PEOPLE OF MI V DARRELL SOLOMON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 21, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 248597
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 03-000437-01
KENDALL LAMAR DONALDSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 248634
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-013450-01
KENDALL DONALDSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 249209
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-013450-02
v
DARRELL SOLOMON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Smolenski and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants Kendall Donaldson and Darrell Solomon were tried jointly before different
juries in connection with two separate robbery offenses in Detroit on October 3, 2002. In Docket
No. 248597, Donaldson was convicted of two counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, felon in
-1-
possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, felonious assault, MCL 750.82, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, in connection with the robbery of the
Gold Coast Lounge.1 In Docket No. 248634, Donaldson was convicted of two counts of armed
robbery, felon in possession of a firearm, and felony-firearm in connection with the robbery of
the Deluxe Coney Island restaurant. In Docket No. 249209, Solomon was convicted of two
counts of armed robbery, also in connection with the Deluxe Coney Island robbery, but acquitted
of felony-firearm. These three appeals have been consolidated.
I. Facts and Proceedings
Two robberies occurred in Detroit within a block of each other during the early morning
hours of October 3, 2002. Two men with pantyhose over their faces robbed Charles Giles and
Ben Robinson at gunpoint at the Deluxe Coney Island at approximately 12:30 a.m. One man—
later identified as Donaldson—carried a handgun and demanded Giles’ and Robinson’s wallets.
The second man—later identified as Solomon—carried a shotgun, stood beside Donaldson, and
helped collect Giles’ and Robinson’s stolen belongings. The robbers took Giles’ and Robinson’s
wallets, which contained their cash, credit cards, driver’s licenses, and miscellaneous cards.
The second robbery occurred outside the Gold Coast Lounge, half a block away from the
Deluxe Coney Island. John Pierce and Eugene Szymanski were working as parking attendants
when two men—identified as Donaldson and Solomon—approached and asked what kind of
club the Gold Coast Lounge was. Szymanski replied that if they did not know, they had no
reason to go in. Pierce recognized the men from a similar encounter the week before.
Donaldson then brandished a gun. Szymanski tried to defend himself by throwing a flashlight at
Donaldson, but Donaldson shot Szymanski in the abdomen causing a flesh wound. According to
Pierce, Donaldson appeared shocked when he shot Szymanski, and began to flee. Solomon told
Donaldson to get money. Donaldson pointed the gun at Pierce, who gave him $1,300.
Donaldson and Solomon then fled in a car.2
The time of the Gold Coast Lounge robbery was in dispute. Pierce initially told the
police that it occurred around 2:30 a.m., and Szymanski reported that it occurred around 1:45
a.m. Detroit Police Officer Laron Simmons testified that he received a dispatch on the robbery
around 1:30 a.m. However, Donaldson had been arrested between 1:00 and 1:15 a.m.
Donaldson and Solomon were arrested a few blocks apart near the two robbery scenes.
The officers involved in their arrests agreed to meet in the Deluxe Coney Island parking lot to
share information and transfer Donaldson to the squad car holding Solomon. When the police
cars arrived in the parking lot, Giles, who had been watching from inside the Coney Island, ran
out and shouted to Robinson that the police had caught the robbers. Robinson looked at the
arrestees, but he could not determine whether they were the robbers. The officers testified at trial
1
Solomon was not charged with any offense committed at the Gold Coast Lounge.
2
Giles and Szymanski both testified that a third man was involved in the robberies. Szymanski
did not identify Solomon at trial, and there was no testimony that either Szymanski or Pierce
identified Solomon at a corporeal lineup.
-2-
that they did not intend to hold an on-scene identification at the Coney Island, and that they
would not have met there if they had known Giles and Robinson were still there. The police
gave Giles and Robinson their personal effects, such as their driver’s licenses and ATM cards,
which they had found in Solomon’s pockets.
Detective James Blanks of the Eleventh Precinct conducted lineups for Donaldson and
Solomon on the afternoon of October 3, 2002. Donaldson was five feet, four inches tall, and
Blanks could not find four other men of similar height, so he arranged a photographic lineup
using mug shot photographs obtained from the precinct files. Giles, Pierce, and Szymanski all
selected Donaldson’s photograph from the array. Giles also identified Solomon at a corporeal
lineup. Robinson could not make an identification at either the corporeal or photographic lineup.
Before trial, Donaldson moved to suppress Giles’ photographic identification of him. He
argued that because he was in custody, the police were required to conduct a corporeal lineup,
not a photographic lineup, and that the photographic lineup was unduly suggestive because the
photograph showed Donaldson wearing the same shirt and hairstyle worn by the robber. He also
argued that Giles identified him based on seeing him in the parking lot.
At a Wade3 hearing, Giles testified that the three robbers wore pantyhose over their faces,
but he could make out Donaldson’s facial features or observe that his hair was braided.
Donaldson wore a jacket, but Giles could see a few inches of a red shirt underneath. He saw the
side of Donaldson’s face for only two or three minutes when Donaldson was returned to the
Coney Island parking lot. He identified Donaldson’s photograph in the array based on several
factors, including his facial features, the “size” of his hair, and his shirt color. Giles downplayed
his reliance on Donaldson’s shirt color, and explained that he had difficulty perceiving the shirt
colors in the other photos because the photos were blurry and because Giles was color-blind.
Giles also denied selecting Donaldson’s photograph based on Donaldson’s braided hair because
he had seen Donaldson’s facial features well enough to not have to rely on his hair. He added
that he had identified Donaldson at the preliminary examination, when his hair was not braided.
He emphasized that he would have picked out Donaldson regardless of what color shirt he was
wearing and regardless of whether his hair was braided, because he was “going by his face and
his structure and everything, it was his face.”
Blanks testified that he did not hold a live lineup with Donaldson, who was five feet, four
inches tall, because he could not find enough people of similar height. Blanks could not have
filled out the lineup with taller persons, because this would have been too suggestive. Instead,
Blanks arranged a photographic lineup using Polaroid mug shots of Donaldson and five other
persons with a similar appearance, age and size. The array was acceptable to the lineup attorney.
Giles chose Donaldson’s photo.
On cross-examination, Donaldson’s attorney questioned Blanks about his efforts to find
suitable participants for a corporeal lineup before resorting to the photographic procedure.
Blanks stated that there were more than twenty persons incarcerated at the Eleventh Precinct that
3
United States v Wade, 388 US 218; 87 S Ct 1926; 18 L Ed 2d 1149 (1967).
-3-
day, but none were near Donaldson’s height. He contacted the nearby Seventh and Twelfth
Precincts, but no one there was the right height. Blanks acknowledged that none of the other
photographs showed a person wearing a red shirt or braided hair, but their closely cropped
haircuts appeared similar to defendant’s hairstyle.
The trial court found that Giles had a good opportunity to observe the robber and that he
gave the police an accurate description before seeing Donaldson. It also gave credence to
Blanks’ testimony that he could not find four other black males who matched Donaldson in
height and other characteristics. The court concluded that Blanks made the correct decision to
conduct a photographic array, and that the array was fair. The court did not believe that
Donaldson’s braids were suggestive because, although Donaldson was the only man with braided
hair, his hair in the photograph appeared to be short and combed straight back, like the men in
the other photos. The trial court found no other indication of suggestiveness. It found no taint
from the momentary parking lot encounter.
II. Docket Nos. 248597 and 248634
Donaldson claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress all
identification testimony. He argues that the police improperly used a photographic lineup
procedure when he was already in custody, and that all subsequent courtroom identification
testimony was tainted by this invalid procedure.
The trial court's decision to admit identification evidence will not be reversed unless it is
clearly erroneous. People v Barclay, 208 Mich App 670, 675; 528 NW2d 842 (1995). The trial
court’s decision to admit an in-court identification is also reviewed for clear error.4 People v
McAllister, 241 Mich App 466, 472; 616 NW2d 203 (2000), remanded in part on other grounds,
465 Mich 884 (2001). We review a trial court’s findings of fact pertaining to motions to
suppress identification for clear error. People v Gray, 457 Mich 107, 115; 577 NW2d 92 (1998).
Generally, photographic lineups are not permitted where the defendant is in custody and
available for a corporeal lineup. People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 298 n 8; 505 NW2d 528
(1993). However, in People v Anderson, 389 Mich 155, 186-187 n 22; 205 NW2d 461 (1973),
overruled in part on other grounds in People v Hickman, 470 Mich 602; 684 NW2d 267 (2004),
our Supreme Court stated that a photographic lineup may be used in lieu of a corporeal lineup
where there are an insufficient number of persons available with the defendant’s physical
characteristics.
4
It is not clear whether defendant raises this issue only with respect to Giles’ identification in
connection with the Coney Island robbery, or also with respect to Szymanski’s and Pierce’s
identifications in connection with the Gold Coast Lounge robbery. In any event, because
Donaldson moved only to suppress Giles’ identification, this issue is preserved only as to Giles.
Donaldson’s arguments that the photographic lineup was improper, and that the array was unduly
suggestive, are factually pertinent to all three witnesses. But because Donaldson fails to
establish error with respect to Giles, he also fails to establish plain error affecting his substantial
rights with respect to the unpreserved identification issues involving Szymanski and Pierce. See
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
-4-
Here, Officer Blanks testified that he tried to compose a corporeal lineup, but he could
not locate five black males of Donaldson’s height in either the Eleventh Precinct or the two
nearest precincts, the seventh and twelfth. He felt that a corporeal lineup would be unfairly
prejudicial if the other participants were notably taller than Donaldson. The trial court gave
credence to Blanks’ explanation, noting that a corporeal lineup would have required four other
black men who were not only similar to Donaldson in height, but who also shared characteristics
such as complexion and build. The trial court further noted that Blanks did an “excellent” job in
composing a photographic array using photographs of men who resembled Donaldson. Because
we defer to the trial court’s factual finding that suitable persons were not available for a
corporeal lineup, Gray, supra at 115, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that
the circumstances justified use of a photographic lineup.
Donaldson argues that Blanks should have made more exhaustive efforts to locate
suitable participants for a corporeal lineup from other nearby precincts and from the ranks of
police department employees, and contends that the trial court should have taken judicial notice
of non-record evidence regarding the location of precincts and the number of department
employees. However, the police are not required to make endless efforts to arrange a corporeal
lineup. People v Davis, 146 Mich App 537, 547; 381 NW2d 759 (1985). In People v Hider, 135
Mich App 147, 149-150; 351 NW2d 905 (1984), this Court was satisfied that the police made
sufficient efforts to compose a fair corporeal lineup before resorting to a photographic lineup
where the defendant was of a “rare physical type” for the county (black male, more than fifty
years old, approximately two hundred pounds and six feet tall). Although the prosecutor in
Hider did not present direct evidence of the number of tall, older black men available for a
lineup, this Court approved the use of a photographic lineup because the police attempted to
arrange a corporeal lineup, but were unable to do so. Id. at 150. Similarly, we note that
Donaldson’s height is observably below average, and we are satisfied that Blanks’ inability to
compose a fair corporeal lineup was due to the difficulty of finding suitable participants, and not
his lack of effort.
Donaldson further argues that his in-court identifications should have been suppressed
because they were influenced by the improper photographic procedure, and the witnesses had no
independent basis for identifying him. If a witness is exposed to an impermissibly suggestive
pretrial identification procedure, the prosecutor must establish by clear and convincing evidence
that the witness has an untainted, independent basis for identifying the defendant before the incourt identification will be allowed. Gray, supra at 115. Donaldson does not fully explain on
appeal why the photographic lineup was suggestive, but at trial he contended that he was easily
recognizable from his braided hair and red shirt. He also maintained that Giles identified him
not from the robbery, but from his observations when the police returned to the Coney Island
parking lot with Donaldson and Solomon in their custody.
The trial court found that the procedure was not unduly suggestive. The court observed
that Donaldson’s braids were similar to the short, combed-back hairstyles of the other men in the
photographs, and credited Giles’ testimony that he identified Donaldson from his face, not the
braids. The court also credited Giles’ testimony that he did not select Donaldson’s photograph
based on the red shirt, and that Donaldson had worn a jacket during the robbery that covered all
but a few inches of the shirt. With respect to the encounter in the parking lot, the trial court
found that Giles caught only a brief glimpse of the side of Donaldson’s face, and that this did not
-5-
influence any subsequent identification. Because the trial court found that the identification
procedure was not unduly suggestive, and this finding is supported by the evidence, we need not
address whether Giles or any other witness had an independent basis to identify Donaldson at
trial.
Donaldson argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the robbery,
assault, and firearms charges in the Gold Coast Lounge robbery because the overwhelming
evidence established that he was already in police custody when this crime was committed.
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, this Court
considers whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, would
warrant a reasonable juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Nowack, 462 Mich
392, 399; 614 NW2d 78 (2000); People v Sexton, 250 Mich App 211, 222; 646 NW2d 875
(2002).
In his original statement to the police, Pierce stated that the robbery and shooting
occurred around 2:30 a.m. Szymanski originally told the police that the robbery occurred around
1:45 a.m. However, Officer Kory Karpinsky testified that he arrested Donaldson around 1:15
a.m., approximately half an hour after first receiving the dispatch on the Coney Island robbery.
Karpinsky’s partner, Officer Tarek Bazzi, estimated the time of arrest as 1:00 a.m. Officer Kyle
Bryant estimated that the time of arrest was between 12:40 and 12:45 a.m., but he was not
present at the arrest.
At trial, Pierce testified that he was mistaken when he gave the 2:30 a.m. estimate to the
police, and explained that he had been extremely stressed by the robbery and loss of money.
Szymanski also testified that he was mistaken in his statement, and estimated that the crime
occurred “approximately prior to 1:00.” He explained that he had not been wearing a watch.
Officer Laron Simmons testified that he arrived at the Gold Coast Lounge around 1:50 or 1:55
a.m., which was fifteen to twenty minutes after he received the dispatch notice of the robbery
and shooting.
The jury could have found from Simmons’ testimony that he was dispatched to the Gold
Coast Lounge robbery around 1:30 a.m., and that the robbery occurred fifteen to thirty minutes
before the dispatch, or before 1:00 a.m., which would have been before Bazzi and Karpinsky
arrested Donaldson. Also, in light of the forty-five-minute discrepancy between Pierce’s and
Szymanski’s original estimates of the offense, their emotional trauma from being robbed or shot,
and Szymanski’s lack of a watch, the jury reasonably could have found that Pierce and
Szymanski were mistaken when they gave their statements to the police.
Donaldson also argues that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the evidence because his
physical appearance does not match Pierce’s or Szymanski’s description of him. Without
conceding guilt in the Coney Island robbery, Donaldson further contends that the same person
could not have committed both robberies, because Giles’ description of the robber arguably fits
Donaldson, but conflicts with Pierce’s and Szymanski’s description.
The discrepancies in the complainants’ descriptions do not invalidate the jury’s verdict.
In his police statement, Pierce described the first robber, i.e., Donaldson, as a black male,
nineteen years old or in his early twenties, five feet and seven or eight inches tall, 175 to 180
pounds, medium brown complexion, with a “low fade” haircut. Szymanski described Donaldson
-6-
as five feet, nine inches tall, 150 to 175 pounds, nineteen or twenty years old, medium
complexion, with braided hair. At trial, Szymanski acknowledged that Donaldson appeared
heavier than his 150- to 175-pound estimate, and stated that his prior estimate of Szymanski’s
height was “an approximate.” Giles described Donaldson as five feet and five or six inches tall,
160 pounds, and a light brown complexion. At trial, Donaldson gave his own weight as 130
pounds, and his height as five feet, five inches. There is no objective evidence as to Donaldson’s
weight on October 3, 2002, but Blanks testified that Donaldson was five feet, four inches tall.
The discrepancies between the witnesses’ descriptions and Donaldson’s actual
characteristics do not render the jury’s findings inherently implausible. The discrepancies are
minor and, although the witnesses varied in their quantitative assessments of the robber’s height
and weight, they generally agreed that the robber was a young adult, slim, shorter than average,
with a medium complexion. This general description is consistent with Donaldson’s claim that
the Department of Corrections describes him as “5'4", 145 pounds,” with a brown complexion.
The jurors had the opportunity to observe Donaldson and make their own determination as to
whether the witnesses’ descriptions and estimates of the robber’s weight and complexion
comported with Donaldson’s appearance. The jurors could have attributed any erroneous
assessments of height and weight to the inherent difficulty of precisely quantifying visual
observations. Viewed most favorably to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to support
the jury’s identification of Donaldson as the person who robbed Pierce and shot Szymanski at the
Gold Coast Lounge.
III. Docket No. 249209
Solomon argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on aiding and abetting
after the jury began deliberating. Solomon was not expressly charged as an aider and abettor,
and the prosecutor neither requested an aiding and abetting instruction nor argued that his actions
constituted aiding and abetting. Solomon argued that he had been misidentified. He did not
argue that the person identified as himself was a non-participant in the robbery.
When the trial court originally instructed the jury, it did not include an aiding and
abetting instruction. After the jury began deliberations, it submitted a question to the trial court:
“Does Solomon have to have a weapon in his possession or is Donaldson considered to be his
weapon?” Solomon argued that the trial court should instruct the jury that Solomon had to have
a weapon in his possession, because the prosecutor never presented an aiding and abetting
theory. The prosecutor advocated using the aiding and abetting standard instruction to answer
the jury’s query. The prosecutor argued that he had proceeded on the theory that Donaldson and
Solomon committed the crime jointly and, although he did not specifically use the term “aiders
and abettors,” it was “quite obvious” that they aided and abetted each other. After some
argument and consultation with both attorneys, the trial court read the standard instruction on
aiding and abetting, CJI2d 8.1. Solomon now argues that this instruction allowed the prosecutor
to belatedly add a new and different theory that he could not address or dispute.
Our Legislature has abolished the distinction between principals and aiders and abettors
in the commission of a crime. MCL 767.39. Consequently, it is not necessary for a prosecutor
to charge a defendant in any other form than as a principal, and a defendant may be charged as a
principal and convicted as an aider and abettor. People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558, 568; 540
NW2d 728 (1995), overruled in part on other grounds in People v Mass, 464 Mich 615, 628; 628
-7-
NW2d 540 (2001); People v Lamson, 44 Mich App 447, 450; 205 NW2d 189 (1973). We
therefore conclude that the prosecutor’s failure to previously expressly raise an aiding and
abetting theory did not preclude the trial court from instructing on aiding and abetting in answer
to the jury’s question.
Our Supreme Court held in People v Mann, 395 Mich 472, 478; 236 NW2d 509 (1975),
that an aiding and abetting instruction is appropriate where there is some evidence of a concert of
action between the defendant and the principal. Here, Giles and Robinson testified that Solomon
entered the restaurant with Donaldson, wearing pantyhose over his face like Donaldson, stood
beside Donaldson during the robbery, and helped collect the stolen belongings. Because there
was evidence of concert of action between Donaldson and Solomon, Solomon could be deemed
an aider and abettor. The jury instruction was thus factually appropriate and it accurately and
aptly responded to the jury’s inquiry.
Solomon further argues that the aiding and abetting instruction was erroneous because it
failed to inform the jury that an aider and abettor of a specific intent crime must either have the
specific intent to commit the crime or aid the principal with knowledge that the principal has the
requisite intent. Although Solomon objected to the trial court giving the aiding and abetting
instruction, he did not object to the omission of an instruction on intent. Accordingly, we review
this unpreserved issue for plain error affecting Solomon’s substantial rights. People v Hill, 257
Mich App 126, 151-152; 667 NW2d 78 (2003).
The aiding and abetting instruction was given to address the jurors’ question about the
armed-with-a-weapon element of armed robbery. The trial court had previously instructed the
jury that the prosecution must prove that Solomon specifically intended to permanently deprive
Robinson or Giles of his money or property. The intent element of armed robbery was
applicable regardless of whether the jury determined that Solomon was a principal or an aider
and abettor, because an aider and abettor must possess the same level of intent with respect to the
commission of the crime as the principal, and conviction of a crime as an aider and abettor does
not require a higher level of intent than that required for conviction as a principal. Mass, supra
at 628. Because the jury already had sufficient information as to the specific intent requirement
of armed robbery, and sought information only as to the armed-with-a-weapon requirement, the
trial court did not plainly err in failing to further instruct on the requisite intent for aiding and
abetting.
Moreover, the specific error alleged by Solomon actually served to Solomon’s advantage.
Solomon correctly asserts that there are two means for proving that an aider and abettor
possessed the requisite intent to commit a specific intent crime: either the aider and abettor
himself possesses the requisite specific intent for the underlying crime, or the aider and abettor
knows that the principal has the requisite intent. People v King, 210 Mich App 425, 429; 534
NW2d 534 (1995). He alleges that the instruction was incomplete because the trial court omitted
the second means of proof. However, by omitting the alternative means of proof, the trial court
actually increased the prosecutor’s burden by requiring proof that Solomon himself intended to
commit the robbery, not merely that he acted with knowledge of Donaldson’s intent. Under
these circumstances, the omission did not affect Solomon’s substantial rights, and he is not
entitled to relief on this basis.
-8-
Solomon argues that the trial court erred in declining his request for a jury instruction on
the lesser offense of unarmed robbery. The trial court determined that the instruction was not
warranted under People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 357; 646 NW2d 127 (2002), in which our
Supreme Court held that “a requested instruction on a necessarily included lesser offense is
proper if the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual element that is
not part of the lesser included offense and a rational view of the evidence would support it.” In
People v Reese, 466 Mich 440, 441; 647 NW2d 498 (2002), the Supreme Court examined how
the analysis in Cornell applied to a request for an unarmed robbery instruction as a lesser
included offense of armed robbery. The defendant in Reese was accused of robbing an employee
at a gas station. Id. at 442. There was no dispute that an armed robbery had been committed, as
all the eyewitnesses testified that the perpetrator used a knife, the knife was found at a spot
where the perpetrator had dropped some items, and a knife-like object was visible on the
surveillance tape. Id. at 446. Applying Cornell, the Supreme Court reasoned that unarmed
robbery was clearly a necessarily included lesser offense of armed robbery, and turned to the
question of whether the evidence supported the unarmed robbery instruction. Id. at 446-447.
The Court resolved this question against the defendant because there was “no real dispute
concerning whether defendant was armed,” the evidence of a weapon was “overwhelming,” and
the defendant did not dispute the presence of a knife, but instead argued that the robbery victim
misidentified him and that she did not feel threatened by the robber’s knife. Id. at 447-448.
In the instant case, Giles and Robinson unequivocally testified that Donaldson carried a
pistol and that Solomon carried a shotgun, but Solomon maintained that the surveillance camera
film was fuzzy, and did not “definitive[ly]” reveal the presence of a shotgun. These facts are
analogous to Reese, where all the witnesses testified that the robber carried a knife, and where
the surveillance film revealed a stick-like object that could have been a knife. Id. at 446.
Solomon’s defense, like the defense in Reese, was based on the premise of misidentification, not
the absence of a gun. Furthermore, because Solomon could also be viewed as an aider and
abettor, Donaldson’s undisputed possession of a gun negated any possibility that the crime
committed was only unarmed robbery. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in declining to
give the instruction on unarmed robbery.
Solomon argues that the trial court erred in not reading his theory of the case to the jury.
The trial court declined to do so, commenting that it did not read theories because it was not
obligated to do so, and theories were only helpful when attorneys waived closing argument.
Generally, the trial court must give the defendant’s theory of the case if it is supported by
the evidence. People v Hoskins, 403 Mich 95, 100; 267 NW2d 417 (1978); People v Reed, 393
Mich 342, 350; 224 NW2d 867 (1975). However, a trial court’s failure to give the theory of the
case when requested does not constitute error requiring reversal if the trial court adequately
instructed the jury as to the defense theory of the case. People v Barnes, 146 Mich App 37, 48;
379 NW2d 464 (1985). In the instant case, defendant acknowledges that the substance of his
theory of the case was not preserved as part of the record, but asserts that “its contents must have
involved the identification process.” Because the substance of defendant’s theory of the case is
not apparent from the record, we cannot determine whether it included anything not covered by
the court’s jury instructions. Assuming that the theory related to identification as defendant
asserts, there was no error because the trial court instructed the jury on identification. Indeed,
before proceeding to the elements of the charged offenses, the trial court asked the attorneys if it
-9-
had omitted or misstated anything from the general instructions. Solomon’s counsel and the
prosecutor both replied that it had not. Under these circumstances, there is no basis for
concluding that the trial court’s refusal to read the theory constituted an error requiring reversal.
Solomon also raises claims of prosecutorial misconduct. Solomon failed to preserve
these claims with a timely objection at trial. People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 30; 650
NW2d 96 (2002). Unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed for plain error
affecting the defendant's substantial rights. People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 645; 672
NW2d 860 (2003). To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be
met: (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious; and (3) the plain error
affected substantial rights. Id., quoting People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130
(1999). Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of
an actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.
Solomon cites several instances where the prosecutor stated in her closing argument that
she had “proven” each element of armed robbery. Solomon contends that these statements were
improper because the prosecutor was conveying her personal belief in Solomon’s guilt and using
the “weight of her office” to influence the jury.
A prosecutor may not ask the jury to convict a defendant on the basis of the prosecutor’s
personal knowledge or the prestige of his office. See People v Reed, 449 Mich 375, 398-399;
535 NW2d 496 (1995). Here, however, the prosecutor’s remarks that she had “proven” each
element of the offenses and thereby proved Solomon’s guilt were not an assertion of personal
belief in defendant's guilt or an argument that the jury should convict Solomon, regardless of the
evidence, based on the prestige of the prosecutor’s office. The prosecutor made the remarks
while commenting on the evidence, and, viewed in context, the clear meaning of the remarks was
that the prosecutor had met her burden and proved her case by presenting this evidence. The
remarks did not constitute plain error.
Solomon also argues that the prosecutor denigrated defense counsel during closing
arguments when she stated:
That’s what we’re here for, ladies and gentlemen. The obvious puzzle
picture, ladies and gentlemen, not the smoke that defense counsel would like you
to believe. Not the smoke or the misleading information or minor details the
defense counsel want [sic] you to focus on to get you misled.
Solomon also cites the prosecutor’s statements, “Don’t be misled. Don’t get caught up in the
smoke,” as instances of further denigration.
A prosecutor may not suggest that defense counsel is intentionally attempting to mislead
the jury. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 592; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). However, the
prosecutor’s statements must be considered in light of defense counsel’s arguments, and an
otherwise improper remark is not error when made in response to defense counsel’s arguments.
Id. at 592-593. Here, the prosecutor’s remarks about “smoke” and “misleading information”
were made in response to defense counsel’s attempts to undermine the prosecutor’s case.
Defense counsel argued that Giles’ identification of Solomon at the lineup was unreliable
-10-
because Giles saw Solomon in the parking lot after the police returned to the crime scene. He
further argued that, under these circumstances, Detective Blanks should have used more than
five persons in the lineup, so that Giles would have had a less than twenty percent probability of
picking the correct person by chance.5 The prosecutor responded by pointing out that there was
no twenty percent probability of a correct choice because Giles did not have to pick anyone.
Considered in this context, the prosecutor’s comments about “smoke” and “misleading
information” were an acceptable response to defense counsel’s closing argument. Accordingly,
Solomon has not established error, plain or otherwise.
Solomon further argues that his counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s remarks
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show (1) that the attorney's performance was objectively unreasonable in light of
prevailing professional norms, and (2) that, but for the attorney's error or errors, a different
outcome reasonably would have resulted. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600, 623 NW2d
884 (2001). Our analysis of the prosecutorial misconduct claims demonstrates that Solomon has
failed to establish the “error” prong of the plain error standard. Consequently, defense counsel’s
failure to object was neither objectively unreasonable nor prejudicial.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Donald S. Owens
5
At trial, Blanks admitted that if he had known of the inadvertent on-scene identification in the
Coney Island parking lot, he would have used more than five persons in Solomon’s lineup.
-11-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.