PATRICIA RUTH RILEY V TAYLOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICIA RUTH RILEY,
UNPUBLISHED
October 14, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 248292
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 03-300738-NO
TAYLOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Saad and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from an order denying its motion for summary disposition
based on an assertion of governmental immunity. We reverse. This appeal is being decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(7) with regard to plaintiff’s claim based on the public building exception
to governmental immunity. We agree. A decision on a summary disposition motion is reviewed
de novo. Fane v Detroit Library Comm, 465 Mich 68, 74; 631 NW2d 678 (2001). To survive a
motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) based on governmental immunity, a
plaintiff must allege facts justifying application of an exception to governmental immunity.
Fane, supra at 74. In reviewing a decision on such a motion, an appellate court considers all
documentary evidence submitted by the parties and accepts as true the contents of the complaint,
unless specifically contradicted by affidavits or other appropriate documents. Id.
Under MCL 691.1407(1), a governmental agency is generally immune from tort liability.
However, MCL 691.1406 provides for the public building exception to governmental immunity.
To establish the applicability of the public building exception, a plaintiff must prove (1) a
governmental agency is involved, (2) the relevant public building is open for use by members of
the public, (3) the existence of a dangerous or defective condition of the public building itself,
(4) actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged defect by the governmental agency, and (5)
the governmental agency failed to remedy the allegedly defective condition after a reasonable
amount of time. De Sanchez v Dep’t of Mental Health, 467 Mich 231, 236; 651 NW2d 59
(2002). The trial court found that whether a condition was defective was immaterial to the
question of whether the public building exception applied. This view was incorrect because the
existence of a dangerous or defective condition is one of the elements that a plaintiff must show
in order to establish the applicability of the public building exception.
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We conclude that the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion for summary
disposition because, based on undisputed facts, no reasonable person could conclude that a
dangerous or defective condition of the school building existed with regard to the area where
plaintiff apparently fell at the time of the incident. From the color photographs submitted by the
parties, it is manifest that the relevant condition of the building cannot reasonably be considered
dangerous or defective. The floor of the school building was elevated a few inches above the
pavement outside the doorway so that a person walking into the school would need to step up in
order to enter the school. The vertical portion of the step was painted yellow which highlighted
the difference in elevation. Put simply, the entranceway to the school, including the elevation
from the outside pavement to the floor of the building, was a highly typical entranceway that
cannot reasonably be viewed as constituting a dangerous or defective condition. In addition,
defendant appropriately references the following discussion in Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449
Mich 606, 616-617; 537 NW2d 185 (1995):
In summary, because steps are the type of everyday occurrence that people
encounter, under most circumstances, a reasonably prudent person will look
where he is going, will observe the steps, and will take appropriate care for his
own safety. Under ordinary circumstances, the overriding public policy of
encouraging people to take reasonable care for their own safety precludes
imposing a duty on the possessor of land to make ordinary steps “foolproof.”
Therefore, the risk of harm is not unreasonable. However, where there is
something unusual about the steps, because of their “character, location, or
surrounding conditions,” then the duty of the possessor of land to exercise
reasonable care remains.
This discussion indicates that an ordinary step under typical circumstances, such as in the present
case, does not involve an unreasonable risk of harm and cannot be considered a dangerous or
defective condition of a public building. Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying
defendant’s motion for summary disposition.1
We reject plaintiff’s argument that defendant prematurely sought summary disposition
prior to an appropriate opportunity for discovery because, in light of the undisputed facts,
particularly the photographs of the scene provided by each party, there is no reasonable chance
that discovery would uncover factual support for plaintiff’s position. Peterson Novelties, Inc v
City of Berkley, 259 Mich App 1, 25; 672 NW2d 351 (2003).
1
In light of this conclusion, we do not need to reach defendant’s argument regarding lack of
notice of the alleged defect.
-2-
We reverse the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for summary disposition and
remand for entry of judgment in favor of defendant. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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