PEOPLE OF MI V MAHIR G DAOUD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 18, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 250166
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 1994-133324-FC
MAHIR G. DAOUD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and Murphy and Neff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a bench trial, of first-degree premeditated murder,
MCL 750.316(1)(a), arising from the killing of his mother. The circuit court sentenced
defendant to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without parole. Defendant appeals as of
right. We affirm.
I
The victim was reported missing from her Troy home early on February 5, 1985. During
the evening hours of February 4, 1985, the Toledo Police Department discovered a body inside a
dumpster that someone had set on fire. After the Toledo police discovered the missing person
report concerning the victim that the Troy police had filed, the two departments cooperated to
identify the unidentified body found in Toledo. Dental records, x-ray films, and fingerprint
comparisons positively identified the body as Teriza Daoud, defendant’s mother.
In February 1985, the Troy police twice interviewed defendant concerning his
whereabouts on the date his mother disappeared. The police identified defendant as a suspect at
the time of the second interview, during which defendant permitted the police to search the
vehicle he had been driving on February 4, 1985, and the police discovered that he had washed
out the vehicle’s back seat and trunk. But no arrest of defendant ensued because, according to
the Troy police investigating the crime, defendant and the rest of the victim’s family ceased
cooperating with the police.
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Defendant was not arrested for the victim’s murder until May 21, 1994, when he jumped
in front of a marked Detroit police vehicle and proclaimed that he had killed his mother ten years
earlier. The Troy police then interviewed defendant, who waived his Miranda1 rights and gave a
detailed, tape-recorded account of his commission of the killing, disposal of the victim’s body,
and efforts to clean up evidence of the crime.
II
Defendant first contends that the circuit court erred by admitting into evidence his May
1994, tape-recorded statement to Troy police officers. Because the Michigan Supreme Court has
already addressed the admissibility of defendant’s statement to the Troy police officers, this issue
presents a legal question regarding the applicability of the law of the case doctrine, which this
Court considers de novo. City of Kalamazoo v Dep’t of Corrections (After Remand), 229 Mich
App 132, 134-135; 580 NW2d 475 (1998).
In June 1994, defendant was bound over on a charge of first-degree premeditated murder.
Between June 1994 and the time of defendant’s bench trial in June 2003, the circuit court held
several competency hearings. One of the hearings, which extended over two years and several
different hearing dates, addressed defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to the Troy
police because it occurred while defendant allegedly occupied a state of psychotic delusion. On
October 22, 1998, the circuit court entered an opinion and order suppressing defendant’s
statement because his delusions rendered him unable to knowingly and intelligently waive his
Miranda rights.
The prosecutor filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal with this Court in
Docket No. 215615. This Court reversed the circuit court’s decision to the extent that it found
inadmissible “[t]he first statement defendant made in response to police questioning, which
occurred before he was transported to the police station . . . [and] was not the product of
custodial interrogation[.]” People v Daoud, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered
January 11, 1999 (Docket No. 215615). This Court denied the prosecutor’s application for leave
“[i]n all other respects[.]” Id.
The prosecutor then filed an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which
granted leave on September 29, 1999. 461 Mich 873. In a decision subsequently issued on July
20, 2000, the Supreme Court initially noted that “whether a waiver of Miranda rights is
voluntary depends on the absence of police coercion,” and that “[i]n the instant case, there is no
question that defendant’s decision to waive his Miranda rights, and, concomitantly, his decision
to confess, was completely voluntary.” People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 635; 614 NW2d 152
(2000)(citation omitted). The Court next surveyed decisions addressing the knowing and
intelligent prongs of Miranda waiver analysis, then rejected the circuit court’s reasoning that to
make a knowing and intelligent waiver, defendant had to “be able to ‘apply (his Miranda rights)
to himself and understand his relationship with the police.’” Id. at 636-639. The Court
explained that the circuit court had applied an incorrect legal standard by focusing on
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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defendant’s motivation for making his statement, instead of considering the appropriate inquiry
whether defendant basically understood “that he did not have to speak, that he had the right to
the presence of counsel, and that the state could use what he said in a later trial against him.” Id.
at 639-644. The Court reviewed the testimony of the Detroit and Troy police officers who spoke
with defendant on May 21, 1994, and the testimony and reports of forensic psychologists Drs.
Robert Charles Clark, Thomas Grisso, and Robert D. Mogy, and concluded that defendant
clearly made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. Id. at 625-628, 641-645.
The Court reversed the circuit court’s opinion and order suppressing defendant’s confession. Id.
at 645.
The law of the case doctrine precludes this Court from revisiting our Supreme Court’s
decision concerning the knowing and intelligent nature of defendant’s confession.
Under the law of the case doctrine, if an appellate court has passed on a
legal question and remanded the case for further proceedings, the legal questions
thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a
subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain materially the same.
The appellate court’s decision likewise binds lower tribunals because the tribunal
may not take action on remand that is inconsistent with the judgment of the
appellate court. Thus, as a general rule, an appellate court’s determination of an
issue in a case binds lower tribunals on remand and the appellate court in
subsequent appeals. [Grievance Administrator v Lopatin, 462 Mich 235, 259260; 612 NW2d 120 (2000) (citations and quotation omitted).]
The Supreme Court ruled on the legal question of the knowing and intelligent nature of
defendant’s statement to the Troy police before the case returned to the circuit court for
defendant’s eventual trial. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court plainly considered the
same material facts on which defendant relies in his brief on appeal, primarily the reports by and
testimony of psychologists Clark, Grisso, and Mogy. Nowhere in defendant’s brief on appeal
does he identify any specific material facts that the Supreme Court neglected to address, or any
significant and material information concerning his confession that came to light after the
Supreme Court’s decision. Under these circumstances, this Court remains bound by the
Supreme Court’s ruling that defendant knowingly and intelligently made his statement,2 and we
cannot take action after remand inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s judgment.3 Grievance
Administrator, supra at 259-260.
2
To the extent that defendant also mentions in his brief on appeal the involuntariness of his
statement, we observe that the record contains no evidence of police misconduct, none of the
psychological experts questioned the voluntary nature of defendant’s statement, and, most
importantly, the Supreme Court already considered these facts in finding that defendant’s
statement clearly qualified as voluntary. Daoud, supra at 635; Grievance Administrator, supra
at 259-260.
3
Although defendant cites Locricchio v Evening News Ass’n, 438 Mich 84, 109-110; 476 NW2d
112 (1991), and People v Herrera (On Remand), 204 Mich App 333, 340-341; 514 NW2d 543
(1994), for the proposition that the law of the case doctrine occasionally may yield because
(continued…)
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III
Defendant next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not assert at
trial an insanity or diminished capacity defense.4 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must demonstrate that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that counsel’s representation so prejudiced the defendant that he was
deprived of a fair trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). With
respect to the prejudice aspect of the test for ineffective assistance, the defendant must
demonstrate the reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors the result of the proceedings
would have been different and that the attendant proceedings were fundamentally unfair and
unreliable. Id. at 312; People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001). The
defendant must overcome the strong presumption that his counsel rendered effective assistance
and that his counsel’s actions represented sound trial strategy. Id. at 715.
The record indicates that in 1997, defendant’s trial counsel spoke extensively with
Grisso, a nationally renowned insanity expert, and asked Grisso if he could develop an opinion
regarding defendant’s insanity at the time the victim was killed in 1985, but that Grisso declined
that he could express such an opinion. The record of Grisso’s testimony reflects that even his
thorough investigation into defendant’s mental health history revealed no evidence that he
suffered from mental illness in 1985; Grisso testified that defendant did not begin to display any
symptoms of mental illness until the late 1980s and that even then no one would have diagnosed
defendant with a psychotic disorder. Defense counsel also discussed with Mogy in the mid to
late 1990s whether he could attempt to recreate the status of defendant’s sanity back in 1985, and
Mogy similarly declined that he could do so. Defense counsel further asked Clark twice if he
could attempt to reconstruct the status of defendant’s mental condition at the time of the killing,
and Clark likewise indicated that he could not. None of the information to which Dr. Jennifer
Balay, who performed a competency examination of defendant in 1994, Clark, or Mogy testified
suggests that defendant might have qualified as legally insane in 1985.
Nonetheless, after the Supreme Court’s decision in 2000 concerning defendant’s capacity
to waive his Miranda rights, defense counsel still sought and obtained a criminal responsibility
examination by the Forensic Center to attempt to ascertain the status of defendant’s sanity in
1985, and the February 2002 examination concluded that in 1985 defendant “did not suffer from
(…continued)
constitutional facts sometimes require independent review, we reiterate that the Supreme Court
already plainly did review the constitutional facts involved in this case, and defendant offers no
additional evidence that would have had relevance to the Supreme Court’s determination of the
instant constitutional facts. Further, the context of the cases cited by defendant are clearly
distinguishable.
4
To the extent that defendant suggests in his reply brief that the circuit court erred by denying
his request for the appointment of an independent medical examiner to assess the issue of his
insanity, defendant’s promulgation of the issue in his reply brief does not suffice to properly
present the issue for appellate review. MCR 7.212(G); Check Reporting Services, Inc v
Michigan Nat’l Bank-Lansing, 191 Mich App 614, 628; 478 NW2d 893 (1991) (declining to
address issues raised for the first time in the appellant’s reply brief).
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‘a substantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly impaired judgment, behavior,
capacity to recognize reality or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life,’” and that
defendant did not suffer a mental illness that impaired his “ability to appreciate the nature and
quality or wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”
In summary, neither the 2002 criminal responsibility examination nor any testimony by
Balay, Clark, Mogy, or Grisso contains any suggestion that defendant had a serious mental
disturbance in 1985. The apparent efforts by defense counsel to obtain an opinion concerning
defendant’s sanity at the time of the killing belie defendant’s suggestion on appeal that he failed
to properly investigate an insanity defense. Given the absence of support for such a defense
from the four experts solicited, defendant has not overcome the strong presumption that defense
counsel engaged in sound trial strategy by focusing elsewhere during trial, for example by
attacking the credibility of defendant’s statement to the police and the abundant evidence of
premeditation on the basis of the evidence that defendant experienced delusions, and by arguing
that no physical evidence tied defendant to the killing. Furthermore, defendant offers nothing
beyond bare speculation in support of his suggestion that through additional efforts defense
counsel may have been able to locate someone who might have opined that defendant was insane
in 1985. Accordingly, we conclude that defense counsel was not ineffective because no
indication exists that defendant was deprived of a substantial defense. People v Daniel, 207
Mich App 47, 58; 523 NW2d 830 (1994).
IV
Defendant lastly asserts that the circuit court clearly erred by determining that the
evidence of his mental illness did not substantiate either an insanity or guilty but mentally ill
defense. At trial, defense counsel waived appellate review of this issue, thus extinguishing any
error, when during his closing argument he made clear that “I’m not presenting to this Court, nor
have we been ever able to even consider presenting an insanity defense,” and “[t]hat’s the same
with guilty but mentally ill. We can’t present the issue, because we’re nineteen years down the
road here.” People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 208-209, 214-216; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
Even assuming that defendant has not waived appellate review of this issue, the circuit
court did not clearly err by finding that the evidence in the case did not support an insanity
defense. MCL 768.21a; People v Swirles (After Remand), 218 Mich App 133, 136; 553 NW2d
357 (1996). The 2002 criminal responsibility evaluation, the only evidence at trial that directly
addresses defendant’s criminal responsibility at the time he killed the victim, concludes that
defendant did not then qualify as legally insane. As discussed in part III, supra, no contradictory
evidence regarding defendant’s sanity at the time of the 1985 killing exists within any of the
other psychological experts’ observations and conclusions. Given this record, we do not possess
the definite or firm conviction that the circuit court made a mistake when it observed that “[t]his
case is not about insanity.”
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Janet T. Neff
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