressive
chemotherapy, which would not have been necessary but for Dock’s negligence. The essence of
plaintiff’s claim was that Dock failed to perform a follow-up ultrasound within four to six weeks
of observing a complex cystic mass involving plaintiff’s right ovary during a laparoscopic
procedure, as required by the applicable standard of care.
II. The Affidavit of Merit
Defendants filed a motion to strike plaintiffs’ affidavit of merit, which was denied by the
trial court on the basis that plaintiff’s counsel had a reasonable belief that the doctor signing the
affidavit of merit met the requirements of MCL 600.2912, and therefore, was qualified to do so.
Defendants argue that this finding was erroneous. We disagree.
MCL 600.2912d(1) requires that the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action “file with
the complaint an affidavit of merit signed by a health professional who the plaintiff’s attorney
reasonably believes meets the requirements for an expert witness under section 2169.” To be
qualified as an expert under MCL 600.2169, a doctor must be licensed and:
(a) If the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered
is a specialist, specializes at the time of the occurrence that is the basis for the
action in the same specialty as the party against whom or on whose behalf the
testimony is offered. However, if the party against whom or on whose behalf the
testimony is offered is a specialist who is board certified, the expert witness must
be a specialist who is board certified in that specialty.
(b) Subject to subdivision (c) [pertaining to general practitioners], during
the year immediately preceding the date of the occurrence that is the basis for the
claim or action, devoted a majority of his or her professional time to . . .
(i) The active clinical practice of the same health profession in
which the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is
offered is licensed and, if that party is a specialist, the active clinical
practice of that specialty. [Emphasis added.]
An affidavit of merit is sufficient “if counsel reasonably, albeit mistakenly, believed that the
affiant was qualified under MCL 600.2169.” Watts v Canady, 253 Mich App 468, 471-472; 655
NW2d 784 (2002). This Court reviews de novo the trial court’s determination that plaintiff’s
counsel had a reasonable belief that the affiant was qualified to sign the affidavit of merit.
Grossman v Brown, 470 Mich 593, 598-599; 685 NW2d 198 (2004).
Defendant Dock is a board certified obstetrician/gynecologist and was practicing in that
area when the alleged malpractice occurred, in July and August 1998. Thus, plaintiff was
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required to file an affidavit of merit signed by a doctor who was also a board certified
obstetrician/gynecologist and who practiced gynecology in the year immediately preceding July
1998. The doctor signing the affidavit of merit, Dr. David E. David, was a board certified
obstetrician/gynecologist. However, during his deposition, he indicated that he had discontinued
his gynecology practice in 1996. Therefore, David was not qualified under MCL 600.2169 to
testify against Dock. Thus, plaintiff’s affidavit of merit was defective, unless plaintiff‘s counsel
reasonably believed that David practiced gynecology in the year immediately the occurrence of
the alleged malpractice.
To establish that his belief in this regard was reasonable, plaintiff’s counsel submitted the
affidavit of his witness consultant, who averred that: (1) he assisted plaintiff’s counsel in finding
medical experts; (2) he specifically inquired into David’s “credentials and present qualifications”
and was informed by David that he continued practicing in the area of gynecology through 2000;
(3) he received a resume of David, which indicated that David continued in private practice; (4)
he informed plaintiff’s counsel of David’s credentials; and (5) he did not know that David had
discontinued his gynecology practice in 1996 until David’s deposition in this case. The trial
court determined that the this affidavit was sufficient to establish that plaintiff’s counsel had a
reasonable belief that David was qualified to sign the affidavit and denied defendants’ motion to
strike. We agree.
Defendants argue that, under this Court’s decision in Geralds v Munson Healthcare, 259
Mich App 225, 232; 673 NW2d 792 (2003), plaintiff’s counsel was not entitled to rely on the
inquiry posed by his witness consultant. In Geralds, supra, this Court held that the plaintiff’s
counsel could not form a reasonable belief as to the credentials and qualifications of the affiant
based on the belief by a referring doctor that the affiant was board certified, on the affiant’s
having been president of the American Board of Emergency Medicine and on information
contained on that board’s website. Id. at 228, 232. No one affiliated with counsel – including
the referring doctor – asked the affiant if he was in fact board certified, even though the affiant’s
curriculum vitae did not indicate that he was board certified. This Court concluded that “[i]t is
unreasonable for an attorney to form a belief regarding the board certification of a physician
without asking the physician about his board certification.” Id. at 233. Contrary to defendant’s
assertion, however, Geralds does not require that only plaintiff’s counsel ask the pertinent
questions of the affiant; rather Geralds requires that someone, either plaintiff’s counsel or
someone acting on counsel’s behalf, actually ask the pertinent questions of the affiant rather than
relying on second-hand information or assumptions. We agree that, under Geralds, it would
have been insufficient for plaintiff’s counsel to rely on a representation by the consultant that he
“knew” that David maintained the requisite practice without the consultant having made the
specific inquiry as to whether such was the case. However, that was not what transpired here;
rather, the consultant made specific inquiry to the doctor himself as to the nature of his practice
and was told by David that he continued practicing gynecology through the year 2000. The only
reasonable interpretation of such a statement at that time, was that David was practicing in the
area of gynecology in a time frame including the year immediately preceding July and August
1998. Thus, plaintiff’s counsel had a reasonable belief that David was qualified to sign the
affidavit of merit.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Breach of the Standard of Care and Causation
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Defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motions for summary
disposition, directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because plaintiff did not
present sufficient testimony as to the appropriate standard of care, as to defendant’s breach of
that standard of care and as to causation. We disagree.
This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of each of these motions de novo, viewing the
record and evidence presented at trial, respectively, in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003); Wiley v Henry Ford Cottage
Hosp, 257 Mich App 488, 491; 668 NW2d 402 (2003). Summary disposition is appropriate
where the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich
155, 164; 645 NW2d 643 (2002); Rice v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 252 Mich App 25, 31; 651 NW2d
118 (2002). A directed verdict is appropriate only where reasonable jurors could not honestly
reach different conclusions. Wiley, supra at 491. Similarly, the trial court should grant a JNOV
motion only if the evidence fails to establish a claim as a matter of law, and when the evidence
presented could lead reasonable jurors to disagree, the trial court may not substitute its judgment
for that of the jury. Forge v Smith, 458 Mich 198, 204; 580 NW2d 876 (1998).
In a medical malpractice case, plaintiff bears the burden of proving: (1) the applicable
standard of care; (2) breach of that standard of care by the defendant; (3) injury; and (4)
proximate causation between the alleged breach and the injury. Locke v Pachtman, 446 Mich
216, 222; 521 NW2d 786 (1994). Expert testimony is required to establish the standard of care;
ordinary laypersons are not equipped by common knowledge and experience to judge the skill
and competence of a doctor’s conduct to determine whether it meets the standard of care. Locke,
supra at 223. The party offering the testimony of an expert must demonstrate the expert’s
knowledge of the applicable standard of care. Bahr v Harper-Grace Hosp, 448 Mich 135, 134135; 528 NW2d 170 (1995). However, such testimony is not patently deficient merely because
the expert does not define, specifically, the applicable standard of care. Id. at 144-145.
Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Myer Borenstein, testified that he was familiar with the standard of
care, and that Dock breached that standard of care by failing to perform a follow-up ultrasound
within four to six weeks after observing a complex ovarian cyst during the July 2, 1998
laparoscopy. Defendants argue that Borenstein’s testimony was insufficient to establish the
applicable standard of care, because Borenstein’s definition of the standard of care was improper
and because Borenstein only judged defendant’s conduct by what Borenstein himself would have
done. While Borenstein does refer to what he himself would have done, he also makes objective
statements as to what the standard of care required. Here, as in Wiley, supra at 493, Borenstein’s
references to himself are more in the nature of example; he also testified unequivocally that the
standard of care required a timely ultrasound.
Certainly, as noted by this Court in Haisenleder v Reeder, 114 Mich App 258, 265; 318
NW2d 634 (1982), “counsel should clearly elicit that the expert knows the standard and what the
standard was before questioning as to what that standard would have required.” Plaintiff’s
counsel did not do so in this case. Still, Borenstein’s testimony that he was familiar with the
standard of care, that an ultrasound should have been done within four to six weeks after the
laparoscopy, and that Dock breached the standard of care by failing to perform such an
ultrasound, was legally sufficient to allow the issue to go to the jury and to support the jury’s
finding that Dock committed malpractice. See Bahr, supra at 144-145.
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Turning to causation, plaintiff asserts that, as a result of Dock’s breach of the applicable
standard of care, she was forced to undergo eleven sessions of double-agent chemotherapy,
which she would not have had to undergo otherwise. To prevail as to causation, plaintiff must
establish both cause in fact and proximate cause. Cause in fact requires that the damages would
not have occurred “but for” defendant’s conduct; proximate cause is “that which, in a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by new and independent causes, produces the injury.” Wiley,
supra at 496. Plaintiff was required to “present substantial evidence from which [the] jury
[could] conclude that more likely than not, but for [Dock’s] conduct, the plaintiff’s injuries
would not have occurred.” Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 164-165; 516 NW2d 711
(1994).
Plaintiff offered the testimony of Dr. Larry Milner, her oncology expert, to establish that
had Dock performed an ultrasound prior to October 1998, her cancer would have been diagnosed
at a time when it was of a lesser stage and grade and would have permitted her to avoid
chemotherapy, or at worst, undergo a milder form of chemotherapy. Defendants point out that
their experts both testified that chemotherapy would have been recommended to plaintiff
regardless when her cancer had been diagnosed and that plaintiff conceded that more than likely
she would have undergone chemotherapy had it been recommended to her. However, the jury
could have chosen to believe Milner, who testified clearly and unequivocally that plaintiff would
have had different treatment options – most notably, milder chemotherapy or no chemotherapy –
had she been diagnosed earlier. Thus, Milner’s testimony was sufficient to allow a reasonable
juror to conclude that plaintiff was forced to undergo eleven sessions of aggressive, double-agent
chemotherapy as a result of defendant’s failure to perform the follow-up ultrasound.
IV. Evidentiary Issues
Defendants argue that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing testimony regarding
whether Dock should have performed a CA-125 blood test on plaintiff and whether plaintiff’s
cancer was discernable in April 1998. We disagree.
A trial court’s decision to admit evidence is within its sound discretion and will not be
reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Chimielewski v Xermac, Inc, 457 Mich 593,
614; 580 NW2d 817 (1998). An abuse of discretion occurs where an unprejudiced person,
considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would say that there was no justification for
the ruling made, or where the result is so violative of fact and logic that it evidences perversity of
will, a defiance of judgment or the exercise of passion or bias. Campbell v Sullins, 257 Mich
App 179, 196; 667 NW2d 887 (2003). Error may not be predicated on the admission of evidence
unless that admission affected a substantial right of a party. Id. at 196-197.
Defendants argue that because plaintiff’s only allegation of malpractice against Dock is
that he breached the standard of care by failing to conduct a follow-up ultrasound within four to
six weeks of the July 2, 1998 laparoscopy, testimony as to when plaintiff’s cancer was first
discernible and whether Dock should have performed a blood test to determine plaintiff’s CA125 levels (a possible indicator of the presence of cancer) was irrelevant. We disagree. When
plaintiff’s cancer would have first been discernible was relevant to the determination of when
plaintiff’s cancer could have been diagnosed, which itself was relevant to the causation issue.
Further, any references to the CA-125 blood test were very limited and included an explanation
by Borenstein, as wells as of defendant’s experts, that in an infertile patient as young as plaintiff,
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this test would not have been reliable. Thus, the testimony of plaintiff’s own expert indicated
that Dock did not breach any standard of care in failing to perform this test. Certainly, admission
of this testimony did not deprive defendant of any substantial right and did not affect the
outcome of the trial.
V. Jury Instructions
Defendants assert that the trial court erred in giving certain jury instructions regarding
causation and damages, and further, that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give
special instructions requested by defendants as to damages and defining the factual basis for
plaintiff’s claims against Dock. We disagree.
Claims of instructional error are reviewed de novo. Cox v Flint Board of Hosp
Managers, 467 Mich 1, 8; 651 NW2d 675 (2003); Case v Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6;
61 NW2d 17 (2000). A trial court’s determination whether a standard instruction was applicable
and accurate is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Lewis v Legrow, 258 Mich App 175, 211;
670 NW2d 675 (2003), and its determination whether an instruction is supported by the evidence
is entitled to deference, Keywell & Rosenfeld v Bithell, 254 Mich App 300, 339; 657 NW2d 759
(2002). A standard jury instruction must be given when requested by a party if it is applicable
and accurately states the law. MCR 2.516(D)(2), Chastain v General Motors Corp (On
Remand), 254 Mich App 576, 590; 657 NW2d 804 (2002). Whether an instruction is accurate
and applicable based on the characteristics of a case is in the sound discretion of the trial court,
Stevens v Veenstra, 226 Mich App 441, 443; 573 NW2d 341 (1997). The trial court is to
determine when the standard jury instructions are applicable in the context of the “personality”
of the particular case and with due regard for each party’s theory of the case. Johnson v Corbet,
423 Mich 304, 327; 377 NW2d 713 (1985). Thus, the trial court has a duty to determine the
subject matter of the instructions to be given to the jury, including the applicability of a
particular standard jury instruction requested by counsel. Id. at 326.
Each of the challenged standard instructions properly informed the jury of the applicable
law and was supported by the evidence presented at trial. Standard instruction 15.03, regarding
proximate cause, was appropriate because there was more than one proximate cause of plaintiff’s
having to undergo chemotherapy: (1) the continued development of her cancer independent of
any conduct, and (2) defendant’s failure to timely diagnose that cancer and prevent its continued
development. Even if the giving of this instruction was error, it was clear throughout this case,
and in the jury instructions considered as a whole, that the jury could only find defendants liable
if it found that Dock breached the standard of care and that breach caused some harm to
plaintiff.1 There is nothing in SJI 2d 15.03 that negates this notion. The trial court did not abuse
its discretion in finding that SJI 2d 15.03 was applicable and supported by the evidence.
1
Jury instructions should be reviewed in their entirety, rather than extracted piecemeal to
establish error in isolated portions. Case, supra at 6; Bachman v Swan Harbour Association, 252
Mich App 400, 424; 653 NW2d 415 (2002).
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Further, with regard to instructions SJI2d 50.10 and SJI2d 50.11, relating to damages,
these instructions were appropriate in that they aided the jury in evaluating damages for Dock’s
conduct in the context of plaintiff’s preexisting cancer. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the challenged instructions were applicable and supported by the
evidence. Even if they were not appropriate, however, any error in giving these instructions was
rectified by the trial court’s granting of remittitur on the basis that the jury awarded damages for
the entire ordeal and not just the incremental difference between no chemotherapy and
aggressive chemotherapy; thus, any error is not inconsistent with substantial justice.2
Defendants requested that the trial court instruct the jury that plaintiff’s sole claim for
damages was for having to undergo chemotherapy as a result of a delayed diagnosis of cancer,
and that the sole claimed breach of the standard of care was the failure to perform an ultrasound
by August 16, 1998. The trial court declined to do so. When the standard instructions do not
adequately cover an area, the trial court is obligated to give additional instructions when
requested if the supplemental instructions properly inform on the applicable law and are
supported by the evidence. Bouverette v Westinghouse Electric Corp, 245 Mich App 391, 401402; 628 NW2d 86 (2001). The determination whether the supplemental instructions are
applicable and accurate is within the trial court’s discretion. Stoddard v Manufacturers Nat’l
Bank of Grand Rapids, 234 Mich App 140, 162; 593 NW2d 630 (1999). The trial court need not
give a supplemental instruction if doing so adds nothing to an otherwise balanced and fair jury
charge and does not enhance the ability of the jury to decide the case intelligently, fairly and
impartially. Novi v Woodson, 251 Mich App 614, 630-631; 651 NW2d 448 (2002). The trial
court’s decision regarding supplemental instructions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion,
Chastain, supra at 590. Given the nature of this case, and the Supreme Court’s clarification of
the types of damages recoverable in a delayed diagnosis of cancer case, see Wickens v Oakwood
Health Care System, 465 Mich 53, 62; 631 NW2d 686 (2001), we find that defendant’s requested
special instruction as to plaintiff’s sole claim for damages being for having to undergo
chemotherapy was applicable and appropriate. Still, given the trial court’s ultimate granting of
defendants’ motion for remittitur to an amount compensating plaintiff for the incremental
damages of having to undergo aggressive chemotherapy, any error in not giving this instruction
did not deprive defendants of substantial justice. See MCR 2.613(A), Case, supra.
Additionally, we find that defendant’s requested special instruction as to the nature of the
alleged breach of the standard of care was not appropriate. The trial court specifically instructed
the jurors that to find that Dock was professionally negligent, they must find that he failed to act
within the recognized standard of practice or care within the specialty of obstetrics and
gynecology at the time of the alleged malpractice and that they must look to expert testimony to
determine what the standard of care required. What was required by the applicable standard of
care was a question of fact to be determined by the jury, based on the expert testimony presented,
and it involved the evaluation of conflicting testimony and a weighing of credibility. The
instructions as given properly directed the jurors to look to the expert testimony to determine
2
Reversal is not required unless the failure to do so would be inconsistent with substantial
justice. MCR 2.613(A), Case, supra.
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what the standard of care required of Dock; the instructions adequately instructed the jurors in
this regard and there was no need to give defendant’s proposed instruction. Further, defendant’s
proposed instruction assumed a specific conclusion as to the determination of the applicable
standard of care – that all that was required was a follow-up ultrasound and nothing more – and,
therefore, it was inappropriate. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
give this instruction.
VI. Costs
Defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying prevailing party costs against James
DiFalco, on the basis that James DiFalco’s claim for loss of consortium and lost wages in caring
for his sick wife were dismissed with prejudice prior to trial. We disagree. Because James
DiFalco’s claims were derivative of plaintiff’s claims, their claims are properly considered to be
a single cause of action, on which defendants were not prevailing parties. It is well settled that
“a derivative claim for loss of consortium stands or falls with the primary claims in the
complaint.” Long v Chelsea Hosp, 219 Mich App 578, 589; 557 NW2d 157 (1996). Indeed,
defendants’ bill of costs submitted below supports this conclusion. Defendants’ bill of costs
seeks to recover for costs incurred in defending plaintiffs’ claim; it reveals no costs whatsoever
attributable to defending against any separate element of James DiFalco’s loss of consortium or
loss of wages claim. Given the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff Joyce DiFalco, the denial of
costs to defendants was not an abuse of discretion.
VII. Remittitur
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendants’ motion
for remittitur and reducing the amount of the jury’s award by half. We disagree.
In determining whether to grant a motion for remittitur a trial court must consider
whether the evidence supported the jury award. Henry v Detroit, 234 Mich App 405, 414; 594
NW2d 107 (1999). The trial court’s inquiry is limited to objective considerations regarding the
evidence presented and the conduct of the trial. Palenkas v Beaumont Hosp, 432 Mich 527, 53533; 433 NW2d 354 (1989); Weiss v Hodge (After Remand), 223 Mich App 620, 636-637; 567
NW2d 468 (1997). Remittitur is justified when a jury verdict exceeds the highest amount the
evidence will support. MCR 2.611(E)(1). When determining whether an award is excessive, a
court may consider whether the verdict was the result of improper methods, prejudice, passion,
partiality, sympathy, corruption or mistake of law or fact, whether it was within the limits of
what reasonable minds would deem to be just compensation for the injury inflicted, and/or
whether the amount actually awarded is comparable to other similar cases. Palenkas, supra at
532-533. A verdict should not be set aside simply because the method of computation used by
the jury in assessing damages cannot be determined, unless it is not within the range of evidence
presented at trial. Green v Evans, 156 Mich App 145, 156-157; 401 NW2d 250 (1985).
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for remittitur for an abuse of
discretion. Palenkas, supra at 531. As our Supreme Court explained in Palenkas:
[T]he question of the excessiveness of a jury verdict is generally one for the trial
court in the first instance. The trial court, having witnessed all the testimony and
evidence as well as having had the unique opportunity to evaluate the jury’s
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reaction to the proofs and to the individual witnesses, is in the best position to
make an informed decision regarding the excessiveness of the verdict.
Accordingly, an appellate court must accord due deference to the trial court’s
decision and may only disturb a grant or denial of remittitur if an abuse of
discretion is shown. Id.
When reviewing a trial’s court’s decision as to remittitur, this Court must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Wiley, supra at 499. “An abuse of discretion
exists when an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court made its
decision, would conclude that there was no justification for the ruling made.” Szymanski v
Brown, 221 Mich App 423, 431; 562 NW2d 212 (1997).
In granting the motion for remittitur, the trial court noted that plaintiff’s cancer was
diagnosable at the latest in October 1998, when it would have been a late stage two cancer still
requiring chemotherapy, albeit a milder dose than was needed in February 1999, and that
plaintiff testified that if her doctor had recommended chemotherapy, she would have accepted
that recommendation. Thus, the court concluded that the evidence did not support an award of
noneconomic damages for the pain and suffering for undergoing any chemotherapy at all, but
only for the incremental difference of such damages between undergoing the more “extensive
chemotherapy the plaintiff endured” and the milder chemotherapy she necessarily would have
undergone had her cancer been diagnosed earlier. Under these circumstances, the trial court
concluded that an award of $250,000 was excessive and reduced the verdict to $125,000, finding
that to be the amount appropriate to compensate for the pain and suffering associated with
having to undergo the more aggressive treatment.
Reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the trial court’s ruling was
not without justification. Plaintiff testified that she underwent eleven sessions of chemotherapy
and that she suffered from nausea, vomiting and achy joints for five to six days after each
treatment, as well as from hair loss and neuropathy in her heel for the duration of her treatment.
Plaintiff also testified that she was suffering no long term effects of the chemotherapy and had
resumed “for the most part” her normal pre-treatment activity. Thus, the jury’s award of
$250,000 would have provided plaintiff with approximately $3,700 for each of the sixty-six days
that she testified she was physically ill as a result of chemotherapy. On the record before us, we
conclude that the trial court’s determination that this was excessive and that a reduced award of
$125,000 more appropriately compensated plaintiff for the temporary, albeit extremely
unpleasant, effects of the more aggressive chemotherapy was not an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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