PEOPLE OF MI V WILLIAM JOSEPH KNOPPE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 9, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 249103
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 02-187438-FH
WILLIAM JOSEPH KNOPPE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and White and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions of operating a vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor or with an unlawful blood alcohol level, third offense
(OUIL/UBAL-3d), MCL 257.625(8)(c), and operating a vehicle while his operator’s license was
suspended or revoked, second or subsequent offense (DWLS-2d), MCL 257.904(3)(b).
Defendant was sentenced to 334 days in jail for the OUIL/UBAL-3d conviction, and 183 days in
jail for DWLS-2d conviction. We affirm.
I. Facts
At approximately 2:35 a.m. on October 11, 1999, two Michigan State Troopers arrived at
the scene of a one-car accident on Interstate-75 in the city of Hazel Park. A car registered to
defendant had struck the median wall and rolled over. Defendant was standing outside the car in
the traffic lanes on the driver’s side. One of the troopers observed that defendant had red, watery
eyes, smelled strongly of alcohol, was slurring his speech, and was having trouble standing and
walking. Defendant also urinated on the median in the presence of the troopers. When a trooper
asked defendant if anybody else was in the car, defendant responded, “No.” Defendant did not
say anything that morning about somebody else being the driver. At the hospital, the troopers
observed that defendant had a rainbow-shaped bruise on his chest, which looked like it had been
made from impact with a steering wheel. A blood test revealed that defendant’s blood alcohol
level was 0.14.
Defendant testified that he had been drinking before the accident and that his license was
suspended, but that he had only been the passenger of the car when the accident occurred.
-1-
According to defendant, Dwight Jackson had picked defendant up from the Club Room in Royal
Oak and had been driving when the accident occurred.1 After the accident, defendant and
Jackson got out of the car on the driver’s side. Defendant walked to a streetlight and Jackson
disappeared. Defendant thought that the accident was caused by a problem with the car’s
steering.
II. Analysis
A. Substitute Appointed Counsel
Defendant first argues that the trial erred in denying defendant’s motion for substitute
appointed counsel. We review the decision to permit substitution of appointed counsel for an
abuse of discretion. People v Russell, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 122998,
decided July 27, 2004), slip op at 13 n 25; People v Traylor, 245 Mich App 460, 462; 628 NW2d
120 (2001).
An indigent defendant is guaranteed the right to counsel; however, he is
not entitled to have the attorney of his choice appointed simply by requesting that
the attorney originally appointed be replaced. Appointment of a substitute
counsel is warranted only upon a showing of good cause and where substitution
will not unreasonably disrupt the judicial process. Good cause exists where a
legitimate difference of opinion develops between a defendant and his appointed
counsel with regard to a fundamental trial tactic. [Id., quoting People v Mack,
190 Mich App 7, 14; 475 NW2d 830 (1991) (citations omitted from Mack).]
Here, defendant argues that his appointed counsel refused his request to present relevant
evidence. Defendant argues that this constituted a legitimate difference of opinion regarding trial
tactics.2 However, defendant does not specify on appeal what evidence trial counsel refused to
present, and there is no indication on the record that counsel refused to present relevant evidence
at trial. “‘Defendant may not leave it to this Court to search for a factual basis to sustain or reject
his position.’” Traylor, supra at 464, quoting People v Norman, 184 Mich App 255, 260; 457
NW2d 136 (1990). At trial, counsel presented defendant’s theory of the case, arguing that
defendant was not driving the morning of the accident, and elicited testimony in support of this
defense. There is no indication that defendant and counsel had a difference of opinion regarding
a fundamental trial tactic or defense. Further, counsel’s decision regarding what evidence to
present is a matter of professional judgment or trial strategy that does not justify substitution of
counsel. Traylor, supra at 463, citing People v O’Brien, 89 Mich App 704, 708; 282 NW2d 190
(1979).3 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that defendant failed to show
1
Defendant testified that he had been paying Jackson to drive him to and from work because
defendant did not have a driver’s license. Jackson kept the car on the weekends.
2
Defendant erroneously relies on People v Fett, 257 Mich App 76; 666 NW2d 676 (2003),
which was vacated by our Supreme Court, 469 Mich 907 (2003).
3
Defendant also contends that he was entitled to substitute counsel because his appointed
counsel met with him for only twelve minutes before the trial. There is nothing on the record to
(continued…)
-2-
good cause for appointment of substitute counsel. Additionally, the trial court was not required
to make further inquiries into defendant’s claim of dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel.
See Mack, supra at 14 (where this Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial court’s
failure to make further inquiries into the defendant’s claim of dissatisfaction with his appointed
counsel essentially forced the defendant to represent himself, thereby denying his constitutional
right to counsel).
B. Effective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant next argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel for several
reasons. In order to preserve the issue of effective assistance of counsel for appellate review, the
defendant must move for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing in the trial court. People v Sabin
(On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658; 620 NW2d 19 (2000). Because defendant failed
to preserve this issue, our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the existing record. People v
Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 38; 650 NW2d 96 (2002).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must first show that the
performance of his counsel was below an objective standard of reasonableness under the
prevailing professional norms. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). The
defendant must show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
“counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600; 623
NW2d 884 (2001). The reviewing court indulges a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and the defendant bears the
heavy burden of proving otherwise. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 689; 104 S Ct 2052;
80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984); People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). The
defendant must overcome a strong presumption that the assistance of counsel was sound trial
strategy. Carbin, supra at 600. In addition to showing counsel’s deficient performance, the
defendant must show that the representation was so prejudicial to him that he was denied a fair
trial. Toma, supra at 302. In order to show prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. Carbin, supra at 600. “A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id., quoting Strickland, supra at 694.
1. Lack of Preparation
Defendant first claims that his trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance, because
counsel met with him for only twelve minutes in the months before trial and was, therefore, not
prepared for trial. When claiming ineffective assistance due to trial counsel’s unpreparedness, a
defendant must show prejudice resulting from the lack of preparation. People v Caballero, 184
Mich App 636, 640; 459 NW2d 80 (1990). Here, there is no testimony verifying defendant’s
claim that counsel only met with him for twelve minutes before trial. Additionally, the record
(…continued)
support this contention. Further, such a fact would not support defendant’s argument that he
should have been assigned substitute counsel, because it would not show that defendant and his
counsel had a difference of opinion regarding a trial tactic. Instead, this contention is relevant to
counsel’s effectiveness, which we will discuss, infra, in part II(B)(1) of this opinion.
-3-
does not show that counsel was unprepared. On the day of trial, trial counsel stated that he was
ready for trial. The record reveals that trial counsel knew the facts, effectively questioned
prosecution witnesses and defendant, and presented a cohesive defense. Because the record does
not support the claim that trial counsel was unprepared, defendant has failed to show any
prejudice due to lack of preparation. Therefore, defendant’s claim ineffective assistance of
counsel due to lack of preparation lacks merit.
2. Trial Strategy
Defendant next argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
counsel had no trial strategy. We disagree. The record reveals that defendant’s counsel had a
legitimate trial strategy. Trial counsel’s strategy, apparent from his opening remarks and
questioning of the witnesses, was to inject reasonable doubt regarding whether defendant was the
driver of the car. Defendant asserts that counsel’s lack of trial strategy was apparent because
defendant did not know before trial whether he was going to testify or what he would testify
about. However, uncertainty about whether defendant was going to testify did not interfere with
trial counsel’s strategy, and defendant does not demonstrate how such uncertainty prejudiced
him. Further, we will not substitute our judgment for that of counsel regarding trial strategy, and
simply because a strategy failed does not render it ineffective assistance. People v Kevorkian,
248 Mich App 373, 414-415; 639 NW2d 291 (2001). Therefore, defendant did not receive
ineffective assistance of counsel based on lack of trial strategy.
3. Failure to Call Witnesses
Defendant next claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial
counsel failed to locate and call the following witnesses at trial: Jackson, the dispatcher, the
EMTs, defendant’s nurse, and defendant’s doctor. Failure to call a witness constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel only if it deprives the defendant of a substantial defense.
People v Dixon, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 246739, issued August 24,
2004), slip op at 3, lv pending (Supreme Court Docket No. 126996). There is no indication on
the record that these potential witnesses would have testified favorably for defendant. Defendant
has not demonstrated that he was deprived of a substantial defense because those witnesses were
not presented. Further, decisions regarding whether to call witnesses are presumed to be matters
of trial strategy, and we will not second guess such decisions with the benefit of hindsight. Id.
4. Stipulation to Blood Alcohol Level
Defendant next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he stipulated to
defendant’s unlawful blood alcohol level. We disagree. The evidence of defendant’s
intoxication the morning of the accident was overwhelming. When asked if he was intoxicated
at the time of the accident, defendant responded, “Oh absolutely.” Defendant admitted that he
was “above the legal.” Because the evidence strongly supported defendant’s unlawful blood
alcohol level, trial counsel instead focused on injecting doubt as to whether defendant was the
driver of the car. This was sound trial strategy. Regardless, we will not substitute our judgment
for that of trial counsel regarding matters of trial strategy. Kevorkian, supra at 414.
5. Cross-Examination
-4-
Finally, defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine the
troopers on two key issues. As discussed, decisions regarding whether to question witnesses are
presumed to be matters of trial strategy. Dixon, supra at 3. We will not substitute our judgment
for that of counsel regarding trial strategy. Kevorkian, supra at 414. First, defendant contends
that his counsel should have cross-examined the troopers about the bruise they saw on
defendant’s chest at the hospital. However, the record shows that defense counsel did indeed try
to raise doubts about the bruising in his cross-examination of the troopers. Counsel questioned
one trooper about the lack of information about the bruise in his initial police report, and he
questioned both troopers about the absence of photographs of the bruise. Defense counsel may
well have deliberately chosen not to question the troopers about their conversation with the
doctor so as to not reinforce the troopers’ vivid observations about the rainbow-shaped bruise on
defendant’s chest. Second, defendant maintains that defense counsel should have crossexamined the troopers regarding an inconsistency in their testimony: one trooper testified that
the crashed car landed on all four wheels, while the other trooper testified that it landed on its
roof. While such an inquiry may have cast doubt on the troopers’ memory, the position of the
car was not an issue in the case, and defendant has not demonstrated how this omission
prejudiced him. Thus, defendant has failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.