PEOPLE OF MI V RODNEY WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 23, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 232827
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-004026
RODNEY WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
ON REMAND
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Hoekstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right after a jury convicted him of felony murder, MCL
750.316(1)(b), and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b.1 Our Supreme Court, holding that
defendant’s waiver of counsel mid-trial to proceed in propria persona was unequivocal, knowing,
and voluntary,2 reversed this Court’s prior decision3 to the contrary and remanded this case for
our consideration of defendant’s remaining claims. We affirm.
We first note that our Supreme Court did not address one of defendant’s other claims,
which this Court previously rejected. Because it is unclear whether this issue is within the scope
of Our Supreme Court’s remand order, we adopt that part of our prior opinion addressing
defendant’s speedy trial claim:
Defendant also argues that he was denied a speedy trial. Specifically,
defendant claims that his convictions should be reversed because he was not
brought to trial until about nine months after his arrest. This issue lacks merit.
We review denovo [sic] a speedy trial claim. People v Mackle, 241 Mich App
583, 602; 617 NW2d 339 (2000). “In determining whether a defendant has been
denied a speedy trial, four factors must be balanced: (1) the length of the delay;
1
Defendant was also convicted of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, but the trial court on double
jeopardy grounds vacated this conviction.
2
470 Mich 634, 636, 647; 683 NW2d 597 (2004).
3
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued February 28, 2003 (Docket No. 232827).
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(2) the reasons for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his right to a
speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant from the delay.” Id., quoting
People v Levandoski, 237 Mich App 612, 620 n 4; 603 NW2d 831 (1999). The
burden is on the defendant to show prejudice when the length of the delay is less
than eighteen months. People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 112; 605 NW2d 28
(1999). After reviewing the above factors, the lower court record in this matter,
and defendant’s allegation that he suffered anxiety while awaiting trial, we
conclude that defendant has not met his burden of showing prejudice from a delay
of relatively short duration. Id. at 112-113. Reversal of defendant’s convictions
is not warranted on speedy trial grounds. [Unpublished opinion per curiam,
issued February 28, 2003 (Docket No. 232827), slip op at p 2.]
Next, defendant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to permit him to call Agatha
Bond as a defense witness to testify regarding a statement the victim made to her over the
telephone before his death. This Court reviews the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse
of discretion. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). Here, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion because defendant never sought to call Bond as witness. Instead, he
sought to admit her written statement as an exhibit. The trial court properly denied that request
as inadmissible hearsay and also ruled correctly that it could not be used for purposes of
impeachment if the declarant did not testify. Even assuming that Bond’s statement embodied a
dying declaration, MRE 804(b)(2), it still was inadmissible because under MRE 805, “hearsay
within hearsay” is admissible only “if each part of the combined exceptions conforms with an
exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules,” and no such exception permitted the
introduction of Bond’s written statement.
Next, defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when
before proceeding in propria persona, defense counsel failed to bring out inconsistency in the
robbery victim’s identification of defendant at the preliminary examination. We disagree.
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 578; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). Generally, to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: (1) that counsel’s
performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms; (2) that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s error the result of the
proceedings would have been different, which in turn denied defendant a fair trial. People v
Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). Our de novo review of the record
convinces us that defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that counsel was employing
reasonable trial strategy by not pursuing the robbery victim’s preliminary examination
testimony. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 689; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984);
see, also, People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999), “Decisions regarding
what evidence to present and whether to call or question witnesses are presumed to be matters of
trial strategy.”
Here, defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to pursue the witness’s preliminary
examination testimony. This is true for two reasons: counsel actually did seek to impeach the
witness’s testimony, and the preliminary examination testimony probably harmed rather than
helped defendant. As a whole, the witness’ testimony in the preliminary examination strongly
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affirms his identification of defendant. Any supposed discrepancies it contains are merely
semantical; they do not pertain to the overall assurance of the identification. Trial counsel
employed sound trial strategy by electing not to impeach the witness by using this testimony;
therefore, there was no ineffective assistance of counsel.
Next, defendant argues error occurred when the trial court failed to instruct the jury about
the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identification. Again, we disagree.
We review jury instructions de novo and as a whole to determine whether error occurred.
People v Perez, 469 Mich 415, 418; 670 NW2d 655 (2003). Imperfect instructions will not
warrant reversal if they fairly present the issues to be tried and sufficiently protect the
defendant’s rights. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 124; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). We find
the trial court’s failure to give the requested instruction was not error mandating reversal.
Defendant relies upon People v Anderson, 389 Mich 155; 205 NW2d 461 (1973), for the
proposition that the jury ought to have been instructed that eyewitness identification is inherently
unreliable. Anderson does contain a lengthy and wide-ranging discussion of difficulties with
eyewitness identification, id. at 167-187, including detailed expositions of “psychological
principles” underlying identification and of the approach taken by “the British [with their] nononsense handling of criminal cases,” but its actual holding is limited to procedures for using
photographic identification, id. at 186-187, not at issue here. Anderson never suggests a
requirement that juries be instructed that eyewitness identification is inherently unreliable, and in
the thirty years since it was decided, no such rule has been adopted.4
The facts in this case, moreover, do not present special difficulties with eyewitness
identification, and defendant’s contrary argument is unpersuasive. Two people identified
defendant. One was the murder victim himself. Obviously his identification was not conveyed
to the jury by him personally; it was conveyed by defendant’s sister, to whom it was given.
Defendant’s sister was a girlfriend of the victim, and defendant and the victim were very close,
as defendant acknowledged in his own testimony. The victim was certainly in an excellent
position to identify his assailant. And the robbery victim (the pizza delivery man),
notwithstanding attempts to attack his credibility, had no doubt that it was defendant who shot
the murder victim. Although defendant argues that the porch light was not on, he ignores the
fact that a bright streetlight was, and the circumstances were such that a positive identification
was certainly reasonable. Similarly, defendant stresses the fact that the robbery victim noted that
another person in the lineup sounded more like the perpetrator than defendant but he ignores the
testimony that defendant was attempting to disguise his voice, behavior consistent with
defendant’s two attempts at trial to hide or turn his back to avoid being identified in court. Nor
does defendant ever explain why the robbery victim’s sleep deprivation after the crime rendered
his identification unreliable. Moreover, though insisting that the case against him fails without
4
Our Supreme Court recently overruled Anderson to the extent it extended the right to counsel to
a time before initiation adversarial criminal proceedings. People v Hickman, 470 Mich 602,
603-604; 684 NW2d 267 (2004).
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the robbery victim’s identification, defendant fails to explain why the murder victim’s
identification should be discounted.
In general, defendant’s objections to the reliability of the identification amount to little
more than quibbling, typified by the claim that defendant’s very light and apparently not readily
noticeable facial hair negated a description of him as “clean-shaven.” Taken as a whole, all of
the difficulties defendant raises with the identification amount to concerns over the credibility of
witnesses and the weight to be given evidence, matters with which neither the trial court nor this
Court may interfere. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 636, 646-647; 576 NW2d 129 (1998);
People v Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 452; 569 NW2d 641 (1997). Moreover, the trial court,
properly instructed the jury on how to evaluate witnesses’ testimony, on the presumption of
innocence, and the burden of proof. Thus, trial court’s instructions to the jury in their entirety
sufficiently protected defendant’s rights. Aldrich, supra at 124.
Next, defendant claims he was denied a fair trial when without advance notice, the
prosecutor elicited on cross-examination irrelevant and prejudicial information about defendant’s
prior gun use. Reviewed in context, we conclude that error warranting reversal did not occur.
The trial court’s admission of evidence about prior bad acts under MRE 404(b)(1) is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785
(1998). But contrary to defendant’s assertion on appeal, he did not preserve this issue by
objecting to the prosecutor’s question about prior gun use. Indeed, the question was answered
without objection. Thus, our review is for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 447; 628 NW2d 105 (2001).
Defendant correctly argues that the prosecutor must give advance notice if he intends to
introduce evidence of prior bad acts by defendant, id. at 453, and that evidence of other bad acts
should only be admitted if relevant and for a proper purpose, with the relevance outweighing the
danger of any unfair prejudice and subject to a limiting instruction upon request, id. at 447-448,
citing People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55, 74-75; 520 NW2d 338 (1993). Here, all the
prosecutor did in the face of defendant’s denial that is was possible that gunpowder residue
could have been found on his hands at the time of the shooting, was to ask defendant whether he
had ever fired a gun before. Defendant responded, “To be honest, I never shot a gun since I was
about, what, about 16?” The prosecutor did not pursue the answer by asking for what at the age
of sixteen defendant had used the gun, and nothing in the record suggests it was a “bad act.”
Rather, defendant’s answer appears in context to have simply been an emphatic way of denying
recent gun use, and was taken as such by the prosecutor, who responded that the implication was
that defendant certainly had not used a gun within six hours of the victim’s shooting. In context,
the clear point of the question was to explore whether defendant might have recently used a gun
for innocent reasons and which could explain the presence of the gunshot residue without
implicating defendant in the victim’s shooting. Quite simply, defendant’s volunteered answer
was not evidence of a prior bad act, nor is there any showing that the prosecutor knew of or
sought to bring before the jury the fact that defendant had (for whatever unknown reason) fired a
gun at age sixteen. Consequently, there was no plain error here. Hawkins, supra at 447.
Finally, defendant argues that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to establish he
possessed the requisite intent to be convicted of felony murder. We review de novo a challenge
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to the sufficiency of evidence to determine whether when the evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, a rational factfinder could conclude that the essential elements of the
crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Terry, supra at 452, citing People v Wolfe, 440
Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), mod 441 Mich 1201 (1992). On the basis of the record
here, defendant’s argument is without merit.
Our Supreme Court in People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 759; 597 NW2d 130 (1999),
quoting People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558, 566, 540 NW2d 728 (1995), stated:
“The elements of felony murder are: (1) the killing of a human being, (2)
with the intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a very high risk of
death or great bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm was
the probable result [i.e., malice], (3) while committing, attempting to commit, or
assisting in the commission of any of the felonies specifically enumerated in [the
statute, including armed robbery]”
Defendant implicitly concedes that there was evidence that he acted with intent to
commit the felony of robbery, so the remaining question is whether there was evidence from
which it may be inferred he acted with malice necessary for murder. But from evidence that
defendant participated in an armed robbery with a deadly weapon, the jury could infer
“defendant set in motion a force likely to cause death or great bodily harm.” Carines, supra at
760.
Furthermore, malice which can satisfy the mens rea requirement for murder is acting with
wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of the defendant’s
behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm. Here, defendant concedes that there was
evidence that he fired at a door. Also, there was evidence that someone had just come to answer
the door, that defendant knew that someone had done so, and, in fact, defendant had yelled for
the person to get back before firing the shot at the door. Because the natural tendency of firing a
gun at a door behind which someone is standing is to cause death or great bodily harm, there was
evidence from which a rational factfinder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
acted with malice. Thus, viewing the identification by two eyewitnesses, which included the
victim’s declaration to defendant’s sister, and evidence of the presence of unexplained
gunpowder residue on defendant’s hand in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational
factfinder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that all of the essential elements of the crime
were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Wolfe, supra at 514-515.
We affirm.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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