PEOPLE OF MI V TERRILL D BOYLES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 14, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 249502
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2001-180759-FC
v
TERRILL DEON BOYLES, a/k/a RASHON
DEON JOHNSON, a/k/a WILLIE MOORE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Jansen and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree premeditated
murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), one count of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), two
counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, one count of conspiracy to commit armed robbery,
MCL 750.157a, one count of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83, one count of
felonious assault, MCL 750.82, and eight counts of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. At sentencing, the circuit court announced that it was
sentencing defendant as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to terms of life imprisonment
without parole for each murder conviction, ten to twenty years’ imprisonment for the assault
with intent to commit murder conviction, ten to twenty years’ imprisonment each for the armed
robbery and conspiracy convictions, five to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the felonious assault
conviction, and two years’ imprisonment each for the felony-firearm convictions. Defendant
appeals as of right. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for correction of the judgment
of sentence.
I
Defendant first contends that trial counsel was ineffective in several respects. Defendant
has preserved this issue for appellate review to the extent that he has provided affidavits and a
police report in support of his unsuccessful motions to remand for an evidentiary hearing.
People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 38; 650 NW2d 96 (2002). To establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel’s representation so prejudiced the
defendant that he was deprived of a fair trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521
NW2d 797 (1994). With respect to the prejudice aspect of the test for ineffective assistance, the
defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of
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the proceedings would have been different, and that the attendant proceedings were
fundamentally unfair and unreliable. Id. at 312, 326-327; People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702,
714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001). The defendant must overcome the strong presumptions that counsel
rendered effective assistance and that counsel’s actions represented sound trial strategy.
Rodgers, supra at 714-715.
A. Failure to Call Alibi Witnesses
Defendant first insists that trial counsel should have presented the testimony of Cleve
Manley, whose affidavit avers that minutes after leaving “Krazy Moes [near downtown Pontiac]
at 2:00 a.m.” on August 2, 2001, he “ran into [defendant] at the stoplight on Woodward down the
street . . . between the hour of 2:05 and 2:10 a.m.”1 According to Manley’s affidavit, he and
defendant “spoke and exchanged a few words” before defendant “drove off in one direction and
[Manley] went in the other.”
After reviewing the trial record, we cannot conclude that Manley’s testimony would have
provided defendant a substantial defense that might have made a difference in the outcome of his
trial, given that much trial testimony indicated that the robbery and shooting took place well
before 2:05 or 2:10 a.m. on August 2, 2001. See People v Hyland, 212 Mich App 701, 710; 538
NW2d 465 (1995) vacated in part on other grounds 453 Mich 902 (1996). The testimony of
surviving victims Kenneth Hayes, Aimee Kendrick, and Jerean Tidwell suggested that a friend
named Corey Brown arrived at 624 Kenilworth between midnight and 1:00 a.m.; that Brown
spent ten or fifteen minutes inside the house; that defendant arrived when Brown was still
present; that defendant left the house around the same time as Brown; that defendant reentered
the house a couple of minutes later with codefendant David Daniels; that defendant and Daniels
spoke with Kevin Stephens for approximately ten minutes before pulling out their revolvers; that
the robbery and shooting took place over the course of ten to fifteen minutes and ended around
1:00 a.m.; and that ten or fifteen minutes passed between the conclusion of the robbery and
shooting and Hayes’ call to 911. In light of this testimony, the fact that defendant was at a
Woodward stop light at 2:05 or 2:10 a.m. does not contradict the possibility that he previously
was at 624 Kenilworth at the time of the robbery and shooting. Manley’s affidavit thus does not
create an alibi for defendant. People v Gillman, 66 Mich App 419, 424; 239 NW2d 396 (1976)
(defining “alibi testimony” as that offered to prove the defendant was somewhere other than at
the scene of the crime when the crime occurred).
The testimony of Brown and his girlfriend Kelli Lee somewhat differently indicated that
they arrived at Stephens’ house at 1:45 or 1:50 a.m. on August 2, 2001; that defendant arrived
alone within the next few minutes, by 1:50 or 1:55 a.m.; that Brown spent ten or fifteen minutes
in the house, during which time he observed defendant buy a small amount of marijuana; that
defendant walked out of the house at nearly the same time as Brown so that “he could go get his
boy out of the car”; that as Brown and Lee drove away between 2:00 and 2:10 a.m., defendant
and a man wearing a hooded sweatshirt went inside the house;, and that Lee drove Brown 1 to 1-
1
For purposes of this analysis, we assume that Manley is the “O.J.” to whom defendant referred
during his trial testimony.
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1/2 miles to his house, then called Brown at 2:17 a.m. to inform him that she had made it home.
The testimony of defendant and Daniels also placed defendant at Stephens’ house by 2:00 a.m.
on August 2, 2001. Defendant averred that he left Stephens’ house at 2:10 a.m., and saw “O.J.”
at a Woodward intersection in Pontiac at 2:15 a.m.2 Assuming the veracity of Brown’s
recollection that defendant and Daniels went inside Stephens’ house by 2:00 a.m., the estimation
by Kendrick that the crime took place over a ten-minute period, and defendant’s own belief that
he left Stephens’ house by 2:10 a.m., Manley’s allegation that he saw defendant by 2:10 a.m. still
would not have established that defendant was someplace other than at Stephens’ house at the
time of the robbery and shooting. Gillman, supra at 424.
Assuming the veracity of Brown’s and Lee’s alternate estimations that defendant and
Daniels did not enter Stephens’ house until approximately 2:10 a.m., and the resultant
implication that the robbery and shooting on Kenilworth did not occur until after this time, the
affidavit of Manley does tend to establish defendant’s presence at a Woodward traffic light at the
time of the charged offenses. But even assuming that Manley’s affidavit would have tended to
support defendant’s proffered alibi defense, we cannot conclude that the absence of Manley’s
testimony at trial deprived defendant of a substantial defense in light of the facts that (1) all three
surviving victims identified defendant at trial as one of the assailants; (2) Brown’s testimony,
corroborated by Lee, established that just after he left Stephens’ house, in which the victims all
were present and unharmed, he saw defendant and another man entering the house; (3) defendant
and Daniels acknowledged that they went into Stephens’ house during the early morning hours
of August 2, 2001; and (4) Kenya Campbell testified that (a) Daniels called her shortly after 2:05
a.m. on August 2, 2001, and requested that she pick him up at defendant’s house, which was
located within a five-minute drive of Stephens’ house, (b) on arriving at defendant’s house, he
came outside, entered the car, and told her to drive him to get Daniels, (c) at the next block,
Daniels, who was sweating and appeared crazy, got inside the car, and (d) in response to
Campbell’s inquiry what Daniels and defendant had done, Daniels replied that her “boyfriend
[Hayes] had got whupped down, and his friend was hurt.”3
With respect to defendant’s contention that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call
his cousin, Arthur Moore, as a witness, defendant offers on appeal absolutely no substantiation
of his suggestion that Moore would have provided alibi testimony. Although the prosecutor’s
third amended witness list filed on February 21, 2002, listed Moore as both a known res gestae
witness and a witness the prosecutor intended to produce at trial, the prosecution ultimately did
not call Moore to testify. In closing argument, defense counsel raised the prosecutor’s failure,
stating:
2
Pontiac Police Officer Michael Miller testified that he received a dispatch to Stephens’ house at
2:15 a.m. on August 2, 2001.
3
Moreover, defense counsel did present to the jury an alibi defense in the form of defendant’s
own testimony that at the time he left Stephens’ house to drive around Pontiac, the victims were
alive and well. The trial court instructed the jury concerning its consideration of the alibi
testimony in accordance with CJI2d 7.4, but the jury ultimately rejected the defense.
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But then [defendant] went on to say that . . . I did go to the house [on
Kenilworth]. I did buy marijuana. I did see some people there. I did see Mr.
Daniels there, and what-not, but I left. And when I left, all was well. And this is
where I went. I went downtown, . . . and I saw this person and I saw that person.
I went by my house and I did that. And guess what? Some of the people that he
says he saw are on the People’s witness list, right there . . . .
So, if [the prosecutor] didn’t believe that or wanted to disprove that in
some way, that this was not a valid alibi, that he had not seen these people, that
he had not been in those places, some of the witnesses that might have been able
to do that are right here on the People’s witness list. Did you hear from any of
them, saying that, no, I didn’t see him? No, he wasn’t where he said he was. Not
one. . . . [Emphasis added.]
Defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that counsel pursued a reasonable trial
strategy in suggesting to the jury that the prosecutor failed to call Moore because his testimony
would have corroborated defendant’s own alibi testimony. Rodgers, supra at 714-715.
B. Inadequate Preparation for Trial
Defendant fails to substantiate his claim that trial counsel neglected to investigate
witnesses that defendant proposed or otherwise prepare for trial because he met with defendant
only the day before trial began. Although defendant submitted an affidavit in support of this
claim, the affidavit points to no specific witnesses or evidence that defense counsel allegedly
failed to discover or proffer. Because defendant offers absolutely no suggestion of any specific
evidence, witness, or theory that counsel failed to put forth at trial, he has not shown that
counsel’s conduct in waiting to meet with him until the day before trial qualifies as objectively
unreasonable. Similarly, because defendant entirely fails to contend with specificity that the
allegedly inadequate trial preparation caused him prejudice, he has not demonstrated a
reasonable probability that counsel’s conduct affected the outcome of the trial. Rodgers, supra at
714-715.
C. Failure to Object to Photographic Identification Evidence
Defendant maintains that counsel should have objected to evidence of Kendrick’s and
Tidwell’s participation in photographic lineups that included his likeness, which occurred during
the late morning of August 2, 2001, because Hayes already had identified defendant to the police
as a primary suspect in the robbery and shooting, and no attorney had protected his interests
during the photographic lineups. Generally, “‘[i]n the case of photographic identifications, the
right of counsel attaches with custody.’” People v McCray, 245 Mich App 631, 639; 630 NW2d
633 (2001), quoting People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 302 (opinion by Griffin, J.); 505 NW2d
528 (1993). This Court has recognized that a right to counsel at the time of a precustodial
photographic lineup may exist only in unusual circumstances, such as when (1) a defendant
already has been taken into custody and then released shortly before the occurrence of the
challenged photographic lineup, or (2) “‘the witness has previously made a positive
identification and the clear intent of the lineup is to build a case against the defendant.’” People
v Lee, 243 Mich App 163, 182; 622 NW2d 71 (2000), quoting People v McKenzie, 205 Mich
App 466, 472; 517 NW2d 791 (1994).
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In this case, because (1) defendant, who the police did not arrest until 6:00 p.m. on
August 2, 2001, acknowledges that he was not in police custody at the time of the identification
procedures in which Kendrick and Tidwell participated, (2) the police never contacted defendant
before showing Kendrick and Tidwell the photographic lineups involving him and Daniels; (3)
neither Kendrick nor Tidwell previously had identified defendant to the police; and (4) “[t]here is
no evidence that the photographic lineup was conducted in an effort to build a case against
defendant or to bolster the case against defendant as opposed to simply confirming who
defendant was,” we conclude that defendant possessed no right to counsel at the time of the
precustodial photographic lineups. Consequently, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to
raise a meritless objection to evidence of the photographic lineups. People v Snider, 239 Mich
App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
D. Failure to Request a Mistrial
Defendant lastly asserts that counsel should have moved for a mistrial on the basis that
the prosecutor purposefully left prejudicial documentation concerning him in the jury room for
the jurors to see. The transcripts reflect that the prosecutor and defense counsel spent some time
in the jury room reviewing the proposed instructions, and that the prosecutor apparently
inadvertently left in the jury room a file containing some proposed instructions, the criminal
information applicable to defendant and Daniels,4 and a copy of People v Kelly, 423 Mich 261;
378 NW2d 365 (1985). The first juror who arrived for duty on the fifth day of trial discovered
the file and returned it to the circuit court clerk immediately thereafter. The court questioned the
lone juror who discovered the file, and the juror explained that she saw a document in the file
that bore defendant’s name and listed “the charges that had been read to [the jury] in the opening
statement,” “realized that the[ documents] were probably not supposed to be in there,” and
“picked them up and . . . found [the court clerk] and handed them to him.” The juror denied
examining the top document, or any pages below that document. The juror further denied
discussing her discovery of the documents with her fellow jurors. The court cautioned the juror
“to disregard anything that you saw relative to those documents and only judge this case solely
on the evidence presented in the courtroom and this Court’s instructions on the law,” and to
refrain from discussing the file or the court’s inquiries with the other jurors. All counsel
expressed satisfaction with the extent of the trial court’s inquiries and the fitness of the juror to
continue service, and according to defense counsel, defendant also “indicated to [defense
counsel] that he ha[d] no problems.”
Even assuming that defendant has not waived appellate review of this issue by
affirmatively expressing satisfaction with the trial court’s handling of the prosecutor’s misplaced
file, neither his arguments on appeal nor the affidavits he offers in support thereof identify any
specific information to which a juror may have been exposed, or explain how any allegedly
improper information prejudiced the outcome of his trial. Accordingly, defendant cannot
establish the required prejudice element of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Rodgers,
supra at 714. Defendant also cannot establish his related claim that the prosecutor engaged in
4
The information contained the same counts that the jurors were read at the commencement of
the case, except for bifurcated charges of felon in possession of a firearm.
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misconduct, in this regard, that deprived him of a fair trial. People v Watson, 245 Mich App
572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001).
II
Defendant next argues that the circuit court violated his right to be free from double
jeopardy by imposing separate first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder
convictions and sentences arising from Stephens’ death. This Court has recognized that when a
defendant obtains convictions for both first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree felony
murder arising from the death of a single victim, “the appropriate remedy to protect defendant’s
rights against double jeopardy is to modify defendant’s judgment of conviction and sentence to
specify that defendant’s conviction is for one count and one sentence of first-degree murder
supported by two theories: premeditated murder and felony murder.” People v Bigelow, 229
Mich App 218, 220; 581 NW2d 744 (1998). Because defendant has convictions and sentences
for both premeditated and felony murder arising from the death of one victim, we remand to the
circuit court for correction of the judgment of sentence to reflect one conviction and sentence for
first-degree murder, supported by two theories. We further vacate one of defendant’s felonyfirearm convictions as he had a felony-firearm conviction for both the premeditated murder and
the felony murder.5
III
Defendant lastly asserts that insufficient evidence established his identity as one of the
assailants. We need not address this issue because defendant failed to present it within his
Standard 11 brief’s statement of questions presented. People v Miller, 238 Mich App 168, 172;
604 NW2d 781 (1999). We nonetheless conclude after reviewing the record that ample evidence
of defendant’s identity exists in the form of: (1) Hayes’, Kendrick’s, and Tidwell’s unwavering
identifications of defendant at trial as one of the gun-wielding participants in the robbery and
shooting, whom they had the opportunity to observe in Stephens’ house for at least several
minutes over the course of the events; (2) defendant’s and Daniels’ acknowledgments that
defendant was present at Stephens’ house shortly before the time of the robbery and shooting,
and (3) Campbell’s account that Daniels directed her to defendant’s house, where he entered her
car and instructed her to pick up Daniels, who appeared sweaty and crazy, and who replied to
Campbell’s inquiry regarding what he and defendant had done by advising Campbell that Hayes
had been “whupped down” and his friend had been hurt. People v Riley, 468 Mich 135, 139; 659
NW2d 611 (2003); People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 399-400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). To the
extent that defendant challenges the credibility of Hayes, Kendrick, and Tidwell, the jury had the
opportunity to consider their testimony, as well as two defense counsels’ extensive efforts to
impeach them with prior inconsistent statements. The jury apparently accepted Hayes’,
Kendrick’s, and Tidwell’s identifications of defendant, and this Court will not second guess the
jury’s credibility determination. Nowack, supra at 400; People v Elkhoja, 251 Mich App 417,
442; 651 NW2d 408 (2002) vacated in part on other grounds 467 Mich 916 (2003).
5
The prosecution conceded at oral argument that one of the felon-firearm convictions should be
vacated.
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We vacate one felony-firearm conviction, affirm the remainder of defendant’s
convictions, and remand to the circuit court for modification of his judgment of sentence to
reflect a single conviction and sentence for first-degree murder supported by alternate theories of
premeditated murder and felony murder and to reflect that a felony-firearm conviction has been
vacated.6 We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
6
Although not raised by defendant, the judgment of sentence also erroneously reflects two
separate convictions of assault with intent to commit murder. The jury found defendant guilty of
only one count of assault with intent to commit murder at trial and, consistent with this verdict,
the trial court announced only one sentence for assault with intent to commit murder at the
sentencing proceeding. Additionally, the various sentences listed in the judgment of sentence do
not accurately correspond to the previously identified conviction offenses listed in the judgment,
and some of the listed sentences appear inconsistent with the sentence announced by the trial
court at the sentencing proceeding (e.g., whereas the court announced four ten-to-twenty-year
sentences at the sentencing hearing, one each for the assault with intent to commit murder, the
conspiracy, and the two armed robbery convictions, the judgment of sentence reflects only three
ten-to-twenty-year sentences, and the offenses to which those sentences pertain is unclear from
the judgment; the court also announced just a single five-to-fifteen-year sentence at the
sentencing hearing, that being for the felonious assault conviction, yet the judgment of sentence
reflects two five-to-fifteen-year sentences, and the offenses to which those sentences pertain is
again unclear. On remand, the trial court shall also modify the judgment of sentence to correct
these apparent clerical errors.
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