PEOPLE OF MI V CHRISTINE WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 21, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 244205
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-007086
CHRISTINE WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Smolenski and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right her jury convictions for arson of a dwelling house, MCL
750.72, and insurance fraud, MCL 500.4511(1). We affirm.
On September 22, 2000, there was a fire at defendant’s house located on Cherrylawn in
the City of Detroit that was started through the use of combustible fluids. At trial, Lieutenant
Charles Simms of the Detroit Fire Department testified that subsequent to the fire he received a
call from Jennifer Neely, who lived at the Cherrylawn house, claiming she had information about
the fire. After speaking with her, Simms contacted defendant’s insurance claims agent who
indicated that an investigation led to a conclusion that arson caused the fire. Simms then
investigated other fires at properties associated with defendant—at houses located on Stoepel,
Yacama, and Parkgrove Streets—and found that those at Yacama and Parkgrove Streets were
labeled “suspicious” for arson by the fire department. He issued an arrest warrant for defendant.
The fire investigation specialist hired by defendant’s insurance company, Daniel Terski,
testified as an expert in the field of cause and origin of fires. His investigation revealed a
distinctive flammable liquid burn pattern in the middle of the floor in the northeast upstairs
bedroom that led to the hallway in the Cherrylawn house. The fuse panel box located in the
kitchen had also been on fire but evidence led him to conclude that something was sprayed in the
panel box and ignited by a candle to make it look like an electrical fire but it was not an electrical
fire. During his investigation he noticed that there were no light bulbs in the lighting fixtures.
Terski testified that finding two points of origin of a fire indicated it was intentionally set.
Wayne Figley, defendant’s insurance claims adjuster, testified that in December of 1997
defendant had paid $1,100 for the house on Cherrylawn and had subsequently mortgaged the
house for over $30,000. The fire insurance policy had been in effect for four years when the fire
occurred. Defendant filed a claim for policy limits, $60,000, claiming that the fire was caused
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either by an iron left on or an electrical problem. The insurance paid off the mortgage. Figley
determined that the electricity to the house had been turned off since April of 2000 because of an
outstanding bill, the house had no gas since December of 1993, and the meter had been removed
in September of 2000 because of illegal use. Figley also testified that defendant had filed
insurance claims after fires on other properties she owned. In December of 1999, she filed a
claim on a dwelling policy as a landlord with regard to a fire at her house on Stoepel Street in
Detroit which she had purchased in May of 1998 for $3,500. Because of the fire, she was paid
$24,000 for the building, $1,333.36 on lost rent, and $5,295 was paid to the City to demolish the
remaining structure. Figley further testified that in October and November of 1998, there were
two fires at a home owned by defendant and her husband on Yacama Street in Detroit. They had
a dwelling fire policy as landlords of the property and recovered $12,750 on this total loss.
Jennifer Neely, an unavailable witness, testified at defendant’s preliminary examination
that she lived at the house on Cherrylawn with defendant, children, and another woman. She
stated that in December of 2001, defendant told her that she “paid a man to burn up the house.
The first man she paid, it didn’t, the house didn’t burn up. The second guy it burned up.” Neely
testified that defendant told her she did it for the insurance money.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the
evidence about the prior fires at homes associated with defendant contrary to MRE 404(b). In
particular, defendant argues that the jury could not find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
defendant committed the prior alleged arsons. We disagree. The trial court’s decision to admit
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d
607 (1999).
Under MRE 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible if (1) offered
for a proper purpose, (2) relevant to an issue or fact of consequence at trial, and (3) sufficiently
probative to outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice, pursuant to MRE 403. People v Starr, 457
Mich 490, 496-498; 577 NW2d 673 (1998); People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74-75; 508
NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994). It is a rule of inclusion that contains a
nonexclusive list of “noncharacter” grounds on which such evidence may be admitted. Starr,
supra at 496. Further, the trial court need not find that there is sufficient evidence to establish
that such “other acts” actually occurred before permitting its admission. See Huddleston v
United States, 485 US 681, 689; 108 S Ct 1496; 99 L Ed 2d 771 (1988). After examining all of
the evidence in the case, if the trial court concludes that a jury could reasonably find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the “other act,” such evidence is
admissible. Id. at 690.
One of the elements that the prosecutor had to prove to establish arson of a dwelling was
that defendant intended to start the fire at Cherrylawn. See People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392,
409-410; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). Proof of a fire alone gives rise to the presumption that it
resulted from an accident; therefore, the prosecutor must show that defendant set the fire
intentionally. People v Lee, 231 Mich 607, 612; 204 NW2d 742 (1925). Proof of a common
plan, system, or scheme can be used to prove motive and intent. People v Engelman, 434 Mich
204, 220; 453 NW2d 656 (1990). To be admissible under MRE 404(b) as logically relevant to
establish a common plan, however, the uncharged acts must be sufficiently similar to the charged
act as “to support an inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, scheme, or
system.” People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 63; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). In other
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words, the common features must indicate the existence of a plan and not just a series of
spontaneous acts, although the plan need not be distinctive or unusual. Id. at 65-66, quoting
People v Ewoldt, 7 Cal 4th 380, 403; 867 P2d 757 (1994).
Here, the prosecutor sought admission of the other acts evidence on the ground that the
evidence established defendant’s intent to set the house on Cherrylawn on fire in order to collect
insurance proceeds. Defendant contends that such evidence should not have been admitted
because a reasonable jury could not find that the fires were caused by arson or that defendant had
anything to do with the fires. Evidence that defendant’s properties were destroyed by fire was
relevant under the prosecutor’s theory if the jury could reasonably find that the other fires were
intentionally set for the purpose of committing insurance fraud. Because defendant was not on
trial for the other alleged arsons, the evidence need only preponderate in favor of the finding.
After consideration of all of the evidence, we conclude that it does. Three properties that
defendant had an interest in were destroyed by fires, at least two of the fires were labeled
“suspicious” by the fire department, all of the properties were purchased for very little money yet
defendant had significant insurance coverage for them, and defendant received or had the right to
receive the proceeds of those policies. There was sufficient evidence to support a finding by the
jury that defendant had committed the “similar acts,” i.e., intentionally set the fires; thus, such
evidence was admissible. See Huddleston, supra at 691.
Further, the similar acts evidence was offered for a proper purpose – that it established
defendant’s motive or intent to set the Cherrylawn house on fire as illustrated by her common
plan, system, or scheme to buy a house for very little money, purchase an expensive insurance
policy, and then burn it down and collect the insurance proceeds. The evidence was logically
relevant under a theory that it showed defendant’s plan, scheme, or system to commit insurance
fraud by purchasing houses cheaply, buying high limit insurance policies, and then burning down
the houses to collect the insurance proceeds. The common features of all of the fires include that
defendant had a financial interest in each of the properties, her initial investment in the properties
was very minimal, she purchased high limit insurance policies on all of the properties, the
properties were kept for a period of time, and one property a year that defendant had an interest
in was destroyed by a suspicious fire. See Sabin (After Remand), supra. Hence, the proffered
evidence tended to make a material fact at issue, i.e., defendant’s intent to burn down her house,
more probable than it would be without the evidence. See MRE 401. Further, the probative
value of the other acts evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice—it was highly probative. See MRE 403. The trial court also instructed the jury,
following defendant’s request, to consider the evidence only for the proper purpose for which it
was admitted. In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence
under MRE 404(b).
Finally, defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel through her standard 11
brief is without merit. No evidentiary hearing was conducted with regard to her claim, so review
is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. See People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242
Mich App 656, 658-659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000).
Defendant argues that her attorney “concealed vital facts and evidence.” Defendant lists
as alleged “facts and evidence,” in pertinent part, that (1) she did not commit the arson or fraud
and still owes money on the Cherrylawn house, (2) one of the witnesses, Neely, was not an
acquaintance, (3) a child admitted to accidentally starting the fire, and (4) she received social
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security insurance checks and so had no motive to cause the fire. However, to establish a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must affirmatively show that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for defense
counsel’s errors, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have
been different. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687-688; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). Defendant
seems to claim that her counsel failed to admit certain evidence in support of her denial of guilt
but decisions as to what evidence to present are presumed to be matters of trial strategy for
which this court will not substitute its judgment. See People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76-77;
601 NW2d 887 (1999). Further, the evidentiary “errors” assigned to counsel by defendant would
not constitute a substantial defense; thus, defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance on
these grounds. See People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 58-59; 523 NW2d 830 (1994).
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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