PEOPLE OF MI V JOEL MARCEL CARTER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 21, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 249089
Monroe Circuit Court
LC No. 02-031916-FH
JOEL MARCEL CARTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Smolenski and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of delivery of 50 grams or more but less
than 225 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), conspiracy to deliver the same, and
possession of marijuana, MCL 333.7403(2)(d). He was sentenced to consecutive sentences of 10
to 20 years’ imprisonment for the conspiracy to deliver and delivery of cocaine convictions, and
to 275 days for his possession of marijuana conviction to be served concurrently. Defendant
appeals as of right. We affirm.
This case stems from a controlled buy of cocaine on February 1, 2002. Defendant
contacted undercover police officer Paul Royal in late January 2002 regarding whether Trooper
Royal was interested in buying any drugs. Trooper Royal had previously bought drugs from
defendant. Through a series of phone calls over the next four days, defendant and Trooper Royal
agreed to meet in a parking lot in Dundee. Defendant was to deliver four and one-half ounces of
cocaine. Defendant arrived in a purple Escort driven by alleged coconspirator Demetrick Garner
and got into the passenger side of Trooper Royal’s car. Defendant produced a brick of cocaine
and Trooper Royal gave defendant $1,900, far less than the agreed upon sale price. Defendant
and Mr. Garner were subsequently arrested on the scene.
Defendant first argues that his due process rights were violated when the trial court
allowed the prosecution to substantively amend the information after defendant’s close of proofs.
A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to amend an information is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion exists if the result is so contrary to fact and logic that
it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or an exercise of passion or bias, or if an
unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would say there was no
justification or excuse for the ruling. People v McGee, 258 Mich App 683, 686-687; 672 NW2d
191 (2003) (citations omitted).
-1-
Both MCL 767.761 and MCR 6.112(H)2 permit the substantive amendment of an
information at any point during criminal proceedings so long as the amendment does not
prejudice the defendant. McGee, supra at 686. This includes an amendment directed at curing a
variance between the information and the proofs, unless the amendment charges a new crime.
People v Higuera, 244 Mich App 429, 444; 625 NW2d 444 (2001). In this case, after both
parties had rested, the prosecution moved to amend the information to add an unknown
conspirator based on defendant’s testimony that Garner was not involved in the drug transaction
and that defendant had obtained the cocaine from another individual.3 Over defendant’s
objection, the motion was granted.
In determining whether an amendment to a criminal charge would cause unacceptable
prejudice to a defendant, a court must consider whether the amendment would cause unfair
surprise, inadequate notice, or insufficient opportunity to defend. People v Hunt, 442 Mich 359,
364; 501 NW2d 151 (1993). Here, defendant asserts that “the amendment charged an entirely
different offense.” Defendant contends that, being apprised of the charges against him, he
presented a defense which showed that he did not conspire with Garner, the named coconspirator
in the information, and that the amendment was prejudicial because it affected his ability to
present an alternate defense.
We simply cannot say that defendant was prejudiced by this amendment in such a manner
so as to violate his due process rights. First, the amendment did not substantively change the
charge against defendant. Count II of the information, both before and after the amendment,
alleged conspiracy to deliver 50 to 224 grams of cocaine. The only difference is that the
amended count added an unnamed person as a co-conspirator. People v Weathersby, 204 Mich
App 98, 104; 514 NW2d 493 (1997). The amendment did not change the elements of the offense
or the penalty. Second, the information fairly put defendant on notice as to the transaction the
conspiracy charge was based on. And no new evidence was needed to sustain the charge.
Defendant’s prejudice was caused by his own testimony admitting to participating in a
conspiracy to deliver cocaine, establishing the elements of the conspiracy offense.4
1
MCL 767.76 provides in part, “The court may at any time before, during or after the trial
amend the indictment in respect to any defect, imperfection or omission in form or substance or
of any variance with the evidence.” Although the statute refers to an “indictment,” all laws
applying to prosecutions by indictment also apply to prosecutions by information, unless
otherwise specified. McGee, supra at 687.
2
MCR 6.112(H) provides in part, “The court before, during, or after trial may permit the
prosecutor to amend the information unless the proposed amendment would unfairly surprise or
prejudice the defendant.”
3
After the amendment, count II of the information alleged that defendant “did unlawfully
conspire, combine, confederate and agree together with Demetrick Earl Garner and/or another
unnamed individual . . . .”
4
A criminal conspiracy occurs when two or more individuals voluntarily agree to effectuate the
commission of a criminal offense. People v Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich 334, 345-346;
562 NW2d 652 (1997).
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Defendant likens his case to the situation in Gray v Raines, 662 F2d 569, 571 (CA 9,
1981), where the defendant was charged with forcible rape, but after presenting a consent
defense, the prosecutor requested a jury instruction on statutory rape, which was given, and the
defendant was convicted of statutory rape. The Ninth Circuit held that this violated the
defendant’s due process rights because the forcible and statutory rape were separate, distinct
offenses. Id. at 573. This case is clearly distinguishable from the one at bar because the
amendment here did not change the offense. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in granting the prosecutor’s motion to amend the information to conform to the proofs
presented by defendant at trial.
Defendant next argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conspiracy
conviction.5 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view de novo the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of
fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999); People v Lueth, 253 Mich App
670, 680; 660 NW2d 322 (2002). Circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences which
arise from the evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the crime. People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). It is for the trier of fact to determine what
inferences can be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded to
the inferences. People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002).
Defendant claims that his conviction for conspiracy to deliver cocaine cannot stand
because the prosecution introduced no evidence to show that defendant’s alleged coconspirator(s) possessed the requisite specific intent to deliver the statutory minimum amount of
cocaine as charged, i.e., the co-conspirator knew of and agreed to further the criminal objective
of delivery of at least fifty grams but less than 225 grams of cocaine. People v Justice (After
Remand), 454 Mich 334, 349; 562 NW2d 652 (1997). We disagree.
Defendant was charged with delivery of 50 grams or more but less than 225 grams of
cocaine and conspiracy to do the same. Conspiracy is a separate and distinct crime from that
which is the object of the conspiracy. People v Mass, 464 Mich 615, 632; 628 NW2d 540
(2001). While delivery of cocaine is a general intent crime, conspiracy is a specific intent crime.
Id. at 628-629. Conspiracy is defined as the specific intent to combine with others to accomplish
an illegal objective. Id. at 629; see also MCL 750.157a. In the context of conspiracy to deliver,
the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt “which delivery offense a defendant
conspired to violate.” Mass, supra at 634. Thus, in addition to the elements of delivery of
cocaine, the prosecution must prove that a defendant and another person had the specific intent to
combine to deliver the statutory minimum as charged to a third person.6 Id. at 630.
5
We note that defendant is not appealing his conviction for delivery of the cocaine. Therefore,
we disregard plaintiff’s argument as to that conviction.
6
Plaintiff argues that Mass was wrongly decided in that it held that knowledge of the amount
agreed to be delivered was an element of conspiracy to deliver. We believe that Mass was
correctly decided, but regardless, we are bound to follow Mass until our Supreme Court
overrules its decision. People v Hall, 249 Mich App 262, 270; 643 NW2d 253 (2002).
-3-
The term “combine” means that all the participants formed an agreement,
express or implied, to accomplish the objective of the conspiracy. That is, all
parties shared knowledge that the narcotics are ultimately to be delivered to a
third party for consumption and all agreed to meet this objective of delivery by
fulfilling their agreements. [Justice, supra at 345 n 19 (citations omitted).]
Direct proof of the conspiracy is not required; rather, proof may be inferred from the
circumstances, acts and conduct of the parties. Id. at 348.
The gist of the crime of conspiracy is the agreement to commit an unlawful act. Id. at
345. Here, defendant admitted in court that he obtained a large quantity of drugs from an
unnamed individual for the purpose of delivering it to the undercover police officer. The officer
testified that he asked defendant to obtain four and one-half ounces, or one-eighth of a kilogram
(125 grams), of cocaine for which the officer would pay defendant $4,200 or $4,500.7 And the
evidence established that the amount of cocaine the officer received was 111 grams.
We agree with defendant that the evidence is insufficient to prove that defendant
conspired with Mr. Garner to deliver the cocaine. Even viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, the most the evidence established was that Garner gave defendant a
ride, was paid $75 to do so, and was in possession of a cell phone at the time of his arrest.
Defendant denied that Garner was aware of the drug transaction, Garner did not testify, nor were
any of his statements permitted to be introduced, and no cell phone records were presented to
show that defendant used the phone in Garner’s possession to call the undercover police officer.
However, we do find that there was sufficient evidence presented from which the jury
could reasonably infer that defendant conspired with an unnamed person to deliver 50 grams or
more but less than 225 grams of cocaine. Defendant testified that he told this person how much
cocaine he wanted, assumed the amount he was given represented that amount, and gave the
undercover officer all the cocaine that he received from this unnamed person.8 The undercover
officer testified that he agreed to buy 125 grams of cocaine from defendant, the amount he
received weighed 111 grams which is “quite a bit of cocaine,” and it was packaged as a brick,
appearing to have been broken off a larger brick of cocaine. Even though defendant did not
testify that he specifically told his supplier that he would be delivering the cocaine to third party,
the jury could reasonably infer, given the amount of cocaine, that the supplier knew defendant
would be reselling it.
Also, defendant testified that he balked when the officer gave him only $1,900 because
he had to “bring this guy his money back,” implying that he had bought the cocaine on credit. It
7
The undercover officer stated that the agreed upon price was dependent on how far from
Detroit defendant had to travel in order to consummate the sale.
8
Defendant stated, “[A]ll I know is that I had told the person what I wanted, he gave it to me,
and I’m bringing it to him, all right? I didn’t know what it was or nothing like that, how much it
weighed. I told him it – should all be there ‘cause that’s what I told the guy, exactly how much
he wanted.”
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was reasonable for the jury to infer that the supplier knew that defendant would be reselling the
brick and paying for it with the money he made from the transaction. Furthermore, defendant
stated that had he sold the cocaine for $4,000 he would still have made a little profit and the
undercover officer testified that $4,000 was a more reasonable price, $4,200-$4,500 being a
premium price. The officer could not estimate the retail value of the cocaine because it would
depend on how it was subsequently cut and packaged, but the maximum retail value was
probably $15,000. The jury could reasonably infer that the unnamed supplier knew the cocaine
was not for personal use given these dollar amounts. While general conspiracy law prevents a
defendant from being convicted of a conspiracy based solely on a coconspirator’s confession that
was obtained before or after the conspiracy,9 there is no basis for precluding a conviction based
on the defendant’s own statements.
Defendant also asserts on appeal an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Generally, to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: (1) that counsel’s
performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms; (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the
proceedings would have been different, Bell v Cone, 535 US 685, 695; 122 S Ct 1843; 152 L Ed
2d 914 (2002); People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000), and (3) that the
resultant proceedings were fundamentally unfair or unreliable, People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App
702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001). Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant
bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise. People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663; 683
NW2d 761 (2004). Counsel’s performance must be measured against an objective standard of
reasonableness and without benefit of hindsight. Bell, supra at 698.
Defendant argues that his original trial counsel told him that he would not be found guilty
of delivery of cocaine if he testified that he only “intended” to deliver the cocaine. Defendant
claims that as a result of this inaccurate statement, he withdrew his guilty plea and went to trial.
Defendant asserts that his prejudice stems from the fact that had he not withdrawn his plea, his
sentence would have been substantially less. We fail to find any merit to defendant’s argument.
On April 19, 2002, after a Cobbs10 evaluation during which the trial court informed
defendant that it would not sentence defendant to a term less than he would receive were he to
accept the pending plea agreement, and after conferring with defense counsel, defendant decided
to accept the plea agreement. In exchange for defendant’s guilty plea to delivery of 50 grams or
more but less than 225 grams of cocaine, the conspiracy and possession of marijuana charges
were to be dismissed. In addition, defendant would not be charged with delivery of cocaine to
the same undercover officer in November 2001. The sentence to be imposed, eight to twenty
years’ imprisonment, was a downward departure of two years less than the statutory minimum.
After ensuring that defendant’s guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily given, the court
accepted defendant’s plea per the terms of the plea agreement.
9
People v Berryman, 43 Mich App 366, 373; 204 NW2d 238 (1972).
10
People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276; 505 NW2d 208 (1993).
-5-
On July 12, 2002, the court heard defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. He claimed
that because of the medications11 he was on at the time he entered his plea, he did not fully
understand the proceeding and its ramifications. Additionally, defendant maintained he was
pressured into pleading guilty to crimes he did not commit because of the downward sentencing
departure offered in the plea agreement. Although the court believed that defendant knowingly
and voluntarily entered a guilty plea, it nevertheless allowed defendant to withdraw his plea. At
the same time, the court permitted defense counsel to withdraw his representation citing a
communication breakdown and defendant’s mother’s financial inability to continue to retain
defense counsel. Defendant was appointed counsel, proceeded to trial, and was convicted as
charged. At sentencing, defendant claimed that the reason he went to trial was because he
was told that there was a possibility of me getting intent to deliver at trial. I
wasn’t trying to waste the Court’s time with this matter, I just thought that I was
guilty of intent to deliver, I didn’t think I would be found guilty of delivery that’s
why I was so honest and outspoken and candid ‘cause I thought I was guilty of
intent to deliver.
Because defendant failed to move for an evidentiary hearing or a new trial, this Court’s
review is limited to the facts contained on the record. People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 38;
650 NW2d 96 (2002). First, we note that on appeal defendant does not specify which defense
counsel allegedly misadvised him. But because defendant claims that as a result he withdrew his
guilty plea, we can only assume defendant is referring to Robert Zaranek, defense counsel at the
time defendant was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. Second, the record does not support
defendant’s assertion that he was given inaccurate advice. When he withdrew his plea,
defendant stated it was because he did not fully understand the proceeding due to medication he
was taking and that he was innocent of the charges against him. At sentencing, after his
convictions, defendant did state, “The reason I did go to trial is because I was told that there was
a possibility of me getting intent to deliver at trial;” however, defendant failed to identify who
gave him this information. Furthermore, Zanarek stated that one of the reasons he was
requesting to withdraw as counsel was because, “[Defendant’s] got his own ideas; doesn’t really
want to listen to what I have to say to him.”
Based on the record before us, we can see no reason to attribute defendant’s withdrawal
of his guilty plea to anything but his own wishes. Moreover, the record indicates that defendant
was offered a similar plea agreement before the trial began and rejected it over his then defense
counsel’s advice. Defendant stated in court that he wanted to go forward with the trial because
he was not comfortable with the plea agreement.12 Accordingly, we find no merit to defendant’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
11
Defendant suffers from multiple sclerosis.
12
The details of the second plea agreement were not placed on the record, although defense
counsel did mention that he would plead to the same charge as before. Presumably, then, the
sentencing portion differed.
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Next, defendant raises two sentencing issues. First, he argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for resentencing because the amended controlled substance statute applied to
his case. The question this issue raises is whether the legislative sentencing guidelines
applicable to MCL 333.7401 as amended,13 2002 PA 665, apply to offenses committed before
the amendment’s effective date of March 1, 2003. This question was recently answered by our
Supreme Court in People v Dailey, 469 Mich 1012; 678 NW2d 439 (2004).
In Dailey, the defendant had pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver 50 grams
or more but less than 225 grams of cocaine, which, at the time the defendant committed the
offense, carried a mandatory sentence of ten to twenty years’ imprisonment. This Court held that
the defendant was entitled to resentencing because the trial court failed to explain why certain
factors it identified constituted substantial and compelling reasons to depart downward from the
mandated minimum term. People v Dailey, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued August 26, 2003 (Docket No. 239683). In a footnote, this Court stated:
2002 PA 665, effective December 26, 2002, made extensive revisions to
MCL 333.7401. MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii) now provides that possession with
intent to deliver 50 grams or more but less than 450 grams of a controlled
substance is punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty years or a fine
of not more than $250,000.00, or both. As a general rule, the proper sentence is
that which was in effect at the time the offense was committed. See People v
Schultz, 435 Mich 517, 530; 460 NW2d 505 (1990). The amended version of
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii) enacted while this case was pending on appeal is
ameliorative in that it eliminates the requirement that the sentencing court impose
a minimum term of not less than ten years. On remand, defendant is entitled to
seek resentencing under the amended version of MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii). See
People v Shinholster, 196 Mich App 531, 533-534; 493 NW2d 502 (1992);
People v Sandlin, 179 Mich App 540, 543-544; 446 NW2d 301 (1989). [Id., slip
op 1 n 1.]
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, our Supreme Court vacated this footnote “because it is
inconsistent with MCL 769.34(2).”
[MCL 769.34(2)] provides that courts shall sentence defendants in accord
with the minimum sentences prescribed by the ‘version of those sentencing
guidelines in effect on the date the crime was committed.’ This demonstrates a
legislative intent to have defendant sentenced under the law in effect on the date
of his offense, which predated the amendment to MCL 333.7401. [Dailey, supra
at 469 Mich 1012.]
Accordingly, because the legislative sentencing guidelines did not apply to the instant offenses
on the date defendant committed them, he is not entitled to resentencing on this basis.
13
MCL 777.13m states that the legislative sentencing guidelines apply to drug-related offenses,
including MCL 333.7401. 2002 PA 666 (effective March 1, 2003).
-7-
Second, defendant asserts that he is entitled to resentencing because he was sentenced
according to inaccurate information, namely that defendant was involved in selling kilos of
cocaine. However, a party may not raise on appeal an issue challenging the scoring of the
guidelines or challenging the accuracy of information relied upon in determining a sentence
which is within the appropriate guidelines range unless the party has raised the issue at
sentencing, in a proper motion for resentencing, or in a proper motion to remand. MCL
769.34(10); People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 309-310; 684 NW2d 669 (2004). In this case,
defendant was sentenced to the applicable mandatory prison terms and he did not raise this issue
at sentencing, in his motion for resentencing, or in a motion for remand.
Moreover, we find that the “inaccurate information” defendant cites is a distortion of the
court’s comments. The court never stated that it believed defendant was involved in selling kilos
of cocaine. Rather, it stated that the delivered cocaine appeared to have been broken off of a kilo
given its brick-like, as opposed to granular, form. Thus, the court noted that defendant dealt
“with people that have access to an extreme amount of cocaine.” The court acknowledged its
ability to depart downward in sentencing defendant, but stated that it could not find any
substantial and compelling reason to do so. Accordingly, we find that defendant is not entitled to
resentencing.
Lastly, defendant contends that the trial court erred in requiring him to pay restitution for
conduct that did not give rise to the instant convictions and that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to the ordered restitution amount. At sentencing, the court ordered defendant
to pay $1,450 in restitution to the Michigan State Police for unrecovered buy money and the
subsequent forensic testing stemming from a drug transaction defendant completed with Trooper
Royal on November 26, 2001, a few months prior to the transaction that gave rise to defendant’s
convictions in this case. Trooper Royal paid defendant $1,300 for twenty-five ounces of
cocaine. Defendant argues that the restitution ordered in this case was impermissible because it
relates to conduct for which defendant was never charged. We disagree.
This Court has held that the loss of “buy money” is compensable under the Crime
Victim’s Rights Act, MCL 780.751 et seq., as a “financial harm that results from the commission
of a crime.” People v Crigler, 244 Mich App 420, 426-427; 625 NW2d 424 (2001). Therefore,
narcotics enforcement teams are permitted “to obtain restitution of buy money lost to a defendant
as a result of the defendant’s criminal act of selling controlled substances.” Id. at 427. And
MCL 780.766(2) provides in pertinent part that a defendant must pay restitution “to any victim
of the defendant’s course of conduct that gives rise to the conviction . . . .”14
In People v Gahan, 456 Mich 264, 272; 571 NW2d 503 (1997), our Supreme Court
concluded that there was no indication that the Legislature intended to restrict the broad
common-law construction given to the phrase “course of conduct.” Thus, the Court held that
restitution may be ordered for all losses incurred by victims attributable to a defendant’s illegal
scheme that culminated in his conviction even if some of those losses were not the factual basis
14
See also MCL 769.1a.
-8-
of the charge that resulted in the conviction. Id. Therefore, giving broad meaning to this phrase,
it appears to encompass defendant’s earlier drug transactions with Trooper Royal.
Defendant attempts to distinguish this case from Gahan, which involved the defendant’s
repeated scheme to defraud his customers in the same or similar manner. The defendant would
tell his customers that their cars sold for less than the actual price and pocketed the difference.
In dicta, the Gahan Court stated, “Although totally dissimilar crimes committed at different
times may not satisfy the statutory ‘course of conduct’ requirement, such facts are not presented
in this case.” Id. at 273 n 11. Defendant contends that the November 2001 drug buy was a
totally dissimilar crime that occurred at a different time and, therefore, cannot be considered part
of defendant’s “course of conduct” as contemplated by the restitution statute. We find no merit
to this argument. Defendant’s course of conduct in this instance is his repeated sales of cocaine
to Trooper Royal.15 We can discern no meaningful difference between the defendant’s
continuing illegal fraud scheme in Gahan and defendant’s continuing drug sales in this case to
the same police officer. Had defendant not been involved in previous drug sales with OMNI, the
narcotics enforcement team, he would not have contacted Trooper Royal regarding the drug sale
which gave rise to his instant convictions. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err
in ordering defendant to pay restitution in the amount of $1,450 for the recoupment of “buy
money” and subsequent lab testing of the cocaine. Accordingly, because defense counsel is not
required to make a futile objection, People v Riley, 468 Mich 135, 142; 659 NW2d 611 (2003),
we likewise reject defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Donald S. Owens
15
See also People v Bixman, 173 Mich App 243, 246; 433 NW2d 417 (1988) (This Court held
that restitution for nonsufficient funds checks for which defendant was not convicted was proper
because those checks were part of the defendant’s course of conduct which gave rise to his one
conviction for a nonsufficient funds check over $200).
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