BRANDON JAMES HUBER V ROGER DRIELICK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARIE HUNT, Personal Representative for the
ESTATE OF EUGENE HUNT,
UNPUBLISHED
October 5, 2004
Plaintiff/Counter-DefendantAppellee,
v
No. 246366
Bay Circuit Court
LC No. 96-003280-NI
ROGER DRIELICK, ROGER DRIELICK
TRUCKING, COREY DRIELICK,
Defendants/CounterPlaintiffs/Cross-Plaintiffs/ThirdParty Plaintiffs,
GREAT LAKES CARRIERS CORP and GREAT
LAKES LOGISTICS & SERVICES INC,
Defendants/Cross-Defendants,
MERMAID TRANSPORTATION INC,
Defendant,
SARGENT TRUCKING INC,
Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff,
THOMAS LUCZAK and NOREEN LUCZAK,
Third-Party Defendants/CounterDefendants,
and
EMPIRE FIRE & MARINE INS CO,
Garnishee-Appellant.
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THOMAS LUCZAK and NOREEN LUCZAK,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
ROGER
DRIELICK,
ROGER
DRIELICK
TRUCKING, COREY DRIELICK, GREAT
LAKES CARRIERS CORP, GREAT LAKES
LOGISTICS & SERVICES INC, MERMAID
TRANSPORTATION INC, and SARGENT
TRUCKING INC,
No. 246367
Bay Circuit Court
LC No. 96-003328-NI
Defendants,
and
EMPIRE FIRE & MARINE INS CO,
Garnishee-Appellant.
JAMES BRANDON HUBER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
ROGER
DRIELICK,
ROGER
DRIELICK
TRUCKING, COREY DRIELICK, GREAT LAKES
CARRIER CORP, GREAT LAKES LOGISTICS &
SERVICES INC, MERMAID TRANSPORTATION
INC, and SARGENT TRUCKING INC,
Defendants,
and
EMPIRE FIRE & MARINE INS CO,
Garnishee-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Cooper and Kelly, JJ.
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No. 246368
Bay Circuit Court
LC No. 97-003238-NI
PER CURIAM.
Garnishee-appellant Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Co. (“Empire”) appeals as of
right from three writs of garnishment sought by Great Lakes Carrier Corp. (“Great Lakes”) and
Sargent Trucking, Inc. (“Sargent”), and payable to plaintiffs Marie Hunt, Thomas and Noreen
Luczak (the “Luczaks”), and James Brandon Huber, to collect on consent judgments entered in
Docket Nos. 246366, 246367, and 246368. The writs of garnishment continued after a hearing
on Empire’s motion to quash. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Following a multi-vehicle accident in which defendant Corey Drielick was driving a
Drielick Trucking semi truck bobtail,1 Ms. Hunt filed suit on behalf of her deceased husband,
Eugene, on March 21, 1996, and the Luczaks and Mr. Huber filed suit on or after March 28,
1996.2 At the time of the accident, Corey was heading to the Great Lakes yard to pick up a load
to transport and was about a half mile away from his destination.
Defendant Roger Drielick contacted the insurance carrier for his trucking company,
Empire, regarding the lawsuits. Empire had issued a non-trucking use, or bobtail, policy to
Drielick Trucking. The policy covered damages and liability when the semi truck was not
engaged in the business of hauling a trailer or under lease to a carrier. Empire denied coverage
and refused to defend, based on the policy’s business use exclusion, claiming that the truck was
under lease to or being used in the business of Great Lakes at the time of the accident, and under
the named driver exclusion. The policy excluded Corey as a covered driver.
Following settlement negotiations, all plaintiffs settled with Great Lakes and Sargent and
entered into a covenant to dismiss the suit against Great Lakes and Sargent and/or their insurance
carriers. The settlement agreements did not release the Drielicks and expressly indicated that all
plaintiffs and defendants were free to proceed against Empire. As a result of the settlement
negotiations, plaintiffs also entered into consent judgments with the Drielicks. Thereafter, the
parties agreed to an “Assignment, Trust and Indemnification Agreement.” The Drielicks, to
avoid the collection and execution of the consent judgments against them, assigned their right to
collect on their insurance claims to plaintiffs, as well as Great Lakes and Sargent. In turn, Great
Lakes and Sargent agreed to attempt to collect the consent judgments and to intervene in any
collection action filed by plaintiffs.
1
Bobtail means to travel without a trailer. Zurich Ins Co v Rombough, 384 Mich 228, 230; 180
NW2d 775 (1970). Drielick Trucking is owned by Corey’s brother, defendant Roger Drielick.
2
The trial court consolidated these cases. This Court also consolidated the cases on appeal on
March 5, 2003.
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As a result of this agreement and the assignments therein, the attorney for Great Lakes
filed writs of garnishment, with plaintiffs’ consent, against Empire for the amounts of the
consent judgments. Plaintiffs agreed to share in the proceeds with Great Lakes and Sargent in
exchange for their collection efforts. Empire filed a motion to quash the writs, arguing that Great
Lakes and Sargent lacked standing to seek the writs and that it properly denied coverage, based
on the policy exclusions. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Empire improperly
denied coverage under its policy. The court specifically found that Empire’s named driver
exclusion did not comport with MCL 500.3009(2), and that its business use exclusion was
ambiguous.3 The trial court then issued three judgments against Empire, and in favor of
plaintiffs, in order to execute the consent judgments. This appeal followed.
II. Policy Exclusions
Empire challenges the writs of garnishment, arguing that it properly denied coverage,
based on the exclusions in its bobtail policy. “Generally, a garnishee-defendant is barred from
challenging the validity of the judgment entered in the original action. However, an insurer may
raise an exclusionary clause as a defense in a garnishment proceeding if that issue has been
preserved.”4 Although an insurance carrier fails to defend in the original action, those defenses
raised in its initial letter denying coverage are deemed preserved.5 As Empire’s letter declining
to defend the Drielicks in the original action relied on the business use and named driver
exclusions, Empire was entitled to defend against the garnishments on those grounds.
A. Business Use Exclusion
The Empire policy issued to Drielick Trucking is a bobtail policy, intended only to cover
liability when the truck is not towing a trailer or leased to a carrier. Consistent with this purpose,
the policy specifically excludes coverage when the truck is carrying property in any business or
is under lease to a carrier.
The trial court found this exclusion ambiguous, as its applicability under the
circumstances was questionable. However, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that a factual
question regarding the applicability of the plain language of an insurance policy “to specific
circumstances does not render the policy language ambiguous.”6 As the language of the business
use exclusion is unambiguous, we must enforce the contract as written.7
3
It appears from the record that the trial court agreed with the appellees that the agreement
amounted to a valid assignment and that the writs were properly sought. However, the trial court
did not specifically make this finding.
4
In re Smith Estate, 226 Mich App 285, 288; 574 NW2d 388 (1997), citing Havens v Roberts,
139 Mich App 64, 67; 360 NW2d 183 (1984).
5
Id. at 290.
6
Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co v Nikkel, 460 Mich 558, 570; 596 NW2d 915 (1999). The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals found an identical exclusion in another Empire bobtail policy was
(continued…)
-4-
Although the language of the business use exclusion is clear, whether this accident was a
covered event is not. The record evidence reveals an orally revoked written lease agreement
with Sargent. There was no written lease agreement with Great Lakes.8 Great Lakes claimed that
it never approved the placement of its placards on the Drielicks’ truck. Corey Drielick admitted
that the Drielicks transported for another person during the period that they transported for Great
Lakes, which is inconsistent with a lease agreement.9 Furthermore, the truck was traveling
bobtail at the time of the accident, creating a question of fact whether the truck was being used
for a business purpose at that time. A writ of garnishment, however, may not direct a garnishee
to pay an obligation unless allowed by statute or court rule.10 The party seeking the writ must
have reason to believe that the garnishee has control over the defendant’s property, is indebted to
the defendant, or is required to make periodic payments to the defendant.11 Accordingly, we
reverse and remand to allow the trial court to take evidence regarding the propriety of the writs
of garnishment against Empire, based on the business use exclusion in the policy.
B. Named Driver Exclusion
Empire also denied coverage based on a named driver exclusion endorsement signed by
Roger that excluded Corey from the policy’s coverage. Pursuant to MCL 500.3009, an insurer
may exclude coverage for the liability of a named driver as follows:
If authorized by the insured, automobile liability or motor vehicle liability
coverage may be excluded when a vehicle is operated by a named person. Such
exclusion shall not be valid unless the following notice is on the face of the policy
or the declaration page or certificate of the policy and on the certificate of
insurance: Warning—when a named excluded person operates a vehicle all
liability coverage is void—no one is insured.[12]
Empire may be correct that there was an endorsement that actually notified Roger that
Corey was a named excluded driver. However, this Court “has explicitly held that § 3009(2)
(…continued)
unambiguous. Empire Fire & Marine Ins Co v Brantley Trucking Inc, 220 F3d 679, 681 (CA 6,
2000). “The language of the ‘Business Use’ exclusion is plain. That ‘contractual language may,
on occasion, pose difficult factual applications . . .’ and that the parties disagree as to coverage,
does not create ambiguity.” Id., quoting Hartford Ins Co v Occidental Fire & Casualty Co, 908
F2d 235, 239 (CA 7, 1990). See Abela v General Motors Corp, 469 Mich 603, 606-607; 677
NW2d 325 (2004) (decisions of the United States Supreme Court are binding on this state’s
courts, while the decisions of lower federal courts are merely persuasive).
7
Nikkel, supra at 566.
8
According to 49 FCR 376.11(a), any such agreement must be writing.
9
See 49 CFR 367.11(c) (a lease is a for a specified period of time).
10
MCR 3.101(E)(3)(d).
11
MCR 3.101(D)(3).
12
MCL 500.3009(2).
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presents ‘no room for judicial construction or interpretation.’”13 Empire must strictly comply
with the statute by including the specified warning on the required documents. Substantial
compliance is not sufficient. The language of the statute is clear and “sets out the Legislature’s
approved method of excluding a person from a policy’s coverage, and must be deemed the only
way in which such an exclusion may be accomplished.”14
The endorsement that listed Corey as an excluded driver did not contain the language
required in MCL 500.3009(2). Furthermore, Empire failed to include the required warning on all
required documents. The face of the policy does reference the attached excluded driver
endorsement, but fails to include the required warning. Empire presented only the front of the
certificate of insurance into evidence at the hearing and we are bound by the record evidence.
This document made no reference to the named driver exclusion. As Empire completely failed
to meet the statutory requirements to exclude a named driver from coverage, this exclusion is
invalid.
Empire also contends that the writs of garnishment amount to a de facto contribution to
the settlement agreements reached between plaintiffs and Great Lakes and Sargent and that it is
not contractually obligated to pay prejudgment interest on the consent judgments. However, we
decline to review these issues as the trial court has yet to determine whether the writs of
garnishment were proper based on the business use exclusion in the Empire policy, and
therefore, may be rendered moot.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to allow the trial court to take evidence
regarding the propriety of entering the writs of garnishment against defendant based on the
business use exclusion in the policy. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
13
Verbison v Auto Club Ins Assn, 201 Mich App 635, 640; 506 NW2d 920 (1993), quoting
Allstate Ins Co v DAIIE, 142 Mich App 436, 442; 369 NW2d 908 (1985).
14
DAIIE v Felder, 94 Mich App 40, 44; 287 NW2d 364 (1979).
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