PEOPLE OF MI V ANTONIO RAMON STAPLETON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 9, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 249184
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 03-001458-01
ANTONIO RAMON STAPLETON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Sawyer and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions for carjacking, MCL 750.529a,
armed robbery, MCL 750.529, possession of a firearm by a felon, MCL 750.224f, and possession
of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced to
thirty to sixty years in prison for the carjacking and armed robbery convictions, two to five years
in prison for the felony in possession of a firearm conviction, and two years in prison for the
felony-firearm conviction. We affirm. This case is being decided without oral argument
pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress identification testimony. We disagree.
Issues of law relevant to a motion to suppress are reviewed de novo. People v Hickman,
470 Mich 602, 606; 684 NW2d 267 (2004). On review, the trial court’s decision to admit
identification evidence will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous. People v Kurylczyk,
443 Mich 289, 303; 505 NW2d 528 (1993).
An identification procedure that is unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable
misidentification constitutes a denial of due process. People v Williams, 244 Mich App 533,
542; 624 NW2d 575 (2001). The defendant must show that in light of the totality of the
circumstances, the procedure used was so impermissibly suggestive as to have led to a
substantial likelihood of misidentification. People v Colon, 233 Mich App 295, 304; 591 NW2d
692 (1998). When examining the totality of the circumstances, relevant factors include: 1) the
opportunity for the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, 2) the witness’ degree
of attention, 3) the accuracy of a prior description, 4) the witness’ level of certainty at the pretrial
identification procedure, and 5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Id.
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For federal Sixth Amendment and Michigan state constitution purposes, the right to
counsel attaches only to corporeal identifications conducted at or after the initiation of
adversarial judicial criminal proceedings. Hickman, supra at 609. In Hickman, the Michigan
Supreme Court abolished the longstanding rule of People v Anderson, 389 Mich 155, 187; 205
NW2d 461 (1973), extending the right to counsel to all pretrial identifications as being without a
constitutional basis, and adopted the straightforward analysis of Moore v Illinois 434 US 220,
226-227; 98 S Ct 458; 54 L Ed 2d 424 (1977), and held that the right to counsel attaches only to
corporeal identifications conducted at or after the initiation of adversarial judicial criminal
proceedings. Hickman, supra at 611. The Court held that the right to counsel did not attach to
on the scene identifications that take place before the initiation of adversarial judicial
proceedings. Id.
The carjacking victim was able to see defendant’s facial features during the incident.
There was adequate lighting inside the vehicle when defendant opened the door. Additionally,
before exiting the vehicle, the victim’s acquaintance parked the vehicle in a spot where there
were security lights to increase visibility. She described the perpetrator’s clothing, race, and
facial features. She was able to give police an accurate enough description for them to
apprehend a person matching that description.
Police returned to the scene of the incident with defendant approximately two hours later
for identification purposes. The victim was unable to see defendant through the car windows
because they were fogged and asked police to pull defendant out of the car so that she could get a
better look at him. The police brought defendant out of the vehicle and the victim asked them to
place defendant’s hood on his head so that she could get a “better look at him.” She wanted to
see defendant with the hood because that is how she remembered him during the incident. After
the hood was placed on defendant’s head, the victim positively identified defendant as the
perpetrator of the crime.
Defendant contends that the police manipulated his clothing until his appearance more
exactly matched the description the victim provided. However, the police acted at the victim’s
request in placing the hood on defendant’s head. It was the victim, and not the police, who was
instrumental in changing defendant’s appearance to assist her in identifying defendant as the
person who carjacked her. In fact, the victim wanted to be sure she did not misidentify
defendant. Moreover, any hesitancy in the victim’s identification of defendant was before the
jury, and goes to the weight of the identification, rather than its admissibility. Kurylczyk, supra
at 303.
The pre-trial identification process here does not implicate the right to counsel.
Adversarial judicial criminal proceedings had not yet been initiated. Hickman, supra at 611. At
the time of the identification, defendant was not entitled a right to counsel for federal Sixth
Amendment and Michigan state constitution purposes. Therefore, defendant was not denied due
process of law, where the procedure used was not unfairly suggestive nor did it lead to a
substantial likelihood of misidentification.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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