PEOPLE OF MI V TONIA JOYCE MILLER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 9, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 249412
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 02-003157-FC
TONIA JOYCE MILLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Tonia Joyce Miller appeals as of right from her jury trial conviction of seconddegree murder.1 Defendant was sentenced to twenty to thirty years’ imprisonment for her
conviction. We affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
The circumstances surrounding defendant’s conviction arose from the October 20, 2001,
death of her eleven-week-old daughter, Alicia Duff. Defendant was the only adult home with
her two young children on the morning of October 19, 2001, as her boyfriend, Alan Duff, was
fishing and his parents, with whom they lived, were at work. Defendant testified that she placed
Alicia in her swing and went to the bathroom. Upon her return, defendant claimed that she
found her toddler pushing the swing quite hard. Defendant took Alicia from the swing and fed
her. About an hour later, defendant attempted to feed Alicia again. However, Alicia lurched
backwards in a startle reflex, stopped breathing and formula dripped from her nose. Defendant
testified that she panicked and shook Alicia to straighten her back out, then placed her on the
carpet to administer CPR and call for an ambulance. Defendant admitted that she knew it was
wrong to shake an infant and denied dropping Alicia during this incident. The defense also
presented evidence that Alicia had stopped breathing on several prior occasions and that her
pediatrician denied defendant’s requests to place Alicia on a heart monitor.
Alicia was taken by ambulance to Battle Creek Health Systems where she was
unresponsive and placed on life support. Two hours later, Alicia was transferred to Bronson
1
MCL 750.317.
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Methodist Hospital and was admitted to the pediatric intensive care unit. Tests revealed
symptoms of shaken baby syndrome, now known as abusive head trauma. Children’s Protective
Services (CPS) and the police were notified. The doctors, defendant and her family were
interviewed by CPS investigators Robert Peck and Russell Bell. The investigators testified that
defendant had a “flat affect” and provided guarded answers.2 The events of that morning
unfolded slowly as the CPS investigators consulted with the doctors regarding defendant’s
answers. Defendant admitted to investigators that she shook Alicia two to three times, but then
changed her answer to four or five times. Alicia died the following day before the Family
Independence Agency could conduct a hearing.
As will be discussed in more detail in the next section, the prosecution and defense expert
medical witnesses presented conflicting testimony regarding the timing and exact mechanism of
Alicia’s injury. However, both experts agreed that Alicia’s death was caused by a severe trauma
to the brain and both experts used the phrase “child abuse.” The prosecution also elicited
testimony from defendant on cross-examination that she had been seeing a doctor for headaches
since Alicia’s birth, was under pressure because she and Mr. Duff were unemployed and that she
was Alicia’s only caregiver in the week preceding her death.
II. Great Weight of the Evidence
Defendant asserts that her conviction was against the great weight of the evidence as the
evidence against her amounted to “a battle of experts.” As defendant preserved this issue for
appellate review by raising it in a motion for new trial,3 we review her claim to determine
whether the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict so that it would be a miscarriage
of justice to allow the verdict to stand.4 However, conflicting testimony and questions of witness
credibility are insufficient grounds for granting a new trial.5 “Unless it can be said that directly
contradictory testimony was so far impeached that it ‘was deprived of all probative value or that
the jury could not believe it,’ or contradicted indisputable physical facts or defied physical
realities, the trial court must defer to the jury's determination.”6
The prosecution presented the testimony of Dr. Brian Hunter, a forensic pathologist for
Sparrow Hospital, who conducted Alicia’s official autopsy. Dr. Hunter found severe cerebral
edema, retinal hemorrhaging, and fresh subdural bleeding around the brain that had seeped down
the spinal cord. The cerebral edema placed so much pressure on the brain stem that grooving
had occurred. Based on the type of cells found in the blood near the injury and the condition of
Alicia’s brain, Dr. Hunter believed that Alicia had died of abusive head trauma and that the
injury would have occurred moments before she exhibited symptoms.
2
Defendant admitted that she answered only those questions directly asked because she was
afraid she would be arrested and would not be there for her older daughter.
3
People v Musser, 259 Mich App 215, 218; 673 NW2d 800 (2003).
4
People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 627; 576 NW2d 129 (1998).
5
Id. at 643.
6
Id. at 645-646 (internal citation omitted).
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Dr. Hunter based his findings in part on the report of an independent neuropathologist
who studied the brain, dura mater (the brain’s protective covering) and spinal cord. The
neuropathologist used specialized stains and inks to detect the presence of inflammation cells
around the injury and the extent of damage to the nerve endings in the brain. Following an
injury, the body begins a “process of organization” to clean out the hemorrhaged blood. The first
inflammation cells to appear to begin the healing process are neutrophil leukocytes, followed by
macrophages. The stain turns each type of cell a different color, making the type and quantity of
cells near an injury discernable. Based on the stain test, the neuropathologist determined that
Alicia’s injury was fresh, as no inflammation cells appeared near the injury. The test also
revealed that nerve endings in Alicia’s brain had been sheared from the shaking that caused her
trauma. However, he also found a secondary injury which he determined to be a week old, as a
number of macrophages appeared elsewhere in the brain. Dr. Hunter concluded that this
secondary injury was a benign trauma caused at birth and sent the report to a second
neuropathologist who confirmed his theory.
The defense presented the testimony of Dr. Ljubisa Dragovic, Chief Pathologist and
Medical Examiner for Oakland County. Based on the reports of Dr. Hunter and the first
independent neuropathologist commissioned by Dr. Hunter, Dr. Dragovic found evidence that
Alicia’s injury was in the healing process and had occurred about a week prior to her death.
From the same evidence viewed by the other doctors, Dr. Dragovic found a greater number of
inflammation cells indicating that the fatal injury was older than believed. He also determined
that Alicia’s brain swelled slowly so that the subsequent hemorrhage was gradual.7 Dr. Dragovic
based this conclusion on the stain test. He found that the blood around Alicia’s brain and spinal
cord was not fresh, due to the color it was turned by the stain. Dr. Dragovic agreed that the
injury was caused by child abuse, but found that Alicia was likely tossed onto a soft surface as
she exhibited no bruising to indicate that she was shaken hard enough to cause the injury.
The expert witnesses agreed that Alicia’s death was the result of a trauma. Defendant’s
contention that the evidence represents “a battle of experts” is, therefore, irrelevant. Defendant
admitted on the stand that she actually shook Alicia knowing that she should not and that she
was Alicia’s sole caregiver in the week prior to her injury. Furthermore, defendant never
contended that Alicia’s injury was caused by any accidental method other than the shaking
immediately prior to her death. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s contention that her
conviction was against the great weight of the evidence. The evidence that Alicia died of a
traumatic injury to her brain, combined with a lack of accidental explanation, was sufficient to
support the jury’s finding of guilt.
III. Admission of Expert Testimony
Defendant also challenges the admission of Dr. Hunter’s testimony. Defendant contends
that Dr. Hunter relied on the report of non-witness independent neuropathologists in violation of
her right to confront the witnesses against her. Defendant also contends that Dr. Hunter
7
Dr. Dragovic testified that Alicia might have been more sleepy, lethargic or cranky in the week
between her injury and her death. The defense, however, elicited no testimony on topic.
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improperly relied on the neuropathologists’ laboratory reports without laying the proper
foundation for their admission. We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse
of discretion and underlying questions of law de novo.8
A. Right of Confrontation
Defendant first contends that she was denied her Sixth Amendment right to confront the
witnesses against her at trial, as Dr. Hunter was permitted to base his findings, in part, on the
reports of independent neuropathologists who did not testify at trial. As previously noted, Dr.
Hunter removed Alicia’s brain, dura mater and spinal cord and sent them to an independent
neuropathologist for further review. When that neuropathologist found evidence of a prior injury
that was in the healing process, Dr. Hunter sent the information to a second neuropathologist to
confirm his theory that the earlier injury was a benign birth trauma.
It is well established in Michigan that an expert witness may base his or her expert
opinion on hearsay or the opinions of other experts.9 However, pursuant to the recent United
States Supreme Court decision in Crawford v United States,10 we must now closely scrutinize the
admission of hearsay evidence in relation to a claimed violation of a defendant’s right of
confrontation.
Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the
Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay
law—as does [Ohio v] Roberts,[11] and as would an approach that exempted such
statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether. Where testimonial
evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common
law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.[12]
A report completed by one pathologist at the request of another pathologist for the
investigative purpose of determining a victim’s cause of death is clearly not testimonial.
“Testimonial” evidence is defined as follows: “In the nature of testimony. Evidence is said to be
testimonial when elicited from a witness in contrast to documentary evidence or real evidence.”13
Although the Crawford Court intentionally “[left] for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial,’”14 it is clear that the description applied to evidence
8
People v Washington, 468 Mich 667, 670-671; 664 NW2d 203 (2003).
9
See People v Dobben, 440 Mich 679, 695-696; 488 NW2d 726 (1992); Forest City Enterprises,
Inc v Leemon Oil Co, 228 Mich App 57, 72; 577 NW2d 150 (1998); Triple E Produce Corp v
Mastronardi Produce, Ltd, 209 Mich App 165, 175; 530 NW2d 772 (1995).
10
Crawford v United States, ___ US ___; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004).
11
Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56; 100 S Ct 2531; 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980).
12
Crawford, supra at 1374.
13
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed).
14
Crawford, supra at 1374.
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like affidavits, custodial examinations, prior ex-parte testimony of witnesses, depositions and
confessions, i.e. statements of an official nature that resemble testimony.15 An autopsy report
documenting the doctor’s medical observations clearly does not meet this definition.
We also note that, if not bound by Crawford, we would find that defendant waived this
claimed constitutional violation. Not only did defendant fail to object to the proffered testimony,
but Dr. Dragovic actually relied on the first neuropathologist’s report in forming his expert
opinion. Accordingly, we would find that defendant waived the claimed error which was thereby
extinguished.16 Pursuant to Crawford, however, a defendant’s right to confrontation is
preeminent and cannot be so easily waived.
As Dr. Hunter’s testimony was based on nontestimonial evidence, we must determine if
the evidence is admissible under the standard of Ohio v Roberts. As the evidence bears adequate
indicia of reliability, we find that it is admissible. We first note that the neuropathologists’
reports fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, and therefore, reliability may be inferred.17
Dr. Hunter testified that it was standard practice in conducting an autopsy of a victim who
suffered a brain injury to send the brain, dura mater, and spinal cord to a neuropathologist for
examination. The neuropathologists, therefore, in the regular practice of their occupation,
conducted tests and prepared reports to determine the cause of death for incorporation into the
autopsy reports of the requesting medical examiner.18 Such records are excluded from the
hearsay exception.19 The neuropathologists’ reports were otherwise reliable, pursuant to
Roberts, as they were based on medical observations relating to real evidence to determine the
cause and time of death. These reports did not, on their own, implicate defendant as the
perpetrator. Furthermore, it would appear that the defense conceded the reliability of these
reports as Dr. Dragovic similarly relied on the first neuropathologist’s report in forming his
expert opinion. As independent pathologists, neither doctor had a motive to falsify his findings
to point to abuse. As the reports fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception and bore adequate
indicia of reliability, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Hunter’s
testimony.
Furthermore, Crawford recognizes a state’s right to exempt nontestimonial hearsay “from
Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.”20 MRE 803 provides a comprehensive list of those
types of evidence not “excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a
witness.”21 Accordingly, confrontation is not required with regard to such evidence. Dr.
15
Id. at 1365.
16
People v Riley, 465 Mich 442, 448-449; 636 NW2d 514 (2001), (After Rem) 468 Mich 135
(2003), quoting People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214-216, 219; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
17
Roberts, supra at 66.
18
MRE 803(6).
19
Id.
20
Crawford, supra at 1374.
21
MRE 803.
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Hunter’s testimony based on his own report is clearly admissible under MRE 803 as an autopsy
report is a public record or report prepared as part of the statutorily defined duties of a medical
examiner.22 As noted previously, the independent neuropathologists’ reports also fall within a
hearsay exception provided in MRE 803—records of regularly conducted activity.23 As the
Michigan Rules of Evidence have excepted these types of evidence from the hearsay exclusion,
regardless of the availability of the declarant, the evidence is exempted from a Confrontation
Clause challenge.
B. Foundation
Defendant also asserts that the trial court improperly admitted Dr. Hunter’s testimony as
he based his findings on the neuropathologists’ reports without laying a proper foundation for
their admission. However, as noted previously, defendant not only failed to object to this
testimony, but the defense expert witness also relied on the report of the first neuropathologist in
making his findings. Accordingly, defendant waived the right to appellate review and the error
is deemed extinguished.24
Affirmed.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
22
MRE 803(8). See also MCL 52.202(1)(a) (mandating a medical examiner to conduct an
autopsy when the deceased’s death was unexpected), MCL 52.207 (mandating a medical
examiner to conduct an autopsy upon the order of a prosecuting attorney).
23
MRE 803(6).
24
See Riley, supra at 449.
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