SHELLEY MARIE MEDRANO V KURT BRADLEY MEDRANO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SHELLEY MARIE MEDRANO,
UNPUBLISHED
October 28, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 254842
Lapeer Circuit Court
LC No. 03-032557-DM
KURT BRADLEY MEDRANO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Gage and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right the judgment of divorce challenging the trial court’s award
of custody, parenting time, and spousal support. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in not granting him joint physical custody
or greater parenting time than specified in the friend of the court guidelines. We disagree. “To
expedite the resolution of a child custody dispute by prompt and final adjudication, all orders and
judgments of the circuit court shall be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge made findings of
fact against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear
legal error on a major issue.” MCL 722.28. “When reviewing the trial court’s findings of fact,
this Court defers to the trial court on issues of credibility.” Mogle v Scriver, 241 Mich App 192,
201; 614 NW2d 696 (2000). “To whom custody is granted is a discretionary dispositional
ruling. Therefore, a custody award should be affirmed unless it represents an abuse of
discretion.” Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 880; 526 NW2d 889 (1994) (citations omitted).
Before turning to the best interest factors, a court must determine whether an established
custodial environment exists. Whether a custodial environment is established is a question of
fact. Thompson v Thompson, 261 Mich App 353, 363 n 3; 683 NW2d 250 (2004). Whether
there is an existing custodial environment determines the burden of persuasion on a party arguing
for a custody change:
While clear and convincing evidence must be presented to change custody
if an established custodial environment exists, if no custodial environment exists,
the trial court may modify a custody order if the petitioning party can convince
the court by a preponderance of evidence that it should grant a custody change.
[Hayes v Hayes, 209 Mich App 385, 387; 532 NW2d 190 (1995) (citations
omitted).]
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The court found that “there is an established custodial environment over a significant
period of time (the children’s entire lives) with the Plaintiff.” The evidence supports this
finding. The court heard testimony that plaintiff was the children’s primary caregiver and most
responsible for their upbringing. Plaintiff testified that the parties agreed that plaintiff would
postpone advanced education so she could stay home with the child. After the parties’ son was
born, plaintiff worked only part time so she could be home with the children.
Although defendant, his brother, and mother testified that defendant was fully involved in
the children’s upbringing, this does not preclude a finding that the children looked to plaintiff for
guidance, discipline, and comfort. MCL 722.27(1)(c) See also Mogle, supra at 197-198
(observing that an established custodial environment can exist with both parents). Deferring to
the trial court’s superior position to assess witness credibility, id. at 201, we conclude that the
evidence does not clearly preponderate against the court’s finding an established custodial
environment with plaintiff. Therefore, defendant must present clear and convincing evidence
that the children’s best interest would be served by changing custody. Hayes, supra at 387.
“[A] trial court determines the best interests of the child by weighing the twelve statutory
factors outlined in MCL 722.23.” Eldred v Ziny, 246 Mich App 142, 150; 631 NW2d 748
(2001). “The trial court need not necessarily engage in elaborate or ornate discussion because
brief, definite, and pertinent findings and conclusions regarding the contested matters are
sufficient. MCR 2.517(A)(2).” Foskett v Foskett, 247 Mich App 1, 12; 634 NW2d 363 (2001).
A parent may request joint custody, and the court is required to consider, though not necessarily
grant, a parent’s request and document the reasons for its decision. MCL 722.26a.
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the trial court elaborated its findings on each best
interest factor. The court assessed best interest factors (a), (b), and (c) equally for both parties
“when settlement assets, and child support are factored in.” The court assessed factors (d) and
(e) in favor of plaintiff, affirming its previous determination that an established custodial
environment existed with plaintiff. The court scored factor (f) against defendant, “given
Defendant’s admitted extramarital affair and his less than credible testimony regarding the time
of the affair, a wedding spat, and his commitment to spending time with the children.” The court
found that factor (g) was equal, and that factors (h) and (i) were inapplicable because the
children were too young to go to school or express a custodial preference. Finally, the court
found that factors (j) and (k) weighed in plaintiff’s favor, “given the Defendant’s deceptive and
manipulative testimony” and “Defendant’s controlling and verbally aggressive attitude.” The
court did not weigh any additional considerations under factor (l).
Defendant argues that the court erred in determining that factors (a), (b), and (c) weighed
equally between the parties. Defendant does not specifically assert that he outweighs plaintiff
with respect to the “love, affection, and other emotional ties” that exist between the children and
the parties. MCL 722.23(a). Rather, he focuses on the parties’ relative abilities to provide for
the material needs of the children, factor (c), and to actively promote their education factor (b).
But as noted in the discussion above regarding an established custodial environment, the
evidence demonstrates that plaintiff took the lead in nurturing and caring for the children before
the divorce. Further, the court recognized the disparity in earning capacity and assets between
the parties, and indicated that it was equalizing this consideration through its handling of the
property settlement. Therefore, defendant has not shown that the evidence clearly weighs
against the court’s assessment of factors (a), (b), and (c).
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Defendant also argues that the court erred in scoring factors (d) and (e) in plaintiff’s
favor. The court found that plaintiff “had custody of the children throughout the divorce and was
the primary caregiver prior to the divorce” and “[t]he children naturally look to the mother for
care and nurturing.” Defendant argues this was error because he had established a permanent
residence and was committed to working toward a joint physical custody compromise.
Our Supreme Court has noted that factors (d) and (e) “are phrased somewhat awkwardly
and there is clearly a degree of overlap between them. However, we are satisfied that the focus
of factor e is the child’s prospects for a stable family environment.” Ireland v Smith, 451 Mich
457, 465; 547 NW2d 686 (1996). The court’s findings on these factors were based on its prior
finding of an established custodial environment with plaintiff, which we have already concluded
was supported by the record evidence. Defendant fails to demonstrate how his new home or
desire for joint custody make erroneous the court’s finding that factors (d) and (e) favor plaintiff.
Therefore, defendant has not shown that the evidence clearly weighs against the court’s
assessment of these factors.
Defendant also argues that the court erred in scoring factor (k) in plaintiff’s favor.
Defendant appears to believe that the court’s evaluation of the factor was based solely on a
reported incident of domestic violence. But the court indicated that its assessment of factor (k)
was based on defendant’s general controlling and verbally aggressive attitude throughout the
course of the hearings. Therefore, defendant has not shown that the evidence clearly weighs
against the court’s assessment of this factor.
Having found no error in the court’s evaluation of the challenged best interest factors, we
conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request for joint
custody. As for increased parenting time, there is no evidence suggesting that the court abused
its discretion by awarding parenting time under the friend of the court guidelines.1
Defendant next argues that the court’s financial settlement was unfair and inequitable,
and that the court abused its discretion in ordering defendant to pay $9,000 of plaintiff’s attorney
fees. We disagree. The trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and the court’s
rulings on property division and financial support are reviewed to ensure they are fair and
equitable in light of those facts. Olson v Olson, 256 Mich App 619, 629; 671 NW2d 64 (2003).
A trial court may order one party to pay the other party’s reasonable attorney fees and litigation
costs “if the record supports a finding that financial assistance is necessary because the other
party is unable to bear the expense of the action.” Id. at 635.
The court considers a variety of factors in awarding spousal support:
The award of alimony is in the trial court’s discretion. The main objective of
alimony is to balance the incomes and needs of the parties in a way that will not
impoverish either party, and alimony is to be based on what is just and reasonable
1
We also note that the trial court awarded defendant significantly more parenting time than the
child psychologist – whom defendant retained – would have recommended.
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under the circumstances of the case. Among the factors that should be considered
are: (1) the past relations and conduct of the parties, (2) the length of the
marriage, (3) the abilities of the parties to work, (4) the source and amount of
property awarded to the parties, (5) the parties’ ages, (6) the abilities of the parties
to pay alimony, (7) the present situation of the parties, (8) the needs of the parties,
(9) the parties’ health, (10) the prior standard of living of the parties and whether
either is responsible for the support of others, (11) contributions of the parties to
the joint estate, (12) a party’s fault in causing the divorce, (13) the effect of
cohabitation on a party's financial status, and (14) general principles of equity.
[Olson, supra at 631 (citations omitted).]
Defendant has not shown that the court clearly erred in its findings or awarded spousal
support unfairly or inequitably. “[D]ue to the disparity in incomes and education,” the court
awarded plaintiff $250 per week support ($13,000 annually) for two years, with her share of her
monthly health insurance premiums to be deducted from that amount. The court also ordered
defendant to pay plaintiff $9,000 toward her attorney fees out of his share of the home equity
proceeds. Given defendant’s superior financial position and the fact that he has already
purchased another home, the court did not abuse its discretion by allowing plaintiff to conserve
more of her assets from the settlement. There is no indication that court’s award was punitive.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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