PEOPLE OF MI V MORRIS PAUL ROGERS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 21, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 250163
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 03-048566-FC
MORRIS PAUL ROGERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Sawyer and Saad, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his convictions, following a jury trial, of assault with
intent to commit murder in violation of MCL 750.83, for which he was sentenced as a fourthoffense habitual offender to twenty-three to forty years’ imprisonment; possession of a firearm
by a person previously convicted of a felony in violation of MCL 750.224f, for which he
received one to fifteen years’ imprisonment; and one count of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony in violation of MCL 750.227b, for which he received two years’
imprisonment. We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences.
During the early morning hours of January 18, 2003, approximately fifteen to eighteen
people were gathered in the basement of a home owned by Sandra Jones. The people were
drinking and socializing, and some of the people, including defendant and the victim, Kenyatta
Jones, were playing dice. At some point, an argument began between defendant and the victim
when, according to his own testimony, the victim began making fun of defendant because
defendant was losing money in the game.
Thereafter, defendant apparently became loud and began arguing not only with the victim
but with others at the table. At this point, Sandra Jones told defendant to leave the house and
began pushing defendant up a flight of stairs that led to the outside of the house. It appears from
the testimony that defendant was somewhat compliant with Jones’ demand and, indeed, went up
the steps, but walked backwards up the steps and continued to argue with the victim and others.
Apparently, defendant would also occasionally push Jones back as she was pushing him up the
steps. Jones eventually managed to get defendant to the top of the steps and outside the house.
However, during this time, the victim and others, had walked up to the top of the steps and
exchanged words with defendant. Upon seeing the victim, defendant said something derogatory
then produced a pistol and shot her.
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Defendant first asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the
jurors be instructed on self-defense. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed de
novo. In re CR, 250 Mich App 185, 197; 646 NW2d 506 (2002). In order to prevail on his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “defendant must show (1) that the attorney’s
performance was objectively unreasonable in light of prevailing professional norms and (2) that,
but for the attorney’s error or errors, a different outcome reasonably would have resulted.”
People v Harmon, 248 Mich App 522, 531; 640 NW2d 314 (2001). The second prong,
prejudice, requires that defendant demonstrate a probability of a different outcome sufficient to
undermine the confidence in the outcome that actually resulted. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590,
600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001).
The record reveals that defendant’s trial counsel declined to request that the jurors be
instructed on self-defense because he believed that, under our Supreme Court’s decision in
People v Droste, 160 Mich 66; 125 NW 87 (1910), he could not request the instruction when
defendant had not admitted to the shooting. Defendant, however, asserts that Droste does not
prevent him from requesting that the jurors be instructed on self-defense, even when he denies
having committed the shooting, so long as the instruction is requested and there is evidence to
support the theory because he is allowed to assert inconsistent defenses, relying on our Supreme
Court’s decision in People v Heflin, 434 Mich 482; 456 NW2d 10 (1990).
Even assuming, without deciding, that defendant is correct in his assertion that Droste
does not prevent the jurors from being instructed on self-defense when defendant denied having
shot the victim, and that there was adequate evidence to support the instruction’s being given, we
do not believe that defendant has met his burden of establishing that his trial counsel was
ineffective. Defendant’s establishing that his trial counsel misinterpreted the law regarding
whether the trial court was required to deliver the self-defense instruction, even if considered
objectively unreasonable, and showing that there is a reasonable probability that the trial court
would have been required to deliver the instruction had it been requested, does not fulfill his
burden of establishing prejudice. Rather, in order to fulfill his burden of demonstrating a
probability of a different outcome sufficient to undermine the confidence in his conviction,
defendant must demonstrate that the evidence introduced at trial in support of his assertion of
self-defense was sufficient to show a reasonable probability that the jury would have determined
that he did, indeed, act in self-defense. In the present case we do not believe that defendant has
done so.
In support of his assertion that evidence at trial supported the reading of the self-defense
instruction, defendant relies solely upon the testimony of sergeant Gary Cheatum that, when he
called defendant on his cell phone after the shooting, defendant stated “it was self defense. It
was self defense. He [sic, She] pulled a gun on me [first].” However, there was no evidence
introduced at trial to support defendant’s assertion to Cheatum. Indeed, none of the witnesses
that were present when the shooting occurred testified that they saw the victim, or anyone else
other than defendant, with a gun at any time or supported defendant’s assertion that the victim
was the initial aggressor. Further, the testimony of the officers that responded to the shooting
and conducted the investigation establishes that no gun was found at the scene and that no
information was ever received tending to show that anyone other than defendant had a gun on the
night of the incident. Moreover, the only testimony presented at trial tending to show that the
victim did anything other than merely walk up the steps and stand behind Sandra Jones came
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from defendant’s brother-in-law, Wilbur Sargent, who testified that the victim and approximately
six or seven of the victim’s friends followed him up the stairs as Sandra Jones was removing
defendant from the house and that, as they were walking up the stairs, the victim was “trash
talking” to defendant. Sargent also testified that the victim and his friends followed defendant
outside the house and, thereafter, all of them began “trash talking” to defendant. However,
Sargent testified that he did not see the victim with a gun at any time and, moreover, walked
away from the house in the opposite direction of defendant and, indeed, did not see the shooting.
Thus, although it tends to show that the victim may have been making comments to defendant,
Sargent’s testimony does not support defendant’s assertion to Cheatum that the victim either
possessed a weapon or was the initial aggressor. Therefore, because the evidence supporting
defendant’s theory of self-defense consisted solely of his assertion to Cheatum and was not
supported by any other evidence presented at trial, thus making it minimal, defendant has not
demonstrated a probability of a different outcome sufficient to undermine the confidence in his
conviction.
Defendant next asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the
jury be instructed on provocation. Again, we disagree. Defendant correctly asserts that this
Court has held that “if a defendant would have been guilty of manslaughter had the assault
resulted in death (due to an absence of malice), there can be no conviction of assault with intent
to murder.” People v Lipps, 167 Mich App 99, 106; 421 NW2d 586 (1988). The elements of
voluntary manslaughter are (1) that the defendant killed in the heat of passion, (2) that the
passion was caused by adequate provocation, and (3) there was not a lapse of time during which
a reasonable person could have controlled his passions. People v Sullivan, 231 Mich App 510,
518; 586 NW2d 578 (1998). It is the element of provocation that distinguishes manslaughter
from murder. Id. The degree of provocation required to mitigate a homicide from murder to
manslaughter “is that which causes the defendant to act out of passion rather than reason.” Id. In
order for the provocation to be adequate, it must be “that which would cause a reasonable person
to lose control.” Id. (emphasis in original). “The determination of what is reasonable
provocation is a question of fact for the factfinder.” Id. However, “[w]here, as a matter of law,
no reasonable jury could find that the provocation was adequate, the judge may exclude evidence
of the provocation.” Id.
The sole evidence of any provocation by the victim in the present case consists merely of
insulting words. Although our Supreme Court has declined to adopt a per se rule that insulting
words may never constitute adequate provocation, People v Pouncey, 437 Mich 382, 389; 471
NW2d 346 (1991), we conclude that, based on the facts of this case, no reasonable juror could
conclude that the victim’s words would have provoked a reasonable person to react as defendant
did. Thus, there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law to establish adequate provocation.
Therefore, defendant’s assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit, because he
has not shown that his trial counsel’s failure to request the instruction was objectively
unreasonable or that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have
been different had his trial counsel requested the instruction. Further, counsel is not required to
advocate a meritless position. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
Defendant also raises several assertions of error in propria persona. First, defendant
asserts that he was inappropriately sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender, pursuant to
MCL 769.12, based on his assertion that the prosecution never established that defendant was
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convicted of larceny in a building in 1976, one of the convictions listed in its notice to seek an
enhanced sentence, as required by MCL 769.13. Defendant’s assertion is without merit.
Although defendant has failed to provide this Court with a copy of the PSIR as required by MCR
7.212(C)(7), the record reflects that the prosecutor stated at the sentencing hearing that the PSIR
did not list such a conviction and that he had not obtained court records to prove the conviction.
Therefore, he moved to amend the habitual offender notice by adding a conviction for receiving
and concealing over $100 in 1979 and striking the larceny in a building conviction. Defense
counsel stated that he had no objection to that amendment. Thereafter, the prosecutor asked the
court to make a finding that defendant is a fourth-offense habitual offender, and defense counsel
stated “I have no response to that. We are aware of the defendant’s record, and we’re not
contesting that he has three prior felonies.”
Defendant has not challenged the existence or the accuracy of the receiving and
concealing conviction. Moreover, this Court has stated that “A defendant may not waive
objection to an issue before the trial court and then raise the issue as an error on appeal.” People
v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 111; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). Thus, because defense counsel did not
object to the prosecutor’s motion to amend the grounds upon which he sought enhancement of
defendant’s sentence and responded to the prosecutor’s request that the trial court find that
defendant is a fourth-offense habitual offender by stating that he did not contest that defendant
has three prior felony convictions, defendant has waived review of the trial court’s determination
that he is a fourth-offense habitual offender.
Defendant next asserts that his conviction must be reversed because he was never
arraigned in the district court on the charge of assault with intent to commit murder. In the initial
complaint, defendant was only charged with assault with intent to commit great bodily harm,
felony-firearm, and possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony. Defendant does
not deny that he was arraigned on those charges in the district court. However, at defendant’s
preliminary examination, the prosecutor moved to amend the charges to add the count of assault
with intent to commit murder. After the trial court informed defendant, who was appearing in
propria persona at the time, that the maximum penalty for that charge was life imprisonment, the
trial court allowed the prosecutor to amend the complaint and thereafter held the preliminary
examination, after which it found that probable cause existed to believe that defendant had
committed all four of the crimes charged.
First, our Supreme Court has held that the right to an arraignment is a procedural right
that can be waived by defendant through his counsel. People v Phillips, 383 Mich 464, 470; 175
NW2d 740 (1970). In the present case, during a discussion at defendant’s trial concerning the
charge of assault with intent to commit great bodily harm and the charge of assault with intent to
commit murder, defendant’s trial counsel, who was appointed after the preliminary examination,
specifically stated, “I have no legal challenge at this point to the magistrate adding or allowing—
granting the prosecutor’s motion to add the assault with intent to commit murder. I can’t defeat
that.” “A defendant may not waive objection to an issue before the trial court and then raise the
issue as an error on appeal.” Aldrich, supra, 111. Therefore, defense counsel’s express
statement on the record that he had no legal challenge to the amendment constitutes a waiver of
this issue.
Even if we were to review defendant’s assertion, we find it to be without merit.
Defendant relies on this Court’s holding in People v Thomason, 173 Mich App 812; 434 NW2d
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456 (1988), in support of his assertion that his conviction must be reversed because he was not
arraigned on the charge of assault with intent to commit murder. However, the present case is
distinguishable from Thomason because the defendant in Thomason received no arraignment at
all. Id., 814. Defendant in the present case admits to being arraigned on the original three
charges and only asserts that he was not arraigned on the later added charge of assault with intent
to commit murder. As stated above, our Supreme Court has stated that the right to an
arraignment is a procedural right. Phillips, supra, 470; see also Thomason, supra, 815. MCL
769.26 provides that a verdict shall not be set aside nor a new trial granted on the basis of a
procedural error unless it affirmatively appears that the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
Our Supreme Court has stated that, under the statute, reversal is not required if the error is
harmless. People v Mateo, 453 Mich 203, 211-212; 551 NW2d 891 (1996). We believe that,
under the facts of the present case, any error was harmless.
Specifically, because defendant admits that he was arraigned on the original charges, and
because the record indicates that he signed an advice of rights form on the same date that he was
arraigned on those charges, defendant does not dispute that he was informed of his right to
counsel, that bail was fixed, and that the preliminary examination was fixed. Further, the trial
judge informed defendant of the maximum penalty for the charge of assault with intent to
commit murder at the preliminary examination. Moreover, at trial, after defendant had retained
counsel, a lengthy plea discussion was held on the record during which the trial court explained
to defendant the possible sentence that could be imposed if he were convicted of assault with
intent to commit murder and also explained what the penalty would be if defendant were to plead
guilty, after which defendant elected to exercise his right to a jury trial. Thus, the purposes of
arraignment stated in Thomason, supra, 815, were met in the present case. Finally, the added
charge of assault with intent to commit murder differs from the charge of assault with intent to
commit great bodily harm, on which defendant was arraigned, only with respect to the element
of intent. MCL 750.83; MCL 750.84. Thus, because the addition of the charge of assault with
intent to commit murder was based on the same facts and evidence upon which defendant had
been charged with assault with intent to commit great bodily harm, defendant was not prejudiced
in his ability to prepare his defense.
Defendant also asserts that his convictions must be reversed because the trial court
allowed him to dismiss his counsel at the beginning of his preliminary examination and did not
inform him of the dangers of self-representation. Again, defendant’s assertion is without merit.
Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant has the right to the assistance of
counsel at “critical stages” of the proceedings, which includes preliminary proceedings where
there is the potential that the defendant may sacrifice rights or lose defenses. People v Green,
260 Mich App 392, 399; 677 NW2d 363 (2004) (citations omitted). However, our Supreme
Court has also recognized that, in Michigan, a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to
waive the assistance of counsel and proceed in propria persona. People v Adkins (After
Remand), 452 Mich 702, 720; 551 NW2d 108 (1996), citing Const 1963, art 1, § 13 and MCL
763.1. However, strict guidelines exist with which a trial court must comply before allowing a
defendant to waive his right to counsel and exercise his right to proceed in propria persona.
People v Hicks, 259 Mich App 518, 523; 675 NW2d 599 (2003) (citations omitted).
The trial judge in the present case did not comply with all of the necessary procedures.
Specifically, although defendant’s request to represent himself was unequivocal, the trial court
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did not advise defendant of the risks and disadvantages of exercising his right to proceed in
propria persona. Hicks, supra, 523. Nonetheless, we do not believe that this error is sufficient to
require reversal. Specifically, this Court has stated that “an error in the preliminary examination
procedure must have affected the bindover and have adversely affected the fairness or reliability
of the trial itself to warrant reversal.” People v McGee, 258 Mich App 683, 698; 672 NW2d 191
(2003). In the present case, defendant’s only assertion relating to an effect on the bindover is
that he was improperly bound over on the charge of assault with intent to commit murder, which
was added at the preliminary examination after he had dismissed his counsel. However, as
discussed above, we believe that any error in the trial court’s allowing the prosecutor to add the
new count, if not waived, was harmless. As to the fairness or reliability of the trial, defendant
was appointed new counsel approximately two weeks after the preliminary examination, who
represented him throughout the remainder of the pretrial proceedings and during the course of
trial, and defendant does not assert that his counsel was prevented from asserting any defenses as
a result of defendant’s having appeared in propria persona at the preliminary examination.
Defendant next raises numerous allegations of error concerning the trial court’s
instructions to the jury on the use of prior inconsistent statements, their consideration of whether
defendant had a motive to commit the crime, and the consideration of lesser included offenses.
However, defendant’s counsel specifically stated that he had no objections to the instructions
after they had been read to the jurors. “This action effected a waiver. Because defendant
waived, as opposed to forfeited, his rights under the rule, there is no ‘error’ to review.” People v
Carter, 462 Mich 206, 219; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
Finally, defendant asserts that his conviction for being a felon in possession must be
reversed based on his allegation that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury that defendant
had previously been convicted of a felony, thereby making it illegal for him to carry or possess a
firearm, thereby depriving defendant of the right to have a jury determine whether each element
of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. First, defendant has waived review of
this issue for the reason stated above. Carter, supra, 219. Second, defendant stipulated during
trial that he had been convicted of a felony and that it was therefore illegal for him to carry or
possess a firearm. Finally, the record shows that the trial court did not, as defendant asserts,
instruct the jurors that defendant had been convicted of a felony but, instead, instructed them that
they must determine whether the prosecution had proven that element beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Henry William Saad
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