PEOPLE OF MI V MUTIZWA SARAB-REMATUAL FINLEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 21, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
MUTIZWA SARAB-REMATUAL FINLEY, a/k/a
MUTIZAW SARAB-REMATUAL FINLEY,
No. 248960
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 248960
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Kelly, P.J., Gage and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of possession with intent to deliver 650 or more grams of
cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i); maintaining a drug house, MCL 333.7405(d); possession of
marijuana, MCL 333.7403(2)(d); felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f; and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to
life in prison for the possession with intent to deliver cocaine conviction, forty-one days for the
drug house and marijuana convictions (with credit for forty-one days served), 2 to 7-1/2 years for
the felon-in-possession conviction, and two years for the felony-firearm conviction. He appeals
as of right. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts and Proceedings
After a confidential informant made a controlled buy of cocaine at defendant’s house on
January 2, 2002, narcotics officers obtained a search warrant and searched defendant’s house on
January 3, 2002. The officers found more than 800 grams of cocaine, a small amount of
marijuana, eleven firearms, scales, packing and cutting materials, written records of drug
transactions, a bulletproof vest, a glass cooking jar that could be used for converting powder
cocaine to crack cocaine, expensive jewelry and receipts showing other jewelry purchases, and
documents linking defendant to the ownership and possession of the house. Defendant
challenged the validity of the search warrant in a pretrial motion to suppress, which the trial
court denied.
Although defendant had not been seen with any of the accoutrements of drug dealing
found in his house, and the only physical evidence connecting defendant to the items was his
fingerprint on the glass jar, the prosecutor argued at trial that defendant constructively possessed
the drugs, firearms, and related items found in the house. Defense counsel attempted to
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undermine this theory by emphasizing the lack of direct evidence of a nexus between defendant
and the items, and by suggesting that the items and equipment found in the house belonged to
another person, such as defendant’s domestic partner or a hired cleaner.
II. Improper Peremptory Challenges
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in finding the prosecutor’s reasons for
peremptorily dismissing two African-American prospective jurors were sufficient to overcome a
discriminatory motive under Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69
(1986).
A. Batson Framework and Standard of Review
In Purkett v Elem, 514 US 765, 767-768; 115 S Ct 1769; 131 L Ed 2d 834 (1995), the
United States Supreme Court outlined the Batson framework and clarified its statements in
Batson regarding the prosecution’s burden of production.
Under our Batson jurisprudence, once the opponent of a peremptory
challenge has made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step one), the
burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a
race-neutral explanation (step two). If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the
trial court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has
proved purposeful racial discrimination. The second step of this process does not
demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. “At this [second]
step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation.
Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the
reason offered will be deemed race neutral.”
*
*
*
It is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the justification
becomes relevant--the step in which the trial court determines whether the
opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful
discrimination. [Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal citations omitted).]
This Court reviews a trial court’s Batson ruling for an abuse of discretion. People v Howard,
226 Mich App 528, 534; 548; 575 NW2d 16 (1998). This Court defers to the trial court’s
evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility. An appellate
court must give great deference to the trial court’s findings on a Batson issue because they turn
in large part on credibility. Id. citing Harville v State Plumbing & Heating, Inc, 218 Mich App
302, 319-320; 553 NW2d 377 (1996). The decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory
intent represents a finding of fact accorded great deference on appeal, which will not be
overturned unless clearly erroneous. Miller-El v Cockrell, 537 US 322, 339-340; 123 S Ct
1029; 154 L Ed 2d 931 (2003).
B. Analysis
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Before the trial court denied defendant’s Batson challenge, the prosecutor had exercised
two peremptory challenges to excuse two African-American prospective jurors, Ammon Broden
and Sharon Robinson.1 The prosecutor explained that she struck Broden because he was young,
presumably had little life experience, and exhibited a negative attitude toward the courtroom
proceedings. The prosecutor also was concerned that his first name might give him a sense of
sympathy or connection with defendant. The prosecutor explained that she struck Robinson out
of concern that her work as a child associate in an intermediate school district might make her
sympathetic to people who were in trouble. Defendant maintains that the prosecutor’s reasons
were pretextual because (1) the prosecutor’s explanation with regard to Robinson was
disingenuous, inasmuch as Robinson’s answers suggested that she would be favorable to the
prosecution, (2) there was no linguistic connection between defendant’s and Broden’s first
names, and (3) there was no legitimate reason for favoring older jurors with more “life
experience.”
In McCurdy v Montgomery Co, Ohio, 240 F3d 512, 521 (CA 6, 2001), the Sixth Circuit
addressed the degree of scrutiny required when the prosecutor’s proffered reasons are based on
subjective perceptions or hunches. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that body language,
demeanor, passivity, inattentiveness, or inability to relate to other jurors are valid, race-neutral
explanations for exercising a peremptory challenge, but stated that the trial court must explicitly
adjudicate the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations. The federal court explained:
The need for an explicit, on-the-record analysis of each of the elements of
a Batson challenge is especially important when the purported race-neutral
justification is predicated on subjective explanations like body language or
demeanor. . . . Because the primary defense to pretext based violations of Batson
is the district court’s ability to assess the credibility of an attorney’s
representations, it is critical that the district court independently assess the
proffered justifications. [Id. (citations omitted).]
Here, the prosecutor gave racially-neutral explanations based on her subjective
perceptions about Broden and Robinson. The trial court scrutinized these explanations by
extensively assessing the prosecutor’s perceptions and comparing them to its own perceptions of
Broden and Robinson. The trial court agreed that Broden was unlikely to be a conscientious
juror because he exhibited a hostile attitude, and was young and inexperienced. Defendant
argues that the prosecutor could not establish any similarity between Broden’s and defendant’s
given names, because they are linguistically and etymologically unrelated. However,
defendant’s emphasis on linguistics and etymology is misplaced because the prosecutor is not
restricted to factually sound reasons. The court agreed that Broden’s and defendant’s first
1
The trial court apparently presumed there was an established pattern of strikes made in relation
to the racial identities of other members of the jury pool. The prosecution, at trial and on appeal,
does not challenge the existence of an established pattern of strikes made in relation to the racial
identities of other members of the jury pool. We do not address whether there was an established
pattern of strikes, but rather we assume, for purposes of this opinion, that such a pattern was
established.
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names, whatever their origins, “conjure up” the impression that both were names of similar
origin that might invoke Broden’s sympathy. We cannot conclude that the trial court clearly
erred in determining that these reasons, though subjective and not empirically verifiable, were
genuine and sincere. See also Partida v State, 133 SW3d 738, 742 (Tex App, 2003) (the trial
court did not err in accepting the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation that a juror was struck
because he had a shaved head and wore an earring, which caused him to appear antiestablishment, and unsympathetic to the government).
The trial court acknowledged that it had formed a different perception of Robinson, and
that it was surprised when the prosecutor struck her. However, the trial court carefully
considered the prosecutor’s explanation, and determined that it too was genuine, and not
pretextual. Thus, with both Broden and Robinson, the trial court properly scrutinized the
prosecutor’s subjective explanations, and found that the prosecutor was credible and sincere. We
find no reason for not deferring to the trial court’s credibility assessments.
Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed an age-based Batson violation by
considering Broden’s age as a factor. Because defendant fails to cite any authority for the
proposition that Batson applies to aged-based exercises of peremptory challenges, we deem this
issue waived. People v Weathersby, 204 Mich App 98, 113; 514 NW2d 493 (1994).
Furthermore, we note that several jurisdictions have accepted youthfulness and inexperience as
genuine, race-neutral factors for striking jurors. See State v Payne, 943 SW2d 338 (Mo App,
1997) (no Batson violation where the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against a
young juror based on a perception that she would sympathize with the youthful defendant, and
not the elderly prosecution witness); Ealoms v State, 983 SW2d 853, 856-857 (Tex App, 1998)
(“Youth and employment (or lack thereof) are acceptable race-neutral explanations for striking a
prospective juror.”)
III. Evidentiary Issues
A. Standard of Review
Defendant raises several evidentiary issues. A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Manser, 250 Mich App 21, 31; 645
NW2d 65 (2002). “An abuse of discretion is found only if an unprejudiced person, considering
the facts on which the trial court acted, would say that there was no excuse for the ruling made.”
People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 113; 632 NW2d 67 949 (2002). However, if the alleged
evidentiary error is not preserved by timely objection, MRE 103(a)(1), we review for plain error
affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130
(1999); Aldrich, supra at 113.
B. Analysis
1. Surveillance Officers’ Testimony Regarding the January 2, 2002, Controlled Buy
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding the January 2,
2002, controlled buy. Defendant contends that this testimony was based on inadmissible hearsay
and was irrelevant. At trial, defendant objected to this testimony on relevance grounds, but did
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not raise a hearsay objection. Accordingly, the hearsay aspect of this issue is unpreserved and
our review is limited to plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra.
Defendant contends that the testimony was based on inadmissible hearsay because it
recounted the confidential informant’s nonverbal, assertive conduct of entering and leaving the
house and handing Officer Blough two rocks of crack cocaine. Hearsay is defined as “a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” MRE 801(c). Hearsay is not admissible
except as provided by the rules of evidence. MRE 802. Nonverbal conduct may constitute a
statement as contemplated by the prohibition against hearsay, but only if the person intended the
nonverbal conduct to be an assertion. MRE 801(a).
Defendant incorrectly characterizes the confidential informant’s conduct as nonverbal
assertive conduct. There was no indication that the informant intended any of his actions to be
assertions. He simply fulfilled his role in the controlled buy. Although his actions allow the
inference that he purchased drugs at the house, this inference is based on the totality of the
circumstances, not the informant’s intent to communicate a message through his conduct. Thus,
defendant has failed to satisfy the “error” prong of the plain error test, let alone shown a plain
error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra.
Defendant also contends that the evidence of the confidential informant’s conduct was
inadmissible under MRE 404(b) and unduly prejudicial under MRE 403. MRE 404(b) excludes
evidence of prior bad acts to prove action in conformity therewith, but allows such evidence for a
non-character purpose such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or
system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when the same is
material. People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 510; 674 NW2d 366 (2004). Under MRE 403,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.
The prosecutor offered the evidence of the January 2 controlled buy to establish that the
officers used this information to obtain a valid search warrant, thereby demonstrating that the
officers had a legal right to search the home on January 3. Although the evidence was offered
for a non-character purpose, MRE 404(b) also requires that the evidence be relevant to a material
issue. We are not persuaded that the officers’ legal right to be in the home was a material factual
issue because defendant was not contesting that issue at trial and defense counsel was willing to
so stipulate. The prosecution argues that the issue was material, citing People v Crawford, 458
Mich 376, 389; 582 NW2d 785 (1998), for the proposition that all elements of a criminal offense
are at issue when a defendant pleads not guilty, and that the prosecution bears the burden of
proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of whether the defendant
specifically disputes or offers to stipulate to any of the elements. Here, however, the officers’
legal right to search the house was not an element of any of the charged offenses.
Nonetheless, we conclude that any error in admitting this evidence was harmless because
defendant has not shown that it is more probable than not that it affected the outcome of the trial
in light of the properly admitted evidence. People v Whittaker, 465 Mich 422, 427-428; 635
NW2d 687 (2001). The prosecution presented overwhelming evidence indicative of drug
trafficking based on the evidence seized during the January 3 search. In light of this evidence, it
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is not more probable than not that the jury’s verdict would have been different without the
evidence of the January 2 controlled buy.
3. Testimony that a Magistrate Signed a Search Warrant and Reasons Why a Confidential
Informant Would Desire Anonymity
Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony that the
confidential informant had good reason to desire anonymity, and that a magistrate signed the
search warrant. Officer Blough testified that he wanted to preserve the confidential informant’s
anonymity to protect the informant and the informant’s family from retribution. Officer Blough
then testified that, by using the confidential informant, he was able to obtain a valid search
warrant from a judge. Defendant preserved his challenge to this evidence by objecting on
grounds of relevancy at trial, but he did not raise a hearsay objection. Accordingly, we review
defendant’s hearsay challenge for plain error. Carines, supra.
We find no merit to defendant’s hearsay argument. Officer Blough testified from his
own knowledge that informants want their identities secret because they fear retribution against
themselves and their families. He testified about informants in general, without suggesting that
the informant in this case had any specific reason to fear retribution for his involvement in
defendant’s case. Officer Blough’s testimony regarding the search warrant also was derived
from his own knowledge that he had a warrant to search the house on January 3.
Although defendant also contends that evidence of an authorized search warrant was
unacceptably prejudicial, we conclude that any error in the admission of this evidence was
harmless given the overwhelming evidence indicative of drug trafficking that was presented at
trial. Whittaker, supra. Furthermore, evidence that the officers were authorized to search
defendant’s house on January 3, did not suggest that a judge had sanctioned every aspect of the
prosecution’s case. Thus, defendant’s argument that the evidence was unduly prejudicial is
without merit.
4. Tabulation Sheet
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence Officer
Byrd’s tabulation sheet of the evidence seized during the January 3, 2002, search. The trial court
admitted the document under MRE 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule.
Defendant argues, as he did below, that the business records exception is not applicable because
the document was prepared in anticipation of litigation.
MRE 803(6) provides, in pertinent part:
A memorandum, report, record or data compilation, in any form, of acts,
transactions, occurrences, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or
near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if
kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the
regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record,
or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness, or by certification that complies with a rule promulgated by the
supreme court or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of
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information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness. The term “business’ as used in this paragraph includes business,
institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether
or not conducted for profit.
In People v McDaniel, 469 Mich 409, 414; 670 NW2d 659 (2003), our Supreme Court held that
the business records exception “is based on the inherent trustworthiness of business records,”
which “is undermined when the records are prepared in anticipation of litigation.” Accordingly,
the Court concluded that MRE 803(6) did not apply to a police laboratory report of a chemical
analysis of heroin that the defendant sold to an undercover police officer. Id. at 410, 414. The
Court held that the report was inherently untrustworthy because it was prepared in anticipation of
litigation. Id. The Court also held that the report was inadmissible under MRE 803(8), the
public records exception, because the report was adversarial, and intended to establish an
element of the crime for which the defendant was charged.2 Id. at 413.
Defendant also relies on People v Stacy, 193 Mich App 19, 33; 484 NW2d 675 (1992), in
which this Court construed the public records exception, MRE 803(8), to allow routine police
reports made in nonadversarial settings, but to exclude observations made by law enforcement
officials at the scene of a crime or while investigating a crime.
Defendant contends that the tabulation sheet was prepared in an adversarial setting, and is
therefore inadmissible under either MRE 803(6) or 803(8). Whether this issue is approached
under either MRE 803(6) or 803(8), the salient question is whether an adversarial relationship
existed between defendant and law enforcement at the time Byrd prepared the tabulation sheet.
We conclude that the investigation had progressed far enough to answer this question in the
affirmative. The police had already established probable cause that defendant’s house was being
used to sell drugs, they were in his house searching for evidence of drug trafficking, and they had
found substantial amounts of drugs and records of drug transactions, as well as other
incriminating evidence such as large amounts of cash, firearms, and equipment and materials
related to drug trafficking. Presumably, the police anticipated that their search would lead to
criminal charges against the drug house operator. Indeed, several items on the tabulation sheet
were flagged for fingerprint examination, and several other items flagged for forfeiture
proceedings. We therefore conclude that the tabulation sheet was not admissible under either
MRE 803(6) or 803(8).
Again, however, the error was harmless because it is not more probable than not that it
affected the outcome. Whittaker, supra. Unlike McDaniel, where the laboratory report was the
only evidence that established an element of the crime for which the defendant was charged, the
officers in the instant case independently testified about the items found during the search. The
tabulated listing of the items was thus cumulative to the officers’ properly admitted testimony
about their findings during the search. Accordingly, the error was harmless.
2
MRE 803(8) provides a hearsay exception for records kept by public offices and agencies,
“excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law
enforcement personnel, and subject to the limitations of MCL 257.624.”
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IV. Failure to Suppress Evidence from Search Warrant
We next address defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the January 3, 2002, search warrant.
A. Standard of Review
When reviewing a magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant, this Court must
examine the search warrant and underlying affidavit in a common-sense and realistic manner.
People v Darwich, 226 Mich App 635, 636-637; 575 NW2d 44 (1997). Under the totality of the
circumstances, this Court must then determine whether a reasonably cautious person could have
concluded that there was a substantial basis for the magistrate’s finding of probable cause. Id. at
637.3
B. Analysis
Defendant first argues that the affidavit does not support issuance of the search warrant
because Officer Urban, the affiant of the search warrant, did not participate in the controlled buy.
Defendant is correct that Officer Urban did not participate in the controlled buy. Indeed,
all the information that Officer Urban received concerning the controlled buy was supplied to
him by Officer Blough, who coordinated the controlled buy through his confidential informant
and the assistance of two other police officers.
Defendant first argues that the affidavit of warrant was defective because Officer Urban
failed to inform the magistrate that averments were based on hearsay. In support, defendant cites
to averments contained in the affidavit that reference Officer Urban’s “personal knowledge,”
even though Officer Urban did not participate in the controlled buy. This assertion is not
supported by a common-sense reading of the affidavit. The affidavit early-on stated that Officer
Urban believed probable cause existed “based upon the following facts, which are based on your
affiant’s personal knowledge, fellow officer’s knowledge, and on the personal knowledge of XX
as related directly to me from fellow officers.” (emphasis supplied.) This averment makes clear
that Officer Urban did not have contact with the informant.
Defendant also claims that the phrase “fellow officers” is misleading because only
Officer Blough had contact with the informant. This assertion is not supported by the evidence.
Indeed, as defendant recognizes, before the controlled buy, Officer Petrich searched the
informant, provided the informant with recorded funds, and searched the informant’s vehicle.
Officer Petrich then followed the informant to Christener Street, where Officer Tracy Bryd
3
We note that defendant maintains that the trial court relied on the wrong standard for deciding
the suppression motion. This argument refers to a passing reference the trial court made
regarding the applicable standard where it acknowledged uncertainty about the application of a
clear and convincing evidence standard. However, there is no indication that the trial court later
erroneously used that standard when making its final ruling. Therefore, we reject this claim of
error.
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watched the informant go inside the house and then leave. Officer Petrich then followed the
informant back to the police station where the informant handed Officer Blough suspected
narcotics. Given these undisputed facts, defendant’s claim is without merit.
Defendant also argues that there is no evidence that the informant spoke with personal
knowledge and that he was credible or that the information was reliable. MCL 780.6534
provides, in pertinent part:
The magistrate’s finding of reasonable or probable cause shall be based
upon all the facts related within the affidavit made before him or her. The
affidavit may be based upon information supplied to the complainant by a named
or unnamed person if the affidavit contains 1 of the following:
*
*
*
(b) If the person is unnamed, affirmative allegations from which the
magistrate may conclude that the person spoke with personal knowledge of the
information and either that the unnamed person is credible or that the information
is reliable.
Officer Urban averred that the informant had demonstrated his reliability and credibility
by consistently giving accurate information to “fellow officers” (i.e., Officer Blough) during a
nine-day period. Officer Urban could presumptively rely on Officer Blough for information
concerning the informant’s reliability and credibility. People v Powell, 201 Mich App 516; 506
NW2d 894 (1993). Also, Officer Urban related specific details of the controlled buy, in which it
was verified that the informant possessed no drugs or non-recorded money when he went to
defendant’s house, but left with a substance that field-testing revealed to be cocaine. The
informant was monitored from the time he left for defendant’s house to the time he returned to
the police station. Supplied with this information by Officer Blough, Officer Urban stated that
he believed probable cause existed “based upon the following facts, which are based on your
affiant’s personal knowledge, fellow officer’s knowledge, and on the personal knowledge of XX
as related directly to me from fellow officers.” This statement sufficiently outlines the chain of
hearsay from the informant, to Officer Blough, and to Officer Urban. It also provided sufficient
information to show that the information originated from a reliable and credible source, and that
it reached Officer Urban through a reliable and credible channel. People v Poole, 218 Mich App
702, 706; 555 NW2d 485 (1996). Defendant has thus failed to show that the affidavit was
insufficient with regard to the informant’s credibility.
Defendant also argues that Officer Urban did not provide sufficient information about the
drug transaction to establish probable cause that evidence of drug dealing would be found in the
house on January 3, 2002. He contends that the affidavit did not report the quantity of drugs or
amount of money exchanged during the controlled buy, or other information to establish that
4
Notably, in People v Hawkins 468 Mich 488, 502; 668 NW2d 602 (2003), our Supreme Court
held that a statutory defect under MCL 780.653 is not grounds to suppress evidence seized under
a search warrant, unless there is also a constitutional defect.
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drug-dealing was an ongoing activity. We disagree with defendant’s characterization of the
search warrant affidavit. Officer Urban stated that, based on his training and experiencing,
persons who possess and sell controlled substances from a certain location tend to keep larger
supplies of drugs and related items at those premises. Officer Urban’s allegations were sufficient
to allow a reasonably caution person to conclude that there was a substantial basis for finding
probable cause. Darwich, supra.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in not finding that the affidavit contained
falsehoods and statements made in reckless disregard for the truth. In People v Williams, 240
Mich App 316, 319-320; 614 NW2d 647 (2000), this Court explained:
“[I]f false statements are made in an affidavit in support of a search
warrant, evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant must be suppressed if the false
information was necessary to a finding of probable cause. In order to prevail on a
motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant procured
with alleged false information, the defendant must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the affiant had knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless
disregard for the truth, inserted false material into the affidavit and that the false
material was necessary to a finding of probable cause.” [Id. quoting People v
Melotik, 221 Mich App 190, 200, 561 NW2d 453 (1997), in turn quoting People v
Stumpf, 196 Mich App 218, 224, 492 NW2d 795 (1992), citing Franks v
Delaware, 438 US 154, 98 S Ct 2674, 57 L Ed 2d 667 (1978) (emphasis in
original).]
Defendant takes issue with several statements contained in the underlying affidavit. First,
defendant claims untrue the affidavit’s description of the seller on the basis it could not have
been have true given defendant’s and his girlfriend’s testimony that they moved out of the house
a day earlier. However, there is no testimony to indicate that Officer Blough or Officer Urban
knew or had reason to believe that the informant lied about the seller’s description. Defendant
also argues that Officer Urban, with reckless disregard for the truth, (2) did not tell the magistrate
that the contents of the affidavit were hearsay; (3) led the magistrate to believe that he or
someone other that Officer Blough, the officer who knew the informant and coordinated the
controlled buy, had contact with the confidential informant.5
5
Defendant also attempts to buttress his argument by questioning Officer Blough’s credibility.
Defendant specifically maintains that although Officer Blough testified that he did not sign the
January 3, 2002 affidavit because the Flint Police Department did not want its officers applying
for warrants outside of Flint, he signed a January 4, 2002, affidavit to support a second search
warrant for defendant’s house. However, without further explanation, this discrepancy is
insufficient to show that Officer Blough either lied about his jurisdictional restrictions or
improperly signed the January 4, 2002 affidavit. More important, because Officer Blough did
not sign the January 4, 2002 affidavit until after the first search warrant was obtained on January
3, 2002, it did not provide a basis for Officer Urban, or the magistrate, to question Officer
Blough’s credibility.
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However, Officer Urban averred that he believed probable cause existed “based upon the
following facts, which are based on your affiant’s personal knowledge, fellow officer’s
knowledge, and on the personal knowledge of XX as related directly to me from fellow officers.”
This statement expresses that Officer Urban did not have contact with the confidential informant.
Also, defendant is incorrect in stating that no officer other than Officer Blough had contact with
the confidential informant. Indeed, the above summary of Officers Petrich’s and Bryd’s
participation in the controlled buy indicates they had contact with the informant. Thus,
defendant’s claim is without merit.
V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
A. Standard of Review
Defendant raises several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that the attorney’s performance was
objectively unreasonable in light of prevailing professional norms and (2) that, but for the
attorney’s error or errors, a different outcome reasonably would have resulted. People v Carbin,
463 Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001); People v Harmon, 248 Mich App 522, 531; 640
NW2d 314 (2001). A defendant must affirmatively demonstrate that counsel’s performance was
objectively unreasonable and so prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair trial. People v Pickens,
446 Mich 298, 338; 521 NW2d 797 (1994); People v Ortiz, 249 Mich App 297, 311; 642 NW2d
417 (2001). A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must overcome the strong
presumption that the attorney was exercising sound strategy. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App
361, 385; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).
B. Analysis
1. Conflict of Interest
Defendant moved for a Ginther6 hearing asserting that he was denied effective assistance
of counsel because defense counsel had been charged with possession of crack cocaine before
trial, which created a conflict of interest with regard to his representation of defendant.
Defendant’s claim on appeal is premised on trial court improperly denying his motion for a
Ginther hearing. However, because defendant’s allegations do not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel, we conclude the trial court properly denied his motion for a Ginther
hearing.
In People v Smith, 456 Mich 543, 556-558; 581 NW2d 654 (1998), the defendant
requested our Supreme Court “presume a conflict of interest exists whenever an attorney is being
prosecuted in the same county as a criminal defendant whom he represents.” The Court
“decline[d] to create such a rule and h[e]ld instead that in order to demonstrate that a conflict of
interest has violated his Sixth Amendment rights, a defendant ‘must establish that an actual
conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’” Id. quoting Cuyler v Sullivan,
446 US 335, 350; 100 S Ct 1708, 64 L Ed 2d 333 (1980).
6
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; (1973)
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Here, there is no reason to presume an actual conflict because defense counsel was being
prosecuted by the Attorney General’s office, not by the county prosecutor, and because defense
counsel’s case was before a district court, not a circuit court. Moreover, defendant has failed to
cite any example of how defense counsel’s own legal problems adversely affected his
representation of defendant. Defendant claims that defense counsel improperly handled his
remand for a preliminary examination to curry favor with the prosecutor. However, defendant
does not state how the remand could have benefited him, and thus does not provide support for
his claim. Therefore, defendant has not shown that his right to effective counsel was violated or
that the trial court was obligated to sua sponte intervene.
2. Failure to Stipulate to Predicate Felony
Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective for not accepting the
prosecutor’s offer to stipulate to the predicate felony for the felon-in-possession charge.
Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted carrying a concealed weapon (CCW) in 1998, and
was sentenced to probation for eighteen months. Consequently, he was not permitted to possess
a firearm for five years following the satisfaction of his probation. MCL 750.224f(2) and (6)(iii).
When defense counsel declined the prosecutor’s offer to stipulate to the predicate felony,
he explained that he wanted the prosecutor to prove that defendant’s firearm rights had not been
restored (although the trial court indicated that this was an affirmative defense), and further, he
did not want the jury to speculate about the severity of the prior offense or defendant’s
probationary status. It also appears that defense counsel hoped to insinuate that defendant’s
girlfriend may have actually committed the prior CCW offense.
At trial, defendant’s former probation officer testified about the pertinent details relative
to defendant’s prior CCW conviction, including that he was discharged from probation before
eighteen months had expired, and that a forty-five-day jail term was waived. The probation
officer’s testimony established that defendant’s prior offense was not especially serious,
particularly considered in light of the drug and weapons charges in this case, and also portrayed
defendant as a responsible person who took his probation seriously and rehabilitated himself.
While the evidence clearly established that defendant’s firearm rights had not been
restored, counsel’s strategy of attempting to insinuate that defendant’s girlfriend was the actual
offender was not “nonsensical.” Furthermore, it was not unsound strategy for counsel to allow
the jury to hear evidence of defendant’s prior felony conviction in an attempt to undermine any
unwarranted speculation about the severity of defendant’s criminal conduct and to highlight
defendant’s successful completion of probation.
3. Failure to Sever Felon-in-Possession Charge
Similarly, defense counsel was not deficient in failing to move to sever the felon-inpossession charge. A trial court must sever unrelated offenses for separate trial. Two offenses
are related if they are based on the same conduct or a series of connected acts constituting part of
a single scheme or plan. MCR 6.120(B). Here, defendant’s possession of eleven firearms was
closely connected to his charged activity of maintaining a drug house and trafficking in large
amounts of narcotics. The guns were kept in the same house where the stock of drugs, the drug
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proceeds, and the records, equipment, and supplies related to an ongoing drug operation were
kept. Under these circumstances, a motion to sever would not have been successful.
4. Failure to Redact Prejudicial Information
Defendant also argues that defense counsel erred in failing to take steps to redact or
exclude prejudicial information from the judgment of sentence for the attempted CCW
conviction. This document shows that four unspecified counts were dismissed, that defendant’s
probation requirements included “treatment as directed by probation department,” and that
defendant was required to pay $500 to a special restitution fund, and $60 to a crime victim rights
fund. Defendant claims that this information was highly prejudicial and irrelevant to proving the
predicate felony. We conclude that allowing this document to reach the jurors in unredacted
form was neither objectively unreasonable nor outcome-determinative. The information about
the four additional counts was not prejudicial where the judgment of sentence did not specify the
nature of the offenses and indicated that they had been dismissed. That defendant’s probation
required treatment was not prejudicial, especially in light of the evidence that defendant
successfully completed the requirements of his probation. Nor was defendant prejudiced by the
presence of information indicating that he was ordered to pay an amount of restitution.
5. Failure to Object to Testimony
Next, defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to
testimony from Agent Bowman, who testified that of the eleven firearms found in defendant’s
house, none were registered except two handguns, which were stolen. Bowman also testified
that defendant possessed a sawed-off shotgun which should have been registered, but was not.
(The shotgun did not require registration before it was modified.)
In addition to the firearms charges, however, defendant was additionally charged with
maintaining a drug house and possession with intent to deliver cocaine. “[F]irearms are
recognized as tools of the drug trade; thus, courts have sustained the admission of weapons
evidence in narcotics cases because the possession of a weapon is often a hallmark of drug
trafficking.” United States v Hubbard, 61 F3d 1261, 1270 (CA 7, 1995). Evidence that
defendant acquired firearms through illegal channels is relevant to whether he was involved in
drug trafficking. In addition, evidence that guns were not registered and were stolen was
relevant to establishing the prosecution’s constructive possession theory. The guns in question
here were likely owned by someone who could not legally register firearms, namely defendant.
Accordingly, defense counsel’s failure to object to this evidence was not objectively
unreasonable.
6. Failure to Object to Prosecutor Misconduct
Next, defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
misconduct by the prosecutor. However, a defense attorney is not ineffective for failing to object
to a prosecutor’s conduct when there is no merit to the underlying claims of prosecutorial
misconduct. People v Matuszak, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2004), slip op at 8.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of the
fingerprint expert, Syble Smith. A prosecutor may not vouch for a witness’ credibility or suggest
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that the government has some special knowledge that a witness’ testimony is truthful. Knapp,
supra at 382. A prosecutor may, however, argue from the facts that a witness is credible or that
the defendant or another witness is not worthy of belief. Howard, supra at 548. Here, the
prosecutor merely argued that Syble Smith was a credible fingerprint expert given her
experienced and that her department deemed her deserving of a promotion. This was not
improper vouching. Consequently, there was no prosecutorial misconduct, and no there reason
for defense counsel to object.
Defendant also challenges the prosecutor’s argument that the stolen and unregistered
firearms were further proof of defendant’s guilt. Although a prosecutor may not argue a fact to
the jury that is not supported by evidence, a prosecutor is free to argue the evidence and any
reasonable inferences that may arise from the evidence. People v Callon, 256 Mich App 312,
330; 662 NW2d 501 (2003). Here, the prosecutor was drawing the reasonable inference that,
because the firearms were unregistered, it was more likely that they were possessed by
defendant, inasmuch as he could not legally register guns. Consequently, there was no valid
basis for an objection.
Similarly, the prosecutor’s comments about defendant’s expenditures on luxury items
were not an improper attempt to seek his conviction based on his lifestyle. Rather, the
prosecutor was suggesting that defendant’s purchases did not comport with his live-in domestic
partner’s financial situation or with his legitimate earnings. This evidence was relevant to the
prosecution’s theory that defendant was involved with a lucrative narcotics operation, and was
therefore a proper argument based on the evidence. Callon, supra.
Because the alleged claims of prosecutorial misconduct are without merit, defense
counsel was not deficient for failing to object.
VI. Sentencing
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously increased his sentence for felon-inpossession without prior notice. We disagree.
A court may at any time correct an invalid sentence, but the court may not modify a valid
sentence after it has been imposed except as provided by law. People v Harris, 224 Mich App
597, 599-600; 569 NW2d 525 (1997); MCR 6.429(A). Clerical mistakes in judgments may be
corrected by the court at any time on its own initiative. MCR 6.435(A). Here, the trial court
announced at sentencing that it was sentencing defendant to a term of 2 to 7-1/2 years for the
felon-in-possession conviction. But the judgment of sentence erroneously reported defendant’s
felon-in-possession sentence as forty-one days, which was the sentence the court had announced
for the possession of marijuana conviction. Because the error was plainly clerical in nature, the
trial court properly corrected the error on its own initiative.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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