PEOPLE OF MI V PAUL DONAT KAZARINOFF
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 14, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 249865
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 02-000681-FC
PAUL DONAT KAZARINOFF,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Bandstra and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions of kidnapping, MCL
750.349, and kidnapping – child enticement, MCL 750.350. Defendant was sentenced to life
imprisonment for both counts, with credit given for 390 days. The sentences are to run
concurrently. We affirm.
While the victim was walking home from school, defendant pulled a white car into her
path and grabbed her as she tried to pass around it. She fought defendant while he put her in the
front seat of the car. He pinned her, face up, on the passenger-side seat and floorboards, but she
continued to struggle. She screamed, bit his gloved hand, and eventually escaped. She described
defendant as a tall, lean, balding man with a long, squared beard. She told police he was wearing
a white tank top, tan shorts, and tan work gloves. A bystander who saw her escape and run away
screaming memorized the car’s license plate number. Police traced the license plate number and
found defendant at the registered owner’s apartment. The car’s owner was defendant’s friend
and neighbor down the hall. Defendant had borrowed the car from her that day because his was
broken down. Police identified defendant by the victim’s vivid description of his distinctive
beard and blue eyes. Defendant also had an abrasion on his hand near his wrist, which was
consistent with the victim’s description of where she bit the culprit. Police immediately arrested
defendant. While his clothes were different than the victim described, defendant’s friend
explained that defendant had changed his clothes since the time he left his apartment earlier that
day. Following his arrest, defendant gave conflicting accounts of his whereabouts during the
time of the kidnapping.
Five days later, the police investigation had failed to unearth the pair of tan shorts and
white tank top that fit the victim’s description of the culprit’s clothing, despite a search of
defendant’s apartment. However, police had a phone conversation with one of defendant’s
neighbors indicating that defendant often parked his gray Mazda near the neighbor’s residence.
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Police discovered that this area was a few blocks away from defendant’s residence. The
neighbor mentioned that he occasionally saw defendant carry packages of beer from it. Another
neighbor indicated that he often saw defendant going to and from the vehicle, but he also saw
defendant driving a white car around the neighborhood. An officer found the gray vehicle
parked where the neighbors had indicated, and police impounded the car without a warrant.
Police obtained a warrant before searching the car, however, and found a sleeping bag, a blanket,
and a backpack containing clothing, duct tape, drop cloths, rope, unused condoms, body
lubricant, a razor, surgical gloves, and a knife.
Other witnesses identified defendant as someone who often cruised streets near the
victim’s school in a white car, and another neighbor later came forward to confirm that he saw
defendant moving a backpack from the gray car to the white car before the incident.
Defendant first argues that the fruits of the search of his gray car (the contents of the
backpack) were tainted because the seizure of the car was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. We disagree. When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
evidence, we review a trial court’s findings of fact for clear error, but review the ultimate ruling
de novo. People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 362; 649 NW2d 94 (2002).
The automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s general warrant requirement
allows searches or seizures of automobiles when there is probable cause to believe that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a lawfully stopped vehicle. Florida v White,
526 US 559, 564-565; 119 S Ct 1555; 143 L Ed 2d 748 (1999). As the United States Supreme
Court explained in White, “[r]ecognition of the need to seize readily movable contraband before
it is spirited away undoubtedly underlies the early federal laws relied upon in Carroll [v United
States, 267 US 132; 45 S Ct 280; 69 L Ed 543 (1925)].” Id. at 565. The Court went on to
explain that the laws addressed in Carroll dealt with the warrantless seizure of contraband and
the vessels that carried it. Id. The automobile exception is based on the mobility of vehicles in
general and a reduced expectation of privacy in vehicles, but does not depend upon the actual
mobility of a particular vehicle. People v Carter, 250 Mich App 510, 514-518; 655 NW2d 236
(2002). The exception is so expansive that police have the utmost discretion to impound
disabled or abandoned vehicles to prevent the disruption of traffic, protect the community, or
even preserve evidence. South Dakota v Opperman, 428 US 364, 368; 96 S Ct 3092; 49 L Ed 2d
1000 (1976). The United States Supreme Court has determined that the authority of police in
this regard is “beyond challenge.” Id. at 369. In this case, defendant’s disabled gray car was
parked on the street, and defendant was in custody. Also, leaving the car on the street
jeopardized the evidence it likely contained. Therefore, police had unquestionable authority to
impound the car under Opperman.
Moreover, the search of defendant’s apartment had failed to uncover defendant’s change
of clothes, and police knew that defendant kept the car near his apartment. The neighbors’
accounts of defendant frequenting his disabled car made it reasonable to assume that he probably
stored the change of clothes there. Therefore, police had probable cause to search the car and
could have searched the car on the spot. People v Esters, 417 Mich 34, 51; 331 NW2d 211
(1982). Nevertheless, the method police employed in this case is actually the preferred and more
conscientious method of performing a vehicular search under Esters. Id. at 50-51. Therefore,
police did not violate the constitution when they impounded defendant’s car.
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Defendant argues that the magistrate lacked probable cause to issue the warrant for the
gray car’s search. We disagree. “Probable cause to issue a search warrant exists where there is a
‘substantial basis’ for inferring a ‘fair probability’ that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.” People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411, 417-418; 605 NW2d 667
(2000) (citing People v Russo, 439 Mich 584, 604; 487 NW2d 698 (1992)). In reviewing a
magistrate’s decision regarding the existence of probable cause supporting a search warrant and
underlying affidavit, a reviewing court should “ask only whether a reasonably cautious person
could have concluded that there was a ‘substantial basis’ for the finding of probable cause.”
Russo, supra at 603. In this case, the police affidavit supporting the warrant indicated that
defendant likely used the car for personal storage, defendant had changed his clothes twice on
the day of the crime, and police had not yet uncovered the clothing. Therefore, a reasonably
cautious person would conclude that the magistrate had a substantial basis for determining that a
search of the car would likely reveal the clothing, and the trial court did not err when it allowed
the prosecutor to introduce the backpack and its contents as evidence.
Defendant next claims that the victim’s identification of him at the preliminary
examination and trial was unduly suggestive. Defendant does not dispute that his extremely long
and unusually styled beard and hair made it impossible for police and prosecutors to assemble an
ordinary lineup, or that the prosecution presented defendant with the option of a photographic
array instead. Nevertheless, defendant argued that the photographic array assembled by police
after reviewing nearly 1,000 photographs was also too suggestive because defendant stood out.
Later, defendant complained that an identification in court during the preliminary examination
would be unreliable as too suggestive. Because defendant was required to choose one of these
methods, this boils down to a claim that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a
corporeal lineup. We disagree. We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision on a
motion for a lineup. People v McAllister, 241 Mich App 466, 471; 616 NW2d 203 (2000),
remanded on other grounds 465 Mich 884, on rem 249 Mich App 34 (2001). The trial court
should grant the motion “when eyewitness identification has been shown to be a material issue
and when there is a reasonable likelihood of mistaken identification which a lineup would tend to
resolve.” People v Gwinn, 111 Mich App 223, 250; 314 NW2d 562 (1981).
In this case, defendant demonstrated some potential for misidentification given the
dissimilarities between the victim’s computer sketch and defendant’s appearance. Despite the
problems with the sketch, however, the victim’s vivid description led police to immediately
identify defendant and arrest him when they arrived at his neighbor’s apartment. Furthermore,
defendant as much as conceded that a lineup would not resolve any identification issues, because
defendant’s appearance was so distinctive that a photograph array gleaned from nearly 1,000
computer files failed to produce images that looked enough like defendant to satisfy him.
Because police and defendant essentially agreed that a corporeal lineup under the circumstances
was impossible, it follows that defendant’s argument that it would provide any real assistance or
that there existed any real chance of misidentification is specious.
Regarding the general fairness of the identification procedure, “to sustain a due process
challenge, a defendant must show that the pretrial identification procedure was so suggestive in
light of the totality of the circumstances that it led to a substantial likelihood of
misidentification.” People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 302; 505 NW2d 528 (1993). Contrary to
defendant’s arguments, the photographic array was the least suggestive option given defendant’s
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unique appearance, and contained several photographs that more closely matched the victim’s
rather poor computer sketch than defendant did. Therefore, defendant’s decision to take the most
suggestive option and risk identification in court did not render the process unduly suggestive or
unfair. Moreover, while defendant’s unique appearance impeded the arrangement of a lineup, it
also substantially diminished the likelihood of any misidentification, and the prosecution laid a
solid foundation for the victim’s ability to identify her assailant. Id. Therefore, we reject
defendant’s challenge to the general fairness of his identification in court.
As for trial, the record reflects that defendant had substantially changed his appearance
(including shaving his beard) during his pre-trial incarceration, so any complaint about the
victim’s trial identification is dubious. Nevertheless, the prosecutor sufficiently established an
independent basis (aside from the preliminary examination) for the victim’s identification, and
the preliminary examination identification process was not unduly suggestive. Therefore,
defendant has not shown that the procedure in which the victim identified defendant at the
preliminary examination or at trial was unduly suggestive or otherwise unfair. Id.
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the admission
of evidence classified as 404(b) evidence by the prosecutor. We disagree. The evidence
included the contents of defendant’s gray car and testimony of witnesses who saw defendant
loitering around the victim’s school watching the children. “The decision whether [404(b)]
evidence is admissible is within the trial court’s discretion and will only be reversed where there
has been a clear abuse of discretion.” People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785
(1998).
Under People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74-75; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), there are four
factors that guide a trial court’s decision to admit 404(b), or other-acts, evidence. “First, the
prosecutor must offer the ‘prior bad acts’ evidence under something other than a character or
propensity theory.” People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 509; 674 NW2d 366 (2004). Second, the
evidence must be relevant to an issue at trial under MRE 402. Id. “Third, the probative value of
the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under MRE 403. Finally,
the trial court, upon request, may provide a limiting instruction under MRE 105.” Id.
The testimony from the witnesses satisfied each of the VanderVliet factors. The
witnesses testified that defendant frequented the streets around the victim’s school, both before
and on the day of the offense, and that he often watched the children from his car after their
dismissal. One of the witnesses was so alarmed at the odd and blatant behavior that he notified
police.
The first prong of the VanderVliet test was met because this evidence was not offered
under a character or propensity theory. Rather, it was offered to show defendant’s identity as the
perpetrator and to demonstrate his plan to commit the abduction. These are both listed as
acceptable purposes under MRE 404(b). The second prong was also met because the evidence
was relevant under MRE 402. The evidence’s relevance “must be demonstrated by reasonable
inferences that make a material fact at issue more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” Crawford, supra at 387. A material fact at issue in this case was whether
defendant was the one who kidnapped the victim. Identity is always an essential element of a
criminal prosecution, People v Oliphant, 399 Mich 472, 489; 250 NW2d 443 (1976), and the fact
that defendant committed the crime is more probable with the evidence than without it. Also, the
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existence of a plan corroborated by several different sources tended to make the occurrence and
circumstances of the crime much more likely. Therefore, the trial court correctly found the
evidence relevant.
The third prong was met because the probative value of the evidence was not
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The proffered evidence does not pose such a
danger because the testimony is highly probative of defendant’s identity and plan, and it had
little, if any, independent prejudicial value. The fourth prong was met because defendant did not
request a limiting instruction. A trial court has no duty to give a limiting instruction absent a
request or objection. People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 444; 597 NW2d 843
(1999). Therefore, the trial court did not err when it allowed the prosecutor to introduce the
testimony.
Also admitted into evidence were the sleeping bag, blankets, and the backpack and its
contents, including a change of clothes, latex gloves, lubricant gel, condoms, rope, and duct tape.
In addition, a green blanket and sleeping bag were admitted. The change of clothes strongly
resembled the description of the outfit defendant’s friend saw him in on the morning of the
crime. Although this evidence was proffered as other acts evidence, we are not persuaded that
the evidence requires analysis under MRE 404(b), because the possession of these items alone
does not involve an intermediate inference of character. People v Houston, 261 Mich App 463,
468-469; 683 NW2d 192 (2004). The items are not evidence of acts, but tangible things which
were either relevant to the criminal episode or not. In this case, they were relevant to link
defendant to the abduction and demonstrate his motive for kidnapping the girl. Therefore, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed these items into evidence.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for
a new trial on the ground that the prosecution failed to furnish him two laboratory reports
containing exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87; 83 S Ct 1194;
10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963). We disagree. A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for a
new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 691; 664 NW2d
174 (2003).
“In order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must prove: (1) that the state
possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) that he did not possess the evidence nor could
he have obtained it himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the
favorable evidence; and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable
probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.” People v
Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 281; 591 NW2d 267 (1998). While police possessed evidence that
defendant could not reasonably obtain, the reports only peripherally tend to support defendant’s
misidentification theory. For example, defendant asserts that the lab results exonerate him
because they show that deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) found on a work glove discovered at
defendant’s residence did not match the victim’s DNA. However, the victim claimed at trial that
the work gloves found at defendant’s residence and tested for DNA were lighter in color than the
pair defendant used during the crime. Other lab results were merely inconclusive about the
victim’s presence in the white car and did not provide any exculpatory evidence. Therefore,
defendant has failed to demonstrate how the results would have changed the proceedings.
Moreover, the prosecution did not have possession of the reports during trial, and defendant fails
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to demonstrate any intentional delay in procuring the reports. Therefore, on that basis alone,
Brady does not apply. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 667; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).
The next issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing defendant to
life imprisonment, a range beyond the 81 to 270 months calculated for defendant’s convictions.
We disagree. When reviewing the factors a trial court relied on to support its sentencing
departure, “whether a factor exists is reviewed for clear error, whether a factor is objective and
verifiable is reviewed de novo, and whether a reason is substantial and compelling is reviewed
for abuse of discretion.” People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 265; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). A trial
court abuses its discretion when the trial court’s sentence falls “outside the range of principled
outcomes.” Id. at 269. A court may only depart from the guidelines range if it has a substantial
and compelling reason for the departure and states the reason on the record. Id. at 255-256.
“[O]nly those factors that are objective and verifiable may be used to judge whether substantial
and compelling reasons exist” for the departure. Id. at 257 (quoting People v Fields, 448 Mich
58, 62; 528 NW2d 176 (1995)).
The trial court departed from the guidelines range and sentenced defendant to life in
prison on two grounds. First, the court considered the items found in defendant’s car as evidence
of defendant’s intent to rape and murder the victim. Second, the trial court opined that the
guidelines did not adequately reflect the extent of defendant’s mental illness underlying his
obsession and depravity. The court concluded that the extent of his obsession resulted in “no
likelihood” that defendant can be rehabilitated to the extent that he can ever be allowed to live in
society. These factors are objective and verifiable, because the existence of the physical objects
and defendant’s history of severe mental illness were empirically supported by the record.
Furthermore, these factors provided a substantial and compelling picture of a seriously
dangerous and depraved individual who has not been and most likely never will be reformed or
deterred by the prison system. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
sentenced defendant to life imprisonment.
Finally, defendant argues that the cumulative effect of these alleged errors denied him a
fair trial. Defendant’s allegations of error lack merit. Because errors were not present, defendant
fails to demonstrate any adverse effect, cumulative or otherwise. People v Knapp, 244 Mich
App 361, 388; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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