PEOPLE OF MI V TYREE ANTHONY WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 16, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 246927
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-008388-01
TYREE ANTHONY WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Cooper and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his bench trial conviction of felonious assault, MCL 750.82
and his sentence of seventeen to forty-eight months’ imprisonment. We affirm defendant’s
conviction, vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.
I
Defendant first argues that the trial court reached inconsistent verdicts in finding him
guilty of felonious assault but not guilty of felony-firearm. We agree but conclude that, under
the circumstances and on this record, defendant’s conviction of felonious assault must be
affirmed.
The trial court’s factual findings with regard to the felonious assault and felony-firearm
charges are inconsistent under any rational view of the evidence. The trial court found defendant
guilty of felonious assault based on a finding that defendant shot a weapon at the complainant.
In this regard, the critical evidence was the complainant’s testimony that he saw defendant
shooting a gun while it was pointed at him. Another witness also testified that she observed
defendant point and shoot a gun at the complainant. There was no evidence that defendant
assaulted the complainant with any dangerous weapon other than a firearm. Thus, the trial
court’s finding “beyond a reasonable doubt” that defendant shot a weapon at the complainant in
connection with the felonious assault conviction could only have been based on a finding that
defendant discharged, and thus possessed, a firearm. The trial court’s ensuing remarks
expressing that it was not established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed a
firearm during the commission of a felony are entirely inconsistent with its findings in the
felonious assault conviction.
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Defendant relies heavily on this Court’s opinion in People v Williams, 99 Mich App 463;
297 NW2d 702 (1980).1 In Williams, the defendant was found guilty at a bench trial of felonious
assault, but not guilty of felony-firearm. Id. at 464. The only weapon that could have supported
a conviction of felonious assault in that case was the same weapon that would have led to a
finding of guilt on the felony-firearm charge. Id. The trial court in Williams “found, since the
firearm was never introduced in evidence, that it had a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s
guilt of the felony-firearm charge.” Id. This Court held that the defendant’s conviction of
felonious assault could not stand and ordered the defendant “discharged.” Id. at 464-465. This
means that this Court in Williams did not allow the defendant to be retried for the felonious
assault charge, but rather, effectively concluded that he had to be considered acquitted of that
charge.
On the other hand, the prosecution relies largely on People v Ellis, 468 Mich 25; 658
NW2d 142 (2003). In Ellis, the defendant was found guilty in a bench trial of carjacking and
felonious assault but acquitted of other charges including felony-firearm and felon in possession
of a firearm. Id. at 26-27. Our Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s decision to affirm the
defendant’s convictions in that case. Id. at 26. In its opinion, the Court set forth remarks by the
trial court including a statement that it had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant had a gun. Id. at 27. The Court then stated that the trial court’s “clear statement of the
factual findings” was plainly inconsistent with the acquittals on the felony-firearm and felon in
possession charges. Id. Essentially the prosecution contends that because our Supreme Court in
Ellis allowed convictions to stand despite acquittals that were logically inconsistent with those
convictions, the conviction in this case should likewise be affirmed.
Even if Williams were binding, Ellis is more similar to this case than Williams because
the record in this case contains a “clear statement” of the relevant factual findings. From the
discussion in Ellis, it is apparent that our Supreme Court regarded the trial court as having made
a clear factual finding that the defendant possessed a gun and then having simply acquitted the
defendant of certain charges despite the fact that its findings warranted conviction on those
charges. In this case, the trial court similarly found, in connection with the felonious assault
charge, beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant used, and thus necessarily possessed, a
firearm. But then in connection with the felony-firearm charge the trial court expressly stated, in
direct contradiction of its findings regarding the felonious assault charge, that it was not proven
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony.
On this record, it is clear that the evidence supports both the felonious assault conviction and the
finding that defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of the felonious assault.
The trial court’s “finding” in relation to the felony-firearm charge is a thinly veiled
“waiver break,” i.e., a trial court in a bench trial acquitting a defendant of a charge despite being
convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to that charge as a reward for the defendant
having waived a jury trial. See Ellis, supra at 26. In Ellis, our Supreme Court admonished trial
courts that this practice “violates the law and a trial judge’s ethical obligations.” Id. at 28. But
1
Because this case was decided before November 1, 1990, we are not required to follow it.
MCR 7.215(J).
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because even an improper acquittal is constitutionally protected by double jeopardy principles,
id., “a trial judge that rewards a defendant for waiving a jury trial by ‘finding’ him not guilty of a
charge for which acquittal is inconsistent with the court’s factual findings cannot be corrected on
appeal.” Id. Thus, although the trial court erred in acquitting defendant of the felony-firearm
charge, this Court is powerless to remedy that error.
II
Defendant also argues that the trial court’s imposition of a sentence of seventeen to fortyeight months’ imprisonment constituted an abuse of sentencing discretion. The prosecution
responds that defendant’s sentence is not subject to appellate review because it was within the
sentencing guidelines. We agree with defendant, vacate the sentence and remand for
resentencing.
A trial court is required to impose an “intermediate sanction” rather than a prison term if
the upper limit of the sentencing guidelines range is eighteen months or less unless the trial court
“states on the record a substantial and compelling reason to sentence the individual to the
jurisdiction of the department of corrections.” MCL 769.34(4)(a). The sentencing guidelines in
this case were scored at zero to seventeen months. The trial court did not articulate any
substantial and compelling reasons for imposing a prison term. Moreover, the fact that
defendant’s minimum sentence was seventeen months, the highest point within the scoring of the
guidelines on their face, i.e., without considering MCL 769.34(4)(a), at least strongly suggests
that the trial court incorrectly believed that it was simply sentencing defendant within the
guidelines. Accordingly, upon remand, the trial court must consider an intermediate sanction
and, if it does not, specify the substantial and compelling reasons for imposing a prison term.
People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).
Affirmed in part and remanded for resentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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