PEOPLE OF MI V ERIC TOBAIS WOODS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 28, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 247306
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-012565
ERIC TOBAIS WOODS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and O’Connell and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of first-degree premeditated
murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of
a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole for the first-degree murder conviction, a concurrent term of one to
five years’ imprisonment for the felon in possession conviction, and a consecutive two-year term
of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
I.
Defendant and brothers Antrimone “Terry” Mosley and Surrell “Reddy” Mosley were all
friends of the victim. Late on Easter Sunday, April 23, 2000, or after midnight the following
morning, the victim was shot thirteen times through the windshield of his car on Fenmore in
Detroit. Six of the bullets struck and injured the victim, but did not kill him. The victim was
then transported in another vehicle to a location several blocks north, where a woman and her
granddaughter saw two vehicles and two men. The victim was pushed out of a white vehicle and
shot once by a passenger in a black vehicle. Both vehicles drove away after the shooting,
leaving the victim in the street. One of the witnesses attempted to help the victim, who was
remarkably still alive. The other witness went to a neighbor’s house to get help. A third witness
came out of her house with a telephone and prepared to call 911. The black vehicle returned, and
the shooter got out of the vehicle with a gun, threatening the two witnesses, who then went inside
a house. The man shot the victim in the head, killing him, and the car drove away.
In 2002, Special Agent Mike Yott of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms was
working with Officer George Harris of the Detroit Police Department and Officer Bruce
Christnagel from the Wayne County Sheriff’s Department on “Operation Second Shot,” which
was organized to investigate unsolved homicides or “cold cases.” Two years after the shooting,
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Agent Yott and Officer Harris interviewed the three witnesses. From photograph arrays, two
witnesses identified defendant as the shooter, and one identified Terry Mosley the man in the
white car. Agent Yott and Officer Christnagel arrested defendant, who gave a statement.
Defendant admitted that he killed the victim and explained the Mosley brothers’ involvement.
In his statement, defendant asserted that ten or eleven days before the shooting, Reddy
Mosley informed defendant of a $20,000 contract to kill defendant. Defendant did not explain
why the contract existed. Reddy Mosley told him that he did not have to “go out” like Rene
Hunter, a friend of defendant and the Mosley brothers who had been recently murdered.
Defendant understood this to mean that he did not have to be killed as Rene Hunter had been.
Defendant claimed that Terry Mosley told him that the victim had some information linking the
Mosley brothers to Rene Hunter’s murder. Because he believed that the victim was prepared to
approach the police with this information, Terry Mosley suggested that the contract on
defendant’s life could be cancelled in exchange for killing the victim.
Defendant maintained that, on the day of the shootings, Terry Mosley gave him a gun and
a man named “Black” picked defendant up in a black Taurus. Defendant explained that they
approached the victim’s car, blocking it between their car and Terry Mosley’s white Cutlass.
Defendant got out of the car and shot the victim through the windshield. The victim got out of
his own car and into Terry Mosley’s car. Both cars drove to the second location, where
defendant again shot the victim. They left the victim there, and both cars drove away. After
Terry Mosley called defendant and told him that the victim was still alive, defendant returned
and shot the victim in the back of the head, killing him. Defendant claimed that the following
day Terry Mosley told him to keep his mouth shut and he would be “straight,” which defendant
understood to mean that the contract to kill him was cancelled.
At trial, defendant testified and denied having shot the victim. Although he admitted
signing the statement, he asserted that he had been forced to sign it under psychological duress.
Two alibi witnesses testified that they were with defendant at a hair show in Detroit when the
victim was killed.
II.
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking his alibi
witnesses, Randall Woods and Damon Hicks, whether they had a professional relationship with
defense counsel. With regard to Randall Woods, defendant did not preserve the issue by
objecting to the prosecutor’s questioning at trial. People v Bulmer, 256 Mich App 33, 34-35;
662 NW2d 117 (2003). We therefore review this claim for plain error affecting defendant’s
substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 764-765, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999);
People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370 (2000).
Pursuant to MRE 611(b), a witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any
issue in the case, including credibility. People v Layher, 464 Mich 756, 764; 631 NW2d 281
(2001). Evidence of a witness’ bias is almost always relevant. Id. Here, Woods admitted
having a prior professional relationship with defense counsel, and the prosecutor’s crossexamination was intended to elicit evidence of Woods’ potential bias, given this prior
relationship. Because this is a proper subject of cross-examination, defendant has not shown
plain error.
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With respect to the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Damon Hicks, the trial court
sustained defense counsel’s objection to the questioning, thus precluding examination in this
regard. Furthermore, evidence of Hicks’ prior professional relationship with defense counsel
would have shown potential bias, which is a proper subject of cross-examination. MRE 611(b);
Layher, supra at 764. Defendant has not shown that he was denied a fair trial.
III.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously precluded him from calling his
father as a witness. The decision whether to admit evidence is within the discretion of the trial
court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. People v Katt, 468 Mich
272, 278; 662 NW2d 12 (2003). Even if relevant, evidence may be excluded under MRE 403 “if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, . . . or by
considerations of undue delay, [or] waste of time[.]”
Defendant’s brother testified, providing an alibi for defendant.
During crossexamination, defendant denied that his brother visited him in jail while he was awaiting trial, but
admitted talking with his brother on the telephone. The prosecutor then attempted to impeach
defendant with the fact that a Randall Woods had signed in and visited him in jail. Defendant
testified that it was his father, not his brother, who visited him. During redirect examination,
defendant against claimed that it was his father, not his brother, who visited him at the jail.
Although defendant subsequently sought to call his father to show that it was his father, not his
brother, who visited him at the jail, the import of the prosecutor’s cross-examination was only to
show that defendant had pretrial contact with his brother, who testified in support of defendant’s
alibi defense. Because defendant admitted speaking to his brother while awaiting trial, whether
defendant’s father also visited defendant in jail was not a material issue. Accordingly, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by precluding defendant from calling his father as a witness on
the basis that to do so would be a waste of judicial time. MRE 403.
IV.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting testimony of
defendant’s tattoo, an assault rifle and the inscription, “Real Ni--as Don’t Talk.” During the
prosecutor’s case-in-chief, the trial court ruled that evidence of the tattoo could be admitted, but
excluded evidence of the inscription because of its offensive nature. Subsequently, during crossexamination of defendant, the prosecutor sought to elicit testimony that defendant killed the
victim because he was a “snitch.” Defendant denied that it was his “philosophy that real men
don’t snitch.” Following a sidebar conference, the prosecutor questioned defendant about the
inscription, “Real Ni--as Don’t Talk.”
We reject defendant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly cross-examined him about the
tattoo inscription. Although the trial court had previously ruled that the offensive language was
not admissible in the prosecutor’s case-in-chief, where a defendant elects to testify, evidence
deemed inadmissible in a prosecutor’s case-in-chief may become relevant and admissible to the
defendant’s credibility. People v Ford, 59 Mich App 35, 45; 228 NW2d 533 (1975). See also
People v D’Angelo, 401 Mich 167, 178; 257 NW2d 655 (1977). Relevant evidence is any
evidence that has a tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the
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determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
MRE 401.
During cross-examination, defendant denied subscribing to a philosophy that “real men
don’t snitch.” The tattoo inscription was relevant to rebut the credibility of defendant’s
testimony. Moreover, it was relevant to defendant’s intent and motive in light of evidence that
the victim was shot because he had information about the Mosleys’ involvement in the death of
Rene Hunter and that he was prepared to go to the police with this information. To the extent the
tattoo inscription could be deemed prejudicial because of its offensive nature, in light of the trial
court’s cautionary instruction advising the jury on the limited purpose of the evidence, the
probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. MRE 403.
Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it originally ruled that the
tattoo of the assault rifle was admissible under MRE 401 and MRE 403. The prosecutor
presented evidence that the victim was shot with an assault-type rifle, and the tattoo was
probative of defendant’s familiarity with such a weapon. The trial court’s cautionary instruction
reduced the potential for any unfair prejudice under MRE 403.
We also disagree with defendant’s claim that the prosecutor’s references to the tattoo
during rebuttal argument were improper because they exceeded the scope of defense counsel’s
closing argument. MCR 6.414(E). Although defense counsel did not directly refer to the tattoo
or inscription during his closing argument, he characterized Agent Yott as an experienced
investigator who was “capable of either threatening, cajoling, promising, or doing whatever is
necessary to get this cold case solved,” and of employing “psychological tricks” and threats to
extract defendant’s confession. Defense counsel further argued that Agent Yott’s testimony
about defendant’s interrogation was not credible. The challenged rebuttal remarks were made in
response to defense counsel’s attacks on Agent Yott’s credibility, and to rebut defense counsel’s
suggestion that defendant’s version of what occurred during the interrogation was more credible.
Considered in this context, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing the prosecutor’s argument.
V.
Next, defendant argues that reversal is required because Agent Yott referred to the need
for defendant to testify and impermissibly commented on his silence. Because defendant did not
object to the challenged testimony at trial, this issue is not preserved, and we review it for plain
error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra at 764-765; Schutte, supra at 720.
Agent Yott’s testimony that defendant’s trial testimony would be the “best evidence” of what
happened was arguably responsive to defense counsel’s question and, therefore, was not
improperly injected. Moreover, defendant ultimately testified in this case, thereby alleviating
any concern that the jury might hold it against defendant if he did not testify. Further, the trial
court made clear in its final instructions that the burden was on the prosecutor to prove each
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and that “defendant is not required to prove his
innocence or do anything.” Accordingly, defendant has failed to show plain error affecting his
substantial rights with regard to this claim. Carines, supra at 764-765; Schutte, supra at 720.
VI.
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Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Agent Yott
to testify about two witnesses’ identification of defendant from a photograph array that they
viewed two years after the shooting. Because both witnesses testified at trial and were subject to
cross-examination concerning the identifications, Agent Yott’s third-party testimony was
admissible under MRE 801(d)(1)(C). People v Malone, 445 Mich 369, 371; 518 NW2d 418
(1994).
VII.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial
after a witness referred to defendant and his associates as “killers.” People v Messenger, 221
Mich App 171, 175; 561 NW2d 463 (1997). An unresponsive, volunteered answer to a proper
question does not deny a defendant of his right to a fair trial, and it is highly unlikely that one
isolated unresponsive comment would result in significant prejudice to defendant. People v
Allen, 429 Mich 558, 656; 420 NW2d 499 (1988); People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 36; 597
NW2d 176 (1999). Moreover, the trial court’s statement to the jury that the remark was being
stricken from the record and should not be considered was sufficient to cure any prejudice.
Furthermore, the prosecutor’s remark during rebuttal argument that the witness was fearful
because defendant “is a dangerous man” was proper because it was based on properly admitted
evidence of how the witness perceived defendant and reasonable inferences drawn from the
evidence. Thus, this remark did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. People v Bahoda, 448
Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
VIII.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the prosecutor
to elicit testimony from Agent Yott about the theft of a large amount of narcotics and money as
an explanation for why a “contract” may have been placed on defendant’s life. During crossexamination, defense counsel asked Agent Yott if he had found any information that
corroborated whether a contract on defendant’s life existed, and Agent Yott answered, “no.”
During redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Agent Yott whether he had any information
that explained why there might be such a contract. Agent Yott explained that a large amount of
narcotics and money had been stolen from Reddy Mosley earlier in 2000, before the victim in
this case was killed.
In light of the prosecution’s theory that defendant killed the victim in order to remove the
contract on his life, which was consistent with the explanation that defendant gave the police,
Agent Yott’s testimony was relevant under MRE 401. Furthermore, the prosecutor’s questioning
was responsive to defense counsel’s cross-examination of Agent Yott on this subject. Moreover,
to the extent the prosecutor’s questioning could be considered improper, by opening the door to
the challenged testimony, defendant invited the error. Under the “invited-error doctrine,”
appellate review is precluded because, when party invites the error, he waives his right to seek
appellate review, and any error is extinguished. People v Jones, 468 Mich 345, 352 n 6; 662
NW2d 376 (2003).
IX.
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The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed Agent Yott to testify that the
statements given by two eyewitnesses in 2000 were consistent with their trial testimony.
Contrary to what defendant argues, Agent Yott did not express an opinion about whether the
witnesses were credible; rather, he acknowledged that their prior statements and their trial
testimony were consistent. Thus, defendant’s reliance on People v Suchy, 143 Mich App 136,
149; 371 NW2d 502 (1985), is misplaced. Moreover, defense counsel had the opportunity to
cross-examine both witnesses extensively to reveal any inconsistencies in their testimony.
Therefore, we reject this claim of error.
X.
Finally, there is no basis to conclude that defendant was denied a fair trial because of the
cumulative effect of several insignificant errors. Cumulative error, properly understood,
“actually refers to cumulative unfair prejudice, and is properly considered in connection with
issues of harmless error. Only the unfair prejudice of several actual errors can be aggregated to
satisfy the standards set forth in People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).”
People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 591-592 n 12; 640 NW2d 246 (2002) (emphasis in original).
Because we have found no prejudice, “this issue is without merit.” People v Werner, 254 Mich
App 528, 544; 659 NW2d 688 (2002).
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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