LES JAVOR V TOWNSHIP OF PLYMOUTH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LES JAVOR,
UNPUBLISHED
November 2, 2004
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
No. 247098
Tax Tribunal
LC No. 284366
TOWNSHIP OF PLYMOUTH,
Respondent-Appellee.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Wilder and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner appeals as of right from a decision by the Michigan Tax Tribunal regarding the
value of petitioner’s property for the 2001 and 2002 tax years. We affirm. This appeal is being
decided without oral argument in accordance with MCR 7.214(E).
On June 22, 2001, petitioner notified the tribunal that he disagreed with the tax
assessment value assigned to his home. He filed a petition in the small claims division, stating
that, for the year 2001, his home was assigned a true cash value (TCV) of $402,9801 and an
assessment value (AV) of $201,490 (50% of the TCV). He contended that the actual TCV for
2001 was $337,000, the price he paid for the property in 2000. Petitioner’s claim was later
expanded to include a dispute with regard to the 2002 tax year. Respondent assigned a TCV of
$422,740 to the property for the 2002 tax year, and petitioner again alleged a TCV of $337,000.
The hearing referee summarized the evidence presented by each side and held, on
November 18, 2002, that the TCV was $391,780 and the AV was $195,890 for the 2001 tax year.
He held that the TCV was $422,740 and the AV was $211,370 for the 2002 tax year. The referee
stated, in part:
The price paid by Petitioner for the subject property is not accepted as a
sole measure of value because “usual selling price” is determined with reference
to sales of several properties to ensure that price reflects only market motivation.
1
As noted infra, this amount was revised by respondent after respondent re-measured the
property.
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Petitioner did not testify as to the length of time that the property was listed on the
market or whether any other factors affected the price Petitioner paid for the
subject property. In support of Petitioner’s contention of true cash value
Petitioner relies, in part, on the Appraisal of Real Property prepared for Dearborn
Federal Savings Bank on the subject property as of July 24, 2000. This appraisal
states that the “indicated value by sales comparison approach” is $345,000, and
on the fact [sic] that Petitioner’s purchase price of the property was $330,000,
which the Tribunal notes is less than the appraised value. The Tribunal notes that
in reviewing the bank appraisal, the square footage of the subject property is
noted as 3,264; the Respondent’s revised Market Comparable Approach measures
the square footage at 3,066. Petitioner did not object to Respondent’s measured
square footage used to recalculate the 2001 Revised assessment. The Tribunal
accepts the Respondent’s revised field sheet as the accurate record of the square
footage of the subject property.
Petitioner’s testimony, coupled with the exhibits presented at the hearing,
more credibly outweigh the true cash value achieved by application of
Respondent’s Market Data Approach. The initial Market Data Approach
prepared by Respondent was based on incorrect square footage of the property.
Once Petitioner notified Respondent of this fact and Respondent re-measured the
subject property on June 19, 2002, a revised Market Comparable Approach was
submitted to the Tribunal at the final hearing. This revised document reflects a
$40,000 reduction in the estimated value for the subject property from the original
submission.
Respondent testified that the 2001 assessment based on the corrected field
sheet was $195,890, making the true cash value of the property for 2001
$391,780. . . . Following Petitioner’s proofs indicating a 7.9% increase in
property values in Plymouth Township in 2001 . . . the Assessed value and State
Equalized values on the tax roll for 2002 are correct at $211,370, thus establishing
the true cash value of the property at $422,740 ($391,780 x 7.9% = $422,730.62).
The values for tax years 2001 and 2002 require some clarification since
two values were put forth by Respondent for each tax year at issue. The taxable
value for 2001 is $201,490, which is the taxable value set forth under the 2001
values established by Respondent. The taxable value for 2002 is the taxable value
set forth under the 2002-Assessment Roll values established by Respondent.
On February 14, 2003, the tribunal denied petitioner’s request for rehearing.
Because this case was heard in the small claims division of the tribunal, no transcript was
prepared of the proceedings that occurred before the hearing referee. Instead, petitioner
submitted a “proposed statement of facts in lieu of transcript pursuant to MCR 7.210.”
Respondent objected to petitioner’s proposed statement of facts and submitted, instead, a
“counter-statement of facts in lieu of transcript pursuant to MCR 7.210.” Because the original
referee was no longer employed with the tribunal, another tribunal member reviewed petitioner’s
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and respondent’s statements of fact and concluded that respondent’s submission constituted “a
concise statement of proceedings and facts in support of the appeal filed in said cause.”
Respondent’s submission indicated, in part, the following:
9. Both parties agreed that the square footage of the subject was 3,066. . .
10. The square footage of the subject used by the Respondent in its
Revised Market Valuation analysis was correct.
11. Petitioner contended that Respondent’s market analysis was in error
because the Respondent adjusted prices for time based upon a 3% annual rate.
Respondent contended that its average annual adjustment of 3% per year or
.0025% per month to adjust all sales data and the subject property to tax day is
reasonable and is not an error on its part.
12. The Tribunal found that both the Petitioner and the Respondent’s
market methodologies to be [sic] the most accurate and best indicator of the
property’s True Cash Value.
13. The Tribunal found that the proofs of the Petitioner and the
Respondent were not sufficiently satisfactory so as to allow either party to prevail
in full. The combination of proofs presented led the Tribunal to the conclusion
that there is some room for a compromised determination based on nothing more
precise than reasoned judgment.
***
16. The Tribunal found that the Assessed Value of the subject was best
indicated by Respondent’s Revised Market Valuation analysis based on it’s [sic]
corrected Field Sheet disclosing that the subject property consisted of 3066 square
feet, rather than 3460 square feet. This approach to value resulted in an assessed
value of $195,890.00, suggested a True Cash Value of the property for 2001 in
the amount of $391,780.00. The Tribunal found that for tax year 2002, that [sic]
the Assessed Value should be increased 7.9% as indicated by the Plymouth
Township 2001 Percentage Change Report submitted into evidence by the
Petitioner.
Appellate review of the factual portions of Michigan Tax Tribunal decisions is limited to
determining whether the tribunal’s factual findings are supported by competent, material, and
substantial evidence on the record. STC, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 257 Mich App 528, 533; 669
NW2d 594 (1994). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as
adequate to support a decision. Dignan v Michigan Public School Employees Retirement Bd,
253 Mich App 571, 576; 659 NW2d 629 (2002). Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla of evidence, but it may be less than a preponderance of the evidence. City of Lansing v
Carl Schlegel, Inc, 257 Mich App 627, 630; 669 NW2d 315 (2003). With regard to the
tribunal’s legal reasoning, the Supreme Court noted in Danse Corp v City of Madison Heights,
466 Mich 175, 178; 644 NW2d 721 (2002), that, “in the absence of fraud, review of a Tax
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Tribunal decision is limited to determining whether the tribunal erred in applying the law or
adopted a wrong principle” (internal citation and quotation omitted).
Petitioner first argues that the tribunal erred in failing to accept petitioner’s purchase
price as the best and most accurate determination of the TCV of the property. Petitioner argues
that respondent submitted no competent evidence to rebut petitioner’s evidence with regard to
the TCV of the property.
The tribunal must make an independent determination of the TCV in determining the
correct assessment amount for real property. Alhi Development Co v. Orion Twp, 110 Mich App
764, 767; 314 NW2d 479 (1981). “It is cause for remand if the tribunal merely affirms the
assessment as placed on the rolls by the assessing authority.” First City Corp v City of Lansing,
153 Mich App 106, 114; 395 NW2d 26 (1986). TCV is the same as fair market value. Great
Lakes Division of National Steel Corp v City of Ecorse, 227 Mich App 379, 389; 576 NW2d 667
(1998). However, MCL 211.27(5) states that “the purchase price paid in a transfer of property is
not the presumptive true cash value of the property transferred.”
“Generally, there are three accepted methods of valuation: the capitalization-of-income
approach, the cost-less-depreciation approach, and the market approach. The tribunal's duty is to
select the method which most accurately determines True Cash Value after considering all the
facts before it.” First City Corp, supra at 114.
Here, the hearing referee acknowledged the price that petitioner paid for the property but
ultimately found “the Petitioner’s and Respondent’s market methodologies to be the most
accurate and thus the best indication of the property’s true cash value.” The referee rejected the
initial value of $430,000 suggested by respondent’s market approach because the approach – like
the appraisal petitioner submitted with respect to the property – employed an incorrect square
footage. The referee noted that respondent “testified that the 2001 assessment value based on the
corrected field sheet was $195,890, making the true cash value of the property for 2001
$391,780.” It is not entirely clear to us why respondent “testified that the 2001 assessment value
based on the corrected field sheet was $195,890,” when the revised market approach summary
set forth a TCV of $390,000 (and 50% of $390,000 is $195,000). At any rate, petitioner does not
presently take issue with the small dollar difference in the market approach summary versus the
assessment value as testified to by respondent, but instead argues that the referee should have
accepted the sale price as the TCV.
The referee ultimately chose $391,780 as the TCV of the property. He then used the
adjustment rate provided by respondent, 7.9%, to determine a TCV for 2002 of $422,740.
As the trier of fact, the referee was entitled to accept respondent’s market approach as
ultimately setting forth the TCV of the property. In fact, it appears from the record that this was
the only method submitted that provided a value for the property as of tax day for the 2001 tax
year. Moreover, the use of the 7.9% adjustment rate was supported by evidence submitted by
petitioner, as noted in respondent’s “counter-statement of facts in lieu of transcript pursuant to
MCR 7.210,” which was accepted by the tribunal as “a concise statement of proceedings and
facts in support of the appeal filed[.]” The referee did not commit an error of law or adopt a
wrong principle, and there is no allegation that he committed fraud. See Danse, supra at 178.
The referee simply was not required to accept petitioner’s purchase price as the TCV value of
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the property. Competent, material, and substantial evidence supported the tribunal’s decision,
and no error requiring reversal is apparent. STC, supra at 533.
Petitioner next argues that the tribunal erred in failing to make an independent
determination of the TCV of the property. Petitioner states that the tribunal accepted
respondent’s valuations without making independent findings. We disagree. Indeed, while the
referee did eventually accept a valuation suggested by respondent, it did so after considering the
various options available. Petitioner notes the referee’s statement that “Petitioner’s testimony,
coupled with the exhibits presented at the hearing, more credibly outweigh the true cash values
achieved by application of Respondent’s Market Data Approach.” Petitioner contends that the
referee’s opinion is contradictory in stating that the petitioner’s testimony was the more credible
and then proceeding to “accept[] the Respondent’s assessment.” While we agree that the tribunal
opinion was not artfully worded, contradictory language in a Tax Tribunal opinion is simply not
a proper basis for reversal, given the limited judicial review we must employ.
Petitioner next argues that the tribunal applied “inconsistent market increases” for
determining the TCVs of the property. Specifically, petitioner argues that one of the comparable
properties in respondent’s market data approach was sold sixteen months after the sale of
petitioner’s property and was assigned a price reduction based on a 3% market increase instead
of the 7.9% increase applied to petitioner’s 2002 assessment. We again find no basis for
reversal. First, petitioner acknowledges in his brief that “Respondent had a study which showed
that properties appreciated 3% per year in Plymouth Township. However, there was also another
study for the subject property’s specific economic area indicating that properties were
appreciating at a rate of 7.9% per year.” Accordingly, there was evidence on the record to
support the tribunal’s acceptance of each rate. Dignan, supra at 576. Our limited powers of
judicial review with respect to Tax Tribunal decisions do not allow us to overturn a decision
merely because of inconsistency. Additionally, petitioner fails to note that, under his argument,
the other two comparable properties in respondent’s market data approach would likely be
adjusted upward in price, because they sold before the sale of petitioner’s property. We are thus
not convinced that petitioner’s requested adjustment would result in anything other than a de
minimus change.
Petitioner next argues that “the tribunal’s factual findings recited in justification of its
TCV determination were not supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the
record.” Petitioner’s argument is nothing more than a laundry list of alleged errors. He makes
no attempt to develop a reasoned argument regarding why the tribunal’s ultimate factual findings
were incorrect. He makes no attempt to cite relevant authorities in support of his allegations of
error. We conclude that he has waived this appellate issue because of inadequate briefing. See,
generally, Goolsby v Detroit, 419 Mich 651, 655 n 1; 358 NW2d 856 (1984). At any rate, as
noted in our discussion of petitioner’s first appellate issue, the tribunal’s factual findings were
indeed supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record.
Finally, petitioner argues that the tribunal incorrectly denied his motion for rehearing.
Once again, petitioner’s argument on appeal is skeletal and insufficient. Plaintiff states that
“Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing recited all of the errors of law and mistakes of fact set forth
above, as well as other perceived errors. A cursory review of the written exhibits and opinion
would have confirmed these errors.” It is apparent to us that plaintiff’s argument is simply a
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rehashing of the other arguments he presently raises on appeal.
arguments provide a basis for reversal.
As noted, none of those
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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